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I. Report ofthe Council
Fortieth annual report of the Council
(Second part)
tr. Political questions
1. The future of European security and the
preparation of Maastricht tr 
- 
reply to
the fortieth annual report of the Council
2. New trends in North American coun-
tries' foreign policy and their implica-
tions for transatlantic co-operation in
security and defence matters, with par-
ticular reference to the United States
3. Europe and the establishment of a new
world order for peace and security
4. The situation in former Yugoslavia
III. Defence questions
1. Ukraine and European security
2. European armed forces
3. The Eastern Mediterranean
IV. Technological and aenospace questions
Towards a European space-based observa-
tion system
V. Budgetary and administrative questions
1. Draft budget of the administrative
expenditure of the Assembly for the
financial year 1995 
- 
Opinion of the
Council
2. Draft supplementary budget of the
administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year 1995
3. Opinion on the budgets of the minis-
terial organs of Western European
Union for the financial year 1995
AGENDA
of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session
Paris, 19th - 22nd June 1995
ltth May 1995
Repon tabled by Mrs. Aguiar on belulf of the
Political Committee
Report tabled by lard Finsberg on belnlf of the
Political Committee
Repon tabled by Mr. Marslull on behalf of the
Political Committee
Repon tabled by Mr. Fassino on behalf of the
Political Committee
Reporr tabledby Sir Russell Johnston on behnlf of
the Defence Committee
Report tabled by Mr De Decker on behnlf of the
Defence Committee
Report tabled by Mr Cucd on behalf of the Defence
Committee
Report tabled by MM. Lenzer and
behalf of the Technological and
Committee
Valleix on
Aerospace
Report tabled by Mr Rathbone on belnlf of the
Committee on Bu.dgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion
Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the
Committee on Bu.dgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion
Report tabled by Mr Rathbone on belnlf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion
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VI. Rulcs of Procedurrc and Privileges
Changes to the Charter and Rules of Proce-
dure of the Assembly with a view to
accommodating associate members and
associate partners of WEU
YII. Parliamentary and Public Relations
l. National parliaments, European secur-
ity and defence and the road to the 1996
intergovernmental conference
2. The Baltic Assembly
Report tabled by lard Finsberg on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
Report tabled by Sir John Hunt on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions
Report tabled by Mr. Masseret on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions
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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session
Paris, 19th - 22nd June 1995
MOI{DAY 19th JT]I\E
Morning
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. Opening of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly.
4. Election of two Vice-hesidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session.
3.15 p.m.
6. Address by Mr.Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU.
3.30 p.m.
7 . Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council 
- 
Presentation of the second part of the fortieth annual
report of the Council 
- 
Address by Mr. Dur6o Barroso, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
8. Address by Mr. Figueiredo l,opes, Minister of Defence of Portugal.
4.30 p.m.
9. Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany.
10. Replies by Mr.Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, to questions from members of the Assembly.
11. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II 
- 
reply to the fortieth
annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Aguiar on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
TI,ESDAY 2OthJUIYE
Morning l0 a.m.
1. Address by Professor Dr. Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey.
2. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II 
- 
reply to the fortieth
annual report of the Council:
resumed debate.
Vote on the drafr recommendation.
3. Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating
associate members and associate partners of WEU:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rulcs of
Procedure and hivileges.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi decision.
t2
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At noon
4. Address by Mr. Millon, Minister of Defence of France.
Afternoon 3 p.m. \
l. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Marshall on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
3.30 p.m.
2. Address by Mr.Gligorov, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
3. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security:
resumed debate. t
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
4. European armed forces:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
WEDNESDAY 2lstJUNE
Mornin3 l0 e.m.
l. Towards a European space-based observation system:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. l*nzer and Valleix on behalf of the Technological and
Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
2. New trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic
co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
11 a.m.
3. Address by Mr. Vargas, Minister of Defence of Spain.
4. The Eastern Mediterranean:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cuc6 on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. The situation in former Yugoslavia:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fassino on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
3.30 p.n
2. Address by Mr. Arsenis, Minister of Defence of Grece.
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3. The situation in former Yugoslavia:
resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Draft budget of the adminisrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 -
Opinion of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Adminisfration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
5. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial
year 1995:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi supplementary budget.
6. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial
year 1995:
presenration of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
TIIURSDAY 22nd JUNE
Morning 10 a.m.
1. Ukraine and European security:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendntion.
2. The Baltic Assembly:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Masseret on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations.
Debate.
10.45 a.m.
3. Address by Mr. Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania.
4. The Baltic Assembly:
resumed debate.
Vote on the drafi order
5. National parliaments, European security and defence and the road to the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir John Hunt on behalf of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi resolution.
CLOSE OF TTIE FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION
t4
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I.Introductian
In the second hdf of 1994, the Netherlands
became the first WEU member state to experience
the newly harmonised and shortened term of office
of six months.
On lst July, the Netherlands took over from
Luxembourg in the wake of the important May
ministerial meeting which adopted the Kirchberg
declaration. At Kirchberg, WEU Ministers deci-
ded to give a status within WEU to the nine Cen-
tral and Eastern European states of the Forum of
Consultation. The status of associate partner
offers the opportunity for active participation in
WEU activities.
The challenge for the Netherlands presi-
dency {vas to give practical substance to this new
status in a relatively short period of time. Signifi-
cant progress has already been made.
30th March 1995
The countries of Cenfral and Eastern Europe
now take part in the deliberations of the Perma-
nent Council once every two weeks. Furthermore,
enlarged sessions of the Special Working Group,
when appropriate, and twenty-four-strong meet-
ings of the Council Working Group have taken
place, providing the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries with an opportunity to make a sub-
stantial contribution to the common security
agenda.
Clearly, a new perspective has been opened
up: broader-based participation in WEU opera-
tions by associate members, observers and asso-
ciate partners on the basis of their formal status
within WEU. Their respective experience in the
various new missions defined at Petersberg could
significantly improve WEU's operational r6le and
credibility on a case by case basis, examples being
operation Sharp Guard, the Danube embargo and
the WEU police operation in Mostar. The envisa-
ged arrangements for a humanitarian task force
Second pafi of the fotieth annual report
of the Council to the Assembly
(lst July - 31st December 1994)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Activities of the Permanent Council and the Council Working Group
III. Activities of the Special Working Group (SWG)
IV. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group (DRG)
V. Activities of the Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG)
VI. Activities of the Planning Cell
VII. Activities of the Space Group
VIII. Activities of the Open Skies Working Group
IX. Activities of the Mediterranean Group
X. Certain activities of working grcups (" at 13 ")
XI. Activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) (" at 13 ")
XIL Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA)
XIII. Activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
At{t{H<rs (already printed in Document 1443, Volume III, November-December 1994)
1. Noordwijk declaration, Noordwijk, 14th November 1994
2. Preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a corunon European defence
policy, Noordwijk, 14th November 1994
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and evacuation planning also call for extended co-
operation between WEU states.
The annexed Noordwijk declaration recalls
WEU's underlying aims and aspirations and pro-
vides the basis for the work programme to be
developed further in the crucial run-up to the 1996
intergovernmental conference.
One key element of WEU's future work is
contained in paragraph 6 of the declaration. The
common reflection on new European security
conditions called for by Ministers gets a common
goal for member states, associate members, asso-
ciate partners and observers. On the basis of the
WELJ " acquis ", they have been tasked jointly to
analyse the new European security conditions and
the related issues, including security and stability
in the Mediterranean.
This common effort might in due course
find expression in a white paper on European
security. It could justify a WEU meeting at sum-
mit level before the intergovernmental conference
in order to finalise WEU's political input to the
conference.
The main achievement of the Permanent
Council and its Working Groups was the agree-
ment reached on the preliminary conclusions on a
common European defence policy, which were
endorsed by the Ministerial Council at Noord-
wijk. This document initiates a new process
aimed at shaping the future European defence
policy mentioned in the Treaty on European
Union. It sets out in a balanced way the scope and
objectives of such a policy while identifying a
number of areas which should be developed with
some urgency in order to build WEU into a
flexible and operational organisation capable of
rapid response.
The recommendations on strengthening the
Planning Cell, notably in the intelligence area,
and developing information and consultation
mechanisms in support of the Permanent Council,
with a view to enabling it to provide swift and
appropriate responses to emerging crises, exem-
plify what has to be done in the short term.
The strengthening of WEU's operational
r61e also depends on NATO's elaboration of the
combined joint task force (CJTF) concept. The
results will be a test case both for WEU/NATO
relations and for the operational potential of
WEU.
The Noordwijk Ministerial Council has not
only set the stage for a coherent approach to a
common European defence policy but it has also
initiated an institutional debate which will be at
the heart of the review of the WEU Maastricht
declaration, a debate in which the Assembly's
contribution is both welcome and most necessary.
II. Activitias of the Permanent Council
and the Council Working Group
At their meeting in Luxembourg on 9th
May 1994, the WEU Council of Ministers and the
ministers of foreign affairs and defence of the
nine partners in the Forum of Consultation agreed
on the status whereby the Republic of Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of L,atvia, the
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland,
Romania and the Slovak Republic would become
associate partners of WEU.
Following that WEU Ministerial Council,
half of the Permanent Council's meetings have
taken place with the participation of the associate
partners.
Apart from those meetings where circum-
stances dictated that a specific subject be addres-
sed, the Council's agendas have continued to
contain an item devoted to the report on working
group meetings and an item on topical questions.
The Permanent Council has paid particular
attention to the preparation of draft decisions for
submission to the Ministerial Council and to their
implementation once adopted.
The Council also welcomed the results of
the fourth joint session of the WEU and NATO
Councils on 28th June. In this context, the Perma-
nent Council discussed the possibility of establi-
shing a regular schedule forjoint sessions ofthe
Councils. On 6th December, the fifth joint session
of the two Councils took place, in order to discuss
the effects on operation Sharp Guard of the Uni-
ted States measures to modify its participation
with respect to the enforcement of the embargo.
The Council considered the German propo-
sal to set up a joint EU ilfEU experts grcup to exa-
mine the options for a European armaments policy
and approved the guidelines for an informal group
of experts to study the options for a European
amaments policy on 7th November 1994.
The Council also held exchanges of views
on the recent developments in the internal situa-
tion in Russia and in Ukraine and their implica-
tions for European security. This was an occasion
for the Council to reflect on what kind of relations
might be envisaged between WEU and Russia.
Events in 1994 and difhculties faced by the
United Nations system and non-governmental
organisations prompted public opinion to demand
concrete action. The matter had been raised at the
G7lG8 summit by the Italian President of the
Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council had
examined an Italian proposal for a multinational
task force for humanitarian operations, which led
to the approval, on llth November 1994, of a
report on a humanitarian task force.
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The Council also followed a presentation
by the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, in his capacity as future
Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE ,.
The Council has been kept directly infor-
med of the activities of the WEU Institute for
Security Studies, the Satellite Centre in Torrej6n
and of the work of the Planning Cell. It has conti-
nued to acknowledge the vital importance of the
institutional dialogue with the Assembly, and
followed with keen interest the debates and votes
of the frst part of the fortieth ordinary session.
Lastly, the Council took a number of administra-
tive and budgetary decisions on the basis of opi-
nions submitted by the Budget and Organisatibn
Commiftee.
Apart from preparing the ground for the
Permanent Council's discussions, the Council
Working Group's agenda ranged over specific
questions concerning the implementation- of the
modalities document on the status of association,
the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the
security of the WEU building, relations between
WEU and NATO, the formulation of political
guidance on budgetary and financial matlers, the
development of the WEU Institute into an aca-
demy, the dialogue between WEU and Russia
and between WEU and Ukraine, WEU working
methods, the connection of Greece, Iceland,
Norway and Turkey to the WEUCOM network
and the modalities for information and consulta-
tion between the European Commission and
WEU.
Furthermore, the Council Working Group
dealt with evacuation planning, especially with
the political " chapeau " of the document, whose
technical part was discussed in the Defence
Representatives Group.
The WEU Permanent Council decided on
10th November by consensus to appoint Ambas-
sador Jose Cutileiro as the new Secretary-General
of WEU. In this capacity, Ambassador Jose Cuti-
leiro succeeded Dr. W.F. van Eekelen who had
served as Secretary-General since May 1989.
1. Topical questions
(i) Situation informer Yugoslavia
The German Representative, on behalf of
the Presidency of the Twelve, has regularly brie-
fed the Permanent Council on the activities and
d6marches of the European Community aimed at
reaching a peaceful settlement of the conflict in
former Yugoslavia.
1. Renamed Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) at the Budapest summit of December 1994.
The Permanent Council has closely moni-
tored developments on the ground, its discussions
focusing on the implementation of the Danube
embargo, the participation of naval forces of
WEU member states in the Adriatic embargo, and
WEU's police contribution to the EU's adminis-
tration of the Mostar district. The Experts Groups
and the Mostar Working Group, in io-operation
with the Planning Cell, dealt mainly with these
lSSUeS.
The Presidency has regularly briefed the
Council on developments in the WEU Danube
operation.
The Council also closely followed the
conduct of the WEUI{ATO combined operation
Sharp Guard to strengthen the embargo in the
Adriatic. On 6th December, the fifth joint session
of the WEU Council and the NATO Council took
place, in order to discuss the effects on operation
Sharp Guard of the United States meaiures to
modify its participation with respect to the enfor-
cement of the embargo. The Joint Council noted
that the concept of operations remained complet-
ely valid, taking into account the adjustments
made by the operational commanders.
The WEU police contribution to the Euro-
pean Union administration in Mostar also ranked
high on the Council's agenda. The memorandum
of understanding on the EU administration of
Mostar was signed on 5th July in Geneva by the
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs on
behalf of WEU. The EU administrator, Mr.
loschnick, took up his duties on 23rd July. TheCouncil confirmed the appointment of General
Eleta as military advisor and of Colonel Meijvo-
gel as Head of the WEU police element.
From 23rd-25th August, a high-level team
of the WEU Presidency visited Mostar, following
the request made by the EU administrator, in
order to discuss issues relevant to the deployment
of the WEU police element.
From 13th-15th December, a multidiscipli-
nary team 
- 
sent by the WEU Presidency 
- 
visited
Mostar to take stock of the progress made so far
and of the obstacles 
- 
political, legal and operatio-
nal 
- 
that needed to be removed in order to ensure
the effective implementation of the police opera-
tion. The Planning Cell participated in order to
give the necessary logistics and planning support.
The Mostar Council Working Group also
discussed the implementation schedule and
resource requirements for the first stage of imple-
mentation of the WEU police element, the estab-
lishment of a unified police force for Mostar,
budget arrangements, reporting and liaison zrrran-
gements, identification of WEU police personnel
and vehicles in Mostar, rules of conduct of the
WEU police element in Mostar and the command
authority of the Police Commissioner.
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(ii) Situation in Rwanda
The Council continued to keep the situation
in Rwanda under review. Its discussions proved to
be a useful catalyst for nations. The Planning Cell
was tasked to continue monitoring events closely.
The links established with the United Nations
remained operational and reports were produced
on a weekly basis.
(iii) Involvement of the intergoventmental bodies
Councilworking Broups
At each of its meetings, the Council took
note of the results of its working groups' activities
since the previous meeting. The summary records
were discussed as necessary.
WEU Institute for Security Studies (lSS)
The Institute Director attended all those
Council meetings where the agenda warranted his
presence. The Institutes's quarterly reports to the
Council provided an opporhrnity for exchanges of
view on the current work of the ISS.
WEU Satellite Centre
The Centre's Director attended all those
Council meetings where the agenda warranted his
presence to brief the Council on the progress of the
Centre's activities during its experimental period.
III. Activities of the Special Working Group
The Special Working Group held three
meetings in the second half of 1994: two joint
meetings of the SWG with the Defence Represen-
tatives Group (DRG) and one meeting with the
associate partners.
Apart from discussions on an approach to a
common European defence policy (CEDP), the
agenda for the meetings with the DRG also inclu-
ded defence implications of the security analyses
undertaken in the CFSP framework and non-pro-
liferation. The conclusions of the SWG/DRG on
the CEDP were submitted to the Council and the
Council Working Group for consideration.
During the SWG meeting with the associ-
ate partners, the SWG discussed the issue of dra-
wing the associate partners closer to WEU and
had an exchange of views on the situation in the
Balkans, including arms conftol measures.
IV. Activilies of
the Defence Representatives Group
Pursuant to the mandates given by the Per-
manent Council, the Defence Representatives
Group, in close co-operation with the Planning
Cell, focused on the following issues:
- 
humanitarian task force
- 
generic planning
- 
WEU intelligence policy
- 
WEU command and conftol
- 
evacuation planning
Humanitarian task force: the DRG exami-
ned the document on a humanitarian task force,
which was approved by the Permanent Council at
its meeting on 1lth November 1994.The report
regarding the setting-up of the arrangements and
the provisions of the means for a WEU humanita-
rian task force was endorsed by Ministers on 14th
November in Noordwijk.
Generic planning: the DRG had several
discussions on the subject based on the comments
received on the Planning Cell's paper on generic
planning and on national contributions. Subse-
quently, the DRG set up a Working Group on
Generic Plartning composed of planning experts
familiar with the planning activities of their
MODs, with the aim of drafting a generic plan-
ning " directive " or " guidelines " for the Plan-
ning Cell.
WEU intelligence policy.' two complemen-
tary aspects were discussed: (a) intelligence sup-
port to the PC and (b) longer-term objectives of
the WEU intelligence policy. As a follow-up to
the CHODs meeting, the DRG set up a working
group composed of intelligence experts. Work
within the Experts Group is continuing.
WEU command and control: the Planning
Cell briefed the DRG regularly on the results of
the Military Delegates' C2 Working Group meet-
ings. This Working Group, a sub-group reporting
to the Military Delegates and chaired by the PC, is
engaged in a programme of work primarily look-
ing at the military and technical aspects of com-
mand and control of WEU operations at the stra-
tegic level.
Evacuation planning: the DRG had several
exchanges of views on the Planning Cell docu-
ment on WEU evacuation operations. The group
concluded that the link with the EU needed to
become more effective. The DRG worked on the
technical part of the document and the political
" chapeau " was discussed in the Council Wor-
king Group. The Presidency presented a progress
report on the document " ROle of WEU in evacua-
tion operations " in order to obtain further direc-
tives by Ministers.
Among the other specific tasks carried out
by the Group, mention should be made of:
- 
the preparation of the agenda for the
Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on
3rd November 1994;
- 
examination of the follow-up to be given
to the CHOD and Ministerial meetings;
- 
examination of future DRG activities.
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V Activitics of the Politico-Military
Working Group
The Council agreed on the text of the terms
of reference for a Politico-Military Working
Group (PMWG) operating under the Council's
authority, as part of the follow-up to the declara-
tion by the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg
and to the alliance summit, especially aspects of
the emergence of a European security and defence
identity (ESDD.
Prior to the second half of 1994, the
PMWG finalised a document on criteria and
modalities for effective use by WEU of CJTFs,
which was agreed by the Council on 28th June
and presented to NAIO at the joint session of the
WEU and North Atlantic Councils, which took
place on 29th June.
Subsequently, the PMWG continued to
hold weekly meetings in order to discuss: pro-
gress of work within NAIO, contacts with NATO,
assets and capabilities necessary for the execution
of operational missions by WEU and mechanisms
and procedures for WEU use of alliance assets
and capabilities.
The PMWG is now awaiting NAIO's reac-
tion to the document on criteria and modalities for
effective use by WEU of CJTFs and continued its
work on the document on mechanisms and proce-
dures for WEU use of alliance assets and capabi-
lities, as well as on the report on assets and capa-
bilities required for WEU operations.
VI. Activities of the Planning Cell
During the period July-December I994,the
Planning Cell's (PC) main effort was again direc-
ted towards long-term planning activity concer-
ning the future modus operandi of WEU, inclu-
ding, for example, the list of FAWEU (forces
answerable to WEU); development of the CJTF
(combined joint task force) concept and generic
planning. With regard to crisis-management and
contingency activity, the PC was involved in dif-
ferent activities related to former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. A third area of PC activity was the rela-
tionship with other agencies both within and out-
side WEU. Finally, PC personnel have been invol-
ved in a wide range of activities concerning the
internal organisation of the WEU Headquarters
(wEU HQ).
1. Long-term planning activitics
Review of Planning Cell activity.' In accor-
dance with its TORs, a review of PC activities
was to be submitted by lst October 1994 to the
Permanent Council. As a part of the review pro-
cess, the PC circulated in September 1994 an
internal review to all delegations. The CHODs
took note of this report and supported its recom-
mendations. The review process is ongoing.
WEU strategic mobility study (WSMS):
Tasked by the Council of Ministers in April 1993,
the PC took forward the study on WEU require-
ments in the field of strategic mobility. The aim of
Phase I was to evaluate WEU cunent capabilities
in this field. In November, the PC presented the
main results and conclusions of this first phase to
the CHODs and the Ministers. Phase II will deal
with the development of solutions designed to
improve WEU capabilities in the field of strategic
mobility.
List of FAWEU: In accordance with its
TORs and with the mandate of the Council of
Ministers (Kirchberg declaration, 9th May 1994),
the PC continued with the collection and evalua-
tion of data and the improvement of the data-base
in order to draft the list of FAWEU from which
could be developed appropriate force packages
for use in future planning and in which specific
forces for employment in humanitarian operations
could be identified. Meanwhile, the process of
checking the individual contributions with the
nations is proceeding but the finalisation still
depends on national contributions and close co-
operation with the PC to solve detailed questions.
The rble of WEU in evacuation operations:
On the basis of the mandate given by the Perma-
nent Council in September 1993, the PC procee-
ded with its work on this issue, drafting a opera-
tional paper entitled " Military considerations ".
This paper was merged with a " Political chapeau "
papei into one document called " The r6le of
WEU in evacuation operations ".
Humnnitarian task force proposal: At the
meeting of the Permanent Council on 12th July
1994,the Italian Ambassador introduced a propo-
sal for a WEU multinational task force for emer-
gency humanitarian interventions. Subsequently,
the PC was tasked to provide a preliminary analy-
sis of this proposal by identifying the implications
of its implementation for WEU's curent organi-
sation and indicating where further development
of existing WEU procedures was required. This
analysis was forwarded to all delegations. In Sep;
tember 1994, the PC circulated a more detailed
analysis and the PC's views on the way ahead.
Nations have been invited to comment and agree
on the proposed way ahead, in order that further
progress can be made.
WEU maritime co-operation (OPLAN
Combined Endeavour): At their meeting in
Luxembourg on 9th May 1994 (Kirchberg decla-
ration), Ministers approved the WEU OPLAN
Combined Endeavour and " agreed that such an
initiative should be further developed in accor-
dance with the initial mandate " The PC, suppor-
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ted by the MilDels is to develop the initiative in
this way. For the moment, the PC is awaiting the
requested guidance from nations to pursue the
Ministers' mandate.
CJTF concepr.'In accordance with the TORs
for the WEU Politico-Military Working Group
(PMWG), the PC is to take part in this group to
support its work. Participation as observers in the
Military Transitional Issues Working Group
(MTIWG) of NATO is envisaged. The PC also par-
ticipated in the PMWG's sub-group on assets and
capabilities and has been requested to provide
inputs to the sub-group's discussions and work.
Tasks of combat forces in crisis-manage-
ment, including peace-moking: At their meeting
in November 1993 in Luxembourg (Luxembourg
declaration), Ministers " requested that work on
planning for the tasks defined in the Petersberg
declaration be continued, especially on peace-
keeping and crisis-management, including peace-
making ". The PC, pending further guidance on
the future " Political chapeau ", started to prepare
a " strawman " of the operational aspects of the
third Petersberg mission following the same struc-
ture as for the existing humanitarian and peace-
keeping documents. This paper will define the
possible " missions of combat forces in crisis-
management including peace-making " which are
simply called " peace-making " but in the sense of
the general concept of peace enforcement in the
context of peace operations.
Generic plan for setting up a WEU
observer mission: The establishment of observers
comes under the heading ofpeace-keeping opera-
tions, as envisaged in the document on the " r6le
of WEU in peace-keeping " noted by Ministers on
9th May l994in Luxembourg. On the basis of this
document, the PC has produced a draft paper to
facilitate the setting-up of WEU observers. It des-
cribes the principles governing their establish-
ment and the operational structures to set up an
international observer mission.
Command and control; At their meeting in
June 1994, the MilDels agreed that a military
Command and Control Working Group (CCWG),
chaired by the PC, would carry out a study on the
details of the interface between the WEU Council
and the Operation Commander. That work is still
ongomg.
Exercise activity: In accordance with the
WEU exercise policy, the PC was involved in dif-
ferent exercises:
- 
Exercise Purple Nova: The PC has co-
ordinated all WEU/PC involvement and
in particular player/visitors/observers
participation in this United Kingdom-led
command post exercise (CPX). It also
provided representatives in the exercise
conffol teams;
- 
Exercise Tramontana: Trilateral (SP-IT-
FR) freld training exercise (FTX) organ-
ised by the Spanish joint staff. Other
WEU nations participated with com-
pany/squadron level units. During the
planning process, the PC collaborated to
introduce WEU objectives as well as the
WEU crisis-management concept. In the
execution phase, the PC actively colla-
borated with representants within eva-
luation, analysis and simulation teams;
- 
Exercise Mistral: Trilateral exercise (FR-
IT-SP) is to take place in September
1995. PC representatives are already col-
laborating with nations on planning for
the exercise.
WEU Headqunrters ADP (Automatic data
processing) plan: WEU HQ ADP plan deals with
the overall ADP issue for both the Secretariat-
General and the PC. Work with the Secretariat and
with the support by experts from capitals is still
ongomg.
2. Crisis-management and contingency activitie s
Weekly situation report to the Permanent
Council: The PC presented weekly written situa-
tion reports to the Permanent Council with the
aim of informing the Council about the develop-
ment of the situation in the former Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY), Rwanda and current opera-
tions like Deny Flight, Sharp Guard and the
Danube embargo. The situation reports are based
upon information provided by a number of WEU
nations, the WEU Satellite Cenffe and NATO.
Rwanda activities: In June 1994, the Coun-
cil tasked the PC to act as a contact and co-ordi-
nation point between contributing states and the
headquarters commanding the operation in Rwan-
da. To carry out this task, a PC liaison officer on a
rotational basis was dispatched to the operational
centre for operation Turquoise in Paris until end
of August 1994, on which date the United Nations
took over the operation in Rwanda. After the
withdrawal of the liaison officer from Paris, the
PC continued to monitor the situation and has
been keeping and updating a table of all WEU
nations' conffibutions to the United Nations and
NGOs dealing with the Rwanda crisis.
WEU police element in Mostar: With
regard to the EU administration in Mostar(EUAM), the PC provides a weekly situation
report to the Council on the deployment of the
WEU police element in Mostar. One section chief
of the PC accompanied a WEU Presidency's high
level team visit to Mostar from23rd-Z5th August
1994. The PC has since been co-ordinating the
national contributions on behalf of the Presidency
and in close contact with the WEU Police Com-
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missioner. In addition, the PC has been involved
in a wide range of other activities including:
- 
commenting on a draft evacuation plan
for the police element in Mostar;
- 
requesting VIIF radio equipment to estab-
lish communication links between the
WEU police element and the (SP)
UNPROFOR battalion;
- 
co-ordinating the installation of a secure
fax link between the WEU police HQ,
WEU HQ in Brussels and the Presidency;
- 
forwarding initial thoughts to nations on
the interoperability of equipment for the
WEU police element;
- 
developing the identification marks for
the WEU police element.
3. Relationships with other agencies both within
and outside WEU
Relations with NATO: The PC keeps in
contact with NATO at two levels. Firstly, regular
meetings are held between the respective points of
contact (PC co-ordination section,IMS plans and
policy, SHAPE, ARFPS and SACLANT). These
meetings are attended by experts as appropriate
and agreed minutes are distributed to the member
nations. Secondly, there are pay to day contacts
concerning ongoing operations e.g. operation
Sharp Guard.
To improve the relationship with
NATO/IMS and to have a better understanding of
WEU's and especially the PC's work, briefings
have been given to members of the IMS. It should
be noted that working relations between the PC
and its NATO counterparts have gradually beco-
me more formal during the period of this report.
Linlcage with the multinational MWEU: In
order to initiate the relationship between the PC
and the multinational FAWEU, the PC made
contact with the Eurocorps and the MND(C). A
briefing on the PC's organisation and current acti-
vities was given to the Eurocorps at Sffasbourg in
Jane 1994. An exchange of briefings between the
PC and the MND(C) took place during a visit of
the Deputy Commander and staff members at
WEU HQ in August 1994. Contact with the Uni-
ted Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force will
be made in the near future.
4. Intemal organisatianal activilits
Interim PC enlargement: ln accordance
with the Kirchberg declaration (9th May 1994),
the three associate members may nominate offi-
cers to the PC. The PC provided the Permanent
Council with a proposal to integrate these officers
within various sections of the PC.
Job descriptions: Based on the TORs and
the experience gained so far, the PC produced the
job descriptions for all PC personnel and distribu-
ted them to the MilDels in November 1994.
PC infrastructure: With regard to the PC's
operational capability, there is some progress with
regard to the internal security standards and com-
patibility with NATO in this area, but secure com-
munication links with the HQ NATO still do not
exist. In accordance with the Noordwijk declara-
tion, the PC began a study on a situation centre
capable of monitoring activities on a 24-how
basis.
PC ambassadors briefings.' In order to pro-
mote a better understanding of its business and to
provide background information on its work, the
PC started to give detailed briefings to Permanent
Representatives of WEU member countries. Until
now, briefings have been given to five delega-
tions. In addition, the associated partner delega-
tions have been briefed.
VII. Activities of the Space Group
This part of the annual report provides
information on the status of WEU space activities
following the decisions taken by Ministers at their
spring 1994 Council meeting. The continuing
WEU space activities do not for the moment
require further decisions by Ministers. Proposals
for possible decisions will be presented to Minis-
ters for their spring 1995 Council meeting.
1. Evaluatinn of the expeimental phase
of the satellile centre
In accordance with this Ministerial deci-
sion, the Space Group has assessed the require-
ments to ensure the continuity of the operations of
the Satellite Centre until the evaluation of its
capabilities has been completed.
On the basis of this assessment the Centre
will be able to continue its activities until the end
of 1995 without additional funding; thus, no
Ministerial decision is necessary at this time.
By the beginning of 1995, the output of the
Cenffe will be sufficient to evaluate the prelimi-
nary operational capabilities of the Centre. The
outcome of this evaluation will be presented to
Ministers at their spring 1995 Council meeting.
2. Proposalfor a possible decisian to launch a WEU
satellile programme
Ministers tasked the Space Group to prepare
for the spring 1995 Ministerial meeting a proposal
for decision including the preparation of a draft
MOU to be concluded between the present WEU
member states. The Space Group has established
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an Organising Working Group and a Technical
Working Group to provide support to complete
this task.
The Organising Working Group will focus
on the prograrnme management and organisatio-
nal aspects.
The Technical Working Group will elabo-
rate the system requirements and the choice of
system options, together with WEU users, taking
into account the final report by the Study Mana-
gement Team.'
3. Further studics
Ministers authorised the Space Group to
initiate further studies within the agreed financial
limits if these were deemed necessary. During this
reporting period the need for such additional stu-
dies did not occur.
The assessment of the results of the studies
performed by an industrial consortium were finali-
sed by the end of November 1994. At that time the
mandate of the Study Management Team, which
was carrying out this assessment, expired. There-
after it would be up to the Technical and Organi-
sing Working Groups to recommend to the Space
Group the possible initiation of further studies.
VIII. Activities of the Open Skies
Working Group
During the second half of 1994, the Open
Skies Experts Group has made substantial pro-
gress in a number of fields.
Standing operating procedure s ( SO P )
Since 18th March 1992, the nine WEU
members have formed a group of states parties
under Anicle III, Section II, paragraph 2 of the
Open Skies Treaty. This has several implications
when receiving observation flights from third par-
ties. To facilitate co-operation, a set of standing
operating procedures (SOP) have been drafted.
The negotiating process started in October 1993
and culminated in the adoption of the SOP by the
Council on 7th November l994.ln May 1994, the
Presidency had presented an outline of the (then
draft) SOP to the Open Skies Consultative Com-
mission in Vienna. Otherparties to the treaty, who
might be affected by the WEU SOP, could have
brought forward comments and suggestions to the
draft, but none of them did.
Trial Jlights
In the first months of 1994, two trial flights
were carried out in which the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Germany and France were invol-
ved. The experience of these flights (lessons lear-
ned) has been useful in refining the terms of the
SOP.
A third trial flight will take place in Febru-
ary 1995.In this trial the United Kingdom, Italy
and Greece will be actively involved. All three
flights have made use of the British Andover air-
craft, being the only available observation system
within WEU so far.
Entry intoforce of the Open Skies Treaty
WEU members tasked the Presidency to
make ddmarches in Kiev, Minsk and Moscow in
order to underline the importance WEU attaches
to a timely ratification of the Treaty on Open
Skies. Ratification by the Russian Federation,
Ukraine and Belarus is a precondition for entry
into force.
N ational imp le me ntati on
Three observation systems will ultimately
function within WEU during the first implemen-
tation phase of the treaty:
- 
The British P.R. Andover has already
been equipped for some time and has
been used for all WEU trial flights so far.
- 
The German Tupolev 154-M is currently
being refitted and it is expected that this
plane will become available for active(trial) flights during the early months of
t995.
- 
The ten parties of the so-called 'POD
Group' (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Greece, Norway, Canada) signed a MOU
formalising their co-operation in July
1994. Procurement procedures for a
Lockheed Samson POD are under way. It
is expected that the POD will be avai-
lable for its flrst trials by July 1995.
IX. Activities of the Mediterranean Group
At its two meetings held since June 1994,
the WEU Mediterranean Group has given priority
to arranging the group's first special meetings with
experts designated by the governments of non-
WEU Mediterranean countries. A series of consul-
tations with the Ambassadors of the Maghreb
countries and Egypt took place in Brussels on23rd
and 26th September 1994, on the initiative of the
Presidency and the Secretary-General.
The first meetings with experts from Alge-
ria, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia were held
on 12th and 13th October 1994. The meeting with
the experts from Egypt took place on 26th Octo-
ber 1994. The group considered that this first
series of meetings produced encouraging results,
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bearing in mind that they constituted a new deve-
lopment in the dialogue on security and defence
between Western European and Southern Medi-
terranean countries. The group also noted the sta-
ted wish of the non-WEU Mediterranean coun-
tries for western help in solving regional issues.
The Maghreb experts aimed to promote a
concept of a dialogue broadened to include the
socio-economic and even the cultural dimension.
They also called for a re-examination of the exis-
ting institutional framework for the dialogue with
WEU countries.
The group agreed that it would continue to
make clear to its Maghreb and Egyptian interlocu-
tors that in the dialogue between these countries
and WEU, WEU was competent to address only
politico-military and defence q$estions, the other
issues coming within the purvipw of institutions
such as the CSCE (now OSCE) and the European
Union. It also agreed on the fact that consultations
with the ambassadors in Brussels and the mee-
tings with the experts were at present the most
appropriate iurangement for continuing the dia-
logue as provided for under the ministerial man-
date.
As to the content of this dialogue, the
Mediterranean Group would have to define the
topics and formulate a common approach for the
meetings scheduled in the first half of 1995. The
assiduous and regular participation of military
experts from the Maghreb countries and Egypt
would continue to be desirable.
The group stressed the importance of the
Institute for Security Studies' conffibution to the
dialogue and of the active participation of milit-
ary delegates and the Planning Cell and its hope
that a regular exchange of information on Medi-
terranean questions would take place between
WEU, the EU and NATO.
The Meditelranean Group welcomed the
Presidency's seminar on North Africa, challenge
and response, which took place in The Hague on
5th December 1994, and which offered a good
opportunity for further reflection.
X. Certain activities of working groups(" at 13 ")
1. Transatlantic publicity activitics (TPA)
As of 1st July 1994, the United Kingdom
took over the TPA Chair from Norway.
The CWG/TPA's efforts were mainly gea-
red to the organisation of Panel Tours to the Mid-
West. From 16th-21st October, a panel consisting
of Sir John Weston, United Kingdom Permanent
Representative, Mr. Per Carlsen, Danish Deputy
Under-Secretary of State for Defence and Mr.
Pieter Feith, Netherlands Deputy Permanent
Representative, visited the mid-West of the United
States. Their itinerary included visits to Dallas,
Houston, Cleveland, Milwaukee and Indianapolis.
During the visit they gave interviews to the
following local media: Dallas Morning News,
Houston Chronicle, Houston Post, Plain Dealer
Newspaper, Milwaukee Journal, and Milwaukee
Sentinel as well as a local radio interview and a
television interview for a public service educatio-
nal channel. An article by Sir John Weston was
also published in the Chicago Tribune. The panel
also carried out speaking engagements at the
Dallas Committee on Foreign Relations, Dallas
Council of World Affairs and the Akron Council
on World Affairs.
The CWG/TPA also turned its attention to
TPA activities in 1995. In 1995, there will be two
panel tours: one to the East Coast, to which will
be added a day in Ottawa; and one to the West
Coast. The CWG/TPA and the Washington Group
have also agreed on the format of a one-day
conference in Washington, to be co-hosted by the
Atlantic Council on Capitol Hill. In addition, the
CWG/TPA is discussing with the WEU Institute
the possibility of organising a seminar in Brussels
for congressional staffers.
2. EUROCOM
At the direction of the WEU Council
" at 13 ", the prime aim of EUROCOM is to pro-
mote interoperability between tactical communi-
cations systems of the land forces of the EURO-
COM nations. A subsidiary aim is to exploit
opportunities for interdependence in systems and
equipment development and production, thereby
making the best use of national resources.
EUROCOM has pursued these aims by
agreeing and documenting the necessary operatio-
nal requirements and system parameters recorded
on baseline documents:
(, EUROCOM D/0 (94) defines opera-
tional concepts, requirements and per-
formance characteristics.
(,, EUROCOM D/l which defines basic
system parameters and EUROCOM
D/l (EES) which defines the enhanced
system.
(,r, EUROCOMDI2 which defines inter-
operability test specifi cations.
To achieve commanders' requirements
well into the next decade, use should be made of
the inherent growth potential of EUROCOM sys-
tems. Therefore evolutionary enhancements and
improvements to the basic system are constantly
being considered.
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3. Western European Logistics Group (WELG)
EUROLOG formally transferred to WEU
on lst January 1994 to become the WELG. Work
continues under the direction of a Steering Group,
chaired by the United Kingdom, supported by
Maritime, Land and Air Subgroups.
The Steering Group met for its first WELG
meeting in Madrid in April 1994, and also in the
WEU HQ in October. Close liaison is maintained
with the Planning Cell and a draft mandate was
submitted for approval to the WEU Council in
October.
Activities
(i) Joint: The WELG is producing a
booklet containing a concise checklist
of key logistic considerations for any
nation about to take part in United
Nations peace-keeping operations.
(ii) Maritime.' Development of a contain-
erised support concept, and a review
of suitable operational logistics mana-
gement information systems for use in
a WEU context.
(iii) Land: Development of the logistics
requirement and a framework for
WEU ground forces logistics systems
in 2000 and beyond.
(iv) Air: Development of a mobility hand-
book for potential WEU operations,
and work to update the mutual emer-
gency supply and support system.
4. Eurolongterm
Eurolongterm terms of reference are likely
to be finalised during the first half of 1995.
XI. Activities of the Western European
Armaments Group (" at 73 ")
The second meeting of the National Arma-
ments Directors in 1994 (their third meeting as
WEAG NADs) took place in Brussels on 14th
October 1994. The yearly meeting of the WEAG
Defence Ministers took place in Noordwijk on
14th November 1994. On the basis of an oral
report by the Danish Minister of Defence, the
WEU Ministerial Council adopted the results of
the WEAG Ministerial meeting.
Current activities
WEAG activities during the second half of
1994 may be summarised as follows:
1. The Armaments Secretariat is now firmly
established within the WEU Secretariat-General
and serves as a focal point for armaments matters.
In the light of the current and expected level of
activity on iumaments co-operation, an increase
in the manning level of one executive and one
support post has been approved. Vacancy notices
have been issued.
2. Equipment co-operation (Panel I): the
structure and operating methods are under review
with the aim of accelerating the creation of colla-
borative prograrnmes by adopting less rigid and
formal rules. Progress on the future large aircraft
programme was welcomed and nations were invi-
ted to participate in this major European project.
The Panel I Chairman has been tasked to approach
the Eurolongterm with the aim of identifying
areas of common interest and of examining how
to expand co-operation between the two bodies.
In parallel, the WEU hesidency and the WEAG
Chair have initiated steps to create a common fra-
mework.
3. Research and technology (Panel II): the
decision was taken to establish step I of a research
cell (in the WEU building) as part of an expanded
Armaments Secretariat. That first phase (step 1)
will lead to the creation of a limited entity provi-
ding support to the EUCLID and the research and
technology prograrnmes. The Cell is expected to
ease the development of additional research and
technology projects.
The research cell will comprise five execu-
tive and two support staff, with effect from lst
April 1995. Vacancy notices have been issued.
The Cell will be working under the authority
of the NADs and will report to NADs through the
Research and Technology Management Commit-
tee and Panel II.
The second, more ambitious phase (step 2),
recommended by NADs for consideration, would
establish the Cell as a subsidiary body of WEU in
order to enable it to place contracts.
A symposium on the EUCLID prograrnme
held in The Hague on 2ndl3rd November 1994
achieved its objective of promoting participation
in the progr:unme. Presentations made jointly by
WEAG representatives and EDIG representatives
on the various research areas contributed to the
participants' better understanding of the objec-
tives, development and constraints of the
EUCLID prograrnme.
Further, it has been agreed to produce a test
facilities catalogue.
4. European defence equipment market
(Panel III): it was decided to continue the initiative
in order to meet, to the extent possible, the objec-
tive of providing benefits for all participants.
Monitoring of progress will continue and the
results will be analysed in two years' time. In
addition, the Panel will investigate the merits of a
commercial approach to military programmes.
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5. In relation to the proposed creation of a
European armaments agency, the principles for
its operation have been approved and the Ad Hoc
Study Group dealing with this matter has been
tasked to complete definition of the organisational
charters and to consider possible locations. Fur-
ther, Panel III was asked to study common proce-
dures and regulations for that agency.
6. Ministers agreed to consider favourably the
Franco-German initiative to create a new arma-
ments co-operation structure as a subsidiary body
under the modified Brussels Treaty, when intro-
duced to the WEU Council. The WEU Council of
Ministers adopted this agreement on the under-
standing as recorded in the summary of conclu-
sions of their meeting.
7. Definition of a European annaments poli-
cy: Ministers endorsed the guidelines for an infor-
mal group of experts to study the options for such
a policy. The report of the informal group will be
submitted for consideration by the Defence
Ministers.
8. The NADs have approved the WEAG 1995
budget of 46 752 275 BEF; this includes the
Armaments Secretariat budget, taking into
account the increase in personnel. The WEAG
budget also includes the establishment of the
research cell (five A grades and two B grades) and
the production of the test facilities catalogue. In
terms of funding arrangements for the research
cell, the agreed WEAG cost-sharing key will be
used without prejudice to a possible future expan-
sion of the established arrangements.
France on lst January 1995 for a period of
two years takes over the WEAG Chair.
XII. Activities of the Agency for the Control of
Armaments (ACA)
The Agency for the Control of Armaments
continued its residual tasks regarding the limita-
tion of atomic, biological and chemical weapons,
at a level of activity corresponding to that obtai-
ning at the time of the 1984 Rome declaration and
in accordance with the procedures approved up to
that point.
As regards atomic weapons, the ACA car-
ried out no controls of these weapons.
As for biological weapons, all the member
states decided to renew the list in force ofbiologi
cal weapons subject to control. As in previous
years, the ACA did not carry out any controls in
this field.
The list in force of chemical equipment and
products (chemical weapons) was also renewed
with the agreement of the member states.
As for chemical weapons, all the member
states are signatories to the United Nations
Convention banning the manufacture of these
weapons. No country reported that it held chemi-
cal weapons on the mainland of Europe.
In accordance with the usual procedure,
four chemical factories were inspected as part of
the " controls on the non-production of chemical
weapons ". In no case did the ACA find any evi-
dence that the undertaking not to manufacture
chemical weapons had been breached.
For this thirty-ninth year of controls carried
out by the ACA, the legal sources used to justify
the levels of control and the control procedures
have remained unchanged.
XIII. Activities of the WEU Institute
for Securtty Studies
During the period lst July to 31st Decem-
ber 1994, the Institute organised, in collaboration
with Ian Gambles, visiting professor at the Buda-
pest Institute for Graduate International and
Diplomatic Studies of the University of Economic
Sciences, a seminar in Budapest, on the eastward
expansion of the West European security-commu-
nity, and four meetings in Paris: the first with the
Bertelsmann Foundation; the second a meeting of
the steering group on a paper on the European
defence markets; the third a meeting of a task
force on Egypt and the fourth the task force on
Russia and the CIS. The Institute also organised,
in collaboration with the Czech Institute for Inter-
national Relations, an enlarged meeting of the
European Strategy Group (ESG) in Prague.
Seven documents, on the conversion of a
meeting room in the Paris building of WEU into a
conference room, the development of the Institute
into an academy, Yugoslavia and Balkan security
- 
what further measures?, the European security
and defence academy, transatlantic publicity acti-
vities 
- 
European seminar 1995(2) and a note to
the Council on the organisation of seminars with
Russia and Ukraine were sent to the Council.
Gabriel Munuera left the Institute at the end
of August to take up an appointment at the United
Nations in New York and the Institute welcomed
two new research fellows, Alessandro Politi and
Carles Echeverria Jesus, for a period of three
years.
The Institute also welcomed a visiting
research fellow, Rudolf Joo, for a period of four
months, and awarded fellowships to Felix Arteaga
of Spain and Johannes Bohnen of Germany, for
periods of one and two months respectively.
Mr. Vlastimil Fiala of the Czech Republic
spent the months of September and November at
the Netherlands Institute of International Rela-
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tions, Clingendael, The Hague; Mrs. Mare Haab
of Estonia spent the month of September at the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,
and Ilmars Viksne of Latvia the period July to
September at the Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir
Auswiirtige Politik, Bonn.
The members of the research team held
information and raining meetings for members of
the Council Working Group, participants from
Cenfral Europe and the Baltic states at the IIIEDN,
parliamentarians from Central and Eastern Europe
participating in the North Atlantic Assembly's
summer seminar, participants in a CHEAR semi-
nar, officers from the NATO Defence College,
Rome, members of Women in International Secu-
rity (WIIS), young diplomats from Central and
Eastern Europe and students at the Institut Euro.
p6en des Hautes Etudes Internationales.
During this period the Institute published
Chaillot Paper 17," The implications of the Yugo-
slav crisis for Western Europe's foreign relations "by Pavel Baev, Ali Hillal Dessouki,
F. Stephen Larrabee, Duygu Bazoglu Sezer and
Monika Wohlfed, edited by Mathias Jopp, and
Chaillot Paper 18 " Peace-keeping in the Soviet
successor states " by Roy Allison.
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Towards a European space-based observation system
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee'
by Mr. I*nzer and Mn Valleix, co-Rapporteurc
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l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
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Draft Recommendation
on a European space-based obsentatian system
The Assembly,
(i) Taking account of the fundamental importance of space in a global strategic concept of security in
Europe;
(ii) Stressing that space-based observation means are an essential and indispensable part of the Euro-
pean security and defence policy;
(iii) Believing therefore that Europe must equip itself as soon as possible with a space-based observa-
tion system that is both autonomous and interdependent;
(iv) Believing that Europe has the necessary technological and industrial capability to establish such a
system;
(v) Considering that the military use of space-based means is a global operation, the various parts of
which cannot remain separated;
(vi) Renewing its congratulations to the industrial consortium for its feasibility studies of the main sys-
tem and the study management team for assessing these sfudies,'
(vii) Congratulating also the space research institutes of the various member countries of WEU on their
outstanding contribution to these studies;
(viii) Takrng account, nevertheless, of the difficulties that will inevitably be encountered in creating this
system, connected mainly with the cost, implementation and use;
(ix) Taking into consideration the various options available in deciding to create this system, which may
be summarised as follows:
(a) an independent WEU system;
(b) a system based on work already carried out (Helios I);
(c) the continuation, pure and simple, of the present work of the Satellite Cenfte in image acquisi
tion and interpretation;
(x) Considering that the frst of these solutions is technologically achievable but very costly, and that
the third in no way meets Europe's need to have independent space-based information means, which are
essential for its security and defence and, in consequence, for the exercise of its sovereignty;
(xi) Considering that the second solution seems to be the most pragmatic and easiest to implement, since
it will draw on efforts already made and experience gained from co-operation which has proved viable and
fruitful (Helios I) and is, additionally, the least costly;
(xii) Welcoming the prospects for a significant participation in the Helios II programme by Germany,
Italy and Spain, alongside France;
(xiii) Conscious nevertheless of the many difficulties linked to participation in the financing and indus-
trial production of the system and its use which must be resolved in order to develop, produce and exploit
the system;
(xiv) Recognising, moreover, that discussions should be started with the United States and possibly other
countries on the possibility of co-operation in early warning and antimissile defence systems;
(n) Taking account, finally, of the overriding need for the Torrej6n Satellite Centre to be given perma-
nent status,
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RecoMNreNDs rHAT nrn CouNcn
1. 
. 
Immediately take the measures necessary to make the Tonej6n Satellite Centre permanent and
make provision for the budgetary means necessary for making use of the most satisfictory satellite
lmages;
l. .-. Sgek agreement with the countries deciding to participate in the Helios and Osiris programmes forfacilitating implementalr_":_g.f these. prograrnmes and assotiating other member countiiesl integrating
them progressively.into WEU's activities and, to this end, requesting participant countries to open u[ tnesE
programmes to their WEU partners;
? Task the Space Group with studying the integration of these prograrnmes into WEU's activities andinvite the.intelligence section of the Planning Cell, as soon as it is iet up, to give its opinion on problems
connected with the use of the system;
4. Conduct the necessary_studies on a European early warning and antimissile defence system and
fJtster c^o-_operation with the United States and, ai necessary, with other partners pursuing aimisimilar to
those of WEU in these areas.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitteil by Mr. I*nzer and Mn Valleb, co-Rapporteurc)
L lntroduction
1. Assembly Documents 1304 (1992\, 1393
(1993), t436 (1994) and 1437 (1994) studied in
depth an aspect that is clearly fundamental to the
future common European security policy and
hence to a European defence policy: the creation
of a European space-based observation system.
2. These documents surveyed the activities of
the WEU Council in space matters, analysed the
consequences of the evolution of the international
situation on setting up a European space-based
observation system, its strategic importance, the
different tasks such a system would have to
accomplish, the challenges which had to be met
and Europe's technological and industrial capabi-
lity for undertaking a project of this dimension;
they also analysed current and future military
space programmes and studied the activities of
nltional space research institutes, the possibility
of co-operation between the latter (Document
1434) and the different possibilities for space co-
operation in Europe and the expediency ofpartici-
pation from outside Europe in this area.
3. Finally, the Technological and Aerospace
Committee organised colloquies on these same
subjects over recent years which brought together
the players essential for implementing such pro-
jects, in order to enable them to present their res-
pective positions and different interests, needs
and difficulties, and to discuss them.
4. A single conviction has been the inspiration
for all these initiatives: namely that such a project
required a rigorous and in-depth study of the stra-
tegic, technical, industrial and financial problems
that it raised and that once these problems had
been examined and resolved a firm and tenacious
political will was necessary in order finally to
achieve the system.
5. The colloquy organised recently by our
committee (on24th and 25th March 1995) in San
Agustin, Gran Canaria, under the same title as the
present report, represented a synthesis of work
carried out to date in order to be able to present a
range of information, considerations and conclu-
sions to the WEU Council that might help the
WEU defence ministers to take the best decision
on the creation of a European space-based observ-
ation system 
- 
a decision which is to be taken in
the coming months.
6. The present report also seeks to make a
realistic and pragmatic summary of the speeches
and debates at San Agustin, avoiding, insofar as
possible, any further mention of data given in
previous reports. Moreover, your Rapporteurs
will draw the conclusions and formulate
recommendations in the best interests of Europe
so that the future European security and defence
policy will have the instrument essential to achieve
its objectives: a European space-based observ-
ation system.
II. The strategic dimension
7 . If the fall of the Soviet empire put an end to
certain risks and threats hovering over Europe's
existence, it nevertheless gave rise to a whole
range of factors of instability that might have
considerable repercussions on our security: wide-
spread political and economic crises, ethnic and
border conflicts due to nationalist extremism,
massive immigration with unpredictable reper-
cussions, extreme deterioration of the environ-
ment, the emergence of powerful mafias frequent-
ly linked to trafficking in drugs and/or armaments
and nuclear materials creating a real risk of arma-
ments proliferation, particularly of ballistic mis-
sile systems etc. Besides and at times precisely
because of these problems we are faced with
numerous regional conflicts and risk factors with
direct and far-reaching repercussions on Europe's
security, such as for example the conflict raging
in former Yugoslavia, the aftermath of the war
between Iraq and Kuwait, the Middle East situ-
ation still far from a final and satisfactory solu-
tion, the Kurdish problem and the civil war that is
rife in many regions of Africa (Rwanda, Burundi,
Somalia, Sudan...).
8. Of particular concern to Europe is the situ-
ation on the southern flank of the Mediterranean
where religious fundamentalism could have dire
consequences for the future of certain countries
and their peoples. The evolution of this situation
is of major importance to Europe which it would
be suicidal to underestimate. In this connection
one might recall the lessons drawn from the collo-
quy organised by our Committee in Rome in
1993, on an anti-missile defence for Europe.
9. The foregoing considerations lead us to
think that a European space-based observation
system (the need for which is proving to be most
urgent) capable of providing real time information
gathered from all over the world, is an essential
element in guaranteeing Europe's security and a
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basic tool for developing a European defence
policy; it would permit verification of treaties on
disarmament, control over arnaments prolifer-
ation, conflict prevention and monitoring and pro-
tection of the environment.
10. It has already been said (Document 1435)
that space-based observation should merely be
one stage in a comprehensive system that would
also include early warning and anti-missile defence.
This will be taken up later in regard to the possi-
bilities for co-operation outside Europe in the
development of such systems.
11. The United States and Russia already have
space-based observation means, which are an
essential aspect of the exercise of their sovereign-
ty. It seems that it is now time for Europe too to
obtain means of its own, enabling it to assert its
sovereignty and independently to strengthen its
presence on the international scene and play an
active part in world security and the defence of
the values it deems to be essential.
12. The experience of the war between Iraq and
Kuwait and the conflict being waged in former
Yugoslavia have recently served to highlight both
the value of information obtained from space-
based observation and the virtual monopoly of the
United States in this area and consequently Eur-
ope's inability to act on the basis of its own
sources of information. In short, Europe must
acquire independent information means enabling
it to play its full part alongside its allies with all
the facts at its disposal.
13.. The press communiqu6 released by the
AsSembly on 1lth Novernber 1994, at a time
when rumours were circulating to the effect that
the United States was about to stop implementing
the United Nations embargo on the supply of arms
to Bosnia-Herzegovina, accurately summarises
certain arguments developed earlier. This states:
" Commenting on reports that the United
States authorities were likely to cease apply-
ing the United Nations embargo on arms
supplies to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presi-
dent of the Western European Union Assem-
bly, Sir Dudley Smith, M.P., today expressed
the hope that the WEU Council of Ministers,
scheduled to meet in Noordwijk (the Nether-
lands) on Monday l4th November, would
act urgently to counter the various potential
problems posed.
The United States dominates the NATO
command structure in the Adriatic area and
the withdrawal of United States ships
and aircraft would make a mockery of
the embargo operations. WEU must be
ready to fill the breach and respond to the
challenge ", said Sir Dudley.
This example also proves just how much
Europe needs to be autonomous where
intelligence gathering, satellite reconnais-
sance and logistic support are concerned. "
Subsequent events have merely confirmed the
above fears.
14. In short, it emerges clearly that, on the one
hand Europe's r6le in terms of world security can
be neither understood nor guaranteed ifit does not
have the necessary space-based means to accom-
plish its task, and, furthermore, if its dependence
on foreign means, even those of our allies, conti-
nues, such dependence can only prevent Europe
from playing its part in the management of world
peace and security and will consequently lead to a
loss of the political weight that it should rightly
have in the international scene.
15. Recently, at a conference held at the Royal
Institute for International Affairs (9th February
1995) on " Western European Union: myth and
reality ", the WEIJ Secretary-General, Mr. Cuti-
leiro stated:
" All of the above is being attempted and if
I have not misjudged the attitude of govern-
ments of WEU member states, we are on
track and will make progress. But even if
everything goes well, WEU will still need
an annaments policy and a space policy if it
is to become a strong enough European
pillar of the alliance and a strong enough
instrument of defence of the European
Union. In conventional defence, Europe's
two glaring shortcomings are the lack of
transport systems and the lack of satellite
intelligence. To correct these deficiencies,
political will has not always been there:
money has seldom been there. Attitudes are
changing, efforts are being made but it is a
long haul. "
16. Your Rapporteurs are convinced that
giving WEU space-based means is part of the
reality that our organisation has to deal with from
now on; the latter must be persuaded that the need
for such an observation system must lead us to
overcome the major difficulties involved in crea-
ting it. These difficulties need to be faced in a
practical and realistic way, but also, and this is
essential, with a firm and resolute political will.
III. The technolagical
and industrial dime nsion
17. The colloquy held recently in San Agustin
served inter alia to confirm what we already
knew: Europe has the technological and indusrial
resources to meet the challenge of building an
independent space-based observation system. If a
problem exists at all in this area it is that ofexcess
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industrial capacity, as the General Rapporteur,
Mr. Rabault (Director of Missiles and Space,
DGA (national procurement directorate), France,
noted in his conclusions to the colloquy.
18. Indeed, Documents 1393, 1434 and 1436,
mentioned previously, examine at great length
Europe's technological and industrial capability
to achieve a space-based observation system.
19. This capability is by no means theoretical,
it is very real. It has been acquired and strength-
ened through the various national space pro-
grarnmes and, more particularly, the programmes
of the European Space Agency (ESA).
20. Industry's ability to meet the challenge of
space is matched by its long experience of
co-operation, not only in the framework of ESA
programmes but also other programmes, the most
appropriate example of which is Helios I, the
French, Italian and Spanish joint programme
which laid the foundations for military space
prograrnmes.
21. France has a leading position among the
space industries of Europe and the experiences of
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom are in
some areas complementary to it. Spain, the
Netherlands and Belgium also have proven space
industries which are perfectly capable of contri-
buting to the European space-programme. This
prograrnme is a prime factor for European poli-
tical integration and plays a part in strengthening
and promoting European industry. Moreover this
space-based system will have spin-off in the civi-
lian sector in the form of experiments and capabi-
lities that can find application there.
IV Achicvement, costs, timetable
and operation of the system
22. Once it is admitted that Europe has a stra-
tegic need for an independent space-based observ-
ation system, built by Europeans using European
technology and since, moreover 
- 
as noted pre-
viously 
- 
such an enterprise would be a factor
of political integration, consolidation and indus-
trial expansion, a stage is reached where several
questions need to be answered: what will be the
costs of the operation, which partners are to be
involved and what will be the time-scale?
23. One of the main reasons for co-operating in
developing such a system is obviously to share
costs. At present it would be difficult for a single
country to bear the financial burden alone.
24. As was observed correctly at the San Agustin
colloquy, space systems are no more expensive
than other defence systems. We need only consi-
der spending in recent years by our respective
countries on fighter aircraft to be convinced of
this fact. Moreover, space-based systems serye a
whole range of countries, for which they provide
cover, in this case, those belonging to WEU: these
are ultimately, therefore, multinational defence
systems.
25. The tables appended to the present report
illustrate certain considerations raised in this
chapter. Your Rapporteurs are unfortunately not in
a position to provide more detailed information
owing to the confidential nature of the studies
undertaken on the feasibility of the system.
26. It would be logical to assume that all WEU
members would participate financially in the sys-
tem, as all would benefit from it. It would be desi-
rable for the criteria that currently apply to mem-
ber countries' contributions to the WEU budget to
be taken as a basis, but, however this may be,
flexibility should be the guiding principle so that
all member countries are able to participate. The
wish to take part in the prograrnme should not be
used as a reference, nor should the programme be
delayed because a member is not participating.
Technological and industrial participation in
achieving the system is another matter. It would
then be appropriate, as far as possible, for indus-
trial profits to be shared in proportion to the
technological and industrial capabilities of each
country but such sharing must not lead to the tech-
nological level being lowered or to perceptible
financial increases.
27. Shared use of the system is a major diffi-
culty but one that is not insoluble. It is in fact a
matter of harmonising the various national infor-
mation needs 
- 
obviously a very sensitive area.
28. The experience gained with Helios I will be
taken into account and in any event specific deter-
mination of standards to be adopted will be an
additional means of European integration and
undeniably a stimulus to the development of a
European security and defence policy.
29. The WEU Planning Cell and its intelligence
section will be able to make their opinions known
through relevant studies and assessments.
30. The projected timetable for the system
should be adhered to as closely as possible. Any
delay in decisions and hence in implementation
will only increase the difficulties and discrepan-
cies between budget forecasts and actual costs.
It is clear that many questions arising out of the
foregoing chapter cannot yet be answered
specifically and that a joint effort is required to
reach solutions that are satisfactory all round. The
means of attaining such solutions exist provided
we are convinced that the system is necessary
for Europe's security and defence and from
that conviction proceeds the determination to
achieve it, followed by the corresponding political
decision.
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V. Conclusions
31. In the second part of the fortieth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly covering
the activities of the second half of 1994, in the
section on the work of the Space Group, mention
is made of a series of proposals which are to be
submitted to the ministers at the meeting of the
Council to be held in May 1995.
32. The report states that the Satellite Centre
will be able to continue its activities until the end
of 1995 without funding in addition to that origin-
ally granted for the experimental phase; also that
by the beginning of 1995, the Centre's output will
already be sufficient to evaluate its operational
capabilities.
33. It is to be hoped that the Council will reach
a decision rapidly on the Centre becoming perma-
nent, making it possible for it to develop its work
under normal conditions, without the difficulties
of temporary status. As to the subject-matter of
the present report, the annual report notes that the
Space Group has been tasked to preparc a pro-
posal accompanied by a draft memorandum of
understanding between present WEU member
states (i.e. the nine) for a decision by the Council
of Ministers in May 1995.
34. Moreover, the Space Group has created two
working groups: an Organising Working Group(programme management and organisational
aspects) and a Technical Working Group with the
task of elaborating " the system requirements and
the choice of system options, taking account of
the final report by the Study Management Team ".
35. These working groups might recommend
that the Space Group carry out further studies if
they consider it necessary.
36. There is every reason to think that no deci-
sion will be reached in May, first, because there is
a wish to know beforehand the result of the nego-
tiations between France and Germany on the lat-
ter's participation in Helios II and to be informed
of the possibility of general agreement between
the two countries on optical and radar space
observation programmes; second, because other
countries have not yet clearly identified their
needs in relation to the system and last, because
one country, without entirely closing the door on
the creation of a system of observation by satellite,
is opening it so little as virtually to prevent its
establishment.
37. The three options available in connection
with the European space-based observation sys-
tem are as follows:
(i) xr independent WEU system;
(ii) a system which would take advantage
of existing efforts (mainly Helios);
(iiil continuation of the activities of the
Satellite Centre as pursued to date, in
other words image acquisition and
processing.
38. The first of these options, and the most
ambitious, at present seems the least realistic,
mainly on account of cost; financial aspects are in
fact the prime consideration put forward by all
countries when it comes to deciding whether to go
ahead with a satellite system.
39. The third option would continue to leave
Europe without the independent information
capability it needs for its security and defence and
hence its sovereignty. This option would provide
no satisfactory answer to the various arguments
we have put forward so far to demonstrate Eur-
ope's need for an independent space-based
observation capability.
40. These various considerations have led your
Rapporteurs to conclude that the second option
seems the most realistic, the most easily achiev-
able and hence the most desirable.
41. Indeed, the Helios I programme would
offer substantial experience of pooling opera-
tional requirements. In a few months the system
will be operational and will begin to supply
images to the Tonej6n Satellite Centre under
agreements reached between WEU and the three
countries that have participated in developing and
producing the system: France, Italy and Spain.
The practical details of this agreement of principle
are now being studied and the results will also
constitute valuable experience which will be use-
ful if the decision finally adopted by the ministers
allows advantage to be taken of work already
completed or in progress.
42. The Helios II programme will combine
infra-red and optical technology: Osiris, another
French programme, covers radar satellites
capable of twenty-four hour, all-weather opera-
tions. France has invited Germany to take part in
these projects in conditions which are the subject
of present and future discussions and negotia-
tions. Italy and Spain, for their part, have let it be
known that a commitment by Germany to these
programmes might lead them to reconsider their
present position, namely their refusal to panicipate
in Helios II, mainly for financial reasons.
43. Estimates for options (r) (WEU's own sys-
tem) and (ii) (use of programmes in the process of
completion or development) as illustrated in
Table V appended to the present report show
lower costs for option (fr). Agreement between
France and Germany (whose radar satellite tech-
nology is very advanced) would be a decisive fac-
tor in obtaining backing for the proposal of your
Rapporteurs.
33
DOCUMENT 1454
44. There are many questions that a decision of
the kind we are prop6sing here might raise in
terms of financial participation, system users
(WEU orWEU and individual counfties?), indus-
trial involvement (which should combine effi-
ciency and national industrial interests while
taking account of the fact that fair return has a
more political than industrial dimension and is a
very effective means of achieving European inte-
gration) and the most desirable course to be
followed (an international executive agency, a
WEU space agency?) etc.
45. Apart from the problems outlined above, a
major hurdle has to be overcome: the Helios sys-
tem is not a development that can be publicly
unveiled. The difficulties raised by its integration
into WEU structures will be greater than those
encountered over the supply of Helios images to
the Tonej6n Satellite Centre: while an image is a
finished product, a system is a far more complex
whole which needs to be brought out into the open
so that it can be sold to third parties.
46. Your Rapporteurs have no intention of sup-
plying answers to all the problems raised; these
answers should proceed from rigorous analysis
and negotiations in the framework of the WEU
Council. In our view the aim of this report should,
first and foremost, be to promote the establish-
ment of a space-based observation system and
then to ensure that a decision is taken in favour of
the option we feel is most in conformity with the
interests of Europe and the most realistic from a
technological and frnancial point of view. We also
hope that the chosen solution will obtain the
necessary consensus and allow participation by
all WEU member countries.
47. Europe must acquire an independent space-
based observation system, but clearly, at the same
time, it must establish close co-operation in this
area with the United States and Russia, for we feel
it is necessary for the various systems to be com-
plementary and, in short, as the General Rappor-
teur of the San Agustin colloquy, Mr. Rabault(Director of Missiles and Space, DGA) put it, to
marry autonomy and interdependence.
48. Moreover, our Assembly has on other occa-
sions spoken out strongly in favour of intensive
co-operation with our American allies on early
warning and anti-missile defence systems. Colla-
boration with our transatlantic allies, and possibly
with Russia, should, in our opinion, therefore be
undertaken under the conditions referred to earlier.
49. On 6th February 1995, at the meeting
between the Presidential Committee of our
Assembly and the Secretary-General of WEU,
Mr. Cutileiro, answering a question put to him by
the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee, Mr.Iipez Henares, sffessed that the
establishment of a European space-based obser-
vation capability was still a very long way off.
50. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur,
addressing the Assembly on 30th November
1994, stated for his part:
" This is an operational, technological and
industrial project which will emancipate
Europe in some measure in the matter of
space reconnaissance. I say emancipate
deliberately. I discussed the subject yes-
terday evening and as late as this morning
with Chancellor Kohl at the Franco-
German summit just held in Bonn. I have
every hope that here too the determination
of our two countries will enable Europe to
take a further step towards equipping itself
with the operational resources that it lacks. "
51. Finally one might recall the remarks of the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kinkel,
at the Koenigswinter conference which periodi-
cally brings together senior German and United
Kingdom officials. At the conference held last
March, Mr. Kinkel, recalling the particular inter-
est the Franco-German parmership holds for his
country, for historical reasons, invited the United
Kingdom, together with France and Germany, to
build a Europe close to its citizens, competitive
and ready for action. Referring to the CFSP, Mr.
Kinkel felt that majority decisions should not be
taboo in the areas that relate to it.
52. In conclusion, your Rapporteurs would first
state their wish to see all WEU member countries
participate in establishing a European space-
based observation system based on the option
they consider most afpropriate and to which they
have just referred. Second, they wish to emphas-
ise that it does not seem reasonable to perpetuate
the present situation where the rhythm of the deci-
sion-making process is imposed by those who
wish to progress the most slowly or who want
purely and simply to call a halt. Third, in the
absence of a joint decision, it would be necessary
initially to foresee launching a project involving
the four countries that envisage co-operating in
Helios, followed by participation by all member
countries in the next generation of the system,
around 2005. Meanwhile, the meeting point for all
concerned would be the Torrej6n Satellite Centre.
53. Political will has already been shown by
the creation of the Satellite Cenfie, but this work
has to be completed. All that is still lacking is the
political will that must be expressed without fur-
ther delay, since all other difficulties can be resol-
ved, as we feel we have shown in our various
reports on this subject.
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1opticalSatellite ?宏lobalreferenceinformation ?patialresolution 
口Panchromatic ?垢risisindicators ?1mcIoselookmode <10msurveymode <2mheightresolution(stereo) 
ーClosel○○k ?changedetection) 
ーSurveymode ?濵appingforoutofregion/outof 
□Ancillaryoptions ?reainterventions 
ーIRrrIR ーStereo ?焏ignatures,terrainpro珊es 
2sARSatellite ?11-Weathercapability,day&night, ?3mcIoselook <10msurveymode 
口S-/Ⅹ-b狐d ーCloselook ーSurveymode ?ddltlOnal(SAR-)slgnatureS 
3DRS/SArCOM ?RSforreaトtimecapabilitycombi- ?atatransmission 
nationwithMILSATCOMtobe Clarified ?500Mb/sec 
4Groundstation(s) 5supplementary ?perationofsate11ites,mission一 ?ccesstime(dataavailability) 
Plamingandnearreal-timeproces- Singandintexpretation Complementaryelementintimesof ?2.5hrs Spatialresolution 
SmallSatellites ?risisand/orforspecifictasks ??@3m 
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APPENDIX III
Basis for cost calculation in rough order of magnitude
wECA)
WEU system proposal French/German co-operation
2 optical satellites in orbit 2 optical satellites in orbit
2 SAR satellites in orbit 2 SAR satellites in orbit
2 DRS in orbit 1 DRS in orbit
Small satellites on demand 
- 
none foreseen
TT&C TT&C
1 system operation centre 2 system operation centres
1 mission control cenffe I mission control centres
I central PAIF National PAIF (not included in the cost figure)
37
DOCUMENT 1 454　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　APPENDIX IV
APPENDIX IV
Progmmme cost pγd紡
Economic conditions 1993
38
Document 1454
Amendments l and 2
30th May 1995
Towards a European space-based obsenation system
AMENDMENTS 1 and2l
tablcd by Mr. Iipez Henares
l. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Considering the interest of making public opinion in WEU member countries aware of the exis-
tence of this centre and of its contribution to building a European defence identity, "
2 At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Organise one, or, preferably, several visits to present the activities of the Torrej6n Satellite Centre
to representatives of the European and international press. "
Signed: Iipez Henares
1. See l5th sitting, 2fth June 1995 (amendments agreed to).
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WEU Council of Ministerc
Lisbon,lSth May 1995
Lisbon declaration
1. Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the WEU nations gathered in Lisbon on 15th May
1995. They warmly welcomed the accession of Greece to WEU as a full member and the consequent entry
into force of the Associate Members' status and the Associate Partners' status, as well as the fact that
Austria, Finland and Sweden became Observers following their accession to the European Union.
2. Ministers recalled that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it
does not include security and defence. They also recalled the r6le of WEU as defence component of the
EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the priority which they
therefore attached to the development of its operational capabilities. They recalled that, in the Petersberg
declaration, preparedness was expressed to deploy WEU military units for humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management. They reaffirmed their resolve to
work, on the basis of the preliminary conclusions adopted in Noordwijk on the formulation of a common
European defence policy, to ensure that this policy can effectively take shape in the years ahead. Ministers
expressed their appreciation of the significant progress made by WEU since their last meeting and
discussed in particular the following issues:
1. WEU development
(a) Op erational dev elopme nt
3. Ministers examined the implementation of their previous decisions, in particular those taken at their
Petersberg, Kirchberg and Noordwijk meetings, regarding the development of WEU operational capabili-
ties. They approved a decision which, inter alia:
- 
provides WEU with new decision-making mechanisms and structures, in particular the estab-
lishment of a new politico-military group in support of the Council, a Situation Centre, and an
Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell;
- 
refines procedures and objectives for the identification of Forces Answerable to WEU;
- 
provides WEU with preliminary conclusions and mansitional arrangements for the financing of
WEU operations.
Ministers underlined the need to gain practical experience of the provisions contained in this deci-
sion through appropriate exercises. In this context they welcomed the intentions expressed by Portugal to
organise an exercise. They also welcomed the agreement reached by the member states of the Eurocorps
to carry out the exercise WEU crisis 95-96, within the framework of the Petersberg declaration, and took
note of the decision to propose this exercise to the Council in order to verify the procedures established in
the relevant operational documents of the organisation.
Ministers welcomed the progress made in WEU in identifying those assets and capabilities that
WEU will need in its future operations, as well as in defining its views on the mechanisms and procedures
for the use of such assets and capabilities which the alliance could make available to WEU.
4. Ministers welcomed the presentation of a report of the Secretary-General on the reinforcement
of the Secretariat in the politico-military field, which will constitute the basis for decisions to be taken
by the Permanent Council before the next Ministerial Council, allowing for the reinforcement to begin by
January 1996.
5. Ministers welcomed the decision of France, Italy and Spain to organise a land force (EUROFOR)
and a maritime force (EUROMARFOR). They noted that thEse forces will be open to WEU member
sta[es. In this context, qhey_we-lcomed the agreements reached on the participation of Portugal in
EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR since their establishment. They also noted that these forces would be
declared " forces answerable to WEU ", that they would be employed as a priority in this framework, that
they could likewise be-employed in the framework of NATO, so as to strengthen the European pillar of the
alliance, and that the fulfilment of their missions will not prejudice the participation of their units in the
colnmon defence missions provided for by Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, and Article 5 of the
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Washington Treaty. Ministers believe that these initiatives will contribute to the development of the
European security and defence identity and strengthen Europe's own military capabilities for operations
conducted pursuant to the Petersberg declaration.
Ministers tasked the Permanent Council, on the initiative of the participating states, to detail the
relations between WEU and these forces, together with the conditions for their use in the WEU frame-
work.
6. As a follow-up to the decision taken at their last meeting in Noordwijk, Ministers endorsed a docu-
ment on " emergency responses to humanitarian crises: a r6le for a WEU humanitarian task force ". The
document, based on an Italian/United Kingdom proposal on the principles and modalities for establishing
a WEU humanitarian task force and on the use of military assets in humanitarian crises, is fully consistent
with the above decision in paragraph 3. They tasked the Permanent Council to complete the work on this
subject as a matter of priority and requested the Planning Cell to take forward as a matter of urgency its
generic planning in this area.
7. Ministers also marked their interest in the initiative by France and the United Kingdom on peace-
keeping and conflict-prevention in Africa. In this connection, they welcomed the preliminary reflections
taking place in WEU in parallel with the discussions within the European Union and against the back-
ground of the debate in progtess at the United Nations; they instructed the Permanent Council to take
forward its reflections on this subject.
8. Ministers also examined progress made in the field of WEU space activities. They approved a
decision on the establishment of the Satellite Cenfte as a permanent WEU body. They also approved a
decision tasking the Space Group to continue its activities, concentrating on the study of the three propo-
sed approaches to developing WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes, namely the
establishment of a WEU satellite system, participation in a developing multinational programme or pro-
curement of imagery with the aim of presenting a proposal to their autumn 1995 ministerial meeting.
9. Ministers took note of the report by the presidency on the Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting held on
20th April 1995 in Lisbon.
10. Ministers took note of documents on WEU's r6le in evacuation operations, generic planning, and
intelligence support to the Planning Cell: short-term measures. They considered these documents as a
significant contribution to the implementation of their decisions on the development of WEU operational
capabilities.
11. They looked forward to the conclusion of the work on other operational aspects identified in
the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy, approved in
Noordwijk.
12. Ministers took note with appreciation of the reports on the Portuguese Presidency's missions to
Mostar and the Danube and welcomed the recent visit to Mostar of the presidency's Foreign Minister,
Mr. Durao Barroso. They also noted with great interest the information provided to the Council by the EU
Adminisftator for Mostar, Mr. Koschnick.
13. Ministers reiterated the importance they attach to the WEU contribution to the EU Mostar adminis-
tration, and to the Danube and Sharp Guard operations, which are visible expressions of WEU's
commitment to European security. They expressed their appreciation and gratitude to all those partici-
pating in these operations and thus contributing to their success.
14. Ministers welcomed the agreement between the parties concerned on the implementation of the frst
phase of the establishment of a unified police force of Mostar ([IPFM) and regarding the structure of the
future LJPFM. They believe that these important steps should lead to the implementation of the UPFM.
Ministers agreed to continue to encourage the parties, in particular via the presidency, to secure agreement
to the subsequent implementation phases and the establishment of the LJPFM. Ministers welcomed the
forthcoming participation of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the WEU police element, in addition to the
contributions provided by the member states.
15. Ministers welcomed the successful results accomplished by the WEU police and customs mission
on the Danube, which contribute to the full implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Coun-
cil resolutions.
16. They also expressed their satisfaction at the continued positive results achieved in the joint WEU-
NATO Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.
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(b) Common reflectbn on new European security condilions
17. Ministers welcomed progress achieved on the common reflection on the new European security
conditions. They emphasised the importance of the fact that, for the first time, such an exercise is taking
place among the27 WEU nations. They approved a document which identifies their common interests, as
well as potential risks to European security. This analysis will be further reviewed in the light of the
second phase of the exercise.
18. Ministers noted that, in the second phase, WEU countries will examine how to enhance and
strengthen their common security through possible responses to the potential risks already identified. They
asked the Permanent Council to submit at their next meeting the final results of the exercise along the lines
of paragraph 6 of the Noordwijk declaration with a view to a decision on the publication of a white paper
on European security.
19. Ministers welcomed the French initiative concerning the organisation in autumn 1995 of a Euro-
pean session to reflect on a European security policy, which will bring together representatives of the
27 WEU nations.
(c) Uher questions
20. Ministers welcomed the Permanent Council decision on the implementation of the Associate Part-
ners' status which will allow for the extension of their participation in WEU working groups, for the
conclusion of liaison alrangements between them and the Planning Cell, as well as for the idehtification
of their forces which may be made available for WEU operations. They welcomed the progress already
achieved on the identification of forces and looked forward to the fulI and rapid implementation of the
abovementioned measures.
21. Ministers underlined the importance they attach to the r6le played by the Assembly in the debate on
security and defence in Europe and its substantive contribution to the wider consideration of these issues.
They welcomed the regular and constructive dialogue between the Council and the Assembly.
22. Ministers welcomed the Permanent Council decision on the gradual transformation of the Institute
for Security Studies into an Academy.
23. Ministers welcomed the signature of the WEU security agreement on 28th March 1995.
2. Rehtions with the European Union
24. Ministers had an exghange of views on the relations between WEU and the European Union. They
sffessed the importance of developing further this relationship for the future of the two organisations and
for European security as a whole.
25. Ministers recalled their decision in Noordwijk last November that WEU should make a timely contri-
bution to the work of the 1996 EU intergovernmental conference (IGC). Ministers held a first exchange of
views on this contribution, which will re-examine and fuittrer develop the r6le of WEU and the proviiions
agreed at Maastricht, taking account of the progress made and experience acquired since the WEU trrtaas-
tricht declaration of December 199 I and the enuT/ into force of the Treaty on European Union.
26. Ministers tasked the Permanent Council to present a report at their next meeting in November inM{rid. In this respect, they welcomed the intention of the incoming Spanish Presidency to present a
reflection document on the WEU contribution to the IGC to serve as the basis of the Permanent eouncil's
report. They noted that the possibility of holding a meeting at summit level to finalise the WEU contribu-
tion to the IGC continues to be considered.
27. In this context, Ministers welcomed as significant contributions to the forthcoming debate the pre-
sentation of the proposals made by the British Prime Minister, of the Netherlands Government memoran-
dum and of other national positions. These, together with the ongoing work in the European Union started
under the French Presidency, would be important inputs to this debate.
28. Ministers welcomed the initiative of the Portuguese Presidency to organise a seminar in Sintra on
3rd and 4th June on the WEU conribution to the future European security and defence architecture.
29. Ministers noted with satisfaction that measures to develop a close working relationship between
WEU and EU, foreseen in the Treaty on European Union, were now being given practicA effect. They par-
ticularly welcomed the close co-operation between the EU and WEU Preiidencies regarding the EU idmi-
nistration in Mostar including the WEU police deployment, the first occasion when WEU,in carrying out
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an operation, is implementing a decision of the Union. In this context they also welcomed the fact that, for
the first time, the WEU and EU Presidencies had carried out a joint d6marche which contributed to the
successful agreement to the first phase of the unified police force Mostar (UPFM).
30. Ministers noted with appreciation co-operation between WEU and EU in the framework of the
informal group of government experts of WEU/TVEAG and EU member states to study options for a Euro-
pean armaments policy. They noted that all items of the agreed progftrrnme of work have already been
covered. They looked forward to the report being finalised shortly.
31. Ministers welcomed the first meeting of the WEU Presidency, the Secretariat and the Planning Cell
with the EU Troika of Consular Affairs' experts on WEU's rdle in evacuation operations. They tasked the
Permanent Council to ensure that the work on this subject is continued in close co-ordination with the rele-
vant EU bodies.
3. Relalions wirh NATO
32. Ministers welcomed the decisions taken recently by both the WEU Council and the North Atlantic
Council, regarding the co-operation between both organisations and noted with appreciation that they are
already under implementation. These decisions represented a further step in the development of working
links between WEU and the alliance, including joint councils and co-operation between secretariats.
33. Ministers stressed the importance, for future co-operation between WEU and NAIO, of the pro-
gress made in WEU in identifying those assets and capabilities that WEU will need in its future opera-
tions, as well as in defining its views on the mechanisms and procedures for the use of assets and capabi-
lities which the alliance could make available to WEU. They stressed the importance of NAIO comments
for pursuing joint work in this field. They also invite NATO to work with WEU to develop a list of assets
and capabilities that could be made available. Ministers recalled the importance they attach to WEU
having an effective intelligence handling facility and to the conclusion of the discussions in this field with
NATO.
34. Ministers welcomed the continuing co-operation and the institutional dialogue between WEU and
NAIO to develop further the CJTF concept, including joint meetings of the WEU Politico-Military Work-
ing Group and NAIO's Provisional Policy Co-ordination Group and attendance of the Planning Cell and
cross-representation of secretariats in the meetings of those groups.
35. These are all significant developments which illustrate the new level of mutually reinforcing
co-operation reached in WEU-NAIO relations.
4. Transallantic publiciry activitie s
36. Ministers took note of the report on transatlantic publicity activities and approved the recommen-
dations on measures to increase the effectiveness of TPA activities and on the message that TPA events
should seek to convey. They looked forward to the forthcoming Washington Conference under the United
Kingdom chairmanship of the TPA.
5. Relations with third countries
37 . Ministers reiterated the particular importance of appropriate relationships with Russia and Ukraine.
They welcomed the Permanent Council decision on the framing of the dialogue with these two countries.
Contacts with Russia and Ukraine, in the framework of this decision, while not duplicating dialogue in
other fora, will allow for the development of the existing dialogue with WEU and for exchanges of
information on issues of common interest.
38. Ministers took note with appreciation of the report by the Mediterranean Group on its activities,
following a new round of consultations in April with Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
They endorsed its recommendations for the future and in particular the review of its mandate. They
expressed the wish that the subjects identified by the Permanent Council for the continuation of this dia-
logue will allow its further enhancement.
39. Ministers welcomed the Permanent Council's decision to enter into a dialogue with Cyprus' and
Malta, which would evolve in line with the development of links between Cyprus and Malta and the Euro-
pean Union.
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6. Relations with the OSCE and the Pact on Stability in Europe
40. Ministers stressed the importance they attach to the place of the OSCE in the European security
architecture and noted in particular its potential as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict-
prevention and crisis-management, as well as in promoting the rule of law, democracy and respect for
human rights. Ministers welcomed the progress achieved at the Budapest summit in strengthening the
OSCE as a comprehensive security structure based on shared values and reiterated their support in parti-
cular for the intensification of OSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict decided by the
Budapest summit.
4I. Ministers welcomed the conclusion in Paris, on 20th April 1995, of the Pact on Stability in Europe
and sftessed its potential for peace and stability in Europe.
7, Situation in former Yugoslavia
42. Ministers discussed the situation in former Yugoslavia and approved the declaration at Annex.
8, Other questions
43. Ministers welcomed the decision, taken in New York on llth May 1995, to extend the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty for an indefinite period. This decision undoubtedly reinforces international security
and therefore represents a success for the international community as a whole. Not only does it assure the
pennanence of the treaty, but it also strengthens the international standard for non-proliferation. It creates
a better chance of securing the accession of those states that have not yet joined, so that the NPT can
become universal. Ministers stressed that the European Union and its member states as well as the other
WEU nations, for which the extension of the NPT was a priority objective, have, together with many other
states, greatly confibuted to this success.
4. Ministers underlined the importance of an early deposit of all the instruments of ratification of the
Open Skies Treaty, which will allow for the entry into force of the rea[. In this context, Ministers noted
the d6marches carried out by the Presidency and expressed the hope that the remaining difficulties
experienced by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus will be overcome in the near future.
45. They expressed their appreciation for the achievements of the Institute under the authority of its
Director, Mr. John Roper. They welcomed the appointment of Mr. Guido l*nzi, as the new Director of the
Institute. Ministers paid ribute to the achievements of the Planning Cell under the authority of its Direc-
tor, Lt. Gen. Marcello Caltabiano, and welcomed the appointment of Vice-Admiml Rafael De Morales, as
his successor.
1. Turkey dissociates itself from this decision.
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ANNEX
D e c hration on fonne r Yugo s lavia
l. Ministers expressed their deep concern at the recent developments with respect to former Yugo-
slavia, which present growing risks to the region.
2. Ministers expressed profound concern over the escalation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
They also condemned attacks on United Nations safe areas and on United Nations personnel, which can-
not be tolerated. They expressed their full support for the efforts pursued by the United Nations in order
to renew the agreement on cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina reached on I st January 1 995,
and appealed to the parties to accept such a renewal without any further delay.
3. Ministers expressed their undivided support for the continued international efforts by the EU, the
United States and the Russian Federation, namely for those of the contact group, including its peace plan,
aiming at a political solution to the conflict. They reiterated deep concerns at the continued refusal of the
Bosnian Serbs to accept that initiative. They deplored the continuing hostilities resulting from this situa-
tion. They underlined the need for renewed urgent efforts towards a lasting peace sefflement.
4. Ministers addressed the issue of mutual recognition between all states of former Yugoslavia within
their internationally recognised borders, and consider that such a move would constitute a very positive
step towards a global political solution. They recalled the important decision taken by Belgrade to support
the peace plan and to close the border with Bosnia, and reaffirmed the need for further effective pressure
on the Bosnian Serbs.
5. Ministers reiterated that lifting the arms embargo would entail a further escalation of the conflict,
increase the sufferings of the civilian population, pose grave risks to international organisations in the
field, and could lead to the withdrawal of United Nations forces 2.
6. Ministers considered that full implementation of the Washington Agreements establishing the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other commitments entered into by the parties, is an essential
factor in an overall political settlement based on the principle of balanced reatrnent for all the peoples of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this context, Ministers re-emphasised the crucial importance of the efforts to
arrive at a single adminisration of Mostar, including a unified police force. They appealed to the parties
for their active co-operation to reach the objectives laid out in the memorandum of understanding concern-
ing the European Union administration of the city.
7. Ministers discussed the situation in Croatia and expressed their profound preoccupation at the rene-
wal of hostilities, and in particular the actions affecting civilian populations. They condemned the action
taken by Croatia in violation of the cease-fire agreement of 29th March 1994, which endangers the efforts
being pursued under the aegis of the international community to promote a peaceful solution for the
Krajinas, and which took place at the time when the new United Nations confidence restoration operation
in Croatia is being deployed. They fully supported the presidential statement of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council demanding that the Croatian forces withdraw immediately from the zone of separation in sec-
tors North and South and that both the Croatian and the Serbian sides should withdraw from sector East
and they demanded the immediate restoration of United Nations authority in the zones concerned. Minis-
ters condemned Serb retaliation against urban cenfies in Croatia, particularly Zagreb, and the detention of
United Nations personnel. They reiterated their commitment to promoting a political solution that pre-
serves Croatian sovereignty over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders, and fully
respecting the rights of the Serb community in conformity with internationally recognised standards.
8. Ministers called on the parties to show the utmost restraint and to avoid any initiative which would
entail a new escalation of the conflict. They expressed their support for the efforts of UNCRO and ECMM
aimed at facilitating the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and assisting the re-establishment of
normal life in the Western Sector and called on the parties to allow for freedom of movement of the United
Nations forces in performing their mission. Ministers invited the parties to enter, without any further
delay, into political negotiations under the aegis of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.
9. Ministers expressed their appreciation for the activities carried out by NAIO in former Yugoslavia
pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolutions, including in support of United Nations
forces.
2. Turkey dissociates itself from this paragraph.
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Drafi Recommendatian
on Eumpe and the establishment of a new world
orderfor peoce and secarity
The Assembly,
(i) Disturbed by the fact that the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations is
also-the 
-ygar iq w_hic_h the !!Che.st number of aqled regional conflicts has been recorded throughout the
world, although the United Nations is involved by means of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and
peace-making operations with a view to re-establishing peace and security in the areas concerned; -(ii) Considering that most of today's armed conflicts causing the worst destruction and human casual-
ties are not taking place between but within member states of the United Nations;(iii) Condemning Russia's military operations against the civilian population of Chechnya where basic
human right.s, as recognised in the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of the
OSCE, continue to be violated;
(iv) Stressing that in combating terrorist activities such as those pursued by the Kurdish PKK it is
necessary to respect the appropriate proportion of means and the fundamental principles of internationally
recognised human rights;
(u) Firmly convinced that a continuous political dialogue with the religious movements, of increasing
importance particularly in the Islamic world, in a spirit of tolerance and mutual understanding is still cru--
cial in order to avoid mutual misunderstanding and growing discontent turning religious movements into
political and even terrorist violence;
(yi) Convinced that the United Nations can come to grips with the new challenges stemming from the
changing nature of armed conflicts only if its member counffies are prepared:
(a) to give the United Nations their full support as the only existing universal organisation devoted
to the maintenance of international peace and security;
(b) t9 agree to substantial changes in the United Nations Charter in order to provide the organisa-
tion with the necessary means, organisational effectiveness and authority;
(c) to work out practical concepts for the division of labour between the United Nations and regio-
nal organisations in peace-keeping and crisis-management;
(vii) Concerned, howgve,r,. that the growing difficulties of the United Nations to carry out its steadily-
increasing duties while lacking the necessary means and organisational professionalism mightprompt cer-
tain leading member countries, particularly the United States, to question the usefulness of-the United
Nations as an instrument for maintaining peace;
(uiii) Convinced therefore that all the member countries of Western European Union, together with asso-
ciate members, associate partners and observers, have an important responsibility in overcoming these
dangerous qelJds and, in close co-operation with the United States, jointly taking the necessary steps to
reform the United Nations in every possible way;
(ix) Consequently deploring that the European Union has so far failed to agree on joint action for refor-
ming the United Nations in questions of peace-keeping and crisis-management, nor has it asked WEU, on
the basis of Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Maastricht Treaty, to elaborate a comprehensive European
contribution in this matter;
(x) Deploring also that neither the WEU Noordwijk declaration nor the preliminary conclusions on the
formulation of a common European defence policy published by the WEU Council on 14th November
1994 contain a chapter on relations between WEU and the United Nations;(xi) Expressing firrnly the wish that WEU's new tasks set out in the Petersberg declaration should extend
beyond the planning stage in a foreseeable future;
(xii) Welcoming in this context the ltalian proposal for the creation of a WEU multinational task force
for emergency humanitarian intervention;
(.riii) Recalling the persisting dangers for international peace and security stemming from:
( a ) international terrorism;
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(b) problems of mass migration;
(c) uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile tech-
nology;
(xiv) Wishing the positive effect of the unlimited extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Eeaty to be
completed bylhe early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and the further agreed reduction of
the nuclear arsenals which still exist to be pursued;
(n) Recalling the importance of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of geno-
cide approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and in force since 195 1 ;
(xvi) Recalling the importance of an early ratification of the chemical weapons convention and of the
1972 biological weapons convention;
(xyii) Anxious that increasing differences between NATO member countries and Russia in important
issues regarding European security might jeopardise the effectiveness of the CFE Treaty;
(ruiii) Stressing the importance of making a clearer definition of the r6le of the OSCE as a regional orga-
nisation in the sense of chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter,
Rncouwuos rHAr rrre CouNcu-
l. Establish, possibly in the framework of the elaboration of a white paper on European security, a
comprehensive European contribution to reforming the United Nations Charter in peace-keeping. and.cri-
sis-management with the aim of allowing the Security Council to authorise action in certain situations
within countries if the human rights of people in the relevant country are so severely violated as to
require an international response on humanitarian grounds and introduce such an initiative in the United
Nations;
2. Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to sfrengthen the efficiency and operability of
United Nations forces, increase their means of action and ensure better conduct of their humanitarian and
peace-keeping missions ;
3. Take steps in the United Nations to examine the possible need to strengthen the application of the
convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide approved by the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations;
4. Propose a comprehensive concept on the tasks WEU should assume in regard to operations under
the mandate of the United Nations and the OSCE;
5. Seek agreement with the OSCE and NAIO on a division of labour between the OSCE, NATO and
WEU in peace-keeping, crisis-management and crisis-prevention;
6. For this purpose, accelerate its efforts to make WEU fully operational so as to be ablg 19 carry out
at least the missions envisaged in the Petersberg declaration including those of a WEU multilateral task
force for emergency humanitarian interventions as proposed by Italy;
7 . Inform the Assembly of the tasks of combat forces in crisis-management elaborated by the Planning
Cell and the plans for setting up operational WEU structures for international observer missions;
8. Urge all member countries, associate members, associate partners and observer countries which
have not yet ratified the chemical weapons convention and the l9T2biological weapons convention, to
accelerate the ratification process;
9. Ask France and the United Kingdom to take an initiative among nuclear weapon states to agree on
the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to consider, together with all nuclear
weapon states, further substantial reductions of nuclear arsenals, priority being given to those countries
which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, and further ensure that, in the export of nuclear technology,
care is taken not to allow the emergence of new nuclear weapon states;
10. Agree on a joint initiative in regard to the September 1995 review conference of the 1980 United
Nations Conference on excessively dangerous conventional weapons in order to adopt rules limiting the
development of certain such weapons including non-lethal and anti-personnel laser weapons;
11. Maintain a dialogue with the Maghreb countries, Egypt and other countries of the Islamic world in
order to promote the widest possible co-operation with these countries;
12. Ensure that WEU is regularly represented, together with the European Union, in consultations in the
ASEAN regional security forum.
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Exphnatory Momorandum
(submitud by Mr. Marclull, Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
1. As the subject of the present report is ex-
tremely vast, your Rapporteur is aware, as he
stressed at the committee meeting on
27th March 1995, of the dfficulty of concentra-
ting on the essential problems in which European
countries in particular have to assume responsibi-
lity. It is true that today any development of a
conflict situation, in whatever area of the world it
should arise, cannot be without possible repercus-
sions on European security interests. It will there-
fore be necessary to analyse regularly the situa-
tion on a world scale. Of course, it cannot be the
purpose of this report to advocate that WEU
should assume the leading r6le in settling all pos-
sible corflicts throughout the world. But it should
shoulder its appropriate share of responsibility in
helping to promote peace, stability and security in
accordance with its means and treaty obligations.
2. Even if it is only a repetition of longstand-
ing facts, it is useful to remember that the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty imposes on its signatory
countries certain fundamental and far-reaching
obligations for the preservation of an international
peace and security order based on their resolution
expressed in the preamble:
" to reaffirm their faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity of the human
person and in the other ideals proclaimed
by the Charter of the United Nations;
to fortify and preserve the principles of
democracy, personal freedom and political
liberty, the constitutional haditions and the
rule of law, which are their common heritage;
to afford assistance to each other, in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United
Nations, in maintaining international peace
and security and in resisting any policy of
aggression ... "
3. The Council of Western European Union
was created " for the purpose of strengthening
peace and security " ... and at the request of any of
the member countries " shall be immediately
convened in order to permit them to consult with
regard to any situation which may constitute a
threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should
arise ... " Moreover, as they are all full members
of the European Union, WEU member countries,
when signing and ratifying the Maastricht Treaty,
undertook to further the objectives of the Union's
common foreign and security policy (CFSP),
among them:
- 
to preserve peace and shengthen interna-
tional security, in accordance with the
principles of the Charter of the United
Nations as well as the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of
the Paris Charter;
- 
to promote intemational co-operation, and;
- 
to develop and consolidate democracy
and the rule of law, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms
(Article J.1, of the Maastricht Treaty).
4. A provision of special importance is
Article J.5, paragraph 4, of the Maastricht Treaty
providing that:
" Member states which are also members
of the United Nations Security Council,
will concert and keep the other member
states fully informed. Member states,
which are pennanent members of the Secu-
rity Council will, in the execution of their
functions, ensure the defence of the posi-
tions and the interests of the Union " but
" without prejudice to their responsibilities
under the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations."
5. However, six years after the dismantling of
the Berlin wall and the end of the east-west
confrontation, and on the eve of the celebration of
the fiftieth anniversary of the signature and the
entering in force of the Charter of the United
Nations, the only existing universal organisation in
the world aimed at preserving intemational peace
and security, we have to realise that the great hopes
that all the ideals proclaimed in its charter could
now be implemented in a true world order of peace,
security and liberty, are far from having been frans-
lated into reality. On the contrary, increasing parts
of the world are faced with the danger of growing
disorder amidst increasing number of regional
conflicts or tensions, from which only a few conti-
nents and world areas are spared.
II. The new challcnges for internatianal peace
and security
6. Only a few hours away from major Euro-
pean capitals a terrible war has been raging on the
territory of former Yugoslavia for almost five
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years and the intemational community is able nei-
ther to find the proper means to terminate it nor
even to agree on the nature of that conflict, nor
can it decide whether it is a civil war or a conflict
between foreign countries in which aggressors
and victims can clearly be distinguished.
7 . The political situation on the territory of the
Commonwealth of Independent States is still
uncertain bearing in mind the many regional
conflicts as yet unresolved, particularly in the
Caucasus and in the Russian Federation itself; the
international community has no choice but to wit-
ness a violent so-called " intrastate " conflict in
Chechnya, officially regarded as an internal mat-
ter for Russia in which the intemational commu-
nity has no right to intervene. However, Russia
and all the other participants of the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
have just agreed at a summit meeting in Budapest
on a code of conduct according to which:
" Each participating state will ensure that
any decision to assign its armed forces to
internal security missions is a:rived at in
conformity with constitutional procedures.
Such decisions will prescribe the armed
forces' missions, ensuring that they will be
performed under the effective control of
constitutionally established authorities and
subject to the rule of law. If recourse to
force cannot be avoided in performing
internal security missions, each participa-
ting state will ensure that its use must be
commensurate with the needs for enforce-
ment. The armed forces will take due care
to avoid injury to civilians or their property.
The participating states will not use armed
forces to limit the peaceful and lawful exer-
cise of their human and civil rights by per-
sons as individuals or as representatives of
groups nor to deprive them of their natio-
nal, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic
identity. "
8. The majority of observers agree that this
code of conduct has not been respected by the
Russian authorities in re-establishing state conftol
over the region of Chechnya which is seeking to
gain its independence from Russia. The weakness
of the code of conduct is clearly revealed by the
agreement reached in Budapest that it is only poli-
tically binding and not even eligible for legisla-
tion under Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
9. Finally, it was possible to install an OSCE
observer mission in Chechnya which, however,
has enormous difficulties in fulfilling its tasks
while the fighting continues. But this conflict and
growing differences between Russia and member
countries of the Atlantic Alliance might also have
repercussions on the CFE Treaty if Russia decides
to deploy in the northem Caucasus a new anny
which would constitute a breach of the above-
mentioned treaty obligations subscribed to by the
former Soviet Union, since these obligations com-
mit Russia as successor country of the Soviet
Union.
10. At the same time, a growing number of
regional tensions and conflicts are to be observed
in other world regions, as in Africa, Asia, South
America, the Middle East and in particular in the
southem region of the Mediterranean area where
religious fundamentalism is turning towards
growing political aggression and violence thus
destabilising a number of counfties in those areas.
1 I . It is therefore of tremendous importance for
the WEU Council, with the help of its Mediterra-
nean working group, but also with that of the
WEU lnstitute for Security Studies, to continue to
maintain regular contacts and exchanges of views
with the Maghreb countries, Egypt and, in parti-
cular, Algeria. The organisation by the Dutch pre-
sidency of a seminar on " North Africa Challenge
and Response", held in The Hague on 5th Decem-
ber 1994, was in fact a good opportunity for fur-
ther reflection but it should be ensured that such
events allow a real dialogue with experts and
representatives of the relevant southem Mediter-
ranean countries.
12. Because of the importance of this dialogue
which can contribute significantly to improving
understanding of the problems these countries are
facing, the WEU Council should not be over-
anxious to limit this dialogue to politico-military
and defence questions so as not duplicate work
with the authorities of the European Union or the
OSCE. If these countries seek a broader dialogue,
no channel should be neglected and the modified
Brussels Treaty offers WEU representatives a par-
ticularly wide spectrum of competences. The
Council of WEU should also examine very ca,re-
fully the debates and results of the Islamic confe-
rence held in Khartoum at the beginning of April
and the consequences to be drawn for developing
a wider dialogue.
13. [n several trouble spots, notably in Soma-
lia, Rwanda and Bosnia, inability to settle regio-
nal conflicts with the ways and means so far prac-
tised by the United Nations has multiplied calls
for fundamental reform of the working methods
of the United Nations in crisis-management and
peace-keeping including the reform of its charter
and the working of its Security Council. Focal
points in Asia are Afghanistan and Cambodia; in
Africa (apart from Somalia) ffouble spots have to
be settled in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique and
Rwanda; in South America, El Salvador, Guate-
mala and Haiti are on the problem list of the Uni-
ted Nations and recently even, a violent border
conflict almost led to warfare in the traditional
sense between Peru and Ecuador. The reasons for
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the many internal conflicts cannot always be redu-
ced to one and the same common denominator.
Sometimes they are caused by radical ethnic ten-
sions, sometimes by ideological differences,
sometimes by fanatical exploitation of the popula-
tion (for instance in Haiti) or sometimes simply
by power struggles between hostile clan groups
(as in Somalia). Only the consequences of the dif-
ferent conflicts have something in common: the
populations are affected by these conflicts and
deprived of their fundamental living conditions
mainly through the destruction of the infrastruc-
ture of the relevant countries'. The release of
mass flows of refugees is only one of the conse-
quences of these conflicts.
14. Problems of international mass migration
caused by the rapid increase of the world popula-
tion and the rising number of regions of political
instability and famine are demonstrated by the
fact that the global number of refugees has clim-
bed from 2.5 million in 1970 to over 23 million
today. The number of displaced persons within
countries is even larger: approximately 26 million
in 1994 and still rising. No fewer than 71 coun-
tries are currently producing or hosting significant
numbers of refugees 2.
15. Returning to the problems in Africa, one
should note the fact that many countries south of
the Sahara have an average defence expenditure
of about 4.5 Vo of their gross national product; for
Angola the figure is more than32 %o,for Mozam-
bique it is more than 9.8 clo and for Ethiopia it is
more than 7.4 Vo. The danger of this continent
remaining a conflict cenffe will remain as long as
fighting continues between the various guerrilla
movements and the established r6gimes in so
many countries.
16. In the East, the long-standing conflict bet-
ween India and Pakistan over Kashmir is still a
source of dangerous tension in the region even
though both sides have affirmed their
commitment to respect a ceasefre and to seek a
peaceful resolution of the conflict. The matter is
dangerous because both countries have nuclear
technology and plentiful arms supplies.
17. Regarding the Asian-Pacific region, the
establishment of a new govemment in Cambodia,
where the United Nations mandate was completed
successfully, has changed the security situation in
the Asian region in a positive manner. [n
July 1994, a regional forum for consultations in
security matters was created between the ASEAN
member countries (Association of South-East
Asian Nations) of which Australia, China, Japan,
1. c.f. Christian Tomuschat, Europa Archiv, No. 24, 24th
December 1994, page 67 8.
2. Study of the Intemational Crisis Group, February 1995,
Camegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington.
Canada, South Korea, Laos, New Zealand, Papua-
New Guinea, Russia, the United States and the
European Union are members. One of the objec-
tives of this consultative forum is to remove any
remaining conflict potential in Southern Asia 
- 
in
particular territorial disputes on the Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea or the question of
Taiwan and Hong-Kong. It might also be an
appropriate forum to make a contribution to a just,
comprehensive and internationally-acceptable
solution to the question of East Timor, a question
in which the United Nations has been involved for
a long time.
18. In this context, Japan's policy of defen-
ding its interests in the Asia-Pacific area conti-
nues to be based firmly on its close relationship
with the United States despite outstanding econo-
mic disputes and difficulties between the two
countries. With the election of the democrat,
Bill Clinton, as President of the United States,
American policy has shown increasing interest in
developing its relationship with Asia. Consulta-
tions have therefore been strengthened in the fra-
mework of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-
operation) the membership of which includes six
ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei,
as well as Ausfralia, Japan, Canada, South Korea,
New Zealand, the United States of America, the
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong-Kong,
Mexico and Papua-New Guinea. In order to
enhance the importance of this forum which seeks
to liberalise the multinational economic system
in the region, several meetings at the level of
heads of state and of government have been orga-
nised.
19. Furthermore, the creation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) bef
ween the United States, Canada and Mexico
started on lst January 1994 has established the
second largest free trade area after that created by
the European Union. It is to be hoped that the
functioning of the abovementioned regional
forums and organisations, in which countries
with sometimes very opposite interests are repre-
sented, might also contribute to stability and
security in those areas, thus avoiding the need to
introduce peace-keeping and crisis-manage-
ment means under the authority of the United
Nations.
20. A great open question however remains:
what kind of r6le will North Korea play in the
future? This question concerns notably the future
attitude of this country regarding the control of its
nuclear programme, as well as whether North
Korea, a signatory of the nuclear non-prolifera-
tion heaty, will continue to be aparty to this trea-
ty. After the joint statement by North Korea and
the United States on 13th August 1994, one may
hope that North Korea's indication that it was pre-
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pared to remain apafiy to the nuclear non-prolife-
ration treaty and would allow implementation of
the safeguards agreement under the treaty, will
foster the normalisation of the country with other
countries in the region.
21. In the area of worldwide arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation of conventio-
nal and non-conventional armaments, the pro-
blems of smuggling and clandestine arms transfer,
especially of ABC weapons is becoming increa-
singly threatening. Of course, it is most welcome
that the worldwide conference held in New York
from lTth April to lzthMay 1995 led to the deci-
sion reached by consenStrs among the more than
175 participating counffies to extend the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty for an indefinite period.
However, a few days earlier, North Korea
announced that it would leave the conference.
There is also uncertainty about the prospects of
the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty
and a global ban on the production of fissile mate-
rial for building nuclear weapons. The process of
ratification of the chemical weapons convention
is also progressing quite slowly. By the end of
March 1995, only 27 of 159 signatory countries
have ratified the convention3. An increasing num-
ber of countries which refuse to participate in the
international missile technology control r6gime
(MTCR) are developing ballistic and cruise miss-
ile technology, thus increasing the risk of uncon-
trolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Furtherrnore, the Open Skies Treaty has still
not come into force.
22. During the Political Committee's recent
visit to Canada and the United States, it was parti-
cularly interesting to hear Canadian govemmental
representatives and also members of parliament
presenting a definition of " security " which goes
beyond the basic military or politico/military area.
International population glowth, mass immigra-
tion (already mentioned above), international
crime, narcotic trafficking and also environmental
dangers resulting from changes in climate are
considered as security threats in a very broad
sense in Canada.
23. Another area of increasing danger stems
from the individual terrorist groups and also so-
called " renegate " countries in using terrorism as
part of their political activities to make use of the
knowledge of intemational scientists (for instance
from the former Soviet Union who have lost theirjobs) to build up weaponry of mass desffuction.
This was one of the reasons for establishing the
Intemational Science and Technology centre in
Moscow to help those scientists find new fields of
application for their talents and abilities.
3. Information given by the French Ministry for Foreign
Affairs.
III. Necessity and limits of reforming
thc intemational system of crisis-prevention
and crisis-managcment
(il rne Ilnitod Natbns
24. It is not your Rapporteur's intention to
renew the debate on the still controversial question
of whether the idea of creating a universal order of
peace and security is based on an illusion. Of cour-
se, the time has not yet come for a world govem-
ment, but the development of a global order not as
an end in itself, but as a means of protection
against universal dangers and as a possibility for
reaching common goals, must be recognised as a
necessity. The first step in this direction was the
creation of the United Nations which of course has
no power of its own but which has proved its use-
fulness. Its efFrciency can be considerably impro-
ved if all member states show the political will to
use it still more as the main instrument for ensu-
ring international peace and security as proposed
in Article I of the United Nations Charter.
25. However, any thought of reforming the
United Nations as principal guarantor of interna-
tional peace and security has to take account of
the fact that the United Nations as it was 50 years
ago is not at all the same today. When it was crea-
ted, there were 51 founder-members who all had
the impression that they had just experienced the
most disasfious world war in history. Today, the
United Nations has 184 membercountries. Only a
small minority, which could be described as those
belonging to the OECD, constitute a group of
higtrly industrialised countries in which the eco-
nomy is prosperous, human rights and social wel-
fare are generally respected and politics are based
on democratic structures and principles. The secu-
rity of most North West hemisphere countries is
guaranteed by military alliances such as NATO
and by increasing political integration of the
European Union type. The creation of a sfionger
OSCE helps to bring the various parts of the for-
mer Soviet empire closer to a pan-European and
ffansatlantic collective security system.
26. The great majority of today's United
Nations member countries however are not
among this privileged group of states. Only a very
small percentage of the world population lives in
member countries of the OECD. A great majority
of United Nations member countries, in particular
in Africa and Asia, still have an anarchical system
based on a security perception which is based
mainly on their own military power as the only
instrument for guaranteeing peace and order in the
country and the security of territorid borders. For
them, national sovereignty is a cornerstone of
their existence.
27. It is one of the difficult tasks of the United
Nations to reduce the system of anarchy by an
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international order ofpeace and security based on
co-operative security and economic and social
welfare. Other means might be to increase efforts
to introduce democracy among less privileged
countries without imposing on them systems
which do not correspond to their respective tradi-
tions and sometimes different ways of life and
thinking. The idea of establishing a world order
can be convincing for the majority of less privile-
ged countries only if there is no risk of them being
given the impression that this enterprise might
lead to a hegemonial system led by a small club of
highly developed countries creating a sort of neo-
colonialism. On the other hand, the United
Nations must not be allowed to develop into an
assembly where an overwhelming majority of so-
called third world countries can block any sub-
stantial progress with the result that moie and
more great powers 
- 
which are also the largest
financial contributors to the organisation 
- 
lose
interest in the United Nations.
28. There is no lack of ideas and proposals
regarding the necessary reform of the United
Nations in order to adapt its charter and its capa-
bilities to the new challenges. One of the prin-
ciples on which the Charter of the United Nations
is legally based is that of " the sovereign equality
of all its members " (Article 2, parugraph I of the
Charter). Paragraph 7 of the same article states:
" Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorise the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present
Charter. "
The only exception is that " this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement mea-
sures under Chapter VII. " This chapter gives the
Security Council the right to determine whether
there exists " any threat to peace, break of the
peace, or act of aggression " and gives it the
authority to decide on measures to handle the mat-
ter without involving the use of armed forces or to
take such action by military force as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. (Article 42 of the Charter).
29. But according to a report issued by the Uni-
ted Nations Secretary-General on 3rd January
1995 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of
the United Nationsa, of twenty-one peace-keeping
operations established since 1988, only eight have
related to inter-state wars, whereas thirteen
(62 7o\ have related to intra-state conflicts. Of the
cleven operations established since January 1992
all but two (82 Vo\ rclate to intra-state conflicts.
30. In reality, it has so far been rarely possible
to reach agreement in the Security Council about
whether an " internal conflict " in whatever world
region is to be considered a threat to international
peace or an act of aggression, allowing the United
Nations to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction
of a member state. There are therefore growing
calls to amend the Charter to this effect. This is
not the only area where amendments have been
proposed however. At the end of Septem-
ber 19945 Gerard Fuchs, Secretary of the French
Socialist Party launched the following five propo-
sals:
" First, it is necessary to introduce into the
charter the notion of democratic and huma-
nitarian intervention... famine and genoci-
de, non-respect of the rights of minorities,
for example, seem to be widely accepted as
unquestionable grounds for intervention. "
Similar considerations have been introduced in
other frameworks, for instance in the progress
report by the Political-Military steering commit-
teelad hoc group on co-operation in peace-kee-
ping of the NACC on 2nd December 19946,
announcing the examination for spring 1995 of
the legal basis for presence and action under
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, limitations on national sovereignty...
" Moreover, in a report of the 'Commission
on Global Governance', established in
1992 at the instigation of former German
Chancellor Willy Brandt, presented in
Davos by Mr. Ingmar Carlsson at the end of
February 19951, an amendment of the
Chaner of the United Nations was propo-
sed permitting intemational action in cases
which, in the judgment of the Security
Council, constitute such a gross violation
of the security of people that an internatio-
nal response is required on humanitarian
grounds. "
Of course it will be most difficult to agree on such
an amendment calling into question one of the
foundations of the Charter, which will be defended
by various countries and not only these belonging
to the so-called third world. But it is worth taking
an appropriate initiative in order to transfer at least
part of state sovereignty to the United Nations
without lapsing into a sort of neo-colonialism. The
second proposal suggests that:
" the United Nations must devolve certain
responsibilities to regional organisations
that exist or are to be created. Fire-fighting
is all right, fire-prevention is better and
neighbours are the best placed for that. "
5. [.e Monde, 28th September 1994.
6. Atlantic News, No. 2677 (Atrcx),6th December 1994.
7. lnrcmational Herald Tribune, 25th January 1995.4. Document A/50/60 Sll995ll.
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31. This last argument which was also put for-
ward by a representative of the Canadian foreign
affairs ministry during the committee's recent
visit to this country merits more careful examina-
tion to which your rapporteur will revert subse-
quently.
" Third, it is necessary to strengthen the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the Secw-
ity Council for its decisions to be better
applied and less suspect. Germany and
Japan have a place as new permanent mem-
bers. Other states should be added: a Latin-
American, an African, an Asian and an
Arab. "
32. It is obvious that in opening the question of
enlarging the United Nations Security Council
one enters into such difficult problems that it will
be unrealistic to expect early agreements or solu-
tions. The so-called " Open-ended working group
on the question of equitable representation on the
increase of the membership of the Security Coun-
cil " has not yet been able to submit a recommen-
dation to harmonise proposals emanating from
almost a hundred different United Nations mem-
ber countries. It might therefore be more mea-
ningful to concentrate on the problem of how to
improve the efficiency of the Security Council
even though this question cannot be totally sepa-
rated from that of its composition. The possible
representation of the European Union as an orga-
nisation in the Security Council (project which
has apparently been abandoned in the meantime)
again demonsffates the importance of the question
of whether the charter should continue to rely
exclusively on the sovereignty of nation states.
33. In this context it was very interesting to
hear the position defended by a representative of
the Canadian foreign office during the Political
Committee's recent visit to Ottawa. Canada has
opted for more ffansparency and openness in the
deliberations of the Security Council, so that
countries which might be asked to send peace-
keeping troops in a given world region as a result
of a decision taken by the Security Council could
have the opportunity to be consulted before deci-
sions are made.
" Fourth, the United Nations should be
given permanent or semi-permanent mili-
tary means: just as within a state there is nojustice without police, resolutions of the
United Nations must be backed by forces to
ensure, if necessary, that they are respected.
Several thousand of its own forces and, in
the member states, several thousand avai-
lable forces should be created without
delay. "
34. This subject is also one of the most difficult
and controversial chapters of international crisis-
management. The possibilities offered by the
Charter to establish proper United Nations forces
under a proper United Nations command structure
have never been implemented. The experience in
Somalia has led to a situation where the United
States is now less prepared to participate in Uni-
ted Nations peace-keeping operations unless
conducted under United States command.
Congress is even making major efforts to reduce
the powers of the United States President to enga-
ge United States troops abroad without consulting
it in accordance with the draft peace power act
which has not yet become legislation however.
Moreover, the text of the national security revita-
lisation act adopted by the House of Representa-
tives but not yet by the United States Senate pro-
vides that, with the exception of very limited
situations, the President may not place any ele-
ment of the armed forces under United Nations
command or control.
35. Nevertheless, StateDepartmentrepresenta-
tives demonstrated some optimism during the
Political Committee's visit to Washington in affir-
ming that the United States would never withdraw
from participating in peace-keeping but that it was
the policy of President Clinton to review the
whole procedure in order to reduce costs and
enhance efficiency. Nevertheless, there are
grounds for concern: the United States adminis-
ffation has drawn up firm criteria, one of which
being that any operation has to be in the national
interest of the United States.
36. In a more general context, there are increa-
sing problems among member countries in
making troops and equipment available. As the
recent supplementary report of the United Nations
Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the United Nations of
3rd January 1995 clearly points out8, the availabi-
lity has considerably declined as measured
against the United Nations' requirements.
" A considerable effort has been made to
expand and refine stand-by arrangements,
but these provide no guarantee that ffoops
will be provided for a specific operation.
For example, when in May 1994 the Secur-
ity Council decided to expand the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda(UNAMIR), not one of the 19 governments
that at that time had undertaken to have
ffoops on stand-by agreed to contribute. "
37. The United Nations Secretary-General
concludes therefore that the United Nations does
need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid
reaction force:
" such a force would be the Security Coun-
cil's sffategic reserve for deployment when
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8. Document N50l60lsl995ll.
DOCUMENT 1456
there was an emergency need for peace-
keeping troops. It might comprise batta-
lion-sized units from a number of coun-
tries. These units would be trained to the
same standards, use the same operating
procedures, be equipped with integrated
communications equipment and take part injoint exercises at regular intervals. They
would be stationed in their home countries
but maintained at a high state of readiness.
The value of this arrangement would of
course depend on how far the Security
Council could be sure that the force would
actually be available in an emergency. This
will be a complicated and expensive arran-
gement, but I believe that the time has
come to undertake it. "
38. However, the declaration by the Chairman
of the Security Council made on 22nd Februa-
ry 1995 did not follow this proposal but asked that
the first priority be given to improving the rapid
deployment capability by strengthening existing
stand-by agreements with member states.
39. In view of additional differences between
the Unied States and other United Nations mem-
ber countries involved in efforts to settle the
conflict in former Yugoslavia, and in particular on
the respective r6les of peace-keeping units and
NATO forces in that conflict, there are poor
chances that member countries will follow the
recommendations of the United Nations Secretary-
General. As has been said by several leading defen-
ce politicians, there is on the contrary a tendency to
request that military operations authorised by the
Security Council should be executed under the
exclusive responsibility of relevant military organi-
sations such as NATO (orperhaps WEU);
" Fifth, money is necessary if the Secreta-
ry-General is not to be perpetually at the
mercy of bad payers... too often the United
States. Why not feed the United Nations
budget from that low-rate tax on move-
ments of capitals proposed by serious eco-
nomists...? "
The future of the United Nations' financial pro-
blems &pends in large par,t on the attitude of the
United States, its largest financial contributor.
Here we find a marked tendency both in Congress
and in the United States Govemment, to define
the United States' commitment to United Nations
peace-keeping operations according to very strict
conditions and to reduce considerably the United
States' financial conffibutions:
" Republican proposals for sharp reduc-
tions in the United States funding of the
United Nations have generated uncertainty
here about the future of the traditional Uni-
ted States dominance in the world organisa-
tion. Many countries express concern about
- possible American cutbacks because they
know that when the largest United Nations
donor gives less, the whole organisation
does less. Some fear that an abrupt retreat
by Washington would relegate the United
Nations once again to the marginal r6le it
played during the cold war. "e
40. The United States Ambassador to the Uni-
ted Nations, Mrs. Albright, has therefore started a
campaign to protect the United Nations from
attacks by the Republicans, putting forward the
argument that peace-keeping operations cost only
$4 a year for each citizen'o. Moreover, a study
conducted by the Council of Foreign Relations in
New York " says that the approach of Congress is
based on:
" a palpably false factual assumption that
the United States is contributing dispropor-
tionately to the United Nations in voluntary
contributions. In fact, other countries,
including America's major allies and
friends, also voluntarily underwrite
unreimbursable expenses far in excess of
their formal United Nations assessment for
peace-keeping. "
41. In a further attempt to foster continued Uni-
ted States support for the United Nations, the Uni-
ted States permanent representative to the United
Nations in Geneva affirmed in a speech on
6th February 1995 12, that:
" Money is only a part of the problem. The
erosion of United Nations effectiveness in
many sectors has come about because the
institution has largely escaped the reform
movement of the past twenty years which
all major institutions in industrial societies
have experienced. The lack of majorreform
in the United Nations is beginning to take
its toll, much like corrosion attacks the
structure of a large vessel.
The reform of which I speak is not merely
an issue of moving boxes around in an
organisational diagram. Rather, it is crea-
ting fundamental change in basic areas like
the personnel system, the process of finan-
cial control and budgeting, the complex
governance structures of specialised agen-
cies and the obvious presence offunctional
redundancy and overlap.
Far more is involved, however, than badly
needed structural reform.
The United Nations needs to re-examine its
:f..""r, techniques in many areas.
9. Intemational Herald Tribune, 17th March 1995.
10. Le Monde, 12th February 1995.
11. Intemational Herald Tribune, l4th February 1995.
12. USIS, 2lst February 195.
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The time has come for all the member
states and the United Nations secretariats to
recognise that reform must be a high priori-
ty to be pursued in both of their interests. A
United Nations whose performance erodes
steadily from lack of reform will never
obtain the resources it needs to carry out its
functions on behalf of all nations.
Donors are demanding far greater accoun-
tability, transparency and effectiveness in
the United Nations and our adamance is
fast overcoming the reticence of the past.
The developing countries need to join in
the fight for United Nations reform. They
need to understand that they could be the
principal beneficiaries of a vastly more
efficient United Nations. Reform of the
United Nations is not an effort of the indus-
trialised world to somehow deprive develo-
ping nations of benefits which they receive
as a result of the organisation's work.
The ground rules for peace-keeping need to
be re-examined, but peace-keeping must be
maintained.
Peace-keeping operations within states as
opposed to those between states make dif-
ferent and gteater demands on peace-kee-
pers involving considerable risk for their
security as well as for mission success. In
these situations we should consider
delaying introducing forces until the parties
accept and observe for a trial period milita-
ry and political steps toward a negotiated
settlement.
We also need to look beyond traditional
peace-keeping operations to the ability of
regional organisations or to individual
member states or ad hoc coalitions for
peace-keeping functions authorised by the
Security Council.
We must broaden and dcepen the dialogue
between rich and poor nations. "
42. In a further cffort, the United States
Ambassadorto the United Nations, Mrs. Albright,
underlincd in a testimony to thc United States
Senate's Appropriations Committcc on Foreign
Operations 6h 8th Mafch 1995t3, that United
Nations peace-keeping is a " cost-effective means
of containing regional conflicts, promoting demo-
cracy and human rights, stemming refugees
flows, and bringing stability to regions of strate-
gic and economic importance to the United
States ".
43. The attitude of the United States towards
future support of the United Nations as the only
universal organisation devoted to maintaining
international peace and security will be an impor-
tant matter in the future Euro-American dialogue.
Part of this dialogue will be a better definition and
distinction between the various means and instru-
ments to be used in matters such as:
- 
preventive diplomacy;
- 
peace-making;
- 
peace-keeping;
- 
post-conflict peace-building;
- 
sanctions;
- 
peace-enforcement, etc.
44. It is obvious that neither in all member
countries nor in all relevant international organi-
sations will all the abovementioned notions be
used with the same meaning and significance.
Harmonisation is necessary because it has an
important impact on the efficiency of co-opera-
tion between the United Nations, regional organi-
sations and member countries when conducting a
specific mission in a given situation. In this
connection it seems that the United States and the
United Kingdom have already reached some
agreement on the use of certain definitions.
According to the former United States view,
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement were dis-
tinguished only by different levels of violence.
The British view, however, is that peace-keeping,
which depends on the consent of the people of the
country concerned, is different from " peace-
enforcement " which involves taking sides and
using considerable fire powerta. In Somalia, the
United States changed the aim from peace-
keeping to trying to destroy the warlord Moham-
med Farah Aideed and this did not work. The new
United States manual determines now that " IJni-
ted States policy distinguishes between peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement. Both are peace
operations. However, they are not part of a conti-
nuum allowing a unit to move freely from one
objective to the other. "
45. It seems that there is still much work to be
done to elaborate a comprehensive approach for
using the different instruments thus mentioncd
and this holds true not only between member
statcs but also between the interested organisa-
tions. As revealed in the report of the United
Nations Secretary-General published in Septem-
13. USIS, 29th March t995, hartetional Affairs No. 9.
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ber 1994 on the work of the organisation" a mee-
ting was held in New York on 1st August 1994
between the United Nations Secretary-General
and heads of regional organisations. The purpose
of this meeting was to assess co-operation bet-
ween the United Nations and regional arrange-
ments and organisations with a view to further
enhancing it in the area of peace-keeping and cri-
sis-management. Western European Union was
represented at the meeting but the second part of
the fortieth annual report of the Council provided
no information in this respect. According to the
United Nations Secretary-General's report, parti-
cipants were in broad agreement that primary res-
ponsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security remains with the Security
Council.
46. At the same time, participants acknowled-
ged the desirability of decentralising cenain tasks
under a United Nations mandate. It would be
important to know if another such meeting is
envisaged, when it will take place and what will
be on its agenda. One item which Western Euro-
pean Union should ask to be discussed at a funher
meeting should be the detailed description and
definition of all the instruments of peace-keeping
and crisis-management enumerated in
paragraph 40. Furthermore, the division of labour
between the United Nations and regional organi-
sations in the sense of Chapter VtrI of the United
Nations Charter and between the United Nations
and groups of states in the sense of Chapter Vtr of
the United Nations Charter should be worked out.
This second aspect concerns mainly relations bet-
ween the United Nations and NAIO and WEU.
So far certain difficulties of division of labour
became obvious only between the United Nations
and NAIO, i.e. in the case of the military opera-
tions of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(ii) The rdk of regional organisations
47. The necessary reform of the United Nations
in its r0le of global crisis-prevention and crisis-
management must necessarily include the ques-
tion of co-ordination with regional organisations
in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the
United Nations. In this connection, the future r6le
of the OSCE is of a major interest. At the last
CSCE summit meeting in Budapest on 5th and
6th December 1994, the conference was renamed
" OSCE ". [t was decided that it will be " a prima-
ry instrument for early waming, conflict-preven-
tion and crisis-management " in the region cove-
red by its member states.
48. A closer link was agreed between the Uni-
ted Nations and the OSCE so that " the participa-
ting states may, in exceptional circumstances,jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to the
United Nations Security Council on behalf of the
OSCE ". But a joint Dutch-German initiative, an
" OSCE first " whereby states would attempt to
exhaust the OSCE's dispute resolution possibili-
ties before tuming to the United Nations Security
Council and whereby the OSCE could give assis-
tance to participating states in carrying out mea-
sures subsequently adopted by the United Nations
Security Council, was not adopted. As a result of
a number of other differences on ways and means
of co-operation between the OSCE and the United
Nations, the entire chapter which called also for
an additional and regular flow of information bet-
ween the two organisations was jettisonedt6.
49. In this context, it was particularly interes-
ting to hear the assessment made by
Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn, Director-General of the
International Security Bureau of the Canadian
Ministry for Foreign Affairs during the Political
Committee's visit to Onawa. He strongly recom-
mended that regional organisations should play a
major r6le in conflict-prevention and crisis-mana-
gement because they are closer to and more fami-
liar with the problems on the spot. This is an
important argument, but one could also question
the impartiality of regional organisations in that
neighbouring countries might be more involved in
a conflict.
50. One could also examine more closely how
useful the Organisation of American States (OeS)
was in settling the most recent border dispute bet-
ween Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Lysyshyn introduced
a new element into the discussion in affirming
that established and structured intemational orga-
nisations were not always able to settle a dispute.
He believed therefore in the usefulness of creating
ad hoc groups such as the contact group regarding
former Yugoslavia. These groups had major
advantages even if smaller countries were not
very enthusiastic about this kind of conflict-settle-
ment, but contact groups could have variable
membership. Mr. Lysyshyn also advocated a
contact group approach for settling the dispute
between Peru and Ecuador.
51. These ideas must necessarily be of interest
to European institutions such as the European
Union and Western European Union whose
efforts are concentrated on elaborating a joint
foreign, security and defence policy on a more
structured basis. Regarding the OSCE, Mr. Lysy-
shyn sees its usefulness mainly in two respects:
first in its conflict-prevention function and
observer mission, in particular the OSCE's action
in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
through the mediation of the OSCE Minsk group,
16. North Atlantic Assembly StaffReport on the CSCE Buda-
pest summit meeting, 1994, Document AL282PC (94) 9.15. Document N49l1,2nd September 1994.
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in Georgia and Moldova; second, in the fact that
Russia has a full voice in the OSCE process, thus
avoiding being excluded from participating in an
important way in the process of establishing a
stable European security architecture.
52. But one should not conceal that the OSCE
mission finally authorised in Chechnya was to no
avail. The code of conduct on politico-military
aspects of security adopted in Budapest was not
respected by Russia in Chechnya, the Budapest
summit meeting was unable to agree on any state-
ment about the conflict in former Yugoslavia and
co-operation between the OSCE and the United
Nations remained unclear, as was that with other
organisations, in particular the European Union,
Western European Union and NAIO.
53. The latter's Secretary-General, at a meeting
with the United Nations and regional and other
organisations at the occasion of the OSCE summit
meeting in Budapest, recalled that " the alliance
remains ready to support peace-keeping and other
operations, based on United Nations or OSCE
mandate, but effectiveness requires efficient inter-
action and co-ordination both at the political-stra-
tegic level and at the tactical level ". Moreover,
co-ordination between the OSCE function in
conflict-prevention and the activities of the allian-
ce to enhance its r6le in the same area through the
NACC and PFP process has still to be elaborated
more clearly.
54. Unfortunately, the chapter devoted to rela-
tions between WEU and the CSCE in the prelimi-
nary conclusions on the formulation of a common
defence policy published by the WEU Council is
very short, reaffirming WEU's resolution to sup-
port the CSCE with its own resources and to
continue working with the CSCE (now OSCE),
but there is no concrete information regarding
ways and means. The Assembly has only second-
hand information about the fact that the Secretary-
General of WEU made a written contribution to
the Budapest summit meeting of the CSCE held
on 5th and 6th December 1994, according to
which points of contact have been established bet-
ween the Secretariat and the Planning Cell and
OSCE bodies. It is most regrettable that the text of
this contribution was never transmitted to the
Assembly.
MThe rdle of Europe
(i1 The European (Inion
55. According to Article J.3 of the Maastricht
Treaty, the European Union has the possibility to
define a specific area for a joint action in the fra-
mework of its common foreign and security poli-
cy. Within the so far defined six areas for whichjoint actions have been decided, the question of
reforming the efficiency of the United Nations,
including its Security Council, has not been inclu-
ded. Whereas the presidency conclusion of the
European Council's summit meeting dated
1lth December 1994 makes no particular referen-
ce to this question, the Union addressed a lengthy
memorandum to the 49th General Assembly of
the United Nations, in which it sfiesses the need
for appropriate co-ordination between the United
Nations and regional organisations within the fra-
mework of the Charter of the United Nations.
With reference to the fiftieth anniversary of the
United Nations, no mention is made of eventually
reforming this organisation and in which way, but
the European Union:
" is conscious that the severe financial cri-
sis facing the United Nations has profound
implications for the organisation as a whole
and especially for the effective execution of
its peace-keeping task, since some two
thirds of the substantial contributions due
to the United Nations are owed in this res-
pect. As the financial crisis is due to a lack
of payment discipline on the part of a large
number of United Nations member states,
the European Union calls upon those mem-
ber states to duly fulfil their financial obli-
gations to the United Nations. "
56. Conversely, the European Union made an
important contribution to the General Assembly
of the United Nations on all questions of disarma-
ment, arms control and non-proliferation, in the
framework of which it considers the non-prolife-
ration treaty (NPT) as the comerstone of the glo-
bal nuclear non-proliferation system. The Euro-
pean Union has therefore, in the framework of its
common foreign and security policy (CFSP),
adopted joint action on the preparation of the NPT
review conference held in New York from
lTth April to l2th May 1995.
" The Union is convinced that the streng-
thening of the global nuclear non-prolifera-
tion r6gime can only be achieved through
indefinite and unconditional extension of,
as well as universal accession to, the treaty.
Furthermore, this extension is the basis for
the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
The European Union therefore welcomes
the accessions to the NPT which have
recently taken place and we appeal to those
states still outside the NPT to accede to it as
non-nuclear weapon states and to conclude
safeguards agreements with the Intematio-
nal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
As important supplier countries of nuclear
technology and members of the Nuclear
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Suppliers Group (NSG), the European
Union calls on the other supplier countries
to apply the IAEA full scale safeguards
requirements as a condition for supply and
urges all countries concerned to implement
such full scale safeguard agreements.
The European Union is in favour of a com-
plete, universal and internationally veri-
fiable test ban treaty. In this respect, it wel-
comes the substantial progress made in the
Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive
nuclear test ban reaty (CTBT).
The European Union would also welcome
the initiation of negotiations on a universal,
non-discriminatory and effectively veri-
fiable treaty banning the production of fis-
sile material for nuclear explosive devices(cut-off) in accordance with the General
Assembly Resolutior 4817 5 L. "
On the other hand, the member countries of the
European Union which are nuclear powers seem
not to be very keen on initiating reductions in
their own nuclear arsenals and the Union's above-
mentioned memorandum refers merely to the
importance of implementing existing nuclear
disarmament agreements.
57. Conversely, according to the Union, the
convention on the prohibition of chemical wea-
pons (CWC) is one of the most significant and
innovative agrcements on disarmament and arms
conftol.
" The European Union calls upon all states
which have not yet done so to accede to the
1972 convention on the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin wea-
pons and on their destruction, known as
BTWC. The Union supports the sffengthe-
ning of the BTWC by the addition of an
effective verification r6gime. The Euro-
pean Union notes the work of the special
conference of states parties to the 1972
convention on the prohibition of the (biolo-
gical) and toxin weapons and on their des-
truction, currently meeting in Geneva. The
European Union hopes the special confe-
rence will establish a drafting group with a
mandate to develop a legally binding verifi-
cation protocol. The Union attaches gteat
importance to the effective verification of
the convention. The European Union also
calls upon all states which have not yet
done so to accede to the convention. "
In fact, by the end of March 1995, only 27 coun-
tries had ratified the treaty. 65 ratifications are
necessary before the organisation responsible for
the prohibition of chemical weapons can start
work. In Europe so far Bulgaria, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Norway, Romania, Spain and
Sweden have ratified the treaty. It is of course of
particular importance that all WEU member
countries accelerate their ratification process.
58. Whereas nothing can be found in the
memorandum on the question of counter-prolife-
ration measures regarding the spread of ballistic
and cruise missile capabilities in several world
regions, there is an important paragraph on the
question of dealing with dual-use goods, an area
in which the European Union expects soon to
develop uniform legislation for the export control
of dual-use items.
" An essential component of an effective
monitoring system will be corrmon lists of
dual-use goods, intended destinations and
guidelines for authorisation decisions. "
The Union even made an announcement that deci-
sions on the content of these lists will be the sub-
ject of further joint action within the meaning of
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union. It
would be interesting to know how these initiatives
will fit in with present thoughts in the United
States about creating a replacement for the Cocom
r6gime which was abandoned at the end of the
cold war. According to information gathered
during the committee's visit to Washington, a new
r6gime should be based on consensus between the
parties and should include Russia as a founder
member.
(ii) Westera European Union
59. Reading the memorandum transmitted by
the European Union to the 49th General Assembly
of the United Nations, one should ask whether and
to what extent WEU has made a conffibution to this
paper which tackles a number of questions for
which WEU has special responsibility. However,
apart from some minor references to WEU in the
context of the description of WEU's monitoring
activities regarding the implementation of the
Danube and Adriatic sanctions and regarding WEU
police forces as part of the European Union admi-
nistration of the town of Mostar, only a general
remark about closer links between the European
Union and WEU is to be found in this document.
60. Three observations are called for in this
context: frst, all questions of nuclear non-prolife-
ration and all questions regarding global disarma-
ment and arms control seem to be treated exclusi-
vely by the European Union although their
implications for European defence are more than
evident. It is therefore logical that, according to
the Noordwijk conclusions on a common Euro-
pean defence policy, it is within the responsibility
of WEU govemments to deal with questions of
proliferation, disarmament and the destruction of
nuclear and chemical weapons.
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61. One may therefore wonder why the Euro-
pean Union has so far failed to ask Western Euro-
pean Union, in application of Article J.4, para-
graph2, of the Maastricht Treaty, to elaborate and
implement actions of the Union with regard to
weapons proliferation and disarmament. Second,
one may also wonder why the Union has not yet
made any request for a Western European Union
contribution for reforming the existing United
Nations system of peace-keeping and crisis-
management. Thfud, one has to wonder why the
Council of Westem European Union has not taken
such an initiative of its own accord on the basis of
its obligation stemming from the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, in approaching both the United
Nations and the OSCE.
62. However, the Assembly had recommended
establishing direct co-ordination with the United
Nations and the CSCE with a view to permanent
WEU representation in these two organisations
(Recommendation 559). hr its reply to Recommen-
dation 559, the Council specified that the mission to
the United Nations and to the CSCE of the country
holding the WEU presidency acts as a contact point
for these organisations, and is responsible for pre-
senting WEU's contribution to ttre competent United
Nations or CSCE bodies. The Assembly had also
recommended making " its views known in a more
convincing and visible manner in the United Nations
and arange for WEU to speak with one voice in the
Security Council of that organisation " (Recommen-
dation 565 on a European security policy). But the
reply of the Council referred simply to the text of
Articles J.l and J.5 of the Treaty on European
Union, without mentioning any of the commifinents
the WEU Council has entered into vis-i-vis the Uni-
ted Nations and/or the CSCE following its Peters-
berg declaration.
63. It therefore seems necessary to recall these
new commitments. In the Petersberg declara-
tionrT, WEU ministers agreed:
" As WEU develops its operational capabi-
lities in accordance with the Maastricht
declaration, we are prepared to support, on
a case-by-case basis and in accordance with
our own procedures, the effective imple-
mentation of conflict-prevention and crisis-
management measures, including peace-
keeping activities of the CSCE or the
United Nations Security Council. This will
be done without prejudice to possible
contributions by other CSCE countries and
other organisations to these activities.
WEU member states declare that they are
prepared to make available military units
from the whole spectrum of their conven-
tional armed forces for military tasks
conducted under the authority of WEU.
Decisions to use military units answerable
to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council
in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations. Participation
in specific operations will remain a soverei-
gn decision of member states in accordance
with national constitutions.
Apart from contributing to the common
defence in accordance with Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty and Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty respectively,
military units of WEU member states,
acting under the authority of WEU, could
be employed for:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peace-keeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis-manage-
ment, including peace-making. "
64. In the first part of the fortieth annual report
of the Council to the Assemblyrs, the Council
informs the Assembly that " as regards the new
operational missions defined in the Petersberg
declaration, a basic document on peace-keeping
operations has been presented to ministers, who
have taken note ". No further information is given
on the content or the conclusions to be drawn
from this document which has not been transmit-
ted to the Assembly. However, in its preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common
European defence policy the Council affirms that:
" Some important results have already been
achieved on the organisation and functio-
ning of WEU in times of crisis, on WEU
humanitarian missions and on WEU's r61e
in peace-keeping. The preliminary list of
forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) pro-
vides an indication of units available for
WEU operations. "
65. But the Noordwijk declaration contains no
specific chapter on relations benveen WEU and the
United Nations. Nevertheless it recognises that:
" Recent events have underlined the impor-
tance of WEU to be able to play a more
significant and effective r6le in facing
humanitarian emergencies caused by inter-
national crises or natural catastrophes.
Taking account of the leading r61e of the
European Union as a major body for co-
ordination of European humanitarian assis-
tance, ministers stress that it is one of the
r6le of WEU to provide for a European ins-
trument of reaction in cases where, due to
the urgency of a humanitarian crisis or the
17. Document 1322,zgthJunc 1992.
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need for military protertion, military means
must be employed. Consequently, WEU has
to be able to count on immediately available
capabilities and arrangements which allow a
rapid response to such emergencies. Minis-
ters endorse the report regarding the setting-
up of the arrangements and the provision of
the means for a humanitarian task force and
mandate the Permanent Council speedily to
implement this initiative.
Ministers took note of the initial report,
approved by the Permanent Council, on
WEU's r6le in evacuation operations.
Ministers request the Permanent Council to
continue work on this subject in close co-
ordination with the relevant European
Union bodies. "
Moreover,
" WEIJ governments are ready to take on
their share of the responsibility for the pro-
motion of security, stability and the values
of democracy in the wider world, including
through the execution ofpeace-keeping and
other crisis-management measures under
the authority of the United Nations Securi-
ty Council or the CSCE, acting either inde-
pendently or through WEU or NAIO. They
are also ready to address new security chal-
lenges such as humanitarian emergencies;
proliferation; terrorism; international crime
and environmental risks, including those
related to disarmament and the destruction
of nuclear and chemical weapons. "
66. In the Noordwijk declaration, ministers
reaffirmed their will to set up an independent
European satellite system and recognised the need
to complement WEU capacities in the area of
intelligence and crisis-management in order to
fulfil the tasks mandated by the Petersberg decla-
ration: for instance a situation centre and an intel-
ligence section; moreover, combined civilian and
military activities in the framework of Petersberg
missions are under consideration. Nothing regar-
ding these activities has yet been made known to
the United Nations either directly or through
European Union channels with the result that
WEU still plays only a marginalised r6le in
contributing to strengthening worldwide stability
and security.
67. The activities initiated by the Planning Cell
such as studies on the possible deployment of
WEU maritime forces in response to requirements
in order to accomplish specific Petersberg mis-
sions, studies on WEU's strategic mobility, WEU
involvement in peace-keeping missions, WEU
humanitarian missions, WEU generic evacuation
planning etc. have not yet reached a stage at
which firm proposals can be made for WEU
contributions to worldwide crisis-management.
68. It is now time, however, to accelerate the
decision-making process so that WEU finally
becomes operational in crisis-management.
According to the second part of the fortieth annual
report of the Council, " events n 1994 and diffi-
culties faced by the United Nations system and
non-governmental organisations prompted public
opinion to demand concrete action ". But when
will WEU be ready to offer this kind of action?
When will it be possible to implement the Italian
proposal to create a multinational task force for
humanitarian operations?
69. When will the studies defining the missions
of WEU combat forces in crisis-management
including peace-keeping be carried into effect and
when will the studies for the formation of WEU
observers be completed and what will their task
be? As long as WEU remains at the stage of
theoretical study it will continue to be marginali-
sed in the world where policy is carried into prac-
tice.
70. A particular example of the marginalisation
of WEU's r01e is the case of Rwanda. The above-
mentioned memorandum of the European Union
to the United Nations General Assembly contains
an important chapter on Rwanda in which WEU is
not mentioned at all. The frst part of the fonieth
annual report however affirms that:
" A number of member states confirmed
their readiness to contribute to the initiative
to alleviate the terrible sufferings in Rwan-
da, subject to a new decision from the
United Nations Security Council, taking
into account the time needed to gather the
necessary resources for the effec-
tive deployment of the expanded UNA-
MIR II.
In this context, the Council has decided to
give WEU'S support to the efforts of its
member states by co-ordinating their
contributions.
To this end, the Council confirmed the
mandate given at its first meeting to the
Planning Cell and instructed it to act as a
contact and co-ordination point between
contributing states and the headquarters
commanding the operation.
The Council continued to monitor the situa-
tion in Rwanda in the light of the decisions
of the United Nations Security Council. "
But in reality, internal institutional differences
within the Council have prevented WEU from
making a joint contribution to alleviating suffe-
ring in that country, and have thus again demons-
trated that it is not yet ready to become a serious
player in enhancing stability, peace and security
in the world.
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V Conclusians
71. In a period in which the consequences of
the radical changes in the political landscape
throughout the world make it more and more dif-
ficult to find appropriate common strategies for
redefining and achieving a reliable world order of
stability, peace and security commensurate with
the new challenges, it is particularly embarrassing
that the United Nations, the only universal organi-
sation with a legitimate vocation attaining this
goal, finds itself in the throes of a serious crisis of
credibility. Fifty years after its foundation, the
United Nations certainly needs substantial
reform, but the overall aim of this reform should
be to do the utmost to save this organisation as the
only global organisation we have for managing
conflicts on a worldwide scale.
72. Trying to overburden the necessary reform
work by unduly ambitious projects could easily
lead to a failure. It is crucial to enhance and not
diminish the confidence of the United Nations
countries which do not belong to the small club of
the privileged industrial and highly-developed
" first world " that the United Nations is a frame-
work in which they are heard and in which they
have a say.
73. At the same time it is essential for the West
not to lose interest in the future of the United
Nations. The necessary reform of this organisa-
tion can be achieved only if North America and
Europe agree on a joint approach to this question.
This topic should figure prominently in the ffans-
atlantic dialogue. Europe must convince the Ame-
ricans ttrat the actual trend in the United States
Congtess and in the administration to restrict the
commitments of the United States to the United
Nations according to criteria of purely internal
policy considerations, would have disastrous
consequences in setting precedents which other
western countries might be tempted to follow.
Furthermore, the consequences of the attitude of
Russia, China and Japan, some of the most impor-
tant non-western powers in the framework of the
United Nations, would be unpredictable.
74. Regarding the future r6le of Europe, mean-
ing first and foremost the European Union and
Western European Union as an integral part of the
process of the development of this union, its
conffibution for establishing a new world order
for peace and security is still characterised by a
gap between ambition and reality. Many Euro-
pean countries have a good record of contribu-
tions for international peace-keeping with large
military contingents in several troublespots,
mainly in former Yugoslavia. However, Euro-
peans still have difficulties in speaking with one
voice in international crisis-prevention and crisis-
management. It would therefore be highly appre-
ciated if the European Union would request
WEU, on the basis of Article J.4, paragraph2, of
the Maastricht Treaty, to elaborate a concept of
crisis-management in the context of a necessary
reform of the United Nations Charter, or if WEU
were to make relevant proposals of its own.
75. Several subjects should be included in the
agenda of a common European policy in this
context: first the question of the r6le of regional
United Nations organisations in the framework of
international crisis-management, in particular the
division of responsibilities between the OSCE
and the United Nations, a subject which could not
be settled at the Budapest summit meeting of the
CSCE. Second, the question of whether the Uni-
ted Nations should create its own rapid reaction
force as its Secretary-General has again reques-
ted, or whether a better solution is to ask organi-
sations with sophisticated military sffuctures such
as NATO or WEU which is about to become ope-
rational for " Petersberg missions " to conduct the
necessary operations on a mandate from the Uni-
ted Nations or the OSCE. Your Rapporteur has a
clear preference for the latter alternative.
76. This will require an early solution to the
question of whether NATO should be developed
so as to become more involved in international
crisis-management or whether this should become
a major future task for WEU. In any case, the
European and transatlantic institutions must prove
that they are able to make valuable contributions
to the solution of conflicts threatening internatio-
nal peace and security. Otherwise there is a real
danger that international policy may revert to the
practice of using ad hoc alliances with regularly-
changing participants, the consequence being a
renationalisation of foreign and security policy.
Turning back to the year of 1905 and trying a kind
of " neo-realpolitik " should not be the future
remedy for international crisis-management.
Regarding the rOle of WEU, the organisation has
still not yet reached a suitable level in the deve-
lopment of its operational capabilities to be able
to exercise major duties in the framework of inter-
national peace-keeping, further to the goals set in
its Petersberg declaration. In order to fulfil these
commitments much work remains to be done.
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Draft Recommendation
*;f-:;;*'#';tr#:il:"ir::#:,\tr;T';!:ffi il;'f/f H'm^,
wilh pafiicular refercnce to the Unitcd States
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left the
United States the primary superpower in the world;
(ii) Considering that the Democratic hesident of the United States, President Clinton, has proclaimed
his frst priority in his political objectives to be the settling of America's urgent internal problems in the
field of necessary reforms in the social health, educational and budgetary system as well as in the fight
against criminality and terrorism;
(iiil Recalling also that the new United States priorities in foreign and security policy are concenffated
on the creation of a new kind of Asian-Pacific community, containing nuclear proliferation in countries
such as North Korea, China and Russia and reducing the American antimissile defence programme fol-
lowing a sffict interpretation of the ABM Treaty;(iv) Observing however that the freedom of action of the United States President has been considerably
curtailed by the sweeping victory of the Republican Pany in the congressional elections on 8th Novem-
ber 1994 which appeared to weaken the policy of a bipartisan approach;(v) Noting that the new Congress, which is still working out its policy direction, has started trying to
impose restrictions on the American executive regarding, in particular, its foreign, security and defence
policy, by drafting new legislation such as the " Peace Power Act " and the " National Security Revitali-
sation Act ";
(vi) Noting with satisfaction that United States foreign policy has been successful in finalising the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the support of the Canadian Parliament, revitalising
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and co-operating in the ASEAN Regional Security Forum,
thus contributing to enhancing economic stability and security in the regions concerned;
(vii) Noting uneasily, however, that the various signals emanating from the United States Government
and Congress and the steps they are taking regarding relations with Europe, the future of the Atlantic
Alliance and its enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries, relations with Russia and the r6le
of the United Nations are not always consistent, nor does the United States consult on these questions suf-
ficiently with its European allies and partners;
(viii) Worned about the serious differences between the United States and most of its European allies
over the ways of settling the conflict in former Yugoslavia;(ix) Further angered that the decisions reached at the NAIO summit meeting in January 1994 to make
collective assets of the alliance available for WEU operations are still not being carried into effect,
because of remaining Euro-American differences over the procedure to follow;(x) Having a strong impression that the question of whether and how Euro-American relations should
be renewed and founded on a new and enlarged confractual basis are being discussed far more by Euro-
pean than by American politicians;
(xi) Deploring the incredible difficulties in establishing a regular parliamentary dialogue between the
Assembly of Western European Union and the Congress of the United States;
(xii) Reiterating the importance of making full use of Anicle [V of the modifred Brussels Treaty for estab-
lishing closer links with the United States Government through WEU's co-operation with NAIO,
Rpcour"muos rHAT rnr CouNcn-
1. Translate into active policy its intention voiced in its Noordwijk declaration " to continue to work
together in close association with the North American allies. The security of the alliance and of Europe as
a whole is indivisible. The transatlantic partnership rests on a shared foundation of values and interests.
Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, indepen-
dent and increasingly more united Europe will contribute to the security of North America ";
@
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2. Devote a special chapter to the future r6le of the United States in regard to European security and
the question of reforming transatlantic relations in the white paper now being prepared on European secu-
dty;
3. Transform the working group on Transatlantic Publicity Activities into a true political forum with
which ministers of WEU member countries can establish an enhanced dialogue with United States politi-
cians in order to sffengthen their interest in and knowledge of WEU's work in the European and transat-
lantic framework and ensure that members of the Assembly can participate in this dialogue or in a new
North American/European Parliamentary Assembly based on the WEU and North Atlantic Assemblies.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(suhmilted by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
1. In the period between the Political Commit-
tee's visit to the United States and Canada in
February 1992 which led to Recommendation522
on new Euro-American relations' and the commit-
tee's visit to the two countries between lst and
8th March 1995, the intemal political landscape of
the United States has changed fundamentally: since
20th January 1993, the only remaining world
superpower has been governed by one ofthe youn-
gest Presidents so far, the Democrat Bill Clinton,
whose first priority 
- 
as he had promised during the
electoral campaign 
- 
wil, from the very start of his
presidency, to concentrate on settling America's
urgent intemal problems such as budget consolida-
tion, reform of the social health and educational
system and also the fight against criminality.
2. The first outline of Clinton's foreign policy
seemed to be focused on efforts to create a sort of
new Pacific Community on the basis of a CSCE-
like organisation in the Asian area called the
" Asia Regional Security Forum " in which China
and Russia should also participate. Regarding
Europe and in particular the conflict in the Bal-
kans, the lack of a clear concept in the American
administration led to early difficulties and diffe-
rences in the Euro-Atlantic partnership which also
affected the North Atlantic Alliance.
3. The result of the congressional elections on
8th November l994,providing a clear Republican
majority in both chambers of the Congress (230 to
204 n the House and 53 to 47 in the Senate), led
to a situation in which the new majority in
Congress, which started work on 4th January 1995,
tried to impose on the Clinton administration a
new policy direction which had not however been
clearly defined. The first draft bill drawn up by
Congress, the so-called " National Security Revi-
talisation Act ", passed in February 1995 by the
House but not yet by the Senate, embodies the
defence priorities outlined in the Republican
" Contract with America ", thus restricting United
States participation in United Nations peace-kee-
ping operations and, conversely, advocating
strengthening anti-missile defence and including
specific Central European countries, such as
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia in NAIO.
4. Regarding United States' policy towards
NATO, the bill affirms among other things:
" (4) Although new threats are more geo-
graphically and functionally diverse and
less predictable, they still imperil shared
interests of the United States and its NATO
allies.
(5) Western interests must be protected on a
co-operative basis without an undue burden
falling upon the United States.
(6) NATO is the only multilateral organisa-
tion that is capable of conducting effective
military operations to protect western
interests.
(7) The valuable experience gained from
on-going military co-operation within
NATO was critical to the success of joint
military operations in the 1991 liberation of
Kuwait.
(8) NATO is an important diplomatic forum
for discussion of issues of concern to its
member states and for the peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes.
It should be the policy of the United States:
(1) to continue the nation's commitment to
an active leadership r6le in NATO;
(2) to join with the nation's NATO allies to
redefine the r6le of the alliance in the post-
cold war world, taking into account:
(a) the fundamentally changed security
environment of Central and Eastern
Europe;
(b) the need to assure all countries of the
defensive nature of the alliance and the
desire of its members to work co-opera-
tively with all former adversaries;
(c) the emerging security threats posed by
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons of mass des-
truction and the means to deliver them;
(d) the continuing challenges to the inter-
ests of all NATO member countries
posed by unstable and undemocratic
r6gimes harbouring hostile intentions;
and1. Document l3l0,2ndlune 1992.
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(e) the dependence of the global economy
on a stable energy supply and the free
flow of commerce;
(3) to affirm that NAIO military planning
should include joint military operations
beyond the geographic bounds of the
alliance under Article 4 of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty when the shared interests of the
United States and other member countries
require such action to defend vital interests;
(4) to expeditiously pursue joint co-opera-
tion agreements for the acquisition of essen-
tial.systems to significantly increase the
crisis-management capability of NAIO. "
5. Apart from specific items such as anti-mis-
sile defence, command of United States forces and
limiting the outlay of United States funds for Ame-
rican forces placed under United Nations control,
conditions required by Congress regarding United
States contributions for United Nations peace-
keeping activities and expansion of NAIO, the bill
does not discuss the problems of future Euro-
Atlantic relations. In a joint article published in
February 1995 in The New York Times2, both the
United States Foreign Secretary, Warren Christo-
pher, and Defence Secretary, William J. Perry, said
the draft bill was " deeply flawed ":
" The bill's first flaw is that it would return
the United States to a crash-schedule
deployment of a national missile defence
designed to protect the country from missile
attacks. That deployment is not justified by
any existing threat to our nation's security.
Second, the bill unilaterally and perma-
nently designates certain European states
for NATO membership...
Thfud, the bill would effectively abrogate
our treaty obligations to pay our share of
the cost of the United Nations peace-keep-
ing operations that we have supported in
the Security Council... Under current cir-
cumstances, it would end United Nations
peace-keeping overnight. "
6. The abovementioned example of differ-
ences between Congress and government in the
United States demonstrates the start of a power
struggle between these two main political bodies
and hence the question of who in the United
States directs foreign policy. The answer to this
question is crucial for a future European approach
to redefining United States/European relations.
7. This problem has been fuither aggravated
by the drafting in the United States Senate of a
new bill devoted to clarifying the war powers of
Congress and the President in the post-cold war
period under the title " Peace Powers Act of
1995 ". According to this draft, the President
" shall consult with Congress before introducing
United States armed forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated ". Furthermore, the draft
bill envisages strong limitations on the freedom of
action of the President regarding the placing of
United States armed forces under foreign com-
mand for United Nations peace-keeping activities.
8. But also within the administration itself it is
not easy to identify valid concepts regarding United
States priorities in foreign and security policy which
take into account the radical changes in the intema-
tional political landscape since the end of the East-
West confrontation. It was therefore the main pur-
pose of the Political Committee's visit to the United
States and Canada to learn more about future United
States foreign policy and its implications for ffans-
atlantic co-operation in security and defence mat-
ters and, in particular, for the funrre development of
WEU as defence component of the European Union
and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
II. Evolution of United States foreign, securtty
and defence policy since the NATO summit
meeting in January 1994
9. When the committee started its visit to the
United States, its knowledge depended on formal
decisions reached or official speeches published
by leading American politicians since the demo-
cratic administration assumed responsibility for
United States foreign and security policy. One of
the major decisions endorsed by the United States
President was the readiness proclaimed at the
NATO summit meeting, on 10th and 1lth Janu-
ary 1994 in Brussels " to make collective assets of
the alliance available, on the basis of consulta-
tions in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU ope-
rations undertaken by the European allies in pur-
suit of their corrmon foreign and security policy ".
10. According to information provided by the
United Kingdom Government to the House of
Lords in January 1995, NATO collective assets
include communications, command and control,
as well as airbome early-waming and other facili-
ties, but not intelligence unilaterally obtained by
the United States from space. On the question of
whether non-European members of NATO would
be in a position to veto the use of the " collective
assets ", the United Kingdom government recal-
led that " all decisions taken by the North Atlantic
Council are by consensus3 ".
11. During the committee's visit to Washington
Mr. Peter Tamoff, Under-Secretary for Political
3. Hansard, House of Lords, Volume 560, No. 19 WAJ, 9th
January 1995.2. Intemational Herald Tribune, 14th February 1995.
67
DOCUMENT 1457
Affairs at the State Department, categorically
denied the question about the United States block-
ing the outcome of the current discussion between
WEU and NATO on the ways and means of
making NAIO's assets available to WEU, under-
lining that there was now more encouragement in
the United States for a European defence identity.
However, he added that the idea of totally inde-
pendent action by WEU was undesirable because
this would undermine the close co-operation bet-
ween NATO and WEU. At the Pentagon,
Mr. Walter Slocombe, Under-Secretary of Defen-
ce for Policy, said, in the context of the question
of combined joint task forces (CJTF), that accor-
ding to the American concept, providing WEU
with NATO assets should be conducted under
NATO command, even if the relevant NATO staff
in such cases had to follow instructions from the
WEU Council.
12. On the basis of the work of the new politico-
military working group created by the WEU
Council in June 1994, WEU presented to NAIO a
proposal on " Criteria and modalities for effective
use by WEU of the combined joint task forces(CJTF). It is still waiting for an answer. In the
second part of its fortieth annual report to the
Assembly, the Council states that the strength-
ening of WEU's operational r6le depends on
NATO's elaboration of the CJTF concept and that
the results will be a test case both for WEU/NAf,O
relations and for the operational potential of WEU.
Unfortunately, the Council did not use this ques-
tion to examine how it fits into the framework of
the broader problem of future Euro-American co-
operation in security and defence matters.
13. Even after the numerous talks the commit-
tee was able to hold with the relevant goverrrmen-
tal, parliamentary and research institutions during
its visit to Washington, it remains difficult to fit
NAIO's decision of January 1994 into a broader
concept of a new United States foreign and secu-
rity policy. Was this decision an indication that the
United States would more and more renounce its
leadership r6le in transatlantic relations by giving
Europe more responsibilities in matters where the
Americans would not take a prominent r6le?
14. The answer is difficult to find. However
even if President Clinton, in hii State of the Union
address to the new Congress on 25th January
1995, did not mention Europe in a single sen-
tence, he emphasised that
" our security depends upon our continued
world leadership for peace, freedom and
democracy. We cannot be strong at home
without being strong abroad.
From my first day in office I have pledged
that our nation would maintain the best
equipped, best trained and best prepared
fighting force on earth. We have 
- 
and they
are. They have managed the dramatic
down-sizing of our forces since the cold
war with remarkable skill and spirit. To
make sure our military is ready for action 
-
and to provide the pay and quality of life
that the military and their families deserve
- 
I am asking this Congress to add
25 000 million more in defence spending
over the next six years. Tonight I repeat that
request. We ask much of our armed forces.
They are called to service in many ways 
-
and we must give them and their families
what the time demands and they deserve. "
15. But where are the priorities of United
States foreign policy needing such highly quali
fied armed forces as requested by the United
States President? According to his Foreign Secre-
tary, Warren Christopher, developing key prin-
ciples for a United States foreign policy in a
speech on 26th January 1995 at the John F. Ken-
nedy School of Governmenta:
" first, America must continue to engage
and lead. Second, we must seek to maintain
and strengthen co-operative relationships
with the world's most powerful nations.
Third, it is essential that we adapt and build
institutions that will promote economic and
security co-operation. Fourth, we support
democracy and human rights because it
serves our ideals and our interests. "
16. Explaining in a more detailed way the
question of leadership, the United States Foreign
Secretary underlined that:
" American leadership requires that we be
ready to back diplomacy with the credible
threat of force. Towards this end, Presi-
dent Clinton is determined that the United
States military will remain the most powerful
and effective fighting force in the world.
when our vital interests are at stake, we
must be prepared to act alone. Our willing-
ness to do so is often the key to effectivejoint action. But the recent debate betrveen
the proponents of unilateral and multilateral
action assumes a false choice. Multilatera-
lism is a means, not an end. Sometimes, by
mobilising the support of other nations, by
leveraging our power and leading through
alliances and institutions, we will achieve
better results at lower cost in human life and
national ffeasure. That is a sensible bargain I
know the American people support. "
17. The remarks are interesting in two respects.
Firstly in the context that the draft budget for the
Pentagon for 1996 is reduced by 6.6Vo in compa-
rison with the fiscal year 1995 and the numbei of
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military forces should consequently be reduced to
1.6 million troops (1987: 2.2 million). Secondly,
the Foreign Secretary gives a reply on the ques-
tion discussed in several circles about whether the
United States is moving towards some sort of neo-
isolationism.
18. In an article by William Safire' to which
Ambassador Kornblum made reference during his
briefing of the Political Committee in Washing-
ton, it was stated that:
" the essential conflict taking place in Uni-
ted States foreign policy today is not bet-
ween isolationists and interventionists
(who prefer to be called intemationalists).
Global heavy thinkers are not arguing
about withdrawing from America's duty to
help keep the world in order. The real battle
is about the way to go about it.
One school says America should pick its
spots and assert its leadership, inspiring
and pressuring and expecting allies to fol-
low. These unilateralists, as the foreign
policy 6lite likes to call them, are opposed
by multilateralists, who believe the United
States should act mainly in concen with
international organisations like the United
Nations and NAIO.
Mr. Clinton is an unabashed multilateralist.
'The new isolationists both on the left and
the right', he charged, would 'eliminate any
meaningful r6le for the United Nations'
and 'deny resources to our peace-keepers'.
The opposite unilateralist policy was
expressed by Mr. Nixon long ago to the
cadets: 'I say that America has a vital natio-
nal interest in world stability, and no other
nation can uphold that interest for us. "
19. Regarding the second principle, Mr. War-
ren Christopher underlined that:
" our strategy is the central importance of
constructive relations with the world's most
powerful nations: our Western European
allies, Japan, China and Russia. These
nations possess the political, economic or
military capability to affect the well-being
of every American. The relatively co-ope-
rative relations that these countries now
have with each other are unprecedented in
this century, but not irreversible.
Our strategy toward the great powers begins
with Western Europe and Japan. We must
revitalise our alliances with this democratic
core. We must also seize the opponunities
that now exist to build constructive relations
with China and Russia, countries that once
were our fiercest adversaries. Both are
undergoing momentous, though very diffe-
rent, transformations that will directly affect
American interests. "
20. It becomes very clear from this approach
that relations with Europe are described in a glo-
bal context together with relations with Japan,
China and Russia, then demonstrating that, for
America, as Mr. Kornblum said, " Europe is not
the world ". Whereas problems of relations with
Europe are not further developed, Mr. Christopher
elaborates in more depth the importance of rela-
tionships with Japan, China and Russia.
21. The United States' relationship with Russia
also played an important r6le in the Political
Committee's discussions in both Washington and
Ottawa. Whereas Canadian foreign ministry
representatives recognised that Russia remains a
major concern for the security preoccupations of
other countries, while Canada's relations with it
are in general without major problems, Washing-
ton spokesmen gave various interpretations regar-
ding the present state of United States-Russian
relations and United States policy followed in this
respect.
22. In Mr. Christopher's words, the United
States' relationship with Russia is central to Ame-
rica's security.
" The United States has an enormous stake
in the outcome of Russia's continuing
transformation ... that is why the Clinton
adminisffation has been unwavering in our
support for Russian reform. "
However, members of the Camegie Endowment
for International Peace in Washington expressed
major doubts as to whether there existed a cohe-
rent United States policy towards Russia, since
there was always a contradiction between a strong
pro-Yeltsin approach and efforts to enlarge
NATO. The United States had also overestimated
its ability to influence the political situation in
Russia. All questions regarding NATO enlarge-
ment were considered in Russia in a very emotio-
nal, not rational way. Summing up, there is now a
major crisis in United States/Russian relations
and it would be easy for Congress to blackmail
the administration in this area.
23. The assessment by representatives of the
State Department focused on uncertainties in Rus-
sia's future intemal evolution. Whereas Yeltsin is
making major efforts to strengthen state power, a
new kind of power struggle between pressure
groups such as the banking, oil and gas lobbies
can be seen. Moscow's central power seems to be
growing weaker and local authorities are streng-
thening ties with local military authorities. United
States policy tries to convince Russia that enlarge-
ment by NATO is not meant to isolate it but to
contribute to stabilising the situation. Moscow's5. Intemational Herald Tribune, 7th March 1995.
69
DOCUMENT 1457
difficulties in Central Asia would strengthen its
desire to improve relations with the West.
24. Regarding Russia's handling of the Chech-
nya conflict, the official United States position
expressed by its Foreign Secretary is that:
" the way in which Russia has used military
force has been excessive and threatens to
have a corrosive effect on the future of Rus-
sian democracy. As I told Foreign Minis-
ter Kosyrev, the war must end and a process
of reconciliation must begin. What we do
not want to see is a Russia in a
military quagmire that erodes reform and
tends to isolate it in the international com-
munity. "
25. In the State Department, it was affirmed
that the United States had made known to the
Russians that their action in Chechnya was not
consistent with recognised intemational norms.
But vigorous criticism was expressed, particularly
in the Heritage Foundation regarding the reluctan-
ce of the United States Government to protest
more vigorously against Russian warfare in
Chechnya and that there was no United States
support for European politicians when they tried
to call for a more rigorous attitude vis-i-vis Rus-
sia. There was also strong criticism from leading
republicans when President Clinton recently deci-
ded to accept President Yeltsin's invitation to par-
ticipate in the celebration in Moscow of the ffiieth
anniversary of the end of the second world war.
26. In the framework of the preparation of the
summit meeting between President Clinton and
President Yeltsin in Moscow, there were signs of
new irritation between the United States and some
of the European allies in NATO over the way the
United States President intended to present to the
Russian Government the question of NATO's
enlargement. According to rumours appearing in
the German press particularly, the American Pre-
sident, in a letter addressed to hesident Yeltsin,
had even not excluded a full membership of
NATO for Russia, but this was categorically
denied by the American authorities. In any case,
all questions relating to NATO enlargement are
controversial between the allies and Russia and
there are also important differences between the
United States and its European allies on this ques-
tion which is of great significance for the enlarge-
ment of Western European Union. Furthermore,
leading Republicans have severely criticised the
results of the American-Russian summit meeting
in Moscow, in particular with respect to the war in
Chechnya and Mr. Clinton's unsuccessful efforts
to dissuade Russia from concluding a nuclear deal
with Iran, thus threatening to stop any congressio-
nal support for further financial aid to Russia.
27. Regarding the American concept of its
future relations with Europe, it could be conside-
red as some confirmation of the relevant approach
in the abovementioned speech by Mr Warren
Christopher, when a member of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace stated that
Europe was not a major issue in the United States;
otherwise (according to this expert) there would
be calls in the United States for it to withdraw its
remaining ftoops from Europe. American interest
in European affairs was far more concerned with
economrc rssues.
28. The fact that there are several subjects over
which fundamental differences exist between
Americans and Europeans, or where important
problems of elaborating a joint transatlantic sffa-
tegy are to be solved, seems to bother Americans
to a lesser extent than Europeans. The first
example is the problem of the conflict in former
Yugoslavia. The official version published by
Mr. Warren Christopher on 20th January 1995
underlines:
" The fragic war in Bosnia underscores the
importance of building an effective new
architecture for conflict-prevention and
resolution. Together with our parhers in the
contact group, we are seeking a negotiated
solution because only a negotiated solution
has any chance of lasting and preventing a
wider war. What we must not do is to make
the situation worse by unilaterally lifting the
arms embargo. We have always believed
that the embargo is unfair. But going it alone
would lead to the withdrawal of UNPRO-
FOR and an escalation of violence. It would
americanise the conflict and lead others to
abandon the sanctions on Serbia. It would
undermine the authority of all United
Nations Security Council resolutions inclu-
ding sanctions on Iraq and Libya. "
29. Nevertheless, the United States decided not
to participate any more in the enforcement of the
arms embargo in the Adriatic. This American
decision was an unusual step and, for the first time
since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance the
WEU Council, in its Noordwijk declaration, criti-
cised in public a decision of its most powerful and
important ally. Whereas the North Atlantic Coun-
cil's final communiqu6 published on 3rd Decem-
ber 1994 avoided open criticism of the United
States, Frederick Bonnart, editor of NAIO's Six-
teen Nations, made a very sharp comment in the
press on 14th November 19946, when he said that
the American order shows complete disregard for
the aims and constraints of friends and allies, as
well as those of Russia " the impression of a Uni-
ted States Congress determined to bulldoze
through its decisions regardless of America's
allies was reinforced by the way the information
reached NATO. A leaked newspaper story arrived
before any official notification... The danger is
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great... A leaked report from one of the NAIO
ambassadors stated that 'cracks are appearing in
the alliance' ".
30. It is obvious that the United States position
regarding the conflict in former Yugoslavia was
one of the major subjects of discussion during the
committee's recent visit to Washington. There were
no signs from the American side that the United
States was considering deploying peace-keeping
troops in the area,like other United Nations mem-
ber countries and, in particular, France and Britain.
In the State Departrnent, Mr. Kornblum said that
even if, according to the Helsinki Charter, borders
were not to be changed other than by peaceful
agreement, there was no intemationally agreed bor-
der guarantee, obliging United States troops to
interverp in every given case. Affirming that the
United States was present with about 16 000 people
in the area, he stated that the United Nations
approach employed so far in Bosnia and Croatia
had led to a situation in which UNPROFOR had
not confributed to a solution but had become part of
the problem. But he admitted that, if the embargo
on Bosnia was lifted, there would be an increased
danger of a new violent war in the area.
Mr. Alexander Vershbaw, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for European Affairs
in ttre United States National Security Council, said
that the United States ground forces would not be
engaged in the area except to protect a possible
withdrawal of the United Nations forces.
3l . In the event of a United Nations withdrawal,
the United States was still inclined to support Bos-
nia with arms, because Bosnians were the victims.
But the United States would not act unilaterally.
Mr. Vershbaw categorically denied press reports
according to which Americans were already sup-
plying Bosnia with arms. It was very important to
strengthen the Federation between Bosnia and
Croatia, which still had problems to deal with. On
the question of imposing possible economic sanc-
tions on Croatia in order to force Mr. T[djman to
renounce his request for a withdrawal of United
Nations troops from Croatia, Mr. Vershbaw said
that during Mr. Holbrook's last visit to Croatia, the
United States side had adopted a very firm attitude
forwards Croatia. But one had to be careful in
order to avoid Croatia eventually entering into an
unholy alliance with Mr. Milosevic.
32. During the talks in the House of Represen-
tatives, one of the Congressmen acknowledged
that, in his opinion, it would be a mistake to lift
the embargo unilaterally and any measures should
be decided in close consultation with the Euro-
pean allies. There was general frustration regar-
ding the impossibility of ending hostilities in the
Balkans, but Congress had insufficient knowledge
of the historical grounds of the conflict.
33. During the committee's visit to Washington
it was regrettably not possible to meet the relevant
committees of the United States Senate, which
had cancelled the planned meeting at short notice.
Nevertheless, your Rapporteur did have the
opportunity of meeting Admiral Nance, Chief-of-
Staff to Senator Helms, the Foreign Relations
Chairman. He confirmed that NATO would be
supported more strongly by the new Congress and
said that if the United States lifted the Bosnian
arms embargo, he was sure that United States
military would be available to cover any withdra-
wal of United Nations troops. He thought that
NATO enlargement might proceed in stages, the
frst being attendance and participation in all mee-
tings. When these counhies had got their forces to
a stage compatible with NATO and had also the
financial resources to sustain full membership,
then full membership would follow, with all that it
entailed. Of course the final policy decisions are
taken by the Senate and Congress but it was most
reassuring to know the tenor of advice being offe-
red to members.
34. The second example is the question of the
enlargement of NAIO. The American approach
seems to have in mind, first and foremost, the
interests of Russia, second the future character of
NATO but not to any great extent the interests of
the European Union and Western European
Union. As already mentioned in Mrs. Aguiar's
report, the Americans made very clear what had
already been said by Mr. Slocombe during the last
North Atlantic Assembly session:
" The question about WEU and NAIO, let
me only say that I think the United States
Government would view with considerable
concern a situation in which countries were
full members of WEU and were not also
members of the alliance, if only for the for-
mal reason that the WEU security guarantee
is, if anything, firmer and more automatic
than the NATO guarantee, and it would
create for the United States and for any
other non-member of WEU that is in the
alliance the awkward situation in which
some members of the alliance were absolu-
tely obligated to the security of countries
which were not in the alliance ... while I
take the point entirely about the fact that we
must not forget in our consideration of
expansion the issue of the states which were
neutral during the cold war and are now in
the process of joining the European Union,
there are problems about seeing WEU as
some kind of a way station in this sense. "
35. Reverting to the third principle of United
States strategy described by Mr. Warren Christo-
pher, he observed that the United States " must
adapt and revitalise the institution of global and
regional co-operation... Our challenge now is to
revitalise those institutions 
- 
NATO, the United
Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the
7t
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World Bank, the OECD, among others ". Several
very different problems are thus summarised in
one phrase.
36. Regarding NATO andrelations with Europe,
it was said simply that " NATO remains the author
of American engagement in Europe and the linch-
pin of transatlantic security. NATO has always
been far more than a transitory guarantor of Euro-
pean democracy and a force for European stabili-
ty ". There is no indication whether and in what
way the American Govemment deems it necessa-
ry to reform the Atlantic Alliance or to adapt the
whole range of transatlantic relationships on a
new and broader basis.
37 . The question of continuity of United States
foreign policy was addressed by Mr. Christopher
as follows:
" The recent elections changed the balance
of power between the parties. But they did
not change, indeed they enhanced, our res-
ponsibility to co-operate on a bipartisan
basis in foreign affairs. The election was
not a licence to lose sight of our nation's
global interests or to walk away from our
commitments in the world. Leaders of both
parties understand that well.
Bipartisan co-operation has always been
grounded in the conviction that our nation's
enduring interests do not vary with the
times. President Harry Truman had it right
40 years ago: ' Circumstances change ', he
said, ' but the great issues remain the same
- 
prosperity, welfare, human rights, effective
democracy, and above all peace. '
With the cold war behind us, the United
States has a chance to build a more secure
and integrated world of open societies and
open markets. We are the world's largest
military and economic power. Our nation's
founding principles still inspire people all
over the world. We are blessed with great
resources and resolve. We still continue to
use them with wisdom, with strength, and
with the backing of the American people ".
38. The Political Committee obviously used its
stay in Washington and Ottawa to discuss also the
position of the two countries regarding worldwide
crisis-management, peace-keeping, reform of the
Charter and the Security Council of the United
Nations, the r6le of regional organisations and in
particular that of the OSCE, and questions of
worldwide arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation. As these matters are dealt with prin-
cipally in the framework of the report to be pre-
sented by Mr. Marshall, your Rapporteur will
concentrate here mainly on the consequences of
United States policy on transatlantic relations.
III. American and European perceptions
of tran s atlanti c r e lati o n s
39. In this context it is interesting to note an
article on the findings of a recent survey of Ame-
rican public opinion in the area of foreign affairs,
published recently in the German pressT under the
headline " America not contaminated by neo-iso-
lationist vi.rus ".
" TWo thirds of Americans and9S%o of the
'ruling' elite expressly state they are in
favour of the United States being actively
involved in foreign policy. They think
America has a more important part to play
today than ten years ago. This stance in
favour of a world r6le for the United States
became clear from the most recent survey
of the Chicago Council on Foreign Rela-
tions which every four years ' takes the
temperature ' of American public opinion
on foreign affairs and compares it with the
position of leading figures in the world of
politics, the economy and science.
The spectacular changes which have occur-
red over the last five years have, it is true,
led to a sharp focus of attention on national
interests. The study highlights the 'prag-
matic internationalism' of the American
people.
Even the defence of America's traditional
allies is no longer regarded as important in
the eyes of the American public, whose
interests are now concenhated exclusively
on their own well-being: the fight against
drug addiction, protecting American jobs,
controlling illegal immigration, guaran-
teeing energy supplies and reducing Ameri-
ca's external deficit. The only universal
subjects of interest constituting major
foreign policy objectives are prevention of
nuclear armaments proliferation and envi-
ronmental protection.
Despite being inward-looking, public opi-
nion surprisingly comes out in favour of
strengthening the United Nations and
contributing to multilateral peace-keeping
operations. Opinion is divided on whether
United States ffoops can be subordinated to
United Nations command, while leaders
accept this idea.
Public opinion and leadcrs have very diffe-
rent opinions on whether United States
foreign policy should in future give priority
to Europe or Asia. Public opinion is in
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favour of Europe by an overwhelming
majority, while economists tend to favour
both equally, the government has a clear
preference for Asia and Congress is split
down the middle between Asia and Europe.
Public opinion and the 6lite are, however,
in agreement on one point: unification of
Europe is a good thing for the United
States ... "
40. Regarding the future of transatlantic ties, it
seems that in general Europeans are more concer-
ned than Americans about the need to give serious
thought to ways and means of reorganising Euro-
American relations and co-operation to take into
account the changing international political land-
scape. In an article published in the International
Herald Tribune on 30th March 1995, Mr. Kinkel,
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, advocated
an enlarged transatlantic partnership including not
only the security, but also the economic, cultural,
scientific and human relation dimensions. A simi-
lar approach was suggested by the German Defen-
ce Ministet Volker Rtihe, whereas the out-going
French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, prefer-
red to lirpit the reform of transatlantic ties to secu-
rity issues alone. Both the German Foreign and
Defence Ministers had already stressed at the
Munich Conference in February 1995 that NATO
was no longer sufficient as the only basis for
transatlantic relations.
41. Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands raised similar questions
in an article published in the March 1995 edition
of the NATO Review in which he asked whether a
new contract should be limited to transatlantic
security relations only. His point of view is very
close to the German position. Last but not least,
Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for
Defence of the United Kingdom, also in the
March 1995 edition of the NAIO Review, sffes-
sed the need to build a new Atlantic Community
on four pillars: " The first pillar is our shared
belief in the rule of law and parliamentary demo-
cracy. The second is liberal capitalism and free
ftade which has given all our people unpreceden-
ted prosperity. The third is the shared European
cultural heritage emanating from classical Greece
and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared
values, beliefs and civilisations of our own cen-
tury. The fourth pillar must be defence and securi-
ty as represented by the NATO alliance. "
42. But the Euro-American discussions on
these issues are not a one-way European sfteet.
Important American voices are also heard. The
former United States Minister Henry A. Kissinger
has proposed that the Atlantic Community be set
in the context of a new global world orders. Fur-
thermore, the American Secretary of State for
Defence, Mr. WilliamJ. Perry, made an important
contribution at the Munich Conference on Secur-
ity Policy on 5th February 1995, in which he
underlined that times have changed, that the basis
for NATO has changed and " as we adapt Europe
NATO) for the next century, we must deal with
the tough questions and issues raised by our new
relationship ". But this intervention was founded
on a strong belief in the validity of the key
grounds of the Atlantic Alliance as the main
bedrock of Euro-American co-operation.
43. A much more pessimistic view was expres-
sed by Stephen Cambone, member of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, when he
addressed the Political Committee on
8th March 1995. He stressed that both NAIO and
the European Union are at the moment in turmoil
caused by domestic difficulties and procedural
problems. Both organisations were also under
external pressure. Since NAIO and the European
Union were different and not complementary, the
notion of " pillars " was not appropriate any more.
Both sides had to start again in order to define
where their common interests lay. Otherwise it
would not be possible to allocate the different
tasks between NAIO and WEU. If the intergo-
vernmental conference on the revision of the
Maastricht Treaty did not lead to success the Uni-
ted States could lose hope in a United Europe.
Account of the fact should also be taken that sub-
stantial economic and trade problems between the
United States and Europe had to be settled. Euro-
pe should develop a clear and open concept from
which the United States should not be excluded.
The United States should be regarded as a Euro-
pean power. NAIO should continue to play the
main r6le in defence whereas WEU's r6le should
be more political, focusing on creating a system of
collective security. On this basis one might begin
talking about expansion.
4. Finally, a report by the Transatlantic Policy
Network, a group of political leaders and multina-
tional companies, recommends three steps to
strengthen links between the United States and
Europee:
- 
The transformation of the present Trans-
atlantic Declaration into an economic and
political treaty between the European
Union and the United States aimed at
creating a 'North Atlantic free trade area'
which would cover regulatory co-opera-
tion, mutual recognition of product
approvals, standardisation and certifica-
tion, and treatment of foreign investment.
- 
Reforming NATO around a partnership
between the United States and a Euro-
pean defence pillar. Though the authors
8. lnternationale Politik, January 1995, No. l.
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suggest further integrating defence and
military procurement in Europe, they
found 'no firm foundation' for a coherent
European approach on security matters.
- 
A new process for transatlantic summits
which would bring together the annual
NATO summit and the biennial United
States-European Union meetings. The
aim is to exploit the Clinton administra-
tion's shift toward strengthening the
European defence pillar within NATO
and its support for greater European poli-
tical integration built around the Union.
With one eye on the 1996 intergovernmental
conference to review the Maastricht Treaty, the
report says there is a 'window of opportunity' for
real power-sharing between the United States and
European Union. The onus is on member states,
including Britain, to take further steps to integmte
political, economic and security policies within
the European Union in 1996.
45. It is obvious that any thoughts in this direc-
tion, which has substantial support in several
European countries, have reached only a prelimi-
nary stage. It will not only be interesting to know
how the United States envisages transforming
Atlantic relations into a community of real equal
partners, but also Canada's position in this context.
The Canadians have stressed that they still consi-
der NAIO ttre bedrock of joint transatlantic secur-
ity in which they are prepared to participate even
though their practical contribution has diminished.
However, unofficially, fears were expressed that
Canada risked being totally marginalised if the
United States and a United Europe developed into
a community of truly equal partners.
IV LessonsforWEU
46. It was perhaps typical that one of the last
questions put by Mr. Gilman, Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives during the meeting with the Political
Committee in March 1995 should have been the
following: why do we need WEU? This shows that
notwithstanding the decision reached at the NAIO
summit meeting in January 1994 when the United
States recognised Western European Union as the
nucleus of the emerging European defence ident-
ity, the r6le and function of WEU remain largely
unknown even among American politicians.
47. It is therefore necessary to repeat again that
WEU must do far more to explain its functions to
relevant American authorities and also the press.
The r6le of WEU in the framework of the future
shaping of transatlantic relations should be one of
the main items on the agenda of the WEU Coun-
cil. It is therefore regrettable that, whereas the
Noordwijk declaration includes a declaration of
intention on this problem, the second part of the
fortieth annual report says nothing about future
Euro-American relations.
48. The Council has various means for streng-
thening its relationship with the American autho-
rities in Brussels in the framework of its co-opera-
tion with NATO and by establishing direct
contacts with representatives of the United States.
49. Furthermore, the preparation of a white
paper on European security should be taken as an
opportunity to include an important chapter on
future transatlantic relations and the r6le of WEU
in this context. Finally, the new working group on
Transatlantic Fublicity Activities should be sffon-
gly activated and transformed into a high-level
political forum to allow an enhanced dialogue
with North American politicians in Canada, the
United States and in Europe.
V Conclusions
50. Considering that the United States is the
only remaining global power, that its borders and
security are protected by two oceans and that it is
no longer directly threatened by any other oppo-
sing superpower, it is difficult to foresee which
direction its foreign policy will take. The United
States can afford to follow a policy which it consi-
ders to be in its interest and consequently also to
change its policy in specific matters without
taking too much account of other countries, or
even its allies. American policy regarding the
conflict in former Yugoslavia has for instance
changed radically since 1992.
51. Perhaps one of the committee members
was right, when he stated during the talks at the
Heritage Foundation in Washington, that the Uni-
ted States was the only counfiry still able to follow
a " Realpolitik " which would never be totally
coherent. But regardless of whether the American
presidency is weak or strong, one can count on
one permanent and constant factor: the will for
leadership is in no way lessened even if it appears
in somewhat different forms.
52. As to Europe, it is essential that European
preoccupations, and the reasons why a stronger
European political and security identity is also in the
American interest, become better known. On the
other hand, the more ttre United States is tempted to
follow its potitical interests in dealing directly with
leading powers in various regions of the world and
especially Russia, without paying much attention to
consultations with its European alliss, ths more it is
necessary for Europe to pursue iS efforts to shape a
true security and defence identity, the status and atti-
tude of which cannot be neglected.
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IV. The implications of the 1996 intergovernmental conference on Euro-
Atlantic relations
V. The problems of enlargement
VI. A strategy for the way forward
VII. Conclusions
AppeNox
Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty and Article 13 of the North Atlantic
Treaty
1. Adopted in committee by 18 votes to 4 with 0 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. de Pzig (Chairman); Lord Finsberg,Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairme_n); 1,t14. Alegre, (Alternate:
Mrs. Aguiar),-Antretter,Si Andrew Bowdin,MM. Biihler, Caballero, Capsis (Altemate: Pavlides), Cioni (Altemate:Mrs.Gaiotti
de Biaie), Ehrmann, Fassino (Altemate: Benvenuti),Irmer (Altemate'. Felbnann),Si Russell lohnston,W,/1. Kaspereit (Alter-
nate: BautmeD,Lord Kirkhill (Altemate: Marshalt), MM. Koschyk, Liapis, van der Linden, de Lipkowski, Maass, Mrs. PgOqn-
dreou,W,ll.P€ciaux,Pozzo (Altemate: Bianchi),Mrs. Prestigiacbmo ([ltemate: Arata),MM. Puche Rodriguez, Recoder, Rode-
ghiero (Altemate: Latronico), Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Sir Keittr Speed (Alternate: St Peter Fry), MM. Vingon, Wintgens
(Altemate: Kelchternans), Woltjer, Ziljstra, N.. .
N.B. fru names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Drafi Recommendation
onthetutureorErfrr;,:#ff 
"?":H/!:r'#!ff ;l't:{#,i"strichtII-
The Assembly,
I
(i) Emphasising the crucial importance of WEU's contribution which must give the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference clear and coherent guidelines on the place of security and defence questions in Euro-
pean and transatlantic relations;
(ii) Convinced therefore that the Council's contribution cannot be limited to a re-examination of the
declaration on Western European Union annexed to the Maastricht Treaty but must include an in-depth
assessment of its experience regarding the application of Article J.4, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Maastricht
Treaty and its repercussions on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and conclusions to be
drawn from this;
(iii) Taking into account the persistence of major differences over the political goals of an enlarged
Europe and the place it should occupy in international relations;
(iv) Consequently believing that the main goal of WEU's contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental
conference must be to strengthen and improve the European structures involved in the area of defence
policy in order to enable them to guarantee security more effectively, more democratically and with grea-
ter transparency;
(v) Affirming furthermore that the Assembly remains attached to the effective implementation of the
commitment entered into in the modified Brussels Treaty by all WEU member countries which agree to
" promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe ";
(vi) Stressing nevertheless that there are several ways of advancing European integration, of which
merely merging WEU and the European Union is not necessarily the best for increasing security in Europe;
(vii) Noting in particular that the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference is being pursued
in a context of growing divergence between the West and Russia on a large number of questions that
concern European security;
(viii) Believing moreover that the deterioration of the conflict in the Balkans and the problems raised by
maintaining peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean region will continue to preoccupy Ameri-
can and European allies;
(ix) Judging therefore that it would be dangerous to use the 1996 intergovemmental conference to test
the functioning of WEU as an instrument of European defence and thus risk jeopardising its political and
operational effectiveness and its function as the European pillar of NATO;
(x) Convinced that given its specific character and its complexity, the implementation of a common
defence policy makes it necessary, for a transitional period at least, to maintain an intergovernmental deci-
sion-making process based on consensus between member states, without the intervention of the Com-
mission or the European Parliament;
(xi) Convinced in this connection that parliamentary supervision of European defence policy, which is
based on decisions taken by the member states, must be guaranteed ex-lusively by a pariiamentary
Assembly composed of delegations of the national parliaments of the member states;
(xii) Recalling that closer co-operation between the Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament, as
encouraged by the Council, has proved impossible because of the European Parliameht's refusal to base
s,uc!_99l9neration on the principle of reciprocity, respect of the responsibilities of both and recognition of
the WEU Assembly as an integral part of the development of the European Union;
(xiii) Believing that the aim of possible co-operation between the Assembly of WEU and the European
Parliament cannot be some form of merger between the two institutions, but should lead to a precise defi-
nition and recognition of their respective powers and responsibilities which, far from being in conflict
with one another, are complementary, so that democratic supervision in Europe may be exercised by
bodies that are truly representative and efficient;
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(xiv) Believing furthermore that for as long as the member countries of WEU and the European Union
and the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are not identical and WEU is not fully operational, no
merger of any kind between WEU and the European Union will be desirable or feasible;
(m) Believing also that all attempts so far in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty to amalgamate the
responsibilities of community and intergovemmental institutions in the area of the CFSP have not proved
successful, hence the more reason for avoiding them in defence matters;
(rli) Convinced, on the other hand, that everything must be done to facilitate consensus between mem-
ber states in defence matters instead of disturbing them with the prospect of their possibly being put in a
minority position;
(rvii) Wishing therefore that the drafting of the white paper on European security will serve mainly to
bring closer together the points of view and interests of the member countries and achieve fuller European
integration in these areas;
(ruiii) Regretting the " wait and see " attitude prevailing generally in WEU arising from the provisions of
the Maastricht Treaty stipulating that any initiative in foreign policy and security matters with defence
implications must emanate from the European Union, an institution which includes five non-member
countries of WEU and which has less experience than WEU in this area;
(xix) Recalling, however, that the variable configuration of the Council of WEU allows the points of
view of all associate members, associate partners and observers to be taken into account, without the
latter being able to block any consensus that may have been reached by the ten full members;
(xx) Wishing therefore 
- 
as the United Kingdom Govemment memorandum of lst March 1995 proposes 
-
" that future European defence arrangements should be based on ... WEU " and for the latter thus to beco-
me capable of providing the necessary political impetus to the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
(xxi) Furthermore supporting unreservedly the United Kingdom proposal that the heads of state and of
government meet regularly in the framework of WEU to establish general guidelines conceming collective
military action envisaged by Europeans;
(xxii) Believing that the Chairmanship-in-Offrce should not be the sole authority for giving impetus to the
work of the Council and recalling in this connection its various recommendations for strengthening the
functions and power of the Secretary-General of WEU and the participation of the Assembly;
u
(i) Welcoming the conclusion of a stability pact in Europe with the aim of facilitating the progressive
rapprochement between the Central European countries on the one hand and the European Union and
WEU on the other;
(ii) Welcoming also the fact that the European Union is preparing to conclude Europe agreements with
the three Baltic countries and with Slovenia;
(iii) Wishing WEU to strengthen the working relationship it has established with the associate partner
countries as a whole and to create the same kind of relationship with Slovenia;
(iv) Expressing astonishment at the terms of paragraph 6 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 565
which states that " The question of granting Slovenia associate partner status will be kept under review as
Slovenia's relationship with the European Union develops ", whereas the Council fixed no similar condi-
tion for $anting this status to the nine countries mentioned previously;
III
(i) Noting with interest the content of the nvo parts of the fortieth annual report of the Council to ttre Assem-
bly, especially the detailed information it gives on the activities of the various working groups of the Council;
(ii) Regretting nonetheless the lack of political direction of this report which is the essential basis for
the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly;
(iii) Noting furthermore that the annual report provides no information on the Council's experience
regarding the implementation of a working relationship between the subsidiary organs of the Council on
the one hand and, on the other hand, the CFSP institutions and the European Commission or on procedures
adopted in this connection;
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(iv) Wishing, in the face of the new risks threatening European security and the problems raised by the
preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference, for a considerable improvement in co-operation,
co-ordination and reciprocal exchange of information between the Council and the Assembly;
(v) Deeply regretting therefore that the Council has decided to organise an important conference in
Washington in June in the context of its transatlantic publicity relations activities, with a wide participa-
tion of WEU ministers, at exactly the same time as the Assembly is holding the third part of its fortieth
ordinary session and expressing surprise that the Council of Ministers, at its meeting in Lisbon, did not
take this opportunity to express its regret regarding this clash of events;
(vi) Finding it intolerable that certain documents produced by the WEU ministerial organs are not ffans-
mitted to the Assembly, whereas they are published by the services of the European Parliament;
(vii) Astonished that the Westem European Armaments Group (WEAG) is not included in the organo-
gram of the ministerial organs as this was transmitted to the Assembly n 1994, and that the annual report
makes no reference to the tasks and activities of the Verification Group referred to in that organogram,
RgcorrtrreNos rHAT rrm CotrNcu-
I
1. Between now and the end of 1995, make:
(a) an assessment of its experience regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Maas-
tricht Treaty concerning WEU and its repercussions on the application of the modified Brussels
Treaty;
(b) an assessment of its experience concerning relations between WEU and NATO;
2. Prepare from these assessments a concept for developing its relations with the European Union and
NAIO, paying particular attention to its future relations with the European member countries of the Atlan-
tic Alliance which have now become associate members of WEU and transmit such assessment to the
Assembly for early comment;
3. Take into account the memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's approach to the treat-
ment of European defence issues at the 1996 intergovemmental conference, dated lst March 1995, as well
as that of the Netherlands Government on the CFSP, dated 3fth March 1995, or proposals of other mem-
ber governments to develop a common position of WEU countries in the framework of the preparation of
this conference;
4. Arrange to be represented on the group ofexperts established by the European Council and ensure
that all questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty are dealt with exclusively by
the signatory countries of that treaty and its protocols;
5. Ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conferenie results in WEU being recognised as an organi-
sation authorised to act on behalf of the European Union in security and defence matters and that member
countries of the European Union which are not members of WEU cannot block consensus achieved within
WEU in this area;
" 6. On the basis of the white paper on European security, develop a medium-term concept of the crite-
ria, procedures and even the stages that should be adopted for placing the common defence policy on a
new legal and institutional basis subsequently enabling defence questions to be set in the framework of the
European Union;
7. Agree that such an undertaking should be achieved within approximately ten years and use this per-
iod to examine how far the modified Brussels Treaty should be revised and adapted to the new situation
with a view to presenting proposals to another intergovernmental conference which might be convened at
the end of the period mentioned above;
8. Include in this medium-term concept provisions providing for more representative parliamentary
supervision at European level, in particular by transforming the-existing WEU Assembly into a second
chamber, alongside the European Parliament thus confirming the r6le of delegations from national parlia-
ments, with responsibilities that are different from and complementary to those of the European Parlia-
ment;
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9. Not compromise, as matters now stand, the close co-operation between WEU and NATO by open-
ing hastily WEU's doors to organs of the European Union but maintain the procedure for reciprocal
exchange of information on the respective activities of these organs and WEU;
10. Manifest more clearly its will to meet its obligations under Article D( of the modified Brussels Theaty
and leave no doubt, in its relations with other European and Atlantic authorities, about the fact that the
WEU Assembly is the sole Assembly with responsibility in security and defence matters in accordance
with an international treaty;
11. Take the necessary steps to give the Secretary-General of WEU the right of initiative, in particular
the right to convene the Council of Ministers and the right to participate in meetings of the Council of the
European Union and the European Council, when the latter examine questions connected with the CFSP;
12. Hold more frequent meetings, particularly before the meetings of ministers responsible for the
CFSP, in order to give them the neCessary impetus;
13. Take up the United Kingdom proposal to organise WEU summit meetings on the occasion of meet-
ings of the European Council;
14. Accelerate efforts to make WEU fully operational;
II
1. Offer Slovenia the same status as that enjoyed by WEU associate partner countries;
2. Strengthen relations both with the associate partner countries as a whole and with Slovenia by
taking the measures that are required to enable them to participate fully in developing a European secur-
ity system;
3. Take the measures necessary to ensure that the 1996 intergovemmental conference results in a revi-
sion of the articles of the Maastricht Treaty so as to allow WEU to invite European countries which are
members of NATO but not members of the European Union to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
III
1. Ensure that henceforth the annual reports of the Council contain more political substance and also
set out the nature of the difficulties that the Council is having in achieving its objectives, with a view to
stimulating fruitful dialogue with the Assembly;
2. Fulfil the undertaking it gave in its reply to Recommendation 565 to ensure that it keeps the Assem-
bly informed as a mafier of priority through its annual report on the areas and substance of its co-opera-
tion with the European Union and NATO;
3. Explain upon which provision of the modified Brussels Treaty is based the decision of the Mediter-
ranean Group, as set out in the second part of the fortieth annual report, to " continue to make clear to its
Maghreb and Egyptian interlocutors that in the dialogue between these countries and WEU, WEU was
competent to address only politico-military and defence questions, the other issues coming within the pur-
view of institutions such as the CSCE (now OSCE) and the European Union ";
4. Inform the Assembly of the content of the document prepared by the European Union authorities on
the implications of the situation in the Mediterranean for European security, to which the Permanent
Council of WEU contributed, as it emerges from the reply of the Council to Recommendation 565;
5. Ensure in future that the organs mentioned in the organogram of the ministerial organs transmitted
to the Assembly correspond to those on which the Council informs the Assembly in its annual report;
6. lnform the Assembly of the tasks and activities of:
(a) the Verification Group;
(b) the Military Delegates Group;
7 . Take the appropriate measures to improve co-ordination of its activities with those of the Assembly
and transmit to the Assembly its documents which are unclassified.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mrs. Aguia4 Rapportcur)
I. Introduction
1. As 1996 approaches, at the start of which
the intergovernmental conference is to be opened
on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the ques-
tion being raised ever more frequently is what
strategy the WEU Council is to adopt, in the fra-
mework of its contribution to this conference, on
the outcome of which will depend the future of
WEU as a whole, and in particular that of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
2. The programme of the Portuguese presi
dency of the Council of WEU, communicated to
the Assembly on 30th January 1995' identifies
two major issues in this context: " the common
evaluation of European security, including the
French proposal for a white paper, and the institu-
tional implications for WEU for a European secu-
rity and defence identity ". It goes on to state in
this connection:
" In our reflection on European security we
should identify common objectives, risks
and threats, as well as the means we have at
our disposal to face them. Our attention
could then be directed towards answering
the questions raised during this first phase
of our work. This will include the need to
address highly sensitive and complex insti-
tutional matters.
After consultation with all delegations,
Portugal has come to the conclusion that it
would be better to concentrate on the first
of the elements I have just mentioned, lea-
ving the discussion on institutional matters
to the seminar of senior officials which is
due to take place in Portugal in early
June. "
3. It is precisely at the beginning of June that
the group of experts established by the European
Union will begin its work on the institutional
aspects of a revision of the parts of the Maastricht
Treaty which are to be renegotiated at the intergo-
vernmental conference on the basis of reports to
be submitted to it between now and June by the
principal institutions of the Union, namely, the
European Commission, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union and the European Parliament. As to
the possible revision of Anicle J.4 of Title V of
the Maastricht Treaty on the common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) which will deal primarily
with the future r61e of WEU, it should be recalled
that this is to be undertaken on the basis of a
report on this matter which only the Council (of
the European Union) will submit to the European
Council (see paragraph 6 of Article J.4). Conse-
quently neither the Commission nor the European
Parliament are supposed to be involved in prepa-
ring a revision of Article J.4. Nevertheless this has
not prevented the European Parliament from
making the question of the future r6le of WEU
one of its main preoccupations2. The same holds
true for the contributions of the European Com-
mission which has asked a group of experts to
prepare an assessment of Title V of the Maastricht
Treaty, dealing specifically with relations bet-
ween the CFSP and WEU3.
4. Conversely, in all probability, there will be
no contribution from the WEU Council by the
time the European Union's group of experts starts
its work. It should be noted in this connection that
one of the idiosyncrasies of the Maastricht Treaty
is that no preparatory r6le has been assigned to the
WEU Council in the framework of a revision of
the provisions of Article J.4 which specifically
concem WEU, although in the declaration
annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht the WEU
member countries admittedly stated that in 1996
WEU would make its own re-examination of the
present provisions. But Article J.4, paragraph 6,
of the Maastricht Treaty makes no reference to
this declaration.
5. It is therefore crucial for the WEU Assem-
bly to present its ideas in broad outline between
now and June, following the direction already
marked out in the report by Mr. Soell on a Euro-
pean security policya, further to which the Coun-
cil, in its reply to Recommendation 565: " fully
subscribes to the view expressed by the Rappor-
teur that ' this report can be regarded as an initial
contribution to the preparation of the intergovern-
mental conference...' and has taken note of the
report with great interest. "
2. See for example the reports by MM. de Gucht, Bour-
langes, Martin (Committee on lnstitutional Affairs) and MM.
Poettering, Crespo and Matutes (Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Securiry and Defence Policy).
3. See the initial report on European security policy towards
2000: ways and means to establish genuine credibility, l9th
December 1994.
4. Document 1439.l. Document A,/WEU/DG (95) 2.
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6. The Council states in the second part of its
fortieth annual report to the Assembly 5 that the
Assembly's contribution to the institutional debate
" which will be at the heart of the review of the
WEU Maastricht declaration, a debate in which
the Assembly's contribution is both welcome and
most necessary ". The Assembly is quite prepared
to contribute to this debate but in return expects
not only to be heard by the Council and its mem-
ber governments but also to obtain their backing.
In this connection the Assembly noted with satis-
faction the content of paragraph 15 of the Noord-
wijk declaration, which states that " Ministers
acknowledge the consffuctive contributions from
the Assembly to the further strengthening of
European security ". It welcomes the fact that, in
the Lisbon declaration of l5th May 1995, the
Ministers of the WEU Council underlined the
importance they attached to the r6le played by the
Assembly in the debate on security and defence in
Europe and its substantive contribution to the
wider consideration of these issues. If this ack-
nowledgement is not to be just an empty shell, it is
essential for the govemments of WEU member
countries to ensure that the 1996 intergovemmen-
tal conference achieves a result enabling the
Assembly of WEU to continue its constructive
work, even beyond 1998.
II.What is at stake?
7. It is no accident that the European govern-
ments chose 1996 to convene a conference for
reviewing the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty
on the common foreign and security policy.
According to the interpretation being given to the
modified Brussels Treaty by the govemments
concerned (which has been challenged by the
Assembly of WEU), fifty years after the entry into
force in August 1948 of the treaty of economic,
social and cultural collaboration and legitimate
collective self-defence, each WEU member coun-
try will be entitled to submit a declaration to
Belgium, the depository power of the modified
Brussels Treaty, notifying its intention to cease to
be a party to the ffeaty provided it has previously
given one year's notice (Article X of the 1948
Brussels Treaty).
8. It should nevertheless be recalled that
WEU was not created by the abovementioned
treaty, but by the protocol modifying and comple-
ting the Brussels Treaty, signed in Paris, on 23rd,
October 1954, which came into force on 6th May
1955. It should also be recalled that this protocol
fundamentally changed the spirit and objective of
the 194E treaty by creating, for the first time, a
defensive European alliance bringing together
counffies which had been on opposing sides
during two world wars, and that the aim of this
new treaty was, moreover, to promote the unity
and to encourage the progressive integration of
Europe many years before the Treaty of Rome,
creating the European Communities, saw the light
of day. WEU was in fact the flrst to start imple-
menting these aims. There is therefore no justifi-
cation for claiming that it was only " with the
merging of the Treaties of the European Commu-
nities and then with the creation of the European
Union, which has brought WEU inside the pro-
cess of European integration t ", os stated in the
study by the European Strategy Group and the
Institute for Security Studies of Western European
Union, published in March 1995.
9. In placing the emphasis on a " 1998 dead-
line " as the main reason for revising the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the signatory countries are subjec-
ting themselves to an anificial pressure of time,
since in reality there is no dead-line. Indeed, the
govemments were fully aware that the modified
Brussels Treaty would not be terminated automa-
tically after expiry of the fifty-year period and that
there is no valid reason for denouncing this treaty,
which has only begun to secure advantages and
yield concrete benefits since the signatory coun-
tries have at last decided to made use of it. On the
contrary, denunciation of the modified Brussels
Treaty would be as dangerous an undertaking as
the termination of the Treaty of Washington in
1969, twenty years after it came into force'.
10. However, voices are increasingly being rai-
sed to say that it is impossible to achieve such
complicated institutional reforms under pressure
of an artificial deadline and that it is unproductive
to allow oneself to be hypnotised by the arbitrary
determination of that deadline. It will come as no
surprise therefore that in his report submitted on
30th March 1995 on behalf of the consultative
committee responsible for European questions in
the House of Representatives of Belgium, Mr.
Eyskens, who is a partisan of " communitarisa-
tion " of Europe's defence dimension, doubts
whether WEU can be integrated into the European
Union so early as 1998.
11. Several authors ofa study by the European
Strategy Group of the WEU Institute for Security
Studies, published in March 1995 under the title
" Towards a common defence policy " go further,
envisaging the possible intermeshing of WEU in
the European Union ten years hence, a suggested
date being 2005. Such a time-lag might indeed
facilitate agreement on the political objectives of
building Europe and preparation of equitable and
realistic solutions to the institutional problems
linked to the implementation of these objectives.
6. Towards a common defence policy, page 57.
7. See the texts of Article XII of the modified Brussels
Treaty and Article 13 of the Washington Treaty appended to
this report.
8r
5. Document 1453, 30ttr March 1995.
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To the extent that there is agreement on the politi-
cal objectives, it would be possible to adopt a
step-by-step approach, starting from certain crite-
ria to be met, as in the case for monetary union. In
this connection, the drafting of a white paper on
European security might make a useful contribu-
tion.
12. The intergovernmental conference must
deal besides with many other areas in addition to
the revision of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty,
namely:
- 
the question of bringing into the commu-
nity a third pillar of the Union (internal
affairs and justice);
- 
possibility of enlarging the field of appli-
cation of the European Parliament's pro-
cedure known as co-decision in the area
of community legislation;
- 
the question of establishing a hierarchy
of community laws;
- 
the possibility of extending the responsi-
bilities of the European Union to energy,
civil defence, tourism, and
- 
further to the European Council's deci-
sion at Corfu, review of the institutional
operation of the Union with a view to its
enlargement,
placing difficult and complicated tasks on coun-
tries participating in this conference, the most dif-
ficult one with potentially the most serious conse-
quences being the revision of Title V of the
Maastricht Treaty.
13. The preparation of the conference on the
revision of the provisions of the CFSR which
includes the future r6le of WEU, involves, on the
European Union side, participation by all its fif-
teen member countries, five of which: Austria,
Denmark, Finland, keland and Sweden are not
members of WEU. On the other hand, it appears
that the WEU Council, for its part, envisages pre-
paring all the questions relating to the future of
the modified Brussels Treaty within the restricted
framework of the countries that are parry to it,
which might give rise to dissatisfaction, not only
on the part of the five countries referred to above,
but also of associate member and associate part-
ner countries.
14. Moreover, it must be recalled that the
review of the provisions of the declaration of the
WEU member countries annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty will extend to relations between
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, which are of par-
ticular interest to associate members, such as Ice-
land, Norway and Turkey. In any event, the Coun-
cil should insist on the principle that any debate
on the future application of the modified Brussels
Treaty be confined exclusively to the signatories
of that treaty. The consequence of this will be that
the group of experts called upon to discuss the
matter within the framework of the European
Union, in its composition as decided in Corfu, can
have no powers of decision in the case of the
modified Brussels Treaty E.
15. Regarding the substance of the problems to
be resolved, the aims to be pursued in the frame-
work of a revision of the present provisions must
first be determined. One of the deficiencies of the
Maastricht Treaty lies in the fact that its signato-
ries agreed in principle to create full monetary
union within a specific time-frame without, at the
same time, reaching a countervailing agreement
on a true common policy on foreign affairs, secu-
rity and defence. Many political leaders and
experts, notably in Germany, but also in other
European countries, are convinced that European
monetary union will not be viable without a true
common European policy in the other areas men-
tioned.
16. Furthermore, the need to implement a com-
mon security and defence policy cannot be based
on this argument alone. What matters is finding a
consensus on the purpose of building the Euro-
pean Union as a whole, otherwise the discussion
on institutional questions becomes divorced from
reality. If we wish to define the aims that WEU
and its Assembly should pursue in this context
several of them will have to be reconciled. Unde-
niably the strengthening of the security of mem-
ber states and of their citizens and the protection
of their fundamental rights as recognised by the
modified Brussels Treaty and the Chaner of the
United Nations must remain a prime objective of
the Council and Assembly of WEU.
17. In receiving associate members, associate
partners and observer countries into the organisa-
tion, WEU has, in addition, undertaken to extend
securiry to the whole of Europe. Strengthening
security is therefore central to the fundamental
work done by WEU, an example of which is the
preparation of a white paper on security, and also
to its efforts to become truly operational. How-
ever this aim must also be the recurrent theme of
its strategy when it comes to settling the institu-
tional questions on the agenda of the 1996 inter-
govemmental conference.
18. Secondly, sffengthening the principle of
democracy in a Europe which is organising its
security and defence can be defined as another
prime objective of the same value as that referred
to in the foregoing paragraphs. Conversely, when
the European Union sets itself the goal in Article
B of the Maastricht Treaty of asserting its identity
8. Similarly Nicole Gnesotto observes (in Politique 6trangd-
re No.l/95, page 138) that " it is clearly unacceptable for a
non-member country of a military organisation to be able, by
indirect means, to determine the fate of that organisation ".
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on the international scene, one might wonder
whether such an end is defined clearly enough to
be the sole justification for the need to create a
coillmon foreign and security policy eventually
including a common defence policy and, in time,
a common defence.
19. For much remains to be done to reach
agreement on the purpose the European Union
should have in the world. Should it become a
new world power, alongside the United States
and Russia? What is the final aim of greater
European integration? Or is integration an end in
itself? Clearly all member countries cannot be
expected to provide the same answer to these
questions.
20. If integration is regarded not as an end in
itself but rather as a means of strengthening secu-
rity and democracy in Europe, one may then won-
der what solutions are best adapted to these two
aims. The question is also raised regarding the
most suitable institutional instrument for streng-
thening the effectiveness and transparency of the
European institutions in accordance with the
wishes of the vast majority of those concerned.
21. More specifically, in relation to the future
organisation of the external security and defence
of the Union, Dffiy feel that the existing system is
too complicated, that it involves too many institu-
tions and that, consequently, it is necessary to
rationalise and regroup powers within a single
organisation. The problem in carrying out such an
undertaking is to ensure that it does not weaken
security in view of the increasing number of
applicant countries wishing to participate in a new
European security architecture but whose respec-
tive political positions and military situations are
not homogenous.
22. Another aim often put forward is that of
remedying the alleged democratic deficit in rela-
tion to conffol over decision-making processes
within the framework of the European Union, but
also in WEU, the Assembly of which has only a
consultative function and is composed of delega-
tions from national parliaments, while the Euro-
pean Parliament, composed of parliamentarians
elected by direct universal suffrage, hopes to
exercise rights of co-decision in security and
defence matters or even to replace the WEU
Assembly entirely for these questions.
23. Finally, there are two difficult problems to
resolve if one wishes to improve the structures
ensuring European security: one is that of future
transatlantic relations and the r6le of the United
States in Europe, and the other, closely linked
to the first, is the question of enlargement to the
east, including the place Russia might occupy
in that system to satisfy is legitimate security
interests.
III. Different concepts for linking the defence
dimension with the European Union
(a) The communily concept
24. The concept of bringing European foreign
policy, security and defence (and also internal
affairs and justice) into the community corres-
ponds to the idea of building Europe, which
would no longer be based on different pillars
(community and intergovemmental), but accor-
ding to which the European Commission would
evolve towards a truly European government,
possessing all the powers that are characteristic of
national governments.
25. In this version of Europe, the r6le of the
governments brought together in the Council
would be reduced to that of a second chamber
along the lines of the German Bundesrat, while
parliamentary supervision would be entrusted to
the European Parliament alone, elected by direct
universal suffrage, the r6le of the national parlia-
ments alongside the European institutions not
being clearly defined. The concept of straightfor-
ward incorporation in the community is upheld
primarily by the European Parliament and also
enjoys widespread support in German political
circles, as testified in a paper on thoughts about
European policy, published by the CDU/CSU par-
liamentary group of the German Bundestag in
September 1994.
26. This document does not however set out
very clearly the need to bring the CFSP and the
defence dimension into the Community. It states
that now is in fact the time to introduce a common
defence and it therefore advocates that the 1996
conference " reorganise " relations between WEU
and the European Union, but without stating how.
The communitarisation of the CFSP has moreover
suppofters amongst the governments of the
Netherlands and Belgium, which are nevertheless
cautious about the real possibility of its being
implemented during the 1996 intergovernmental
conference. In a report submitted on 30th March
1995 on behalf of the consultative committee res-
ponsible for European questions of the House of
Representatives of Belgium, Mr. Eyskens consi-
ders it desirable in principle for WEU to be inte-
grated into the European Union. However, he
doubts that this transformation will come into
effect in 1998.
27. Other more concrete proposals have been
made in this connection. Mr. Jean-Marie Guehen-
no, representative of France to WEU, observes in
a recent article on European security: The impos-
sible status guo', " Some even imagine that the
Secretary-General of WEU is also the European
Commissioner responsible for the CFSP "; as had
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already been suggested by Mr. Bourlanges, rap-
porteur of the Committee on Institutional Affairs
of the European Parliamentro, to the effect that
WEU's " Secretary-General should be the Com-
mission Vice-President responsible for internatio-
nal action... "
28. Such an approach does not of course pre-
judge the Council's ultimate powers of decision-
making in an intergovernmental context and
consequently safeguards the principle of member
states having responsibility for decisions to be
taken in security and defence matters. Neverthe-
less, this approach, in granting the Commission
not only the right to initiate but also executive res-
ponsibility in this area, regarded by many member
states as going to the heart of national sovereign-
ty, tends towards attainment of a political aim,
namely communitarisation of defence by an ad
hoc institutional measure; it in no way resolves
the fundamental divergences on whether defence
Europe should be organised in a community or
intergovemmental fashion.
29. Hence the implementation of such a propo-
sal, far from strengthening effectiveness, would
cause greater confusion regarding the areas of res-
ponsibility of the various institutions of the
Union. Causes of this confusion are moreover to
be found in the wording of Title V of the Maas-
tricht Treaty which shows clearly that it was
impossible to overcome fundamental disagree-
ments. To increase the confusion over the respec-
tive areas of responsibility of the Community and
intergovemmental institutions might paralyse the
decision-making process. This also holds good for
the proposal made by the Netherlands Govem-
ment on 30th March 1995 conceming increased
participation by the Commission in the work of a
strengthened CFSP unit in the framework of the
Secretariat of the Council or of a new CFSP body.
30. So far, no member government of the Euro-
pean Union or of WEU has proposed a sophistica-
ted concept for bringing Europe's defence dimen-
sion into the Community, but it is clear that
certain states categorically reject this idea. The
report published on 6th April 1995 by the Council
of the European Union on the functioning of the
Treaty on European Union therefore limits itself
to advocating: " As regards preparation for deci-
sion-making [in the CFSP area], it is necessary for
the bodies and structures of the old EPC [Euro-
pean political co-operationl to be properly inte-
grated into the single institutional framework
provided for by the TEU [Treaty on European
Unionl ". The European Commission itself on
10th May 1995 published a report on the opera-
tion of the Treaty on European Union, the aim of
10. See the draft report of the Committee on lnstitutional
Affairs of the European Parliament on the operation of the
Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 intergo-
vemmental conference - implementation, 10th April 1995.
which was to make an assessment rather than put
forward proposals. Regarding the operation of the
CFSP, this report concludes that:
" The very fact that two different working
methods 
- 
the Community approach and
the intergovernmental approach 
- 
coexist
in the same treaty is a source of incoheren-
ce. Experience has confirmed the fears pre-
viously expressed on this subject. The
single institutional framework which was
supposed to ensure harmony between the
various ' pillars 'of the treaty has not func-
tioned satisfactorily. The proper lessons
have to be drawn. "
The European Commission considers that: " The
Union must develop a genuine common foreign
policy commensurate with its economic influence
and equipped with effective decision-making
machinery;". The European Commission there-
fore gives a highly critical assessment of the divi-
sion of the Union's areas of action into different
" pillars ". It also considers that the link with
WEU has not worked satisfactorily.
31. The study undertaken by the European
Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for Secur-
ity Studies entitled " Towards a common defence
policy " analyses the possibility of merging the
Treaty on European Union and the WEU Treaty.
The authors feel that " the strictest institutional
coherence would require that all policies (the
CFSP, the CDP and the CD included) should be
communitarised ". But they rightly acknowledge
that " this option, however, seems difficult to
achieve, both because not all the EU members are
prepared to accept the commitments deriving
from Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty
and because it would require a major transfer of
national sovereignty to the EU to guarantee the
effectiveness of a CD. "
32. Even Mr. van den Broek, the European
Commissioner for foreign affairs and security,
stated before a committee of the European Parlia-
ment in early January 1995 that the introduction
of the defence component might be facilitated by
retaining WEU as a separate structurel. More-
over, it appears that a study prepared at the request
of this same commissionerby the high level group
of experts on the CFSP concluded in December
1994 that foreign policy, security and defence
issues were special cases, to which it was impos-
sible to apply the " community " formulas which
had proved their worth in the economic sphere,
but were not to be imitated in the area which
concerns us here.
33. Your Rapporteur, who does not endorse
extending the community process to European
defence, feels it necessary nevertheless to add the
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following considerations: in order to understand
why German policy is particularly favourable to
the " community " concept of European defence,
it must not be overlooked that herein lies the
expression of the firm intention of a united and
consequently much more influential Germany,
vis-i-vis its European partners, to be integrated
wholeheartedly into Europe so as to avoid its
increased influence leading to a renationalisation
of defence policy and/or a possible return to a
policy of ad hoc alliances in Europe the conse-
quences of which that continent suffered up to the
end of the second world war. Paradoxically, Ger-
many's determination to be integrated into Europe
and even to be subject to decisions taken by qua-
lified majority in cases where Germany was in a
minority is often used by op,ponents of the com-
munity system as an argument against the Ger-
mans, to the effect that such a system would auto-
matically lead to Germany dominating Europe.
Advocates of a community system on the other
hand at times criticise the intergovernmental sys-
tem, arguing that the latter would also facilitate
German domination in another manner...
34. It is to be hoped that the British Foreign
Secretary, Mr. Hurd, was right when he stated in a
speech in Berlin on 28th February 1995 that one
should not fear being driven to a choice between
two extremes: far-reaching integration on the one
hand and competition between nation states on the
nineteenth century model on the other. In his
view, a balance must be found between the system
introduced with the single market and community
institutions on the one hand and the survival of the
nation states on the other. This approach seems
more reasonable than the endeavours of another
British minister who attempted, in an article in the
German press, to convince public opinion in that
country that nationalism as such was not such a
bad thingl'?. Almost simultaneously, Mr. Mitter-
rand, the outgoing President of the French Repu-
blic, stated in his last speech to the European Par-
liament that nationalism was war'3.
35. In any event, it now s@ms that it will prove
impossible at the 1996 conference to overcome
the differences between those in favour of making
all the Union's areas of activity a Community
matter and those who prefer the intergovefllmen-
tal system in certain matters and particularly
defence. However, according to Mr. Guehenno
" the present ambiguity, which holds out the pos-
sibility of future European integration, without
truly implementing it, cannot be maintained for
any length of time "ro. However this does not
mean that the intergovernmental conference is
12. David Davis, Frankflrrter Allgemeine Znitrng, l7th
January 195.
13. Lr Figaro, l8th January 1995; l* Monde, l9th January
1995.
14. Politique dtrangBre, January 1995,page27.
condemned to failure. It is possible to make consi-
derable progress while retaining an intergovern-
mental approach.
36. For, as matters now stand, it is essential to
bring the views of states together, not to deprive
them of their ability to assess the situation and
decide on action. It is a matter of facilitating their
decision by assuring them that they will have the
necessary means to act. To subordinate all action
to bodies which accept only collective action
would leave Europe completely powerless.
( b) I nte rgov ernme ntal conc e pts
37. A gradation ofsuch concepts is to be noted.
First, let us consider those closest to the Commu-
nity system and subsequently those which opt
more in favour of maintaining the autonomy of
existing institutions, practically without change.
(i) Merger of WEU and the CFSP (second pillar
of the European Union)
38. On 8th March 1995, the German Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, stated he
was in favour of a merger between the European
Union and WEU. He advocates that Germany and
France co-operate closely in this connection and
convince their partners of the necessity of this
measure which would constitute further progress
towards European integration's. Although the
German minister does not enter into the detail of
the practical arrangements for this merger, his
proposal makes clear that it falls within the frame-
work of the development of the CFSP and there-
fore within the existing intergovernmental
domain. However, it does not rule out the fact that
decisions might be taken by qualified majority,
which has not hitherto been the case in defence
matters.
39. In emphasising that the development of the
Eurocorps, the fledgling European army, was a
model for co-operation in defence matters, of
great interest to many European Union member
states, the German minister opened the door to
multifarious conjecture as to the authority under
which this body should be placed after any merger
between the European Union arfd WEU. This sta-
tement might therbfore be interpreted as a propo-
sal for incorporating WEU into the second pillar
of the European Union, namely the CFSP, as it
introduces the possibility of decision-making in
defence matters by qualified majority.
40. In an interview with Le Figaro on 16th
March 1995, and at the end of March, in the
framework of the K6nigswinter conference, the
traditional meeting-place of British and German
officials, Mr. Kinkel repeated his proposal for
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merging WEU and the European Union'6. He
stressed that the European Union should develop
its ability to act in this area of the CFSP and rapid-
ly adopt clear positions. " This is why majority
decisions in foreign policy should no longer be
taboo ". He added that " those demanding this
new procedure should, in all honesty, state that
they will accept majority decisions even when
they are contrary to their own preference! "
Mr. Kinkel also replied affirmatively when asked
whether it was necessary to create a European
foreign affairs ministry.
41. In this context, it should be recalled that the
report of the Council of the European Union on
the operation of the Treaty on European Union
states that, since the entry into force of this treaty,
unanimity is the rule and that qualified majority
voting, the use of which is made possible by
Anicle J.3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on European
Union, has not been used.
42. According to information appearing in
the American and French pressl7, the German
Government is currently preparing to take a posi-
tion along the lines referred to in paragraph 40; it
will reach its decision towards mid-June 1995.
According to the press articles mentioned, the
German Govemment would appear to be conside-
ring providing the Secretary-General of the Coun-
cil of the European Union with a " working unit "
similar to a forecasting and analysis cenffe. The
Secretariat-General would act as a transmission
link between the European Council and the Com-
mission in Brussels and might eventually in the
longer term be brought together with the WEU
Secretariat-General, having itself been merged
with the European Union.
43. According to a rcport by the Netherlands
Govemment on the CFSP of the European Union,
transmitted on 30th March 1995 to the Nether-
lands Parliament, Germany's idea of inffoducing,
when possible, majority decision-making for
adopting a common action deserves serious consi-
deration. The Netherlands Government states in
this respect that this would be " majority decision-
making within an intergovernmental context. This
must be distinguished from majority decision-
making within the Communiry framework, which
is a process based on the Commission's exclusive
right of initiative... " It feels however that " com-
munitarisation of the CFSP along these lines may
be an option for the longer term. "
44. On the basis of these considerations, the
Netherlands Govemment is examining the diffe-
rent approaches to absorption of WEU in the
European Union, for which it expresses its prefe-
reirce in principle. While giving greater weight to
16. See AFP, 30th March 1995.
17. Wall Street Joumal Europe,
Monde, 18th May 1995.
the Community approach, the Netherlands
Govemment is endeavouring to draw closer to
Germany on this point. It thinks however that in
view of the tension resulting from differences
between the Community and intergovemmental
points of view, it will be necessary to seek solu-
tions where elements of a Community approach
are combined with the needs of member states
that wish to retain an intergovemmental concept
of the CFSP. All these considerations are leading
the Netherlands Govemment to opt for WEU's
integration into the second pillar of the Union (the
CFSP) which has " the advantage of smoothing
the ransition from CFSP to a common defence
policy... "
45. The Netherlands Government nevertheless
feels that " given the complexity of the problems
mentioned above, it does not seem possible to
achieve full integration of WEU in the EU in the
short term. While the former will therefore conti-
nue to exist as a separate organisation for some
time to come, the IGC ought nevertheless to take
the frst steps towards full integration. " Your
Rapporteur has developed in paragraphs 28 and
29 above the reasons why she believes that the
attempt to mix Community and intergovemmen-
tal responsibilities in this way over a transitional
period can only lead to increased confusion and
growing difficulties in the decision-making pro-
cess and can in no way improve its effectiveness
and transparency.
46. The same holds true for the proposal made
by the Prime Minister of Belgium, Mr. Dehaene,
in an address given to the Colldge d'Europe in
Bruges'8. He suggested WEU being associated
with the European Union through the establish-
ment of a common budget, the merging of the
Secretariat with the CFSP and the presidencies
being held by one and the same counbry.
47. The creation, on NAIO lines, of a high-
level secretariat for the CFSP, which would also
be responsible for WEU affairs, was proposed as
far back as October 1994 by the Italian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Martino. The
appointment of a Secretary-General for the CFSP
has also been suggested by Mr. Lamassoure,
French Minister for European Affairs and by
Mr. Aznar, Chairman of the Spanish People's
Party. However the lafter two do not specify
whether the Secretary-General in question should
have responsibilities for WEU. Nor do the three
proposals settle to what extent this secretary-
general should or should not have duties separate
from those of the Secretary-General of the Coun-
cil of the European Union, already in office.
48. Certain considerations put forward by the
European Strategy Group and the WEU Institute
for Security Studies on bringing WEU in as a true
9th May 1995 and tr
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component of the European Union'e also fall
within the scope of the merging of WEU with the
CFSP. According to this thinking:
" The modified Brussels Treaty (WEU)
could be formally included in an amended
Maastricht Treaty, establishing EU reco-
gnition of its application to all members of
WEU. Those members of the EU that are
not members of WEU would therefore
recognise the WEU rOle in the CFSP and
CDP, and commit themselves to avoiding
any action that might impede or run counter
to it. Such a decision by itself would not
modify considerably what is already estab-
lished by the Maastricht Treaty, except for
one significant point: it would make WEU
a formal part of the EU. Thus, the present
mechanism, according to which the EU
Council of Ministers can only request
WEU to act, would become obsolete and
the EU Council of Ministers would simply
tell WEU to act.
However, such a change would only be
acceptable if the EU simultaneously adop-
ted other measures making variable unity a
working reality and guaranteeing the effec-
tiveness of the CDP/CD decision-making
process.
The decision to include the text of the
modified Brussels Treaty in the Maastricht
Treaty is different from the decision to fuse
the two treaties. However, it would proba-
bly initiate a gradual process of communi-
tarisation of the CDP/CD and WEU that
could lead to some important modification
of the modified Brussels Treaty itself. A
significant change would be that the Com-
mission of the EU could also itself propose
to the WEU Council that a joint actionbe
initiated.lf the communitarisation of WEU
and of the CDP developed further, it could
mean that if a joint actionwerc proposed by
the Commission, the WEU Council would
decide by majority vote.
Also, the problem of revising the r6les and
powers of the Secretary-General of WEU
could arise. Such a revision could be requi-
red if the Secretary-General of the CFSP
were also the Secretary-General of WEU.
In particular, it should be made clear
whether this new " double-hatted " Secre-
tary-General would hold powers of initiati-
ve or not and his relationship with the Com-
mission, the EU Council and the European
Parliament would need to be defined. "
49. The high-level group of experts on the
CFSP set up by Mr. van den Broek, European
Commissioner responsible for European common
security policy, proposed at the end of December
1994 creatine " permanent central analysis and
evaluation capability in Brussels, ... endowed
with the necessary study and information capacity
... directed by a political personality designated
along the same lines as that for the President of
the Commission (European Council and Euro-
pean Parliament) and thus benefitting from suffi-
cient authority, independence and duration in
office. " The group proposes, inter alia, that such a
person should bring together, within a common fra-
mework, the ripartite expertise of the Council of
the Union, theEuropean Commission and of WEU.
50. A like idea was taken up in an address by
Mr. Jacques Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, on 3rd
April 1995, to the Royal Institute of International
Relations in Brussels in which he stressed that the
Commission should be associated with this unit of
analysis and take on a more active r6le, if only
because ofthe global nature that security policy is
likely to have in future. The Netherlands Govern-
ment is calling for a strengthening of the CFSP
unit by proposing that the body within which the
CFSP is prepared should be detached from the
Council Secretariat which has responsibility for
preparing all Councils of Ministers. Such a body,
possibly under the authority of a Secretary-Gene-
ral, might be exclusively dedicated to the CFSP.
According to the Netherlands Govemment, the
Commission should participate in the work of
such a strengthened CFSP unit.
51. Conversely, a report submitted by Mr. Eys-
kens on 30th March 1995, on behalf of the consul-
tative committee responsible for European ques-
tions of the House of Representatives of Belgium,
takes the view that " one must avoid stronger ins-
titutionalisation of the CFSP leading to the crea-
tion of a sort of ' high authority ' responsible for
the CFSP, in parallel with the Commission and to
the latter's detriment ".
52. Summarising all the known initiatives so
far for merging WEU with the CFSP, it has to be
admitted that none of them offers viable solutions
for overcoming the various dilemmas facing the
intergovemmental conference :
- 
no state will accept that its soldiers
should sacrifice their lives on the basis of
a qualified majority vote2o;
- 
the problem arising from the fact that
five states of the European Union are not
prepared to become full members of
WEU has not been resolved;
- 
the question of the participation of asso-
ciate member countries such as Iceland,
19. Towards a common defence policy, March 1995.
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Norway and Turkey in WEU once the
latter has merged with the CFSP, has not
been decided;
- 
the difficulty of achieving coincidence
between the-WEU and Euiopean Union
presidencies still remains;
- 
the confusion between the respective
areas of responsibility of the Community
and intergovernmental institutions
would increase, at the expense of the
effectiveness and transparency of the
decision-making process;
- 
the different aspects of merging the trea-
ties or of incorporating the modified
Brussels Treaty in a new treaty of the
Union have not been developed;
- 
the question of democratic control over
WEU when merged with the CFSP will
necessarily aggmvate the problem of the
respective areas of responsibility of the
WEU Assembly and of the European
Parliament.
53. Under such conditions, it is difficult to ima-
gine that a merger of WEU and the CFSP based
on the introduction of a qualified majority vote for
defence matters, in connection with the second
pillar of the European Union might lead to a
strengthening of security, democracy, effective-
ness and transparency within the Union.
(ii) The creation of a fourth pillar of the Euro-
pean Union
54. Conversely, study of the merger between
WEU and the European Union within the frame-
work of intergovernmental structures might lead to
the idea of creating a fourth pillar of the European
Union: to the second pillar 
- 
common foreign and
security policy, and third pillar 
- 
internal affairs
and justice, would be added a " defence pillar ". In
this connection, the United Kingdom press initial-
ly gave to understand (in autumn 1994") that the
government of that country would be prepared to
accept a fourth pillar, but the United Kingdom
hime Minister announced at the beginning of
March 1995 that his government rejected this
model in favour of pursuing the development
of WEU in a structure separate from that of the
European Union22. For different reasons, the
Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the
creation of a fourth pillar within the Treaty of
European Union seems to have few advantages23.
21. Tlre Guardian, 27thOctober 1994.
22. Memorandum on the United Kingdom Govemment's
approach to the treafinent of European defence issues at the
1996 intergovemmental confercnce, lst March 1995.
23. See report on the CFSR transmitted by thc Nethcrlands
Parliament on 30th March 195.
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55. Notwithstanding the United Kingdom and
Netherlands positions, it might be assumed that
WEU's incorporation into a new pillar of the
European Union will be an issue in one way or
another in the 1996 negotiations. It is necessary
therefore to examine the problems and implica-
tions of such a model. According to the study of
the European Strategy Group of the WEU Insti-
tute for Security Studies referred to previously,
the 1996 conference " could follow the Maastricht
path, choosing to strengthen a single Union with
multiple pillars, and making WEU a formal pillar
of the EU like the monetary union and maintai-
ning distinct decision-making rules inside it. This
approach might gain the support of several mem-
ber countries but would require a significant
rewriting of both ffeaties. " According to this
study, " it is unlikely, and it would be imprudent
for the next IGC to make such an effort without a
careful appraisal of further experience and of
various possible decision-making procedures. " If
WEU were to become one of the pillars of the
European Union, the first question to be raised
would be the fate of the modified Brussels Treaty.
One might envisage, as the European Parliament
has proposed, incorporating the " fundamental
elements " of the modified Brussels Treaty into
the new Treaty on European Unionz.
56. But what are the fundamental elements of
the modified Brussels Treaty that should be pre-
served? The only thing which is clear in this res-
pect is that the European Parliament wishes to see
a change to Article IX so that the powers granted
under this provision to the WEU Assembly are
ffansferred to it. Several other questions are also
raised: account must be taken of the fact that five
members of the European Union are not ready to
commit themselves fully to co-operation in WEU.
While the European Parliament considers that a
different (unspecified) solution must be found for
member countries of the Union which are not full
members of WEU, certain groups of experts of the
European Commission feel it necessary to foresee
a new institutional mechanism according to which
WEU would retain only its collective defence
function under the terms of Article V of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty. Such a concept is, however,
conffary to the recently publicised United King-
dom position, according to which the collective
defence of Europe should remain the principal
task of NATO, while WEU should concentrate on
the " Petersberg " missions, namely humanitarian,
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions r.
57. Although technically it is not difficult to
incorporate all or part of the modifred Brussels
24. See the Poettering report, European Parliament docu-
ment 43-0109/94, adopted 24th March 1994.
25. Memorandum on the United Kingdom Govemment
approach to the tneatsnent of European defence issues at thc
1996 intergovernmental confcrence, lst March 1995.
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Treaty in a new title of the Treaty on European
Union (in the same way as all the treaties setting
up the European Community, the Coal and Steel
Community and the European Atomic Energy
Agency have been incorporated in it), the afore-
mentioned example shows that a complex discus-
sion of the use or need of each of these provisions
is likely.
58. In order to avoid this type of discussion,
whose result cannot be foreseen, at the 1996
conference, one might be tempted simply to
follow the United Kingdom suggestion 26 of
lst March 1995, which would allow WEU to
pursue its development independently of the
structures of the European Union, but in close co-
operation with them. However, this solution
would not exempt WEU from the obligation of
re-examining the provisions of its own ffeaty and
of the Maastricht Treaty, a review which should
extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic
Alliance. WEU is, in point of fact, the only Euro-
pean institution with a contractual link with the
Atlantic Alliance from which the whole of the
European Union might benefit, the more so, the
closer WEU draws to that organisation at institu-
tional level.
59. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the pres-
sure that will be exerted by certain countries and
interested institutions of the European Union to
bring about the " absorption " of WEU by the
Union will continue to be very strong on account
of a perspective that is very widespread, particu-
larly in Germany, that any stagnation in European
integration has to be regarded as a reversal of that
process.
60. If we wish to advance 
- 
in the root meaning
of the word 
- 
European Union, an initial pitfall
must be avoided: the 1996 intergovernmental
conference must not degenerate into a competi-
tion between interested institutions where each is
endeavouring to ensure its zurvival or increase its
powers and areas of responsibility according to
Montesquieu's sociological law. Hence, " large
organisations ", which are powerful and structured,
tend to seek to stifle any activity by another orga-
nisation automatically perceived as a " compe-
titor " even when it is of negligible weight and its
field of action is different'z?. It is therefore neces-
sary first to agree the main aims of a revision of
the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty relating to
security and defence matters and the criteria to be
followed to achieve such aims.
61. Any review tending towards WEU's pos-
sible transformation into orte of the pillars of the
26. Memorandum on the United Kingdom Govemment
approach to the treafinent of European defence issues at the
1996 intergovemmental confercnce, lst March 1995.
27. De Defensa, 10th April 1995, Volume 10, No. 14, page 14.
European Union must be motivated by the primary
intention of guaranteeing and strengthening the
security ofEuropean citizens and not ofreducing
or weakening it. There can therefore be no ques-
tion of in any way lessening the scope of Article V
of the modified Brussels Treaty. Above all, it
would be unacceptable to use possible weakening
of the scope of this article to facilitate the entry
into WEU of five countries, Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland and Sweden, or to make it easier
to enlarge WEU to include the countries of Cen-
tral Europe. It would be equally dangerous to opt
to follow a policy the aim of which was to make
NAIO the only organisation responsible for the
defence of Europe on the sole basis of Article 5 of
the Treaty of Washington, which imposes less
stringent obligations than Article V of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, while WEU's main task
became no more than implementing Petersberg-
type missions. Now if NATO military structures
are the only guarantee of the allies' collective
commitment, any withdrawal of American forces,
if confirmed, would put an end to that structure. If
the intergovemmental conference were to decide
to include the mandate provided for under Article
V of the modified Brussels Treaty in the Treaty of
Maastricht, legitimate collective defence would
then be the responsibility of the European Union
and WEU would become its defence pillar r.
According to the Netherlands Govemment report
referred to earlier on the foreign, security and
defence policy of the European Union, most
member states, including the Netherlands, will
consider that there can be no common defence
policy without mutual obligations, even if that
does nothing to change the fact that the imple-
mentation of such a policy continues to be the res-
ponsibility of NATO.
62. Conversely, there are still many underlying
uncertainties and misunderstandings about estab-
lishing the conditions necessary for decision-
making on crisis-management, peace-making or
peace-enforcement outside the area of applica-
tion of compulsory mutual assistance. Admittedly
there is no treaty that obliges European nations to
take joint decisions in the areas just mentioned.
The Netherlands Government therefore rightly
emphasises the need for stronger external action
on the part of the European Union " primarily...
because contemporary problems exceed, to an
increasing extent, the capacity of individual
countries to make an appropriate response. " But
it is debatable to present matters as if the tasks
referred to above did not derive explicitly from
the modified Brussels Treaty. It is therefore
necessary to reiterate the terms and emphasise
the scope of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the
28. See " Towards a common defence policy ", a study by
the European Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for
Security Studies, March 1995.
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modified Brussels Treaty'e, which should be pre-
served in its entirety and applied in the event of
WEU being incorporated into a fourth pillar of
the Union.
63. The major advantage of this provision lies
in the fact that the WEU member states and (in the
event of its incorporation into a new treaty on the
Union) those of the Union are free to commit
themselves or not in joint action out-of-area and
situations covered by mutual assistance obliga-
tions. Consultations on the basis of Article VIII,
paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty can
therefore lead to a decision on joint action without
obligation to participate therein, but also without
the possibility of blocking it by a veto. This pro-
cedure enables certain countries to abstain but
also to delegate to others the power of acting on
behalf of WEU, as was the case in the Gulf and in
Bosnia.
64. Moreover, it is necessary to maintain and
strengthen suitable means for ensuring transatlan-
tic co-operation within the framework of NAIO,
as expressly provided for in Article IV, paragraph
1, of the modified Brussels Treaty. The conffac-
tual link must not be affected by efforts to extend
the range of transatlantic co-operation to other
areas on the basis of future provisions. Closer co-
operation with NATO should become obvious in
particular when it is a question of harmonising
points of view on the enlargement of European
and transatlantic institutions, in particular towards
the East. This subject will be examined further in
a subsequent chapter. In any event, Article XI,
governing the conditions under which other states
might be invited to accede to the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, must be retained.
65. lnter alia, the fate of Protocols II and III and
Protocol IV on the Agency for the Control of
Armaments, based on Article VIII, paragraph 2,
of the modified Brussels Treaty must be determi-
ned. In this connection, your Rapporteur supports
the proposal for the elimination of the Agency for
the Control of Armaments presented by the
Assembly in June 1991 in its Recommendation
504 on the revision of the modified Brussels Trea-
ty on a report by Mr. Goerenss.
66. In the event of the main parts of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty being transferred to a new
revised treaty on European Union, it will be abso-
lutely essential to study the consequences of this
at institutional level and at the level of the deci-
sion-making process. Similarly, in the event of a
merger of WEU with the second pillar of the
29 . Article VItr, paragraph 3 states " At the request of any of
the high contracting parties, the Council shall be irrnnediately
convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to
any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in what-
ever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic sta-
bility. "
30. Document 1261.
European Union (the CFSP), the specific problem
will need to be resolved of the five countries
which are no more prepired to take on more bin-
ding commitments in defence matters within the
framework of a revised treaty on European Union
than they are at present to accede to the modified
Brussels Treaty. Furthermore, a solution must
be found for WEU associate members, namely
Iceland, Norway and Turkey, which, through the
" defence " pillar should be enabled to obtain the
same status as member countries, without neces-
sarily participating in the CFSP pillar in its pre-
sent configuration.
67. According to the opinion which the Nether-
lands Government submitted to the Netherlands
Parliament on 30th March 1995, a form of asso-
ciation of these countries with the European
Union might be envisaged. " This may involve no
more than a new fourth pillar but, given the fact
that common defence policy and the CFSP are
closely interlinked, it may extend to the second
pillar, especially if the common defence policy
ultimately takes shape within it. This question is
especially relevant in view of the special position
of Turkey, and it therefore merits particular atten-
tion during the preparations for the IGC. " Indeed,
this question will become crucial if the eventual
full integration of the " defence dimension " into
the Union is envisaged.
Implications for the executive
68. Among the various models considered, the
one developed in the study of the European Stra-
tegy Group and the WEU Institute for Security
Studies, published in March 1995, deserves parti-
cular attention. According to this model:
" Since all members of the EU are repre-
sented within WEU, a Defence Policy
Council could meet in the same configura-
tion as the EU Council of Ministers does
for the CFSP, adding defence ministers;
only member countries of the modified
Brussels Treaty would have the right to
vote, whereas the others would not be obli-
ged to adopt the Council's decisions, yet
have the possibility of associating them-
selves with the policies decided on. Partici-
pation in meetings of the Council would be
in accordance with the agenda: discussions
related to Article V or conceming relations
with NAIO would not be open to WEU
non-member countries, in line with current
WEU practice. Similar rules would apply
in meetings of subsidiary bodies of the
Defence Policy Council, including those of
high-ranking offrcials from capitals dealing
with the CFSP and defence (the EU's Secu-
rity Group and WEU's Special Working
Group could then be combined). As there
are already permanent representatives to
90
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WEU, a second Committee of Permanent
Representatives dealing with defence poli-
cy would have to be set up in the EU; this
would not necessarily imply the creation of
two delegations from each EU member
state, as the second ambassador could be a
member of the national representation to
the EU. "
69. The authors of this study rightly wonder:
" What will happen conceming the associate
members or associate partners that already parti-
cipate in the working of WEU but will not all
become full members of the EU in the near
future? " Without being able to give definite
answers 
- 
which is not surprising given the com-
plexity of the problems to be handled 
- 
the
authors take the view that:
" Arrangements will have to be made for
these counffies, which of course cannot be
deprived of their present rights in WEU.
The answer will not be easy to the extent
that the EU, for reasons of homogeneity,
does not have a comparable associate status.
It might be useful to devote some thought
to the introduction of such a status for non-
member countries so that they can partici-
pate in the intergovernmental pillars of the
EU. Another problem, closely related to the
former, is worth considering if it is decided
to incorporate WEU into the EU: can the
EU become a European pillar of the Atlan-
tic Alliance if its members are not all mem-
bers of the alliance and if some European
NATO allies are not members of the EU? "
70. Again, according to the abovementioned
study:
" The WEU Secretariat... could become a
subdivision of the EU Council Secretariat
as a specialised directorate for defence
policy. The Planning Cell, which would
only respond to the Defence Policy
Council, could be collocated with the EU
Council Secretariat. "
71. As paragraphs 46 to 50 above have already
shown, there are other proposals for creating a
high-level secretariat for the CFSP, separate from
that of the Council of the Union, but at the same
time responsible for WEU affairs. Conversely,
Mr. Gu6na, in his report on behalf of the delega-
tion of the French Senate to the European Union
on the anticipated reform in 1996 of the European
Union institutions 3r suggests the creation of a
secretariat-general for each pillar of the Union,
whereas the group of experts formed by Mr. van
den Broek has proposed the creation of a central
analysis capability bringing together the tripartite
31. The 1996 reform of the institutions of the European
Union, Volume I, No. 224, 1994-95,pages32 and37.
expertise of the Council of the Union, WEU and
the Commission. The involvement of the latter in
defence matters nevertheless raises very wide
controversy.
72. The authors of the study by the European
Strategy Group of the WEU Institute for Security
Studies already referred to are very aware that
certain member countries are most reluctant to see
the responsibilities of the European Commission
extended to defence policy matters. They recogni-
se therefore that it might prove difficult to reach
agreement on a mechanism that is differentiated
from the existing CFSP procedures (where the
Commission has a non-exclusive right of initia-
tive). In their opinion, " a right to put forward pro-
posals would, as an alternative, be given to the EU
Council Secretariat, specifically to its specialised
Defence Directorate. This would not be exclusive,
as the member statqs would themselves have the
right to put forward proposals. " Indeed, the ques-
tion as to whether the European Commission
should acquire a responsibility in the event of
WEU being incorporated into a fourth pillar of the
Union, which would remain purely intergovern-
mental and would take decisions on a unanimous
basis, will be crucial in assessing the acceptability
of such a model.
P ar liamentary supervision
73. Parliamentary supervision is the issue
which will raise the most acute controversy in the
event of WEU being incorporated into the Euro-
pean Union, even if it is to be integrated into a
purely intergovernmental " defence " pillar and
separate from the CFSP in its present form. There
are many and various proposals for improving
democratic supervision of defence and security
policy.
74. Before examining them, it is necessary to
stress that the Assembly of WEU considers
strengthening democratic supervision to be a cru-
cial factor in building the European Union as a
whole, which, ten years hence, will perhaps inclu-
de some 25 member countries, the population of
which, in excess of 450 million inhabitants, will
be far greater than that of the United States, Rus-
sia or the Community of Independent States. The
problem of effective and representative democra-
tic supervision of such a vast area, with increas-
ingly powerful executive bodies, therefore goes
beyond the simple choice between a Europe, in
particular a defence Europe, organised on a
" community " model or one on intergovernmen-
tal lines.
75. Apart from this question, the following
point must be examined: if one truly wishes to
work for democracy in a unified Europe, must one
really limit oneself to asking repeatedly for the
powers and rights of the European Parliament
alone to be strengthened? Indeed, the majority of
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the large democracies of Europe and North Ame-
rica, some of which have very old traditions, have
preferred to ensure democratic supervision of the
executive through a bicameral parliamentary sys-
tem. Is it even thinkable therefore that the Euro-
pean Parliament should be the only parliamentary
body of the European Union responsible for
supervision of the European executive?
76. It must be realised that the direction the
intergovemmental conference will take when sett-
ling the question of parliamentary supervision of
the future defence Europe will have decisive
consequences for the subsequent development of
the parliamentary dimension of the entire Euro-
pean Union.
77. The approach chosen up to now by the
Maastricht Treaty in drafting Article J.7 of Title V
was to have the European Parliament intervene
progressively in the area of common foreign and
security policy, in other words, not only in a fun-
damentally intergovernmental arrangement, but
also in an area which includes the eventual defini-
tion of a common defence policy, WEU being res-
ponsible for working out and implementing deci-
sions and actions of the Union which have
implications in that area. Yet according to Article
IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, it is to the
WEU Assembly alone that the Council of that
organisation is obliged to submit a report on its
activities. Further to Article J.11, the European
Parliament has also obtained a right of budgetary
co-decision over CFSP matters. Hence Mr. Gu6na
rightly observes in a report published on 15th
February 1995 on behalf of the delegation of the
French Senate to the European Union32 notes that
the association of the European Parliament " with
a fundamentally intergovernmental policy leads
to a blurring of responsibility and institutional
confusion, an ongoing source ofprocedural diffi-
culty ... the Maastricht Treaty has initiated a
mixing of the species which has proved to be a
source of confusion and has aroused paralysing
procedural controversies. "
78. Severalproposals seekto overcomepresent
ambiguities. The European Parliament initially
favoured a solution providing for the latter to
replace the WEU Assembly completely, both at
the level of plenary sessions and at committee
level, the powers and voting conditions of the
European Padiament being defined by the inter-
govemmental conference 33. This concept is sup-
ported, inter alia, by Mr. Eyskens, who wonders in
the report already referred to whether the parlia-
mentary Assembly of WEU should not be compo-
sed of members of the European Parliament.
32. The 1996 reform of the European Union institutions,
Volume I, Senate Report No. 224.
33. See the de Gucht report adopted on 24th February 1994.
79. None of these considerations provides an
answer to the question of how members of the
European Parliament elected by direct universal
suffrage and remote from national electorates can
claim to exercise supervision over decisions
which are taken exclusively in a national and
intergovemmental framework. The only answer is
perhaps to be found in the hypothesis voiced by
advocates of this solution, to the effect that secu-
rity and defence will ultimately be integrated in
supranational, indeed " communitarised " execu-
tive bodies.
80. However, other problems are raised in this
context: the first is linked to the existence of a
variable geometry Europe and the other to the fact
that national parliaments are claiming increased
supervision over the development of decisions at
European level, even in the purely " community "
domain. In an attempt to resolve the frst problem,
Mr. Bourlanges, Rapporteur of the Committee
on Institutional Affairs of the European Parlia-
mentl observes that:
" The foreseeable emergence of restricted
circles of integration in the areas of mone-
tary union, WEU or the Schengen area
poses a serious threat to the very existence
of parliamentary control. Whenever Union
policies are pursued within a specific insti-
tutional framework and for a period of
several years by a restricted number of
member states, it is therefore vital to set up
an ad hoc body to exercise parliamentary
control. Such ad hoc bodies which would
have to be restricted in size and composed
exclusively of members of the European
Parliament from the member states concer-
ned, could be administered by the secreta-
riat of the European Parliament, which
would thus play a pivotal r6le in a genuine
European system of parliamentary control
(ESPC) "
81. It must first be that this proposal in
no way resolves the due to the existence
of associate member and iate partner coun-
representation in
82. In a report submitted in the context of the
French National Assembly, two deputies, MM.
Catala and Ameline35 envisage the creation of an
34. See the draft report of the Committee on Institutional
Affairs of the European Parliament on the operation of the
Trcaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 intergo-
vemmental conference - implementation, lOth April 1995.
35. What rcfotms for tomorrow's Europe?, Frcnch National
Assembly, delegation to the European Union, Information
Report No. 1389, 8th February 1995.
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interparliamentary committee with the participa-
tion of the national parliaments in the decision-
making process of the Union and composed of
an equal and small number of representatives
per member state. " This committee would also
constitute the appropriate parliamentary supervi-
sory authority for the restricted circles set up in
currency and defence matters ". In these areas the
function of such committee would be consulta-
tive, whereas it would have a decision-making
power as regards treaty revision, the application
of Article 235 of the treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community36, international agreements and
the enlargement of the Union, the budget, income
and internal and judicial matters.
83. This idea is undoubtedly interesting, but it
should be recalled in this connection that in the
matters in which this committee would have
consultative responsibilities, the WEU Assembly
with its present structures could be used perfectly
well, whereas the second area of responsibilities
envisaged for this committee would raise 
- 
as the
authors themselves recognise 
- 
awkward pro-
blems in connection with determining the condi-
tions under which the national parliaments make
their views known in this committee and the need
to avoid the European Parliament and the com-
mittee mutually paralysing each other.
84. If it is wished to maintain democratic and
representative supervision in the framework of a
European Union which is to be enlarged conside-
rably in a foreseeable future, it is necessary to
create a bicameral system which facilitates such
supervision and does not lead to a stalemate. It is
therefore necessary to establish clearly the res-
ponsibilities of the parliamentary institutions in
question. conversely, one must reject any propo-
sal tending to create mixed parliamentary institu-
tions such as the one which envisages representa-
tives of national parliaments sitting in the
European Parliament alongside members elected
by direct universal suffrage.
85. This solution would not only have the
disadvantage of creating a two-speed Assembly,
but, far from improving efficiency, would contri-
bute also to a blurring of responsibilities. The
same holds ffue for the proposal developed in
Chapter V of the study by the European Strategy
Group and the WEU Institute for Security Studies
which envisages replacing the WEU Assembly by
a newly-created joint parliamentary committee on
European defence, composed of representatives
of the European Parliament and members of the
security and defence committees of the various
national parliaments. Conversely, this study righr
ly points out that the present composition of the
WEU Assembly, being dependent on that of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Euro-
pe, does not have any obvious link with the com-
mittees of the national parliaments dealing with
defence and security policy. In this connection,
the Assembly has already adopted recommenda-
tions with a view to separating its delegations
from those of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe; your Rapporteur will return to
these recommendations later.
86. Consideration should also be given to the
ideas developed in the foregoing study on a
reform of the present functions of the WEU
Assembly tending to give it more substantial
powers in budget and supervisory matters. One
should be aware, in any thinking on the need and
possibility of creating a bicameral system of
democratic supervision of the executive at the
European level, that the problem concerns both
the " community " and the intergovemmental
spheres. Even if this question is examined on the
assumption of the fourth (intergovernmental)
pillar being created, it must not be forgotten that
coherence should be maintained with the ques-
tions which will perhaps be raised in similar man-
ner in regard to the Community pillars.
87. One must therefore repeat that the various
proposals for the creation of a bicameral parlia-
mentary system at European level relate primari-
ly to the Community area. Such is the case for the
proposal made by Mr. Balladur3T for associating
national parliaments more closely in the drafting
of Community rules by the creation of a second
chamber of representatives. Mr. Philippe S6guin,
President of the French National Assembly, fol-
lows the same direction when he suggests crea-
ting a bicameral parliamentary system at Euro-
pean level where national parliaments would,
collectively, have the r6le of a lower chamber,
and the European Parliament that of a higher
chamber3s.
88. If account is to be taken of the position of
politicians responsible for European affairs, such
as the European Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan(in favour of creating a " committee of parlia-
ments "), I\ft. Alain Lamassoure, French Minister
responsible for European affairs (who is asking
that in areas where the Union Council acts as
legislator, each member state should be authori-
sed to be represented no longer by a minister but
by a member of the national parliament3e and Mr.
Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing (who wishes to set up a
37. Le Monde, 30th November 1994.
38. For a French memorandum on Europe, Le Figaro, 7th
December 1994.
39. Le Figaro,29th November 1994.
36. Article 235 reads as follows: " If action by the Commu-
nity should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this treaty has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Par-
liament, take the appropriate measures. "
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committee of national parliamentarians respon-
sible for supervising the policy of the European
Central Bankoo), one is led to insist on the prero-
gatives of the national parliaments to supervise
areas in which institutions take decisions in an
intergovernmental framework being preserved at
all cost and even strengthened.
89. As revealed in a draft report on progress
achieved in implementing the common foreign
and security policy, presented by Mr. Matutes on
behalf of the Foreign Affairs and Security Com-
mittee of the European Parliament on 20th April
1995, it is beginning to be acknowledged within
that very institution that to be effective, democra-
tic supervision must be exercised at the same level
as the source of powerat. Again in this report,
bicameralism is referred to as one of the solutions
which would enable institutional questions to be
settled at parliamentary levelo2.
90. As to democratic supervision of the inter-
governmental pillars of the Union, Mr. Yves
Gu6na, Rapporteur of the French Senate on the
1996 reform of the institutions of the European
Union 03, adopts the clearest possible position in
advocating:
" the creation of a European senate repre-
senting national parliaments and with a
mandate to exercise control ... over the
various forms of intergovemmental co-ope-
ration among all or some of the member
states ...
The members of this Assembly would sit in
national delegations, which naturally does
not exclude pluralism of views or of voting;
in this way, its composition might be adjus-
ted in accordance with the participation of
states in the various aspects of the inter-
governmental pillars or in related forms of
co-operation between member states. Thus
the WEU Assembly might become one of
the formations of the European senate, the
one made up of parliamentary delegates of
the WEU member states; similarly, when
discussing the Schengen agreements, the
European senate would be composed of the
parliamentary delegations of the states par-
ticipating in that agreement. "
It should be noted that the WEU Assembly is
already identified as this body and it is left open to
states and national parliaments to decide on pos-
sible adaptions to be made to it for it to carry out
wider functions.
91. Again, according to the French Senate
report:
40. Le Figaro, 1lth January 1995.
41. Paragraph 29 of the explanatory memorandum.
42. Parugraph 35 of the explanatory memorandum.
43. See foofirote 32 above.
" It should be emphasised that a European
senate thus conceived would not complicate
the decision-making process of the Union.
Its r6le would be entirely separate from that
of the European Parliament. In reality, the
Council of the European Union would have
as its essential parliamentary interlocutor
the European Parliament in the case of the
community pillar and the European senate
in the case of the two intergovernmental
pillars. There would be no " shuttle " bet-
ween these two assemblies exercising diffe-
rent and complementary functions. One
could even go so far as to state that the pro-
posed system would be a simplification as
compared with the present situation as it
would be based on a clear definition of the
r6les of each one, while today's institutional
grey area between the second and third
pillars is a source of confusion of responsi-
bilities and procedural conflicts. "
92. These proposals are to all intents and pur-
poses very interesting even if the French Senate
has not formulated them with a view to the incor-
poration of WEU as a fourth pillar of the Union,
because it considers it necessary for WEU to
remain as an organisation, admittedly closely lin-
ked to the European Union, but independent of
the latter. The French Senate's proposals deserve
to be examined the more carefully, given that they
are directed towards granting a consultative r6le
to the WEU Assembly without seeking to go fur-
ther. Conversely, the report in question puts for-
ward clear ideas on the composition of such a
European senate which " should, for reasons of
consistency, be determined in relation to the
weighting of voting within the Council. " ... In
this view, " one might, for example, envisage that
the number of members of the parliamentary dele-
gation of a state should be equal to double the
number of votes that state has in the Council. "
93. The method of weighting will certainly not
be the only question that will have to be settled,
assuming that agreement is reached on the principle
of creating a second European chamber composed
of delegations from national parliaments, which
would sit alongside the European Parliament. The
problem will also arise as to whether the delegations
to this chamber shouldbe different from those of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
94. It should be recalled in this connection that
the WEU Assembly had suggested a more flexible
solution in Recommendation 504 on the revision
of the modified Brussels Treatya, by drafting the
relevant article as follows:
" The Council of Western European Union
shall make an annual report on its activities
94
44. Adopted on 6th June 1991 on a report presented by Mr.
Goerens on behalf of the Political Commitee (Document 126l).
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States Number of votesCouncil
Number of votes
European senate
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Ponugal
United Kingdom
Austria
Finland
Sweden
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
CzechRepublic
Bulgaria
Romania
Slovenia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
5
3
10
5
8
10
3
10
2
5
5
l0
4
3
4
5
E
3
5
5
7
2
2
2
3
10
6
20
10
t6
20
6
20
4
10
10
20
8
6
8
10
16
6
r0
l0
14
4
4
4
6
to an assembly of representatives of the
Brussels Treaty powers appointed in accor-
dance with the same criteria as representa-
tives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council ofEurope. "
95. It will be noted at the outset that the French
Senate's concept does not follow the same criteria
and certainly other models of bicameral systems
can be found based on the experience of the
various member states which have such a system.
h any event, it is virtually unthinkable that, in a
Europe that will soon consist of 25 member coun-
tries or more with a total population of more than
450 million inhabitants, parliamentary supervi-
sion should be entrusted to the European Parlia-
ment alone, without national parliaments being
represented at European level and able to exercise
supervision over decisions taken in the intergo-
vernmental framework.
96. Some opposition must nevertheless be
expected to the introduction of a bicameral system
based, on the one hand, on a European Parliament
elected by direct universal suffrage and, on the
other, on a second chamber composed of repre-
sentatives of national parliaments. Thus, Mr.
Martin, Rapporteur of the Committee on Institu-
tional Affairs of the European Parliament on the
development of the European Union, feels that
this initiative would amount to creating a third
chamber alongside the (Union) Council which
represents national governments and the Euro-
pean Parliament which represents the people. In
his view, if it had any power at all, it would only
make the decision-making process more cumber-
some ... If it were to have no powers at all, this
institution would be nothing more than an expen-
sive platform.
97. Your Rapporteur is convinced that none of
these arguments is valid. First, the Council of the
Union cannot be considered as a second chamber,
even if, in the Community framework, it also acts
as legislator. For, as legislative functions are gra-
dually transferred to the European parliamentary
institutions, the Council will be called upon to
legislate with increasingly less frequency. In this
connection, Mr. Lamassoure's suggestion must be
recalled, which advocated replacing governments
by parliamentarians in these areas. The creation of
a second chamber composed of representatives of
national parliaments would not make the deci-
sion-making process more cumbersome because
its powers would be different to those of the Euro-
pean Parliament. Even in a purely consultative
function, this chamber might exercise essential
political influence over the decisions of the exe-
cutive.
98. On the other hand, Mr. Eyskens, author of a
report in the House of Representatives of Belgiumos
on the preparation of the 1996 intergovemmental
conference, considers the idea of creating a Euro-
pean senate to be dangerous because its introduc-
tion would institutionalise nationalist reflexes,
hinder the operation of the European Parliament
... and devalue the r6le of the latter. As the work
of the WEU Assembly (composed of national par-
liamentarians and therefore comparable to a Euro-
pean senate) shows, this Assembly has always
been poles apart from nationalist reflexes. Indeed,
since it came into existence, it has steadfastly pro-
moted the creation of a European spirit, not mere-
ly among its representatives but also in the natio-
nal parliaments of the member countries. Through
the way it operates, the Assembly, where all poli-
tical tendencies are represented, has always been
able to develop constructive joint positions with a
view to transmitting useful recommendations to
the Council and giving the necessary political
impetus to the govemments the latter brings toge-
ther. [t thus contributes to developing joint solu-
tions, often enabling stalemates in the Council to
be overcome. The introduction of a European
senate or chamber of representatives at European
level on the model of the WEU Assembly there-
95
45. See paragraph 26 above.
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fore in no way constitutes a danger; it would
rather be an institution complementary to the
European Parliament, which would be an indis-
pensable strengthening of the principle of repre-
sentative democracy in Europe.
99. In this context, the debates held on this
question at the 12th Conference of European
Affairs Committees (CEAC) held in Paris on 27th
and 28th February 1995 must certainly be taken
into consideration. These debates were very
varied and dealt with subjects of interest to natio-
nal parliaments in the framework of the 1996 ins-
titutional reform. The reactions of the participants
at this conference to the proposal to establish a
new European chamber composed of representa-
tives of national parliaments differed widely.
Most national parliaments had not yet had the
opportunity to examine this question in depth and
the conference did not reach a common position
on it. The European Commission, in its report of
10th May 1995 on the operation of the Treaty on
European Union, was therefore wrong in stating
that CEAC had merely brushed aside this propo-
sal.
100. In short, your Rapporteur is inclined to
draw the following conclusions: for the Assembly
to argue in favour of WEU being integrated into a
(fourth) pillar of the European Union, it must be
assured of keeping all its present responsibilities.
It must also have a guarantee that any problems
raised by incorporating the provisions of the
modified Brussels Treaty into the Treaty on the
Union, due to differences in composition
(variable geometry) of WEU, the European Union
and NAIO, can be resolved without dilution of
security and that the effectiveness of this new
pillar will not undergo any possible blurring of
responsibilities, in particular due to the involve-
ment of the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment.
101. Taking account of all the abovementioned
problems which would have to be resolved if one
opts for the creation of a fourth pillar of the Euro-
pean Union, it is difficult to foresee whether the
1996 intergovernmental conference will be in a
position to find solutions which are acceptable for
all the interested parties without diluting the legal
bases of security now in force. No doubt sharp
disagreement can be expected not only on the
content of the fourth pillar " defence " and wor-
king methods at executive level, but also the par-
liamentary dimension, on which it will be difficult
to reach agreement, although the idea of a second
parliamentary chamber at European level seems
to be making headway. Your Rapporteur shares
the opinion expressed in the study by the Euro-
pean Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for
Security Studies, namely that it is unlikely that the
intergovernmental conference will be able to
agree on the need to redraft the two treaties and
assess all the effects of the different possible pro-
cedures in relation to the decision-making pro-
cess. Wise counsel might therefore suggest that,
in order to avoid a possible failure of the confe-
rence in this area, one should opt for a system that
enables WEU as a whole to develop as an institu-
tion separate from the Union, but in close co-ope-
ration with it.
(c) The develapment of WEU in ot aatonomoas
instilutio tttl tramew ork (U niled Kingdom proposal)
102. This approach has recently been put for-
ward officially by the United Kingdom Govem-
ment 6, but it is also gaining increasing support
among other member countriesoT and even in the
European Commission. Having recalled that,
among Westem European countries, the United
Kingdom and France both have specific interests
and responsibilities overseas, the United King-
dom Prime Minister states that:
" The government believes that the nation
state should be the basic building block in
constructing the kind of international order
we wish to see; and that the nation state
remains in particular the fundamental enti-
ty for co-operation in the field of defence.
The defence of its citizens remains the first
and most fundamental duty of any govern-
ment. We may choose to exercise our res-
ponsibilities through coalition action with
our partners, but it is a national govern-
ment's duty to answer to national parlia-
ments when troops are sent into action. So
the unshakeable conviction on which our
approach to the development of a European
defence policy will be based will be that the
basis for European action in the defence
and security field should be intergovern-
mental, based on co-operation between
nation states.
Future iurangements should in particular
reflect the varying memberships of the
European Union and WEU. WEU has nine
(soon to be ten) full members, those states
who are members both of the European
Union and of NATO and are thus covered
by NAIO's defence guarantee, except for
Denmark which has opted for observer sta-
tus. It has three associate members 
- 
Euro-
pean members of NATO who are not
members of the European Union (Tirrkey
46. Memorandum setting out the position of the United
Kingdom Government on how questions relating to Euro-
pean defence are to be dealt with at the 1996 intergovem-
mental conference, lst March 1995.
47. See, for example, the article by Mr. Balladur in Lr
Monde, 30th November 1995.
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Norway, Iceland) 
- 
who are covered by
NAIO's defence guarantee in the Washing-
ton Treaty but not by that of WEU. It has
five observers 
- 
Denmark, plus members of
the European Union who are not members
of NAIO (heland, Sweden, Finland, Aus-
tria). Denmark is covered by NATO's
defence guarantee. The others are not cove-
red by any defence guarantee; indeed, their
defence and security policies have traditio-
nally been neutral in orientation. Finally,
WEU has developed an associate partner-
ship with nine states 
-Poland, Hungary, theCzech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
Congruence between the membership of
the European Union and of WEU is thus
not complete. In contrast to the position
within the European Union, there is a wide
spread of rights and responsibilities in
WEU.
Future structures should take account of the
circumstances in which our armed forces
are likely to be operating. Because the mis-
sions they undertake will not be concemed
in the main with territorial defence, the coa-
litions of those involved will vary from
mission to mission. Individual nations will
decide on a case by case basis whether they
wish to contribute forces to particular ope-
rations, taking account of military factors 
-
for example, the existing spread of opera-
tions to which they are committed 
- 
and
political 
- 
for example, regional considera-
tions. Future structures must be able to
accommodate this 'variable geometry' in
future. Designing arrangements that can do
so will strengthen rather than weaken the
flexibility with which we will be able to
respond to the challenges we face. For all
of these reasons, the govemment has rejec-
ted the option of simply folding WEU into
the European Union as an intergovernmen-
tal pillar. "
103. The United Kingdom Government empha-
sises that: " The essential intergovernmental nature
of decision-making on defence would be preser-
ved, with none of the involvement of the Euro-
pean Commission or the European Parliament
which is provided for elsewhere in the European
Union's structure; WEU already has its own
secretariat and its own parliamentary Assembly. "
It proposes moreover to create a new WEU autho-
rity of heads of state and of government including
those of full member counffies, associate member
countries and observer countries. According to
the United Kingdom memorandum:
" This new body would provide a reinfor-
ced decision-making process for matters
relating to European defence and for mobi-
lising effective European military capabili-
ties. It would thus provide the necessary
underpinning to the European Union's
common foreign and security policy whilst
preserving and indeed reinforcing the trans-
atlantic defence and security link. It would
be built on the WEU Treaty base, and the
rights and responsibilities of its members
would thus mirror those already in force in
the WEU Council. It would also preserve
the opportunity for others to 'opt in' to
WEU operations without changing their
status, an issue which is likely to be of par-
ticular importance to those members of the
European Union who are not members of
NATO. ... The new body would have res-
ponsibility for taking forward the definition
of a European defence policy, as envisaged
in the Treaty on European Union. In order
to improve links between WEU and the
European Union, it could meet back-to-
back with heads of state and government
meeting in the European Council. The
European Council, to which the WEU
Secretary-General might be invited when it
discusses issues affecting the European
Union's common foreign and security policy,
could make proposals to the new WEU
body, which as the defence component of
the European Union would have responsi-
bility for formulating general guidelines on
collective European military action. "
104. When examining this initiative, one should
also first welcome the fact that the United King-
dom Government has taken up proposals which
the Assembly had already made on several occa-
sions, particularly in Recommendations 556, 565
and 566. In relation to organising WEU summits,
the British proposal goes further than the declara-
tion adopted by the WEU Council at Noordwijk,
under the terms of which ministers were merely
invited to " consider the possibility of holding a
WEU meeting at summit level before the IGC
in order to finalise its political input to the confe-
rence. "
105. The idea of holding WEU summit meetings
on a more regular basis seems fully justified in
that it would give WEU activities the political
impetus which until now has always been lacking.
However, if this objective is to be attained, seve-
ral questions must be raised: first, whether it is not
more logical for the heads of state and of govern-
ment of WEU to meet before the European Coun-
cil rather than after and, second, whether it should
not rather be envisaged that the WEU summit
meeting should be the one to transmit proposals to
the European Council. Indeed, the more homoge-
nous framework of WEU would enable agree-
ment to be reached more easily on an initiative in
defence policy matters than in a European Coun-
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cil which includes five countries which do not
participate in co-operation in defence matters in
WEU. It is also necessary to ensure that the WEU
observer countries cannot block within the frame-
work of the European Council any initiative put
forward by WEU.
106. If we insist on continuing in the present
direction followed by the Maastricht Treaty,
according to which WEU must act primarily at the
request of the Union, we cannot hope to develop
the political initiative in WEU that we also need.
Moreover it would be more difficult to reach
agrcement in the European Council on proposals
to be transmitted to WEU. Hence the report of the
Council of the European Union on the functioning
of the Treaty on European Union has to admit that
the new possibility offered by Article 1.4, para-
graph 2, has not as such been used. One of the
aims of the revision of Title V of the Maastricht
Treaty should therefore be to amend the text of
paragraph 2 of Anicle J.4by giving WEU a gene-
ral mandate from the Union. The article should
therefore read as follows:
" Westem European Union (WEU), which
is an integral part of the development of the
Union, elaborates and implements decisions
and actions of the Union which have defence
implications. The Council shall, in agree-
ment with the institutions of WEU, adopt
the necessary practical arrangements. "
107. The United Kingdom proposal envisages
inviting the WEU Secretary-General to attend
meetings of the European Council when the latter
discusses questions dealing the common foreign
and security policy. One can but endorse this pro-
posal which is in line with the recommendations
which the Assembly has already addressed to the
Council in this connection. The government appa-
rently does not envisage the participation of asso-
ciate partner countries in WEU meetings at the
level of heads of state and of government
although observer countries will be represented
there. One might therefore question the reasons
for such differentiation which can be explained
only by the desire to avoid making decision-
making too difficult through the participation of
too many countries. However it would be desi-
rable to define the criteria which would enable
associate partners to participate in these meetings
under certain conditions.
108. Finally, it should be noted that, in point of
fact, the United Kingdom proposal does not really
seek to create a new authority since Article VIII,
paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty sti-
pulates that the WEU Council can be " so organi-
sed as to be able to exercise its functions conti-
nuously ". The flexibility of this wording enables
the member countries to be represented there at
the level and in the way they see fit; in other
words, it would already have been possible, in the
past, to organise meetings at the level of heads of
state and of government, if the interested parties
had demonstrated the will to do so.
109. In summary, it might be concluded that
there are several advantages to the British
approach in that it permits progress to be made in
a pragmatic and flexible way towards increasing
cohesion between WEU and the European Union
by deepening the experience ofpractical co-ope-
ration between the two institutions and their res-
pective bodies 
- 
an experience which is still fair-
ly limited. The two parts of the fortieth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly moreover
say nothing about the implementation of this co-
operation. In the Noordwijk declaration, the
WEU Ministers nevertheless stressed that it was
important to develop relations with the European
Union. The report of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union on the working of the Treaty on
European Union states merely that thinking will
continue on the relations between the Secreta-
riats-General of the Council of the European
Union and WEU.
110. It would be particularly useful to obtain
information on WEU's participation in the work
of the Security Group of the CFSP and to know to
what extent co-operation and responsibility-sha-
ring between this group and the WEU authorities
are organised. On the basis of experience gained
in specific areas, among which one might quote,
for example, co-operation between WEU and the
European Union in the administration of Mostar,
or the creation of a group of experts of the mem-
ber states of WEU, WEAG and the European
Union with the brief of studying the options for a
European armaments policy, one might begin to
reflect on improvements to be made to institutio-
nal and practical co-operation; avoiding the diffi-
cult problems that would result from any form of
institutional merger. At the same time, WEU
might resume the revision process of its own trea-
ty which was already envisaged at the time of the
accession of Spain and Portugal and which will
be essential given the radical changes the securi-
ty environment has undergone since 1989. This
revision might constitute another means for
WEU to draw closer to the European Union and
to develop its co-operative links with its North
American allies in the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance.
111. The United Kingdom memorandum seems
therefore to be a basis for discussion and negotia-
tion between WEU member countries and the
other partners of the European Union in the fra-
mework of the preparation of the intergovernmen-
tal conference. This document was favourably
received by several governments at the meeting of
the Fifteen in Carcassonne, among others, by the
Portuguese Government which currently holds
the presidency of the Council.
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IVThe implications of the 1996
inte rgov e rnme ntal c onfere nc e
on E uro -Atlantfu relations
ll2. The preliminary conclusions on the defini-
tion of a common European defence policy which
the WEU Council transmitted to the Assembly on
18th November 1994* contain the following sen-
tence: " Whatever the outcome of the IGC will be,
the inffinsic link between a cornmon European
defence policy and NATO will remain. " How-
ever, at the present time, none of the information
conceming the evolution of relations between
WEU and NATO issued by the WEU Council
would appear to confirm such optimism. Appa-
rently, the implementation of the decisions rea-
ched at the NAIO summit meeting concerning the
conditions for making the collective assets of
NATO available for WEU operations is marking
time and the application of the agreements on
arrangements for the deployment of combinedjoint task forces by WEU is still awaited. The
second part of the fortieth annual report of the
Council to the Assembly ae admits that " the
strengthening of WEU's operational r6le depends
... on NMO's elaboration of the combined joint
task forces (CJTF) concept. The results will be a
test case both for WEU/NATO relations and for
the operational potential of WEU ". Bearing in
mind the persistent difficulties Europeans are
having in reaching agreement with the Ameri-
cans, one might wonder why the WEU Council, in
its Lisbon declaration, welcomed with such opti-
mism " the continuing co-operation and the insti-
tutional dialogue between WEU and NAIO to
develop further the CJTF concept ".
113. The WEU ministers meeting in Noordwijk
agreed it was necessary, in a spirit of transparency
and complementarity, to intensify working rela-
tionships between the two organisations. It is even
more important however for WEU to lose no time
in communicating to the authorities of the Euro-
pean Union, in accordance with the WEU declara-
tion ap,pended to the Maastricht Treaty, its conclu-
sions regarding experience gained in its relations
with the Atlantic Alliance. It is most important to
present to the intergovernmental conference a
WEU concept explaining how the European
Union, once it has a defence dimension, can beco-
me the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (a
r6le reserved so far for WEU), if its members do
not all belong to the alliance and if the European
allies are not all members of the European Unionso.
In an article published in the Intemational Herald
48. Document 1443.
49. Document 1453, 30th March 1995.
50. See Chapter YII of the snrdy of the European Strategy
Group and the WEU Institute for Security Studies " Towards
a common defence policy ".
Tribune on 30th March 1995, Mr. Kinkel, German
Minister for Foreign Affairs, set out the problem
as follows:
" The transatlantic partners in NATO will
have to adapt to the European identity that
is emerging in security and defence policy
within the framework of Western European
Union.
In the context of the European Union inter-
governmental conference next year, the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
will be strengthened. A key issue on the
transatlantic agenda will be the future mer-
ging of NATO security and defence struc-
tures with those of European integration.
NATO must not be weakened, ygt Europe
must be given a wider scope for action on
security matters. "
ll4. It remains to be seen how this aim is to be
achieved. This contribution is decisive in the pre-
paration of the intergovemmental conference and
one cannot wait until 1996 to undertake this exa-
mination as it would then be far too late. WEU has
particular responsibility in this connection since it
is the only European organisation with a contrac-
tual link with NATO, based on Article IV of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
115. Conversely, despite the transatlantic decla-
ration of November 1990 and the organisation of
summit meetings between the European Union,
the United States and Canada, the transatlantic
relations of the European Union are characterised
more by a spirit of competition than by co-opera-
tion. Latterly, all sorts of proposals and ideas have
emerged from the European Union authorities,
and also on the other side of the Atlantic, advoca-
ting the establishment of transatlantic relations on
new and wider bases, encompassing not only
security matters, but also economic, scientific,
cultural and other questions, over which Europe
and North America are tending increasingly to
find themselves in conflict.
116. Discussions on the possibility of develo-
ping a new Euro-Atlantic treaty, which are not
always very coherent, should not call into ques-
tion the bases of solidarity or the experience of
co-operation in security and defence matters
which have proved their worth in the framework
of the Atlantic Alliance for forty-five years. The
conffibution WEU will make, thanks to the expe-
rience acquired in its relations with NAIO, will
therefore be crucial when it comes to determining
the way in which questions linked to future rela-
tions with our North American allies should be
discussed and settled during the 1996 conference.
For the time being, it is difficult to determine the
course the Council will follow in this matter. Its
preliminary conclusions on the definition of a
cofllmon European defence policy reveal only one
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or two indications of its intentions, such as, for
example:
" WE[.I should examine developments in
the transatlantic partnership which repre-
sent an important common interest with the
aim of introducing joint positions agreed in
WEU into the process of consultation in the
alliance.
Another aspect that could merit considera-
tion, while taking into account the parti-
cular situation of some member states, is
the relationship between the development
of the FAWEU planning process and the
NATO force planning process. Equally, it is
necessary to consider possible relations in
times of crisis between, on the one hand,
forces and headquarters answerable to
WEU and, on the other hand, NATO. "
This question is raised in even more concrete
terms since the decision by France, Italy and
Spain to organise a land force (EUROFOR) and a
maritime force (EUROMARFOR) open to all
WEU member countries, the Council having sta-
ted moreover in its Lisbon declaration of 15th
May 1995 that these forces would be " declared
forces answerable to WEU " (EAWEU) and
would be employed as a priority in this frame-
work but might likewise be employed in the fra-
mework of NAIO.
ll7. The preliminary conclusions on the defini-
tion of a common European defence policy also
stress that:
" In taking up these questions, further
thought may also be needed on the proce-
dural aspects such as the introduction of
WEU views into the alliance, joint meet-
ings of the respective Councils, and other
working relationships such as enhanced co-
operation between civilian and military ins-
titutions (secretariats, HQs, staffs). These
questions have become even more topical
in the light of the new tasks of NATO in
the field of crisis-management, including
peace-keeping. "
118. However, it is not only a matter of procedu-
ral questions. One essential issue which must be
examined is that of consistency between the secu-
rity guarantee offered by Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, involving the nuclear umbrel-
la and the full power of the United States, and that
offered by Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty, which is legally more binding than that of
the Washington Treaty. Not only is this question
of decisive importance in the context of the sha-
ring of responsibilities and costs between the two
organisations (the United Kingdom, for example,
considers that NATO should concentrate on the
defence of Europe and WEU on the " Petersberg "
missions, while others feel that WEU's responsi-
bilities cannot be reduced solely to the tasks deri-
ving from Article V), it also plays a vital r6le
when it comes to tackling the problems of the
enlargement of WEU, NATO and the European
Union.
119. The question of sharing responsibilities
between Europeans and Americans in the conduct
of intemational affairs was again aired when,
during their meeting in Carcassonne, the ministers
of the Fifteen suggested that the Atlantic Alliance
offer Russia a special co-operation agreement in
security matters, the content of which has not
been clearly defined 
- 
reference has been made to
a charter or a treaty which includes a reciprocal
non-aggression undertaking. This initiative is
situated primarily in the context of the enlarge-
ment of NATO to the East and closely linked to
that of the European Union and WEU. In an initial
reaction to this initiative the Secretary-General of
NATO made clear that he could not imagine a
member of the European Union becoming a full
member of WEU without being a member of
NATO5'.
V The problems of enlargement
120. At a colloquy held in Prague on 20th and
21st February 1995 at the invitation of the Parlia-
ment of the Czech Republic, the definition of
WEU's future policy towards associate partner
countries with a view to preparing the 1996 inter-
governmental conference was the central subject
of interest to participants. On this occasion, the
permanent representative of Portugal to the Coun-
cil of WEU 
- 
Portugal currently holds the presi-
dency of the Council 
- 
set out the problems that
will be raised in this context as follows:
" ... As to the future development of rela-
tions between WEU and associate partners,
I can only speak for my own country. For
the time being, the Permanent Council does
not envisage any sfiengthening of the pre-
sent status. This does not mean the position
of the associate partners will not change in
the future. However, as you know, there are
two aspects to the process of European
integration 
- 
widening and deepening 
- 
and
as 1996 approaches, the time has come to
give priority to this matter. The final stage
of their convergence with WEU is, natural-
ly, accession to the modified Brussels Trea-
ty, once they have completed the process ofjoining NATO and the European Union.
They might also become observers if they
do not wish to have full member status.
This is the choice the Maastricht declara-
tion offers European Union members.
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However, it is also possible that, before
acquiring full member status, associate
partners might become associate members
of WEU. This possibility will depend on
the timing on the expansion of NATO to
include the countries of Central Europe.
Indeed, WEU's Maastricht declaration also
provides that the European members of the
Atlantic Alliance may become associate
members of WEU if they so wish.
Enlargement should contribute to stability
and peace in Europe and should not, under
any circumstances, create new, artificial
borders on our continent. This means that
enlargement must be accompanied by
mechanisms for increased co-operation
with the CIS countries, particularly with
Russia and Ukraine.
Enlargement should not weaken the stabili-
sing rOle of the European and Euro-Atlantic
institutions in international politics in gen-
eral and European affairs in particular.
Finally, the enlargement of NAIO and
WEU, for which the rationale is, in each
case, different, must maintain the consis-
tency of the defence guarantee provided
under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
and Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty. The best solution would be no doubt
concomitant of the two alliances. But if this
solution is not possible, the two organisa-
tions should agree, prior to their respective
enlargement, on mechanisms to safeguard
the effectiveness of the two defensive
alliances and coherence between the Atlan-
tic Alliance and its European pillar, WEU. I
have no answers or certainties in this
connection, but I believe we are all in
agreement on the need to avoid, at all cost,
the present interlocking institutions beco-
ming interblocking institutions. "
l2l. It is obvious that the associate partner
countries are seeking, first and foremost, a securi-
ty guarantee 
- 
and this is the heart of the problem.
At the colloquy, the Director of the WEU Institu-
te for Security Studies, Mr. John Roper, made the
following observation regarding the present situa-
tion of associate partners:
" It is of course still to be seen what is the
nature of the assurance of a non-conffactual
nature which can be provided to countries
prior to them becoming full members of the
alliance and/or WEU. This may be a politi-
cal rather than contractual guarantee but to
some extent, the assurance that an attack on
the integrity of a country will seriously
affect the future of political relations bet-
ween any aggressor and the group of allies
formerly linked within WEU or the Atlan-
tic Alliance may have a significant deter-
rent effect. While of course it is not as
strong as the military guarantee provided
by membership of an integrated defence
organisation it has significant value. "
122. For as long as the Atlantic Alliance, gover-
ned by a policy of giving " priority to Russia ",
desisted from any concrete initiative leading to
NATO membership for the Central European
countries, the problem of enlargement essentially
boiled down to establishing parallelism between
WEU's expansion and that of the European
Union. In this parallel process, WEU had in fact
moved ahead of the European Union in its policy
towards the East by drawing the Baltic countries
into the circle of associate partners, without wait-
ing for the European Union to negotiate Europe
agrcements with them52.
123. Regarding the ways and means of estab-
lishing such parallelism between WEU and the
European Union, your Rapporteur shares the opi-
nion expressed by Mr. Soell at the colloquy held
on 17th October 1994 when he stated:
" Certainly it is essential to establish a close
link, particularly with the European Union,
the more so that under the terms of the
Maastricht Treaty, WEU shall be an inte-
gral part of the development of that Union.
Let us not forget either that the modified
Brussels Treaty itself invites the contrac-
ting parties to encourage the progressive
integration of Europe. An important ques-
tion therefore now arises about the criteria
according to which this parallel progression
is to be achieved. On this point, I take the
view that the pursuit of more extensive
relations between WEU and its associate
partners cannot depend exclusively on their
degree of integration in the European
Union. This would mean in effect that the
security concerns of these states and our
own security interests would be subordina-
ted to other considerations which prevail in
the framework of the European Union. This
can at times go as far as making security
matters the pretext for holding back on
progress in other areas. This we cannot
tolerate ... "
Your Rapporteur therefore believes that estab-
lishing parallelism between the enlargement of
WEU and that of the European Union should not
become a means of preventing WEU members
from deciding, if they so wish, to invite one or
more Cenffal European countries to accede to the
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modified Brussels Treaty in accordance with the
criteria embodied in the latter.
124. However, it is necessary from now on to
harmonise WEU's approach to enlargement with
both the European Union and NATO, since the
latter 
- 
under a new American political impetus 
-
has accelerated the process of enlarging NATO.
During the Political Committee's visit to
Washington from 6th to 8th March 1995, Penta-
gon representatives clearly intimated that the Uni-
ted States wished that any country becoming a full
member of WEU should also be a member of
NATO. Otherwise, a dangerous situation might
arise where a country admitted only to WEU
might, by a circuitous route, benefit from a NATO
guarantee.
125. This attitude of the Pentagon runs counter
to the declaration of the WEU member countries
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty which links
accession to WEU to membership of the Euro-
pean Union, not of NAIO53. This issue is there-
fore of interest not only to the Central European
countries but also to Austria, Finland and Sweden,
which have just joined the European Union.
These three countries have chosen to become
observers in WEU but doubts remain as to whe-
ther the WEU Council had really given them a
choice between full membership and observer sta-
tus. For that reason, Mr. de Puig, the Chairman of
the Political Committee, put Written Question
329 to the Council in order to determine the man-
ner in which the latter had invited the three coun-
tries to consolidate their relations with WEU.
126. In its answer, transmitted to the Assembly
on24th February 1995, the Council stated that:
" The Chairman-in-Office of the WEU
Council of Ministers, recalling the offers
made in the WEU declaration of Maastricht
of 10th December 1991, invited the Repu-
blic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and
the Kingdom of Sweden, in the light of
their ratification of the Treaty of Accession
to the European Union, to state their inten-
tions with respect to their relations with
WEU.
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden replied to the
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council of
Ministers by confirming their desire to
become observers.
The first meeting of the WEU Council in
1995 took place on l0th January and was
-53ir 
wEli,,"mber state has stated its opposition to acces-
sion by a country which has not at the same time applied tojoin the Atlantic Alliance, in order to maintain identity bet-
ween WEU and the European pillar of the alliance. (See the
study by the European Strategy Group and the WEU Institute
for Security Studies, Chapter V).
marked by the attendance of the new mem-
bers of the European Union 
- 
Austria, Fin-
land and Sweden.
Austria and Sweden were formally welco-
med as observers. Finland, which has yet to
finalise its internal procedures regarding its
observer status, attended the Council on an
informal basis. "
127. In the meantime, the Finnish Govemment
has informed WEU that the parliamentary proce-
dure has been completed and " the invitation to
Finland to become an observer in Western Euro-
pean Union " has been accepted. This sentence
might again raise doubts over the content of
WEU's invitation, but the Council's answer to the
question put by Mr. de Puig refers to the WEU
declaration of 10th December 1991, clarifying
that the content of that declaration is still valid.
Consequently, Austria, Finland and Sweden can
still be asked to become party to the Brussels
Treaty without being members of NATO or be
invited to do so by the WEU Council itself.
128. Matters seem more complicated in relation
to the Central European countries and calls for the
accession of these countries to WEU and to
NATO to be synchroniseds are being heard with
increasing frequency, while opinion in other quar-
ters is against a rapid enlargement of NAIO 55.
Moreover, there is no common approach in the
United States on the criteria for admitting these
countries to NAIO. Whereas the Pentagon appears
to be advocating a case by case approach, rather
than by groups of states, the American Congress
is preparing, in its draft bill HR7, entitled " Natio-
nal security revitalisation act " 
- 
which has been
adopted by the House of Representatives but not
yet by the Senate 
- 
to identify priority groups of
states such as the four Visegrad states, at the same
time fixing a series of criteria and conditions for
the admission of these countries, which must spe-
cifically:
" (a) meet appropriate standards, inclu-
ding:
(r) shared values and interests;
(il) democratic governments;
(iii) free market economies;
(iv) civilian control of the military,
of the police, and of the intelli-
gence and-other security ser-
vices, so that these organisa-
tions do not pose a threat to
democratic institutions, neigh-
54. See, for example, Mr. Riihe in Frankfurter Allgemeine
7.eiung,3lst January 1995, Mr. Riftind in Siiddeutsche Zei-
tung, 6th February 1995 and the analysis of the group of
experts of the European Commission, l9th December 1994.
55. See Klaus Kinkel in Die Welt, 6th February 1995.
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bouring oountries, or the secu-
rity of NATO or the United
States;
(v) adherence to the rule of law
and to the values, principles
and political commitments set
forth in the Helsinki Final Act
and other declarations by the
members of the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation
in Europe;
(vi) commitment to further the
principles of NAIO and to
contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area;
(vii) commitment and ability to
accept the obligations, respon-
sibilities and costs of NATO
membership;and
(viii) commitment and ability to
implement infrastructure deve-
lopment activities that will
facilitate participation in and
support for NATO military
activities; and
(b) remain committed to protecting the
rights of all their citizens and respec-
ting the territorial integnty of their
neighbours. "
129. It should be noted in this connection that
the stage of development that the countries
concerned have reached in their relations with the
European Union and with WEU does not feature
among the criteria listed in this bill, nor does their
membership of the Council of Europe, which
must be considered as the principal guardian of
the principles of democracy and human rights in
Europe. At the American Department of State, on
the confrary, an integral concept seems to be
advocated, envisaging synchronised incorpora-
tion of the Central European countries into the
overall range of international security organisa-
tions in the widest sense, with a view to creating a
kind of network of relations. Moreover, in a recent56
contribution, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, Secretary
of State for European Affairs at the American
State Department, listed the following criteria:
" 
- 
NATO expansion must strengthen
security in the entire region, including
nations that are not members.
- 
The rationale and process for NAIO's
expansion will be ffansparent, not secret.
- 
There is no timetable or list of nations
that will be invited to join NATO.
These will emerge as the process
moves forward.
- 
Each nation will be considered indivi-
dually, not as part of some grouping:
- 
No outside nation will exercise a veto.
- 
As was the case in the original
Washington Treaty, new members
must be democratic, have market eco-
nomies, be committed to responsible
security policies and be able to conffi-
bute to the alliance. As President Clin-
ton has statbd, 'countries with repressi-
ve political systems, countries with
designs on their neighbours, countries
with militaries unchecked by civilian
control or with closed economic sys-
tems need not apply. '
- 
Each new NATO member constitutes
for the United States the most solemn
of commitments: a bilateral defence
treaty that extends the United States
security umbrella to a new nation. This
requires ratification by two-thirds of
the United States Senate, a point that is
often overlooked. "
Conversely, Mr. William Perry, United States
Defence Secretary, recently stated 57 that he was
against setting out explicit criteria for joining
NATO:
" Establishing rigid and detailed criteria
could lead to misunderstandings and recri-
minations between NATO and disappoin-
ted candidates when NATO does admit new
members. It could place the alliance in the
difficult position of rendering explicit,
public judgments on the fitness of other
nations in such sensitive areas as their
commitment to democracy and to a free
market. "
In Europe too, a diversity of concepts can be
noted, among which are to be found, for example,
that of dividing the Central European counffies
into three circles, the first encompassing Poland
and the Baltic countries, the second the Visegrad
countries and the third the Balkan states58.
130. Moreover, account must be taken of the
fact that any enlargement of NATO to the East
will require an equitable arrangement with Rus-
sia, even though it is constantly repeated that this
country will have neither a right of regard nor of
veto in this context. The West's hesitancy, since
the creation of the partnership for peace, in clearly
defining its concepts in this area and its lack of
57. NATO enlargement, USIS,23rd March 1995.
58. See Thierry de Montbrial in Le Figaro, 7th February
t995.
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cohesion over the choice of criteria to be followed
would appear to indicate that this process will be
extremely lengthy. There will also be, in the line
of argument suggesting that this process should be
synchronised with that of the European Union and
WEU, the danger referred to by the representative
of the Chairmanship-in-Offrce in Prague that the
present interlocking institutions might become
interblocking institutions.
l3l. It will be necessary for the WEU Council to
consider the implications of this situation. In its
declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty,
WEU fixed precise criteria for defining the condi-
tions under which applicant countries might acce-
de to the modified Brussels Treaty or become
associate members. The success of the stability
pact will considerably reinforce homogeneity
among the Cenffal European countries, once the
problems with their neighbours that still exist bet-
ween a number of them have been settled. It
would not be in the security interest of Westem
Europe to impose unduly demanding conditions
and to place obstacles that are difficult to over-
come before applicant countries can join WEU. It
is therefore necessary, starting from the criteria
laid down in the modified Bruisels Treaty, to find
the right balance between the interests of the pre-
sent member countries, for which any great
increase in the number of participants should not
run counter to the aims of the treaty and hinder
their implementation, and the legitimate interests
of the newly democratic countries in not being
excluded from a security system from which to
date only Western European countries benefit. For
the security of the latter would also be affected if
an area of lesser security were to be established
east of their borders for any length of time.
t32. However, it seems that for some time the
WEU Council has definitely been back-pedalling
in regard to the future development of its relations
with the countries that have become associate
partners. The fust part ofthe fortieth annual report
of the Council5e still claims that by the creation of
the status of associate partner, " WEU is ... in the
forefront ofthe process ofpreparing for the acces-
sion of these states to the Union and, as a conse-
quence, to WEU ". However now that the status
of associate partner has been established, there is
a clear impression that the enlargement of WEU
towards Central Europe has no longer the same
urgency for the Council of this organisation as for
the European Union and for NATO. The synchro-
nisation of the rapprochement between the coun-
tries of Western Europe and western institutions
increasingly depends on considerations voiced in
NATO; the number of political leaders advocating
that no country should join WEU without at
the same time joining NATO or already being a
member is increasing. It can therefore be noted
that WEU is moving further and further away
from the declaration annexed to the Maastricht
Treaty according to which " states which are
members of the European Union are invited to
accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in
accordance with Article XI of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, or to become observers if they so
wish ". If membership of NATO by the countries
concerned became the essential factor of the
" conditions to be agreed ", one would therefore
be implicitly giving the United States a right of
veto over any enlargement of WEU towards Cen-
tral Europe.
133. This was not the initial intention of the
WEU member governments for in that case it
would have been more honest to state in the above
mentioned declaration that the member states of
the European Union and of the Atlantic Alliance
were invited to join WEU. If any enlargement of
WEU must depend on the extent to which NATO
is expanded, a matter to which the United States
appears to be giving priority, is there not then a
contradiction in American policy, which is see-
king, on the one hand, to extend NAIO's security
guarantees to an as yet ill-defined number of Cen-
tral European countries and tending, on the other
hand, towards a progressive withdrawal from
European security and defence matters?
134. It is clear that the extension of NAIO to the
east will raise various difficult problems as long
as the new purpose of NATO and its relations with
Russia are not clearly defined. [n the absence of
such definition, extension might indeed cause a
further split which everyone is anxious to avoid.
However, NAIO's problems should not be an
obstacle to the rapprochement of the countries of
Central Europe with Western Europe since the
integration of these countries in the European
Union and WEU does not create a split or any
kind of threat to Russia. Conversely, it should not
be forgoffen that, while Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty imposes a very binding obligation
on all its signatories to help any one of them that
might be the object of an armed attack, WEU is
not designed to carry out large scale defensive
action by itself, which obliges itto take maximum
account of NATO requirements and in particular
those of the Americans who do not wish at any
price to find themselves engaged in a major
conflict by a decision of their allies in which they
have not been involved.
135. It is therefore understandable that WEU
should hesitate to consider extending the guaran-
tee offered under Article V to countries that are
not members of the alliance. It would nevertheless
be possible for it to proceed by stages. From
declarations made by certain representatives of
associate partner countries during meetings of the
Political Committee, it appears that their main59. Document 1433, 9th November 1995.
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objective is not to obtain a security guarantee
from WEU but above all to be considered as res-
ponsible partners, capable of making their contri-
bution to a wider Europe with a view to being full
members. It is therefore time for the Council to
consider seriously whether it is not possible to
envisage granting associate partner countries rfte
status of associate member here and now. If it is
possible to give this status to European NATO
countries that are not members of the European
Union, why should it not be possible to give a
similar status to countries whose accession to
NAIO is not yet guaranteed but whose member-
ship of the European Union is already agreed in
principle? A step such as this, apart from the sub-
stantial encouragement it would give to the coun-
tries in question, would also strengthen cohesion
between Western European countries and Central
Europe in security and defence matters.
VI. A strategy for the way forward
136. It will be necessary to determine clearly and
coherently WEU's aims in terms of its future r6le
in the system of intemational organisations before
the group of experts established by the European
Union begins its work. This step is essential not
only in the interests of European security but also
because public expression of WEU's ideas is a
question of its survival. As the smallest organisa-
tion with the most modest resources, particularly
in operational terms, there is a risk of it being cru-
shed betrveen the European Union and the Atlantic
Alliance, both of which have powerful sffuctures
and means. Although the raison d'Otre of the Euro-
pean and Atlantic organisations may not be an end
in itself, it is the existence of WEU alone that is
constantly called into question, because neither
public opinion nor even political leaders have a
clear idea of its r6le and functions.
137. It should however suffice to repeat that the
modified Brussels Treaty has defined its aims and
tasks in a clear and precise manner. After having
transferred the implementation of certain tasks
covered by the treaty to other organisations, it will
be necessary for the Council to draw up a list of
the provisions of the treaty whose execution must
remain within its area of responsibility, at least in
the foreseeable future, explaining publicly the
reasons why these tasks cannot be ca:ried out by
the European Union or by the Atlantic Alliance.
138. In the preliminary conclusions on the for-
mulation of a common European defence policy
published in Noordwijk last November, the Coun-
cil did useful work in defining the main areas of
responsibility and interest common to WEU
member countries. WEU might perfectly well
base its contribution to the 1996 intergovernmen-
tal conference on these factors. Given their signi-
ficance, it is appropriate to include them here:
" 
- 
WEU goveflrments have a direct res-
ponsibility for the security and defence
of their own peoples and territories;
- 
WEU govemments have a responsibil-
ity to project the security and stability
presently enjoyed in the West through-
out the whole of Europe;
- 
WEU governments have an interest, in
order to reinforce European security, in
fostering stability in the southern
Mediterranean countries ;
- 
WEU govemments are ready to take on
their share of the responsibility for the
promotion of security, stability and the
values of democracy in the wider
world, including through the execution
of peace-keeping and other crisis-
management measures under the
authority of the United Nations Securi-
ty Council or the CSCE, acting either
independently or through WEU or
NATO. They are also ready to address
new security challenges such as huma-
nitarian emergencies; proliferation; ter-
rorism; international crime and envi-
ronmental risks, including those related
to disarmament and the destruction of
nuclear and chemical weapons:
- 
Europeans have a major responsibility
with regard to defence in both the
conventional and nuclear field. In addi-
tion to their r6le of national deterrent,
the British and French nuclear wea-
pons contribute to global deterrence in
accordance with ... The Hague plat-
- form of WEU of 1987. "
More specifically, as far as the WEU Assembly is
concemed, this must remain the primary elementfor strengthening representative democratic
supervision in security and defence matters. As
your Rapporteur has explained in the section
devoted to this question, it is essential that the
Council endorse this concept of parliamentary
supervision and support it in its contacts with
other European authorities.
139. There are certainly good reasons why the
analysis of the risks and threats to Europe under-
taken in the context of the first part of the white
paper on European security should be conducted
in a Council with 27 countries present. However,
this analysis should produce practical responses
and a coherent concept of the organisation of col-
lective European security and defence; such a
concept would give a decisive impetus and direc-
tion for both the European Union and the Atlantic
Alliance. This being so, should not the decisions
to be taken in the second phase of the work on this
white paper be reserved for a Council limited to
full members, which would however take into
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account associate members' points of view? This
undertaking should indeed serve as an example
and show that it is from a homogenous and deter-
mined group such as WEU that political impetus
should emanate. The WEU member countries will
thus be able to prove that they are the European
hard core in security and defence matters and are
capable of showing the way to countries belon-
ging to the wider circle of the European Union.
To this end, the WEU Assembly is fully prepared
to co-operate with the Council in a kind of joint
venture.
140. However, to ensure the success of this
enterprise, member governments of WEU and all
its executive bodies will need to bring about a
fundamental change of direction in their political
will. The concept of the Maastricht Treaty where-
by political impetus must be given by the wider
and less homogenous circle (the European Union)
to the smaller, more homogenous circle (WEU) is
not realistic, as experience has shown before and
after this treaty came into effect.
l4l. While the Union, by its nah.ue and its
methods of operation, is incapable of intervening
or giving a valid mandate to WEU in defence mat-
ters, the Maastricht Treaty limits WEU's possibi-
lities in these matters through Article J.4, para-
graph 5, which stipulates that co-operation in the
framework of WEU (on the basis of the modified
Brussels Treaty) must not run counter to or hinder
that provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. This
intolerable situation has promoted a very wide-
spread " wait and see " mentality in the ministe-
rial departments responsible for WEU matters
which is putting a brake on a substantial number
of WEU's political initiatives.
142. This is one of the reasons why certain ini-
tiatives with a bearing on what is properly WEU's
area of responsibility do not proceed from the lat-
ter but from the European Union, as illustrated by
the approach undertaken by the 15 at Carcassonne,
who, after doubtless hasty consideration, invited
NATO to propose a special arrangement to Russia.
Relations with NATO are in effect primarily the
responsibility of WEU.
143. Therefore let us repeat once again: it is flrst
of all necessary to generate the necessary political
will in WEU for that organisation to become the
political driving force in those areas for which it
has responsibility. It is then necessary to draw the
consequences at institutional level by putting an
end to the ambiguities of paragraphs 2 and 5 of
Article J.4 which restrict WEU's activities in an
intolerable and unrealistic way. In this connection,
the United Kingdom memorandum might provide
an interesting working basis since it recognises the
needs of WEU in terms of political impetus.
144. The intergovernmental conference should
lead to WEU being recognised as the hard core of
the Union in security and defence matters in
which it acts on behalf of the Union for a transi-
tory period, with all members of the Union that
are not members of WEU having the possibility of
being associated with WEU actions without being
able to block consensus reached in this frame-
work.
145. Furthermore, WEU must endeavour to
develop a unity which operates as a true political
driving force and at the same time guarantees the
continuity of its action. In this connection, consi-
deration should specifically be given to the propo-
sal of the high-level group of experts set up by Mr.
van den Broek with the aim of creating a central
analysis and evaluation capability with the neces-
sary study and information means ... led by apoli-
tical personality and having sufficient authority,
independence and duration. This proposal
concerns, of course, the whole range of responsi-
bilities of the CFSP. Now, given that the member-
ship of the CFSP and of WEU is not identical, it
will be difficult to work out how to create one and
the same analysis unit for both. Consequently, as
the WEU Assembly has already recommended
several times, the political powers of the WEU
Secretary-General should frst be considerably
strengthened.
146. As to the harmonisation of the presidencies
of the European Union and WEU, the matter is
not urgent as long as " variable geometry " conti-
nues to be a characteristic of all the European ins-
titutions. It is much more important for WEU to
speed up its efforts to become truly operational,
for as long as it is not operational, it will be prac-
tically unable to take any specific action towards
shouldering its responsibilities and achieving its
aims, as summarised at Noordwijk. Moreover, at
operational level, WEU is in a position to prove
that the principles of consensus and intergovern-
mental co-operation which govern it can lead per-
fectly well to considerable progress being made in
developing a common policy. Indeed it would be
mistaken to believe that the determination of the
member states to harmonise their interests and
contribute to consensus in defence mafters can be
strengthened by their fear of finding themselves,
under certain circumstances, in the minority or
even totally deprived of decision-making powers.
147. Monetary union has been achieved by
stages and according to specific criteria which had
to be met in order to participate. Following this
model, WEU member countries might agree to
establish a common defence in successive stages,
but such an undertaking should be pursued so as
to avoid increasing the number of variable geo-
metry circles that exist in Europe.
148. As to relations between the Council and the
Assembly, the Council should atrirm more clearly
that the WEU Assembly is the only parliamentary
assembly to which it is responsible, in accordance
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with the fieaties in force. [n face of the European
Parliament's efforts to establish direct contact
with the WEU Council and its Secretary-General,
it is essential for the Council to take a clear, publi-
cly visible stance, showing that its parliamentary
interlocutor is the WEU Assembly. The clarity of
its position should also be evident in the manner
in which it fulfils the obligation placed on it by
Anicle IX of the modified Brussels Treaty to keep
the Assembly informed of its activities. The
Assembly assesses all the detailed information it
regularly receives in the annual reports of the
Council on the activities of its different working
groups. However, it must be recalled that the dia-
logue between the Assembly and the Council is of
a political nature and that it is therefore essential
for the annual report to give more information on
political guidelines in order to stimulate a fruitful
exchange.
149. Furthermore, the information given by the
Council is not always consistent and complete.
Hence one must wonder why the Western Euro-
pean Armaments Group (WEAG), whose activi-
ties are reported by the Council in its fortieth
annual report, does not appear on the organogram
of the ministerial organs transmitted to the
Assembly by the Secretary-General in November
1994. Conversely, the same organogram shows a
verification group whose existence is not mentio-
ned in this annual report. Nor does it mention the
creation, the aims or the activities of a group of
military delegates set up by the Council.
150. Conversely, the Assembly noted with inter-
est the transfer to WEU of certain Eurogroup
functions, particularly public relations activities
and the existence of a Council working group on
ffansatlantic public relations currently chaired
by the United Kingdom. The Assembly itself
attaches particular importance to making informa-
tion conceming WEU more widely available on
the other side of the Atlantic and wishes to be
associated with this. It therefore deeply regrets
that the Council should have decided to organise
an important conference in Washington in June in
the framework of its transatlantic public relations
activities, with a major participation of WEU
ministers, while the Assembly's plenary session is
to be held on exactly those same dates. Moreover,
no invitation to this event has been issued to any
member of the Assembly. This is hardly the way
for the Council to demonstrate its willingness to
respect the Assembly's work and improve rela-
tions with it.
151. What is more, from time to time it is noti-
ceable that the ministerial organs are not keeping
the Assembly informed of some of their activities
or of those of their subsidiary bodies. Hence the
Assembly has never been informed of the content
of a speech by the WEU Secretary-General at the
last CSCE (now OSCE) summit meeting in Buda-
pest, whereas this speech has been published by
the services of the European Parliament.
152. Most surprising of all, the Council at no
time informed the Assembly that the Government
of Greece, when it transmitted the instrument of
ratification of the protocol of accession of the
Hellenic Republic to the modified Brussels Trea-
ty, made a declaration to the effect that the Helle-
nic Government excluded from the competence of
the International Court of Justice any dispute over
the Hellenic Republic taking defensive military
measures for reasons of national defence. For this
reilson, on 26th April 1995, Mr. Cuco put Written
Question 330 to the Council as follows:
" Does the Council consider that it is law-
ful, when ratifying an intemational agree-
ment, for a reservation to be made which
should normally have been included in the
protocol of accession itself, since such
' reservation,unilaterallymodifyingArticle
X of the modified Brussels Treaty, cannot
acquire validity without the signature and
ratification of all the other conffacting
parties? "
153. At the present juncture, it is of prime
importance for WEU as a whole to assert itself in
the face of the new risks threatening European
security and the problems raised by harmonising
positions and interests of European countries and
institutions with a view to the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference and it is essential for the Coun-
cil and the Assembly to follow the same course.
The risk of disagreement between the Assembly
and the Council will be the less if the Council pro-
vides the Assembly with more information on its
activities and its political guidelines and also on
the problems it is encountering in achieving its
alms.
VII. Conclusions
154. While the various institutions of the Euro-
pean Union and also member governments, par-
liaments, political groups and research institutes
are in the process of drafting their studies and
conffibutions to the preparation of the work of the
group of experts on the revision of the Maastricht
treaty, it is perhaps too soon to draw final conclu-
srons.
155. Faced with the prevailing uncertainty on
the periphery of Europe, in particular regarding
the evolution of the intemal situation in Russia
and also the development of crisis flashpoints on
the territory of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States, the disturbing inability of the intema-
tional community to bring under conffol the bloody
conflict raging in the Balkans only hours away
from the main European capitals, and the fearful
violence of religious extremism which is occur-
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ring with increasing frequency on Europe's sou-
thern perimeter, there is a growing conviction that
it is of the utmost importance to maintain and
consolidate the smooth running of the European
and ffansatlantic institutions, regarded as anchors
of stability and security.
156. In the search for a new security order in
Europe, all organisations concerned, and foremost
among them the European Union, WEU and the
Atlantic Alliance, must adapt in order to meet the
challenges arising from the radical upheavals in
the international situation since 1989, and in parti-
cular the heavy pressrue exerted upon them by the
applicant countries that are knocking at their door.
Under such circumstances, one has to wonder
what the aim of the 1996 intergovernmental confe-
rence will be. It seems more important to move
towards consolidating and improving the present
mechanisms for guaranteeing the security of our
citizens than to seek at all costs to overcome diffe-
rences in ideological vision as to the purpose of a
United Europe, or to bridge the gap between those
in favour of a community Europe with a federal
sffucture and advocates of the primacy of the
nation state in deciding major political questions.
157. More specifically, as far as security and
defence questions are concerned, any attempt
radically to change the method of operation of the
defence system and put it on an entirely new
contractual basis is likely to lead to the failure of
the conference. WEU still needs time to become
truly operational and develop its capabilities. It
should therefore be able to operate autonomously.
In parallel, it must develop more practical proce-
dures for improving co-operation with a CFSP
that will perhaps develop more rapidly in a com-
munity direction, without abandoning the prin-
ciple that it must continue to be directed by an
intergovemmental decision-making body and not
by the European Commission.
158. Regarding democratic supervision of the
European executive, a clearer distinction should
be made between questions within the community
purview and those that are an intergovernmental
responsibility. A cut and dried solution, according
to which all community matters would be the res-
ponsibility of the European Parliament, and all
intergovernmental matters would be entrusted to a
second chamber composed of representatives of
national parliaments would probably be inappli-
cable. On the one hand, the national parliaments
are already demanding increased participation in
matters falling within the community process and
are asking, for example, to ensure supervision of
the principle of subsidiarity, while, on the other
hand, the European Parliament is seeking to exer-
cise a greater influence on questions relating to
the CFSP as the latter develops in a community
direction. In any event, however, during the 1996
conference, it will be essential to seek recognition
of the need for a second chamber in order to com-
plete the European parliamentary dimension.
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APPENDIx
Truaty of economic, social and cuhural collaboration
and c oWective selt-defenc e,
signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948,
as amended by the Protocol modifying and
completing the Brussels Treaty
signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954
Article XII
.- the ppgent Treaty +all be ratified and the insffuments of ratification shall be deposited as soon aspossible with the Belgian Govemment.
It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall there-
after remain in force for fifty years.
After the expiryof the perio.d o! {fty-years, each of the high contracting parties shall have the rightto cease- to_be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunc'ia-t"' t.tT. 
:elgian 
Government'
The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington, D.C.,4th Apfl 1949
Article 13
. 1{fter-the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any party may cease to be a party one year afterits notice of denunciation has been given to the Governmeni o1thL United States of America, wtrictr witt
inform the govemments of the other parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
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Amendments l to 13 14th June 1995
The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II -
reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENTS I to 13'
tabled by Mn Coviello and Mn Fronzuti
1. Leave out paragraph I (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" Stressing nevertheless that there are several ways ofadvancing European integration, progressive
integration of WEU into the European Union being one that must be considered; "
Leave out paragraphl (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" Believing that it would be feasible to use the 1996 intergovernmental conference to assess the
functioning of WEU as an instrument of European defence and the European pillar of NAIO; "
In paragraph I (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " exclusively ".
After paragraphl(xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Wishing, in the context of any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, that it may be possible to
arrive at a different wording of Article IX allowing parliaments of member countries to appoint par-
liamentarians to the Assembly of WEU who are also members of their respective specialist bodies
on Community affairs; "
5. In paragraph I (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " cannot be some form
of merger between the two institutions, but ".
6. Leave out paragmphl (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" Wishing gradual evolution towards an identical membership of WEU and the European Union to
lead to progressive integration of the two organisations, and for WEU's r6le as the European pillar
of the Atlantic Alliance at the same time to be preserved as the essential foundation of our collec-
tive defence and fiansatlantic ties; "
7 . In paragraph I (xv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " hence the more reason
for avoiding them in defence matters " and insert " and hence should be the more determinedly pursued ".
8. Leave out paragraphl (miii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
9. In paragraph | (xix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " however ".
10. Leave out paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper.
11. After paragraph I.8 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Study, with a view to the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, a different wording of Anicle D(
allowing parliaments of member countries to appoint parliamentarians to the Assembly of WEU
other than those appointed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; "
12. In paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: " by opening hastily WEU's doors
to organs of the European Union ".
13. Lrave out paragraph II.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Invite the European members of NAIO that are not members of the European Union and the Euro-
pean Union to re-examine carefu-lly the obstacles preventing the accession of their respective coun-
tries to the European Union, confirming that full membership of the European Union dnO ttre Atlan-
tic Alliance remains an essential condition of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty; "
Signed: Coviello, Fronzuti
l. See l5th sitting, 20th June 1995 (amendments 1,4,6,7,8, 10, ll and 13 not moved; 2,3,5 andg agreed to; 12 withdrawn).
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Amendments 14 to 27
14th June 1995
The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II 
-
reply to the fortieth annual report of the Coancil
AMENDMENTS 14 to 271
tabled by Mr. Benvenuti
14. 
. 
In par.lgrapl I (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " Taking into account the
persistence " and insert " Wishing for settlement ".
15. 
..In paragraph I (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " the main goal of WEU's
contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference must be " and insert " among the-main goals of
WEU's contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference must be progressive iniegration of-the two
organisations and ".
16. In paragraph | (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from " of which " to the
end of the paragraph and insert: " but that all should lead to strengthening the process of progressive
convergence and integration ofthe various European organisations; ".
l7 . At the end of paragraph I (vif) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add " but nevertheless
welcoming the signature by the Russian Federation of agreements with NATO in the framework of the
partnership for peace; ".
18. Leave out paragraphl (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" Judging that the 1996 intergovernmental conference might be used to test the functioning of WEU
as an instrument of European defence, while retaining its function as the European- pillar of
NAIO; "
19. In paragraph | (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " cannot be some form
of merger between the two institutions but, ".
20. In paragraph | (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " desirable or feasible "
and insert " feasible, but that does not, however, prevent a start being made on a process of progressive
convergence and integration of WEU and the European Union, for the time being acknowledging their
respective powers ".
21. In paragraph | (rui) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " instead of disturbing
them with the prospect of their possibly being put in a minority position ".
22. In paragraph I (xix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " however ".
23. In-paragraph I.4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " exclusively by the signatory coun-
tries of that treaty and its protocols " and insert " taking account of WEU positions ".
24. Leave out paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Not compromise, as matters now stand, the close co-operation between WEU and NATO and the
European Union but maintain the procedure for reciprocal exchange of information on their
respective activities; "
25. In paragraph I.10 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " is the sole " and insert: " was
the first ".
26. 
. 
At the end of paragrapll4 of the draft recommendation proper, add: " with a view to progressive
functional integration of the CFSP and WEU secretariats ".
27 . Leave out paragraph tr.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Undertake all appropriate diplomatic measures so that the member countries of WEU, the
European Union and the European counffies, members of NATO, gradually, over time, become one
and the same; "
l. See-15_th sitting, 20th-June l-995 (amendments 14, 15,17 and 2l agreed to; 16 and 20 amended and agreed to; 18, 19,22,23,
24 and25 not moved; 26 and27 withdrawn.
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Amendments2Sto 42
14th June 1995
The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II -
reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENTS 2t to 42'
tabled by Mr. Latronico
28. Leave out paragraph I (.r) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" Convinced that, given its specific character and its complexity, the implementation of a common
defence policy involves a lengthy process of integration and that it seems useful, for a transitional
period, to maintain an intergovernmental decision-making process; "
29. In paragraph | (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after " Convinced in this connec-
tion " insert " until such time as the desired integration can be achieved, ".
30. In paragraph | (xii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " impossible " and insert
" difficult ".
31. In paragraphl (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " so that democratic
supervision in Europe may be exercised by bodies that are truly representative and efficient ".
32. In paragraph | (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " fully operational " and
insert " viable ".
33. In paragraph I (n) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, Ieave out from " have not proved
successful " to the end ofthe paragraph and insert " have proved difficult and careful note should be taken
of this fact in relation to defence matters; ".
34. Leave out paragraphl (niii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
35. In paragraph | (xx) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " 
- 
as the United
Kingdom Government memorandum of lst March 1995 proposes 
- 
".
36. In paragraph | (xxi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " unreservedly the Uni-
ted Kingdom " and insert " the ".
37. In paragraph ll (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " preparing to
conclude " and insert " taking note of ".
38. Leave out paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper.
39. Leave out paragraph I.7 of the draft recommendation proper.
40. In paragraph I.8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after " European
level ".
41. In paragraph I.1l of the draft recommendation proper, after " in particular " leave out " the right to
convene the Council of Ministers and ".
42. In paragraph II.1 of the draft recommendation proper, after " Slovenia " insert " , when the time is
dp., ".
Signed: Latronico
l. See l5th sitting, 20th June 1995 (amendments 28,29 and 3O amended and agreed to; 31,32,35,36,37,38,39,41 and42not
moved; 33 agreed to; 34 negatived; 40 withdrawn.
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Amendments 43 to 46
19th June 1995
The tutare of European security and the proparqlbn of Mwstricht II -
roply to thefortieth annwlrcport otthe Council
AMENDMENTS 43 to #'
tablcd by Mn. Aguiar
43. Leave out paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Ensure that no measure leading to the convergence of WEU and the European Union shall com-
promise the close co-operation between WEU and NAIO;
44. Leave out paragraph tr.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Take the measures necessary to ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conference leads to a
deepening of the articles of the Maasricht Treaty so as to enable the member counties of WEU, the
European Union and the European countries members of NATO gradually, over time, to become
one and the same; "
45. At the end of paragraph I.11 of the draft recommendation proper, add: " with a view to progressive
co-operation leading to future integration between the CFSP and WEU secretariats ".
46. In paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper, after " 30th March 1995 " insert " the com-
munication of the Italian Government to parliament, dated 24thMay 1995,".
Signed: Aguiar
l. See l5th sitting, 20th June 1995 (amendments agreed to).
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Draft Resolution
on natianal parliaments, European securily and detence
and the rood to the 1996 intergovernmental conference
The Assembly,
(i) Stressing the importance of the success of the 1996 intergovernmental conference for implementing
a true European security and defence policy, built around WEU;(ii) Convinced of the need to associate national parliaments closely with the development of a Euro-
pean security and defence policy in the framework of the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental
conference;
(iii) Considering that the intergovernmental conference must result in a clear division of responsibilities
in security matters between the European Union and WEU and, in defence matters, between WBU and the
member states;
(iv) Noting with concern the weakness of Europe's means of intervention and particularly the fact that
the CFSP can take only economic or diplomatic measures, whereas there are numerous sources of crisis
and conflict in the centre of Europe, the Caucasus, the Mediteranean and Africa;(v) Wishing to sfiengthen its links with the national parliaments and to co-operate on a basis of equality
and reciprocity with the European Parliament in order to achieve better parliamentary supervision of WEU
in joint security and defence questions and of the European Union in CFSP questions;(yi) Believing that any steps towards bringing defence matters within the competence of the European
Commission and European Parliament might endanger the effective scrutiny of defence and security mat-
ters by national parliaments and the WEU Assembly,
Itwrrrs rrrE pARLTAMENTs oF MEMBER coLINTRIEs
1. To intensify parliamentary co-operation with a view to implementing an effective system of parlia-
mentary supervision of the CFSP and European defence;
2. To promote exchanges between their respective foreign affairs, defence and European affairs com-
mittees and their co-operation with the corresponding committees of the WEU Assembly with a view to
preparing the L996 intergovernmental conference and subsequently the satisfactory implementation of the
decisions the conference will be called upon to take;
3. To encourage greater transparency on the part ofgovernments regarding their European policies so
as to enable parliaments to exercise more effective supervision, keep public opinion informed and make it
aware of the issues at stake in the European process.
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Exphnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir lohn Hur.t, Rapportear)
I. Introduction
1. The Maastricht Treaty includes a series of
protocols and declarations adopted at conferences
of representatives of governments of the member
states of the European Union, held in Rome, on
15th December 1990, and Brussels, on 3rd
February L992. One such declaration, on the
" r6le of the national parliaments in the European
Union " states that it is important to encourage
greater participation by national parliaments in
the activities of the European Union.
2. Admittedly, since the inception of the
European Economic Community, national parlia-
ments have been involved in European affairs to
varying degrees, albeit in a general way, and since
the executive is pre-eminent in the management
of national political affairs, their r6le has not
always matched their expectations. Debates on
the direction of government policy on Europe and
examination and voting on community legislation
adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Union
give national parliaments only a relative right to
oversee and supervise choices made by the Euro-
pean Union in the areas for which it is respon-
sible, the consequences of which affect all mem-
ber counffies and the political life of each one.
3. Although long dominated by economic,
social and cultural questions, an important quali-
tative change was introduced into the European
debate with the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty. This provides for the establishment of a
common foreign and security policy (Title V of
the Treaty), directly concerned with two distincti-
ve symbols of national sovereignty: foreign poli-
cy and security (and its corollary, defence). The
implementation of the CFSP is doubtless one of
the greatest challenges the Union must face if it
wishes to be more than just an economic power, in
a world that has become unsettled, unstable even,
since the main East-West confrontation gave way
to a myriad of local conflicts, domestic and
foreign, political, economic and military.
4. The responsibility of national parliaments
in this area has increased, for such issues extend
beyond the boundaries of the fifteen European
Union member states, since they concern the
Union's r6le and place in the world and determi-
ne, in part, the behaviour towards it of other inter-
national players: states, regional groupings, inter-
national organisations. The implementation of the
CFSP transcends purely national frames of refe-
rence, making joint thinking about its implica-
tions imperative, and equally so the emergence of
a European parliamentary consciousness which
has its roots in the national parliaments, them-
selves the guardians of the sovereignty of the
nations that make up the European Union.
5. Furthermore, national parliaments are not
the only assemblies concerned with European
policy. The European Parliament, the WEU
Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly
and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, to
mention only the most prominent such institu-
tions, are all party, often randomly, to the debate
on matters relating to the CFSP. Two of them, the
European Parliament and the WEU Assembly, are
nevertheless more directly concerned with deve-
lopments in relation to this question.
6. The European Parliament, whose powers
are strengthened under the Maastricht Treaty,
wishes to play the leading r0le as the parliamen-
tary component of the CFSP. Since Maastricht, it
has several times taken a position on matters of
foreign, security and defence policy in Europe,
basing itself on Article J.7 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, which provides that " the presidency
shall consult the European Parliament on the main
aspects and the basic choices of the common
foreign and security policy and shall ensure that
the views of the European Parliament are duly
taken into consideration ... ". Henceforth it will
inevitably have to be taken into account, being
associated with the preparatory work for the 1996
intergovernmental conference, which is to deal,
inter alia, with the future evolution of the CFSP
and consequently the r6le WEU is called upon to
play in these matters as the defence component of
the European Union.
7. The WEU Assembly has no intention of
relinquishing its powers which are based on
Article IX' of the modified Brussels Treaty.
Through its recommendations to the Council of
Ministers and other initiatives, including a collo-
quy in Paris in October 1994, which brought toge-
ther the chairmen of parliamentary defence and
foreign affairs committees of all countries linked
l. " The Council of Western European Union shall make an
annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the
control of armaments to an Assembly composed of represen-
tatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe. "
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to WEU and Russian parliamentarians, the
Assembly is contributing to thinking in WEU,
preparatory to the intergovernmental conference.
This contribution is of prime imponance as the
conference's decisions on WEU will affect the
Assembly's future work and existence.
8. The national parliaments for their part are
intensifying their co-ordination, as the inter-
governmental conference approaches, through
two forums: CEAC (Conference of European
Affairs Committees) and the Conference of Spea-
kers of National Parliaments, which also have a
liaison r6le with the European Parliament which
has a seat on both.
9. Without prejudging the outcome of the
intergovernmental conference, it can be said that
the development of the CFSP, and, in particular,
the possible inclusion of defence alongside secu-
rity aspects, will be one of the most sensitive sub-
jects for debate. The limits and areas of responsi-
bility of the CFSP must be better defined, on the
basis of existing experience and through judicious
and flexible application of the principle of subsi-
diarity so as to avoid institutions being paralysed
and with due respect for the sovereignty of mem-
ber states. To this end, it would be desirable, at the
conference, to redefine the institutional links bet-
ween the Union, the member states, other Euro-
pean and transatlantic organisations involved and
the national parliaments.
II. European securigt and defence: toward,s a
common policy
10. In his welcoming address to delegations of
the Assembly of WEU, meeting in Paris for the
June 1994 session, the President of the French
National Assembly, Philippe S6guin, observed
that " the new world situation unfolding before us
demonstates how essential is the need for gleater
co-ordination among European states in matters
of defence and security ".
11. This admission of inadequacy is also an
indictment of the relative failure to implement the
CFSP, even if account is taken of the very short
time the Maastricht Treaty has been in force.
12. Simultaneously, WEU has launched a pro-
cess of adaptation to the new geostrategic situa-
tion in Europe by also taking into consideration
the Maasricht decisions that confirmed it as the
defence component of the Buropean Union. In the
run-up to the intergovernmental conference,
whose decisions on the CFSP will have repercus-
sions on the organisation, WEU is developing its
own thinking on its future r6le in the context of
deepening the CFSP and the possible inclusion
therein of the defence dimension.
(a) European Unian and the CFSP
13. The Maastricht Treaty is the outcome of a
laborious and complex process of discussion and
compromise between the member states of the
European Fronomic Community, the incomplete
nature of which is illustrated by the decision to
convene a conference, in principle in 1996, to cla-
rify certain matters in relation to the functioning
of the European Union and the CFSP.
(i) Title V of the Maastricht Treaty
14. The CFSP is the subject of Title V of the
Maastricht Treaty, which comprises Articles J to
J.11. Although in practice, its application seems
very remote from the text, the latter nevertheless
includes a series of provisions binding on states
which have subscribed unreservedly to that part of
the treaty 2.
15. Article J.1.2 sets out the five principal
objectives of the CFSP, namely:
- 
to safeguard the common values, funda-
mental interests and independence of the
Union;
- 
to strengthen the security of the Union
and its member states in all ways;
- 
to preserve peace and strengthen interna-
tional security, in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter,
as well as the principles of the Helsinki
Final Act and the objectives of the Paris
Charter;
- 
to promote international co-operation;
- 
to develop and consolidate democracy
and the rule of law, and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
16. It is imponant to bear these objectives in
mind, as to misunderstand them often creates
confusion and disappointment when progress on
the CFSP is being evaluated. In point of fact,
these objectives stem from the search for a
consensus likely to be acceptable to all the coun-
hies of the Union, and have led the latter, frst, to
align themselves on general, even vaguely wor-
ded principles, and, second, to defer the necessary
discussion on procedures for implementing them
and possibly extending them to defence matters
until the 1996 conference.
17. The second and third paragraphs of the
same article reveal a concern to make the CFSP
an instrument for affirming the Union as a power
that counts, not only in economic terms but also
2. Denmark is not involved in the elaboration and implemen-
tation of decisions and actions of the Union with defence
implications. (European Council, Edinburgh, llth-l2th
December 1992. Conclusions ofthe Presidency, Part B).
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politically, and, by a time yet to be defined, mili-
tarily. It is in this perspective that one must consi-
der Article J.4 which refers to " the eventual fra-
ming of a cofilmon defence policy which might in
time lead to a common defence " (Article J.4.1).
This article, which also concerns WEU, refers to
the 1996 intergovernmental conference " and
having in view the date of 1998 in the context of
Article XII3 of the Brussels Treaty ", to the dis-
cussion on the r6le that WEU will be called upon
to play in its relations with the Union.
(ii) The 1996 intergovernmental conference
18. The Maastricht Treaty is the result of a
hasty but necessary compromise, the aim of
which was to position the European Union vis-i-
vis the political and military changes that had
occurred in Europe and the rest of the world since
the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the consensus
rule did not allow decisions of major scope to be
taken, above all in the area of the CFSP. Hence the
decision to convene a conference of representa-
tives of governments of the member states in 1996
to examine " those provisions of this treaty for
which revision is provided " (Article N.2).
19. The 1996 review must deal with the follo-
wing topics, referred to in the Treaty on European
Union:
- 
the policies and forms of co-operation
introduced by this Treaty (Article B of
the Treaty); '
- 
the common foreign and security policy
(Article 1.4.6);
- 
widening the field of application of the
procedure known as co-decision (new
Article 189 B of the Treaty establishing
the European Community);
- 
possible definition of a hierarchy of the
different categories of community acts
(Declaration on the hierarchy of Commu-
nity acts);
- 
extension of the responsibilities of the
Community to three new areas: energy,
civil protection and tourism (Declaration
on civil protection, energy and tourism).
20. In fact, the intergovernmental conference is
also to decide on the new European architecture
best fitted to meet the challenges of the future, be
they political, economic, military, social, ecologi-
3. Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty provides that
" After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the high
contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party
thereto provided that he shall have previously given one
year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government ".
Unlike the Council of Ministers, the Assembly of WEU takes
the view that the period of fifty years runs from 1954, the
date of signature of the modified Brussels Treaty, and not
1948 (Brussels Treaty).
cal, etc. The debate on institutional questions will
be central to the discussions since only when an
optimal framework for decision-making has been
defined, avoiding extremes of national or pro-
European sentiment, will the Union be able to
give a coherent content to its decisions in essential
areas like the CFSP and implement them effecti-
vely.
21. Looking beyond the debate on deepening
and widening, on federal Europe " d la carte " and
on the respective rOles and powers of the Council,
the Commission, the European Parliament, the
national parliaments and other institutions and
organisations, the question is basically whether
the evolution will be towards renationalising
European policies or " Europeanising " national
policies. The answer will be decisive for defining
the r6le and place ofEurope as a political and eco-
nomic unit in the world of 2000. As far as secur-
ity and defence are concerned, WEU, linked in
accordance with Article J.4 to the intergovern-
mental conference process, is the organisation
best placed to devise a project that is coherent,
clear and devoid of all ambiguity.
(b) WEU and the definition of a common European
defence policy
22. WEU is the only European organisation
with responsibility in security and defence mat-
/ers. Nevertheless, despite its reactivation in
1984, it still gives the impression of not being in a
position to exercise that responsibility fully in
face of the geopolitical and geosfrategic changes
of the last five years. Its evolution is a gradual
process which also takes account of the evolution
of the two other organisations with which WEU is
linked, i.e. the European Union and NAIO, as is
apparent from study of the texts adopted at Maas-
tricht in 1991 and Noordwijk in 1994. To these
documents must be added the memorandum on
the United Kingdom Government's approach to
the treatment of European defence issues at the
1996 intergovernmental conference released on
2nd March 1995, which presents a series of pro-
posals for strengthening the organisation.
(i) The Mansticht declarations
23. Annexed to the Maastricht Treaty are two
declarations by WEU member states intended to
define the organisation's place and r6le in relation
to the European Union and NAIO.
24. In the first, member states " agree on the
need to develop a genuine security and defence
identity and a greater European responsibility in
defence matters ". To achieve this " WEU will be
developed as the defence component of the Euro-
pean Union and as a means to strengthen the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance ".
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25. In asserting itself as the " defence compo-
nent ", WEU may appear to be linking its future to
the institutional development of the Union, as the
organisation has committeditself at the same time
to a review, in 1996, of its declaration annexed to
the Maastricht Treaty, in parallel with the inter-
governmental conference (point D of the declara-
tion on Western European Union).
26. Furthermore, WEU states that it is " prepa-
red, at the request of the European Union, to ela-
borate and implement decisions and actions of the
Union which have defence implications ". To this
end, the declaration presents a series of measures
aimed at developing " a close working relation-
ship " between the two organisations (point A of
the declaration), namely:
-synchronisation of the dates and venues
of meetings and harmonisation of wor-
king methods;
- 
establishment of close co-operation bet-
ween the Councils of Ministers and the
respective secretariats ;
- 
harmonisation of the presidencies;
- 
keeping the Commission informed on
WEU activities;
- 
encouragement of co-operation between
the WEU Assembly and the European
Parliament.
27. The second declaration concerns the enlar-
gement of WEU to include the member states of
the European Union and other states, members of
NATO. According to this declaration:
" States which are members of the Euro-
pean Union are invited to accede to WEU
on conditions to be agreed in accordance
with Article XI of the modified Brussels
Treaty, or to become observers if they so
wish... ".
Simultaneously, European member states of
NATO are offered associate member status.
28. Nevertheless, application of the text is not
easy, despite its apparent simplicity. In practice,
since the decisions taken by the Council in Peters-
berg in June 1992, only one member state of the
European Union, Greece, has become a full mem-
ber of WEU. Denmark has requested observer sta-
tus, as has Ireland. When Austria, Finland and
Sweden joined the Union it was thought that two
of these countries, if not all three, might qualify tojoin as full members but in fact, for the time
being, they only have observer status, placing
them, in theory in a position similar to associate
partners o in WEU, although they are entitled to
take part in the discussions at the 1996 inter-
governmental conference that will deal with the
CFSP and consequently with WEU's future.
(ii) The Noordwijk declaration
29. Atthe Kirchberg meeting on9thMay 1994,
the Council of Ministers, in line with the deci-
sions taken at Maastricht and within the frame-
work of the preparation of the intergovernmental
conference, requested the Permanent Council to
begin work on the definition of a European defen-
ce policy. The Dutch presidency had the task of
preparing a preliminary document which was exa-
mined and adopted by the WEU ministers at
Noordwijk on 14th November 1994.
30. The document defines four levels of Euro-
pean responsibilities and interests in defence mat-
ters ([I.4), as follows:
- 
WEU governments have a direct respon-
sibility for the security and defence of
their own peoples and territories;
- [they] have a responsibility to project the
security and stability presently enjoyed in
the West throughout the whole of Europe;
- [they] have an interest, in order to rein-
force European security, in fostering sta-
bility in the southern Mediterranean
countries;
- [they] are ready to take on their share of
the responsibility for the promotion of
security, stability and the values of demo-
cracy in the wider world, including
through the execution of peace-keeping
and other crisis-management measures
under the authority of the United Nations
Security Council or the CSCE s, acting
either independently or through WEU or
NATO. They are also ready to address
new security challenges such as humani-
tarian emergencies, proliferation, terro-
rism, international crime and environ-
mental risks, including those related to
disarmament and the destruction of
nuclear and chemical weapons.
3I. This list is not exhaustive. These are mere-
ly the broad outlines to be followed, for the docu-
ment also states that " the full development of a
common defence policy will require a common
assessment and definition of ... the substance of a
European defence ... This will in turn depend
upon a judgment of the rOle the European Union
wishes to play in the world and the contribution it
wishes to make to security in its immediate neigh-
bourhood and in the wider world " (II.6). This is
tantamount to assigning the task of elaborating a
5. Now OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe.
tt9
4. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic.
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European security and defence policy to the Euro-
pean Council, when it should rather be the res-
ponsibility of WEU, as the defence component of
the Union, to deal with all aspects of this question.
32. At the same time, it should be borne in
mind that these preliminary conclusions represent
but a first step for WEU towards preparation of
the intergovernmental conference; this explains
their generalised tone, which is also linked to the
need for member states to reach consensus on the
definition of European defence and its objectives.
In this connection it is noteworthy that the list as
it stands does not include the defence of Europe's
economic interests, although this important aspect
of contemporary international relations falls
within WEU's sphere of responsibility 6 and the
United States has integrated this aspect fully into
its concept of national security'. Since lst April
1995, France has also established a committee on
competitiveness and economic security for which
a secretariat is provided by the National Defence
Secretariat-General under the supervision of the
Prime MinisterE. A report to the hesident of the
Republic on the powers of this committee notes
that control over the flow of information governs
economic performance and hence job protection.
It underpins international power relations which
may be confrontational or tend towards partner-
ship'.
33. In order to deal with this new situation, the
report advocates a new organisation of strategic
information around the notion of " economic
intelligence ", defined as " a body of co-ordinated
research, processing, dissemination and protec-
tion of information activities bringing together the
state and the world of business ... " . This aware-
ness, in a context where cold war confrontation
has partly given way to increasing economic com-
petition between large commercial groups (as has
been evident from the GATT negotiations and the
creation of the World Trade Organisation) extends
beyond a strictly national framework as a result of
growing interpenetration and integration of the
economies of the countries of the European
Union.
(iii) The memorandum of the United Kingdom
Governmentto
34. The memorandum on the United Kingdom
Government's approach to the fteatment of Euro-
pean defence issues at the 1996 intergovernmental
conference was released on lst March 1995. This
was the first conribution by a European govern-
ment to the preparation of the IGC dealing with
European security and defence matters.
35. The main thoughts set out in the memoran-
dum are as follows:
- 
NATO is the central component of the
security and defence of Europe;
- 
Europe must be more outward looking,
" pulling its full weight internationally and
acting as a power for good in the world ";
- 
WEU " has an important and growing
rdle to play in the development of a Euro-
pean security and defence identity ". It
must remain autonomous and separate
from the European Union;
- 
" the basis for European action in the
defence and security field should be
intergovernmental, based on co-operation
between nation states ".
36. On WEU, in order to improve the decision-
making process, the memorandum proposes crea-
ting " a new WEU body at head of state and
government level involving full members, asso-
ciate members and observers ". This body
" would be built on the WEU freaty base and the
rights and responsibilities of its members would
thus mirror those already in force in the WEU
Council ". At operational level it is necessary to
" strengthen WEU's planning capabilities " and
" develop its practical arrangements such as a situ-
ation centre and improved intelligence-handling
capabilities ".
37. This document has been quite well received
in other European Union and WEU countries. It is
clear nevertheless that this contribution is open to
discussion and possibly to amendment during the
intergovernmental conference, particularly in
regard to the question of decision-making proce-
dures in the new consultative body proposed in
the memorandum, in the event of that idea being
adopted. The r6le assigned to the associate part-
ners in such a body must also be clarified in order
to avoid the latter being left " out in the cold ".
Nor is there mention of the democratic supervi-
sion that parliaments might exercise over the deci-
siols of this body, the WEU Assembly having
only a consultative rOle 
- 
unlike the European
Parliament which has cenain powers of co-deci-
sion and supervision in the European Union.
6. Article VIIL3 of the modified Brussels Treaty providcs
that " At the requcst of any of the high conuacting partics the
Council shall bc immediatcly convcncd in order to permit
them to consult with rcgard to any situation which may
constitutc a threat to peace, in whatevcr area this threat
should arise, or a danger to economic stability. "
7.In an interview with Newsweck on the Franco-American
espionagc question which surfaccd at the end of February
1995, the Trade Sccretary of thc Clinton Administration, Mi.
Ron Brown stated that United States natiortal security
interests were inextricably linked with its economic interests.(Quoted in Le Monde, 2dd March 1995).
E. Official Journal of thc Freich Republic, No. 80, pagc
53?6, 4th April 1995.
9. Idcm, page 5375.
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IlL Parliaments in Europe and their rille in
the commonforeign and security policy
38. Annexed to the Maastricht Treaty are two
declarations concerning the national parliaments,
one on " the r6le of national parliaments in the
European Union ", the other on " the Conference
of Parliaments ". In both cases the principle is to
involve parliaments in the Maastricht process and
also to reassure them in view of the wider powers
of the European Parliament within the European
Union.
39. Nevertheless, the attention the contracting
parties pay to the national parliaments can also be
explained by political considerations with the aim
of facilitating ratification of the treaty. Further-
more, the two declarations on the rOle of national
parliaments, which are still very general, place the
emphasis on co-operation with the European Par-
liament. If the ftend in the framework of the CFSP
is towards a common defence policy, which WEU
is intended to embody, reference should also be
made to the WEU Assembly, even if the prelimi-
nary conclusions on this question adopted by the
Council of Ministers in Noordwijk make no refe-
rence to the Assembly's r6le.
(a) National parliaments and preparation of the 196
inte rgov emme ntal conferenc e
40. The intergovernmental conference is of the
utmost interest to the national parliaments. The
decisions to be taken on the future of the Euro-
pean Union will have political, economic and
social consequences which must be ca:ried into
effect in each member state with the essential co-
operation of the national parliaments. It is there-
fore logical that the latter should, from now on,
contribute to the reform of the European institu-
tions.
41. Their task is a delicate one in relation to the
CFSP, as the shape of the latter is still ill-defined
and no decision has yet been taken on its nature.
On this point, proposals have been made by par-
liaments or within them, which, not having yet
been finalised, are still subject to debate and
amendment during a process which will continue
until 1996 and beyond.
(i) The French proposals: the European sen-
ate and inte rparliamentary committe e
42. In France, the Senate and the National
Assembly, through their delegations to the Euro-
pean Union, have put forward proposals for the
preparation of the intergovernmental conference
that accord an important place to the question of
parliamentary supervision. These proposals were
set out in detail in three reports published in
December 1994 and February 1995.
43. The Senate has published two reports, on
the preparation of the intergovernmental confe-
rence which present the idea of creating, along-
side the European Parliament, a second European
parliamentary chamber which would allow natio-
nal parliaments closer participation in the Euro-
pean decision-making process. This " chamber of
national parliaments whose powers would be dif-
ferent to those of the European Parliament ...
would supplement the control exercised by the
latter with a control rooted in national political
life ".
44. Its powers " might relate first and foremost
to areas which fall outside the community deci-
sion-making process ... primarily the second and
third pillars of the Union ... Moreover, the second
chamber might exercise control over the principle
of subsidiarity, a task not currently undertaken by
any of the institutions of the Union.. "'2.
45. As to its composition, " the members of
this Assembly would sit in national delegations ...;
in this way its composition might be adjusted in
accordance with the participation of states in the
various aspects of the intergovernmental pillars or
in related forms of co-operation between member
states. Thus the Assembly of WEU might become
one of the formations of the European Senate, the
one made up of parliamentary delegates of the
WEU member states ... "13
46. " Its membership should, for reasons of
consistency, be determined in relation to the
weighting of voting within the Council: one
might, for example, envisage that the number of
members of the parliamentary delegation of a
state should be equal to double the number of
votes that state has in the Council; one would
thus, under present conditions, arrive at an assem-
bly of 174 members ... ".
47. This " European senate ", the aim of which
would be to introduce an element of parliamen-
tary supervision into areas of intergovernmental
co-operation and which would have a r6le distinct
from that of the European Parliament (limited to
supervision of the single " community " pillar)
" would be a simplification compared wittr the pre-
sent situation since it would be based on a clear
definition of the rOles of each one, while today's
institutional grey area between the second and
third pillars is a source of confusion of responsibi-
lities and procedural conflicts "'0.
ll. Senate, Information Reports l04,2nd December 1994,
and 224, 15th February 1995.
12. Senate, lnformation report 104 on the preparation ofthe
1996 intergovernmental conference, 2nd December 1994,
pages 4l-42.
13. Senate, Information report224 on the reform ofthe insti-
tutions of the European Union (Vol. I), l5th February 1995,
page 39.
14. Idem, page 40.
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48. The delegation of the National Assembly to
the European Union has proposed the creation of
an " interparliamentary committee to ensure the
participation of national parliaments in the deci-
sion-making process of the Union "'5. This com-
mittee " would be composed of a number of repre-
sentatives, that might be fixed between three and
six for each member state. States with bicameral
parliaments might share the seats between their
two assemblies in accordance with their own
constitutional system. This commiftee would thus
be a renewed version, with enhanced powers, of
the present Conference of European Affairs Com-
mittees (CEAC)... ".
49. The committee would be competent to exa-
mine " the major decisions of the European Union
and subjects which, by their nature, fell outside
the area of responsibility of the European Parlia-
ment: revision of treaties, international agree-
ments and enlargement of the Union, the budget
and in particular receipts, internal and judicial
affairs. The committee would also be the author-
ity for appropriate parliamentary supervision of
decisions relating to the restricted circles estab-
lished for currency and defence matters. On all
these questions the committee would give consul-
tative opinions ".
(ii) The United Kingdom debate: strengthening
the r6le of the national parliaments
50. In the United Kingdom, the preparation of
the intergovernmental conference and the policy
on an enlarged and reformed European Union
have been a source of extremely lively debate. An
important place is given to the question of parlia-
mentary supervision of decisions taken in the
Union, a question which the Prime-Minister, Mr.
John Major, has undertaken to present to the
conference'6.
51. A consensus is emerging within the main
parliamentary groups in favour of a more active
presence by national parliaments in the European
process; there are divergences only as regards the
means, with most Conservatives in favour of bet-
ter definition and a reduction of the powers of the
European Parliament in favour of national parlia-
ments, while Labour and the Liberal Democrats
generally advocate strengthening the powers of
the European Parliament within the limits impo-
sed by community legislation and closer co-ope-
ration between the latter and national par-
15. National Assembly, Information report 1939 on institu-
tional reform of the European Union, 8th February 1995,
pages 99-100.
16. See in this connection the debate on the European Union;
Hansard, House of Commons, Vol. 255, No. 62, Col. 1063,
lst March 1995.
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liaments ''. The idea of a Europetur second cham-
ber, representing national parliaments has also
met with a degree of suppon within the United
Kingdom Parliament'8.
52. Parliamentary supervision was not develo-
ped in the United Kingdom Government's memo-
randum on " the heatrnent of European defence
issues ", which confined itself to noting the exis-
tence of the Assembly of WEU as the parliamen-
tary component of European defence'e. But the
government is paying close attention to it as is
evident from a confidential information note by
the Foreign Secretary on the preparation of the
intergovernmental conference, extracts from
which have been published in the press'o.
53. This note states that: " building up a formal
r61e for national parliaments through treaty
amendment would not only be fraught with diffi-
culty but would tend to require inputs from parlia-
ments which are significanfly more integrationist
than Westminster ". To deal with this difficulty,
the authors of this document propose " to tread
carefully in this area, avoiding fteaty amendments
wherever possible in favour of practical steps
designed to enable the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment to enhance its r6le in European affairs. "
This text also addresses a question of prime
importance, that of the effectiveness of European
parliamentary supervision exercised by national
parliaments, observing that: " Despite a general
wish to bring national parliaments into the frame,
it seems highly doubtful whether the involvement
of 15 parliaments in testing subsidiarity would in
practice lead to a more positive outcome in indivi-
dual cases. "
54. The United Kingdom Government's propo-
sals on European defence in the memorandum
submitted to Parliament by the Prime Minister on
1st March are the subject of continuing debate and
scrutiny in both Houses of Parliament; select
committees in both the House of Commons and
the House of Lords are currently examining issues
which may be raised at the IGC, including links
between the EU and WEU.
(iii) The German debate: the Lamers-Schriuble
document2l
55. In early September 1994, the CDU/CSU
parliamentary group published a document:
Thoughts on the European Union in the frame-
17. See for example the debate on the 1996 intergovernmen-
tal conference; Hansard, House of Lords, Vol. 562, No. 53,
col. 272-357, 8th March 1995.
18. Idem, col293.
19. WEU Assembly; A/WEU/DG (95) 9, page 7 .
20. The Times, 9th March 1995.
21. Bulletin Europe (Documents) No. 1895/96, 7th Septem-
ber 1994.
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work of preparations for the parliamentary elec-
tions to be held in November of the same year.
This document had repercussions beyond Ger-
many's borders on account of its proposal for a
multi-speed Europe, built around a cenfral core of
five or six counfiies, hinged upon France and Ger-
many.Taking what might be described as a " pro-
integration " stance, this text, in addition to its
arguments in favour of the " hard core " approach,
deserves credit for highlighting certain short-
comings from which the European Union suffers,
especially in relation to the common foreign and
security policy.
56. These " thoughts " do not represent the
views of the Bundestag, but probably provide a
reference in the discussions in the German Parlia-
ment concerning the preparation of the intergo-
vernmental conference. According to the authors
of the text, the European process has reached a
critical stage in its development as a result of its
institutions becoming overextended (enlargement
of the European Union), the growing divergence
of interests of the member countries, differing
perceptions of priorities (the Meditenanean, Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe), economic changes and
their social consequences, a strengthening of
nationalist tendencies and nations looking
inwards (out of fear of migration) and the weak-
ness of governments and national parliaments in
remedying problems that extend beyond the
national framework.
57. Several proposals for dealing with this
situation have been made concerning the institu-
tional development of the Union, strengthening
the " hard core " (composed of five or six coun-
tries involved in a process of advanced currency
and political integration), deepening Franco-Ger-
man relations, strengthening the Union's ability to
act in foreign policy and security matters and
extending the Union to the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. In the institutional sphere,
the document suggests drawing on the federal
model, with clear demarcation of responsibilities
at European, national and regional levels. The
power structure revolves, as is presently the case,
around the Council of the Union, the Commission
and the European Parliament, but the Council and
the Parliament would share the legislative func-
tion, with the first acting as a second chamber (the
Chamber of States), while the Commission would
have the duties of a " European Government ".
58. This structure, intended in principle to
make the Union function more efficiently, never-
theless leaves national parliaments out of the
European process, as their power of supervision
would apply only indirectly through the Chamber
of States (the present Council of the Union), being
exercised, a priori, uniquely over the national
government, while decisions are taken in a com-
munity or intergovernmental framework and are
binding on governments in respect of their part-
ners. That is one of the weaknesses of this docu-
ment, which will have to be revised, as it leads to
marginalisation of the only political representa-
tion available to the peoples of the member coun-
ries of the Union, the source of each state's sove-
reignty, including that of Germany, even if the
authors attribute " in parallel, not as a priority ...
prime importance to the participation of national
parliaments in creating political will in Eur-
ope"".
59. During its working visit to the Bundestag in
March 1995, the Assembly's Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations was able to gain
an impression of the state of the discussions being
held in the German Parliament on the intergovern-
mental conference. For Mrs. Rita Siissmuth, Pre-
sident of the Bundestag, there would be no sense
in WEU remaining outside community structures:
even if a merger were not immediate, it should at
least be effective when the modified Brussels
Treaty became due for review in 1998. In terms of
parliamentary supervision, she believed it would
first be necessary to strengthen the responsibili-
ties of the European Parliament instead of crea-
ting new parliamentary structures 
- 
such as a
second chamber of the European Parliament.
60. A draft resolution of the Bundesrat on the
preparation of the 1996 conference follows simi-
lar lines by proposing better definition of the areas
of responsibility of the Union, its institutions and
the member states and bringing the second
(CFSP) and third (Justice) pillars of intergovern-
mental co-operation into the community. Accor-
ding to this text, the European Parliament should
have greater powers of co-decision alongside the
Council and the number of topics requiring a qua-
lified majority or unanimous vote in the Council
should be reduced. The document furthermore
specifies that national parliaments and the Euro-
pean Parliament should co-operate closely in pre-
paring the Conference and implementing the
results'23.
(iv) Belgium and the 1996 intergovernmental
conference
61. The committee for opinion responsible for
European questions in Belgium's House of Repre-
sentatives has published an interim report on the
issuez according to which the conference should
have a two-fold objective: " develop a medium-
22.ldem, page 5.
23. Bundesrat, Antrag der Linder Bayern und Rheinland-
Pfalz, Drucksache 169195,24th March 1995.
24. House of Representatives of Belgium, interim report on
the 1996 intergovemmental conference: Rapporteurs, MM.
Eyskens and Willcokx; No. 1783/1 - 94195,30th March
1995.
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and long-term political prograrnme for all areas
for which the European Union could and should
assume responsibility ...; make the required
amendments to the treaty in areas where this
should prove necessary, particularly for institutio-
nal reasons ... . In any event, any institutional
reform should have a purpose, namely to permit
enlargement through deepening ". The institutio-
nal reform of the Union is, according to the
authors, the primary condition for completing the
process of accession of new members and the
inffoduction of monetary union is, in their view, a
major requirement, since it is probably the only
real lever for achieving a deepening.
62. The interim report also advocates estab-
lishing a procedure for voluntary withdrawal or
exclusion of a member state and the rejection of a
" Europe d la carte " where " each member state
would decide independently which component of
European policy it intended to implement ". Here
too, the " hard core " theory receives a less than
enthusiastic welcome and a multi-speed Europe
within which the pace of integration would not be
identical for the various member states is accep-
table as a temporary interim solution ...; it cannot
become an end in itself ". Indeed, the concept of a
federal Europe with strong community institu-
tions like the Commission and the Parliament
would seem to be preferred by the Rapporteurs.
63. The CFSP should be the sole responsibility
of the community institutions and decisions in this
area would be taken by qualified majority. Propo-
sals regarding WEU are more tentative since the
Rapporteurs admit that " it is in principle desi-
rable for WEU to be integrated into the European
Union ". At the same time they advocate WEU's
organic involvement in NATO. It is necessary too
for European Union members also to join WEU
and to be members of NAIO ... . Consequently
any form of detachment is to be avoided and the
F.uropean Union should defend Atlantic solidarity
in a convincing manner. Moreover the Rappor-
teurs consider it desirable for COREPERT to be
associated with the working of WEU: states might
replace their ambassadors to WEU by their per-
manent representative to the European Union. As
to the WEU Assembly, the Rapporteurs wonder
whether it should not be composed of members of
the European Parliament, an idea which concords
with the resolutions adopted by the latter in this
connection.
@. With regard to parliamentary supervision,
the idea of a European senate composed of dele-
gations of national parliaments is rejected in
favour of establishing a body for contacts and
consultation between national parliaments. This
converges with the proposal of the French Senate
25. Committee of permanent representatives of member
states.
Delegation to the European Parliament which
advocates the creation of an interparliamentary
committee or strengthening the responsibilities of
the CEAC. The number of European parliamenta-
rians would be reduced but the European Parlia-
ment's powers of co-decision would be extended.
This interim report opts firmly in favour of streng-
thening community sffuctures and the European
Parliament as opposed to attempts to renationalise
European policy and resorting too much to inter-
governmental procedures.
65. The proposals set out in this report are to be
the subject of an in-depth debate during the
second half of this year in the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives, whose membership has changed follo-
wing the elections in May 1995. The Consultative
Committee of the Belgian Senate has a more qua-
lified position on these questions; it envisages the
integration of WEU into the European Union in
the framework of a process of gradual rapproche-
ment, while maintaining effective parliamentary
supervision of security and defence questions.
66. The proposals and current debates in the
national parliaments give an insight into the pos-
sible options for parliamentary supervision of
European decisions, be it by establishing a second
European parliamentary chamber representative
of national parliaments, or by strengthening at
national level the powers of parliaments over the
European policies of governments or again by a
transfer of legislative powers from the Council of
the Union to the European Parliament. Opinions
on the subject are not confined to the cases men-
tioned and the thinking in progress in other natio-
nal parliaments will further contribute to these
questions along lines which, depending on natio-
nal traditions, will be based on one or other of the
views expressed. At the same time, introduction
of the parliamentary dimension into the European
context is also achieved through development of
interparliamentary co-operation.
(b ) Eu ro p e an inte rparliam e ntary c o - o p e mlio n
67. The national parliaments of the member
countries of the European Union and WEU pati-
cipate in the community process to varying
extents. However, one cannot help but note that
this participation remains largely beyond their
rcach and is frequently confined to discussion and
approval of legislation and community decisions
ratified by the Council of Ministers of the Union.
68. In relation to the CFSP, for example, Title
V of the Maastricht Treaty makes no reference
whatsoever to the r6le of national parliaments, but
does mention that of the European Parliament.
Once aware of the situation, national parliaments
responded by stepping up interparliamentary co-
operation in order to face up to the implications of
Maastricht and have their say at the intergovern-
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mental conference. This co-operation is being
developed for the main part within the CEAC anil
the Conference of Speakers.
(i) CEAC 
- 
Conference of European Affairs
Committees
69. CEAC held its first meeting in November
1989 and has since met half-yearly to discuss sub-
jects which fall within the European Union's areas
of responsibility; it is composed of national and
European parliamentarians. Meetings are held in
the couatry of the presidency of the Council of the
Union, thus enabling parliarnentarians to be infor-
med of the programme of the current presidency
and to make their views known.
70. From the time the Maastricht Treaty took
effect and since the initial development bf the
CFSP, CEAC has been used to clarify the r6le of
national parliaments in this area, as noted in the
conclusions adopted at the VIIIth conference 6
held in Copenhagen on 4th and 5th May 1993.
According to these conclusions, participants
agreed that parliamentary supervision of intergo-
vernmental co-operation was most important,
despite the fact that such co-operation did not fall
within the sphere of the Community.
71. For them to exercise this supervision in
full, national parliaments need to be informed by
governments, the Council of Ministers and the
Commission about decisions to be taken, within a
time-frame allowing them to discuss matters in
full possession of the facts. This is far from
always being the case, as current procedure in the
majority of countries frequently limits the powers
of national parliaments in this respect even if in
certain cases they express the wish to intervene
over and above the community decision-making
process.
72. It was in part this question that the Xth
conference sought to answer at its meeting in
Athens on 9th and 10th May 1994 which dealt
mainly with the democratic deficit and transpa-
rency in the decision-making process ". The dis-
cussions provided an opportunity to emphasise
that if there was a perceived democratic deficit
this was largely because governments were not
sufficiently answerable to their national parlia-
ments 28. This facet of the problem is sometimes
neglected when discussing the powers of national
parliaments in European policy matters.
73. In the area of the CFSP, this weakness
might become even more acute because of the
growing trend for the executive to treat such ques-
26. National Assembly (France), Information report No. 143
(amended), 5th May 1993, page 15.
27. National Assembly (France), Information report No.
1237,l7thMay 1994.
28. Idem, page 13.
tions as confidential, indeed, to shroud them in
official secrecy. The conffadiction here between
official speeches to national parliaments calling
for further commitment to the European process
and the unwillingness of the Council of Ministers
of the European Union to authorise publication of
documents drafted by the Council and its commit-
tees during the preparation of Council decisions
on European Union2e legislation is all too evident.
CEAC, aware of the need to resolve these issues,
included an item on the rdle of national parlia-
ments in the institutional development of the
European Unions in the agenda of its XIIth mee-
ting on 27thand 28th February 1995.
74. At the XIIth conference and in the debate
on the rOle of national parliaments in the Euro-
pean Union and their participation in the prepara-
tory work for the intergovernmental conference,
the French proposal for the creation of a second
European chamber and associating national par-
liaments more closely with the group of experts
preparing the intergovernmentaiconierence met
with little response3'. The Luxembourg represen-
tation opted for maintaining the half-yearly confe-
rences and making them more effective32, partly
concurring with the French National Assembly
delegation proposal for creating an interparlia-
mentary committee33.
75. The Danish Delegation adopted a position
in favour of clear demarcation between European,
national and regional areas of responsibility.
Spain and Belgium stated they were in favour of
sfrengthening the supervision exercised by their
parliaments over national European policies * 
- 
a
sensitive issue as it is closely linked to the func-
tioning of the institutions and political tradition of
individual countries, which does not encourage a
harmonisation of procedures in this area between
parliaments. These institutional differences also
explain in part the informal r6le of the Conferen-
ce of Speakers of National Parliaments of the
European Union. The participants agreed to pur-
sue the debate on the preparation of the intergo-
29. Netherlands draft motion on transparency; National
Assembly (France), Information report No. 1237,l7thMay
1994, Appendix 3, page 53.
30. National Assembly (France), Information report No.
1660, l5th November 1994, page 37.
3 1. House of Representatives and Senate of Belgium: report
on the conference of Conference of European Affairs Com-
mittees (CEAC )OI), Paris, 27th and 28th February 1995;
No. 1769/1 - 94195 and 1369-l (1994-1995),24th March
1995.
32. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Chamber of Deputies,
extract from proceedings No. 5/94-95, page7.
33. French National Assembly, Information Report No. 1939
on institutional reform of the European Union, 8th February
1995, pages 99-100.
34. Lr Monde, 2nd March 1995,page 4.
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vernmental conference at the next CEAC meeting
which is to be held in Madrid in the second half of
t995.
(ii) The Conference of Speakers of National
Parliaments
76. A more informal body, the Conference of
Speakers of National Parliaments (which also
includes the European Parliament) has met on
avetage once every two years, since 1975. It
groups speakers with different statuses, some
having a more political than procedural r6le, and
allows exchanges of views on such questions as
parliamentary supervision, links between parlia-
ments and electors, the media and power and
other related questions'3s.
77 . The participation of national parliaments in
the reform of European institutions as envisaged
after 1996 was a cenfral issue in the discussions
during an informal meeting of speakers in Bonn
on 12th September 1994, when members set
themselves two major goals: to participate to the
greatest extent possible in discussions on the
reform of the European institutions before deci-
sions were reached at the 1996 intergovernmental
conference and to work together to ensure natio-
nal parliaments took a leading r6le. At that mee-
ting it was proposed to set up a small working
group to prepare a conference of national parlia-
ments for the second half of 1995, in order to
assert their views before decisions are taken in
199616.
78. CEAC and the Conference are two mecha-
nisms for dialogue and exchange of interparlia-
mentary views, but they are a long way from co-
ordinating national parliaments' attitudes to
Community-related questions. For the CFSP and
European defence, no structures yet exist for brin-
ging together defence and foreign affairs commit-
tees of national parliaments and this shortcoming
is one the WEU Assembly should take upon itself
to rectify. In the meantime, two European parlia-
mentary institutions, the European Parliament and
the Assembly of WEU, are endeavouring, each in
its own way, to introduce a real parliamentary
dimension into this debate.
(c) The r6le of European parliamentary institutions
79. European security and defence remain
essentially within the area of intergovernmental
co-operation, despite mention here and there of a
European army or a European defence policy. In
point of fact, leaving aside the speeches and
declarations of principle, there is a European
defence which, although not integrated, is ensured
in an intergovernmental framework by WEU, and
a Euro-Atlantic defence which, through NATO,
has an integrated command structure, but which is
not supranational.
80. Both these organisations have a more or
less well-defined collective defence r6le (see the
fifth article of their respective reaties). The fact
remains, however, that there are no forces penna-
nently assigned to WEU, nor is there a single
command. Member states decide, case by case,
the possible contribution they will make to anyjoint action, on the basis of national criteria.
81. In the framework of the CFSP and the defi-
nition of a common defence policy, it will be
necessary, if we are to have a credible instrument
at our disposal, for our respective defence policies
to be made more " European " by pursuing the
harmonisation of personnel, equipment and cur-
rent military doctrine. These are difficult steps,
touching as they do upon one of the principal
atEibutes of state sovereignty: national defence.
For to succeed, states must be agreed on such a
development and public opinion and national par-
liaments must also support it. This also presup-
poses a common vision of the problems stretching
beyond mere national considerations. It is in this
area that the WEU Assembly can best contribute
to establishing a European security and defence
policy.
(i) The European Parliament
82. The European Parliament, elected by uni-
versal suffrage in a manner specific to each mem-
ber counffy of the Union, has experienced a quali-
tative enhancement of its r01e through the entry
into force of the Maastricht Treaty. It now has
very real powers in implementing the CFSP, des-
pite difficulties in their application, and would
wish to see them extended.
83. Article J.7 of Title V of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union gives the parliament specific powers
in relation to the CFSP:
- 
" The Presidency shall consult the Euro-
pean Parliament on the main aspects and
the basic choices of the common foreign
and security policy and shall ensure that
the views of the European Parliament are
duly taken into consideration. The Euro-
pean Parliament should be kept regularly
informed by the Presidency and the Com-
mission of the development of the
Union's foreign and security policy.
- 
The European Parliament may ask ques-
tions of the Council or make recommen-
dations to it. It shall hold an annual deba-
te on implementing the common foreign
and security policy. "
35. See for example Conference of Speakers of the European
parliamentary assemblies - Summary report, The Hague,
24th and 25th June 1994 (Netherlands Parliament edition).
36. Le Monde, l3th September 1994.
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84. Additionally, the European Parliament is
sending two representatives to participate in the
preparation of the intergovernmental conference,
whereas national parliaments and the WEU
Assembly, which wish to make a contribution and
be present at the negotiating table, are having dif-
ficulty in this respect, although they will be called
upon subsequently to ratify the results3T.
85. The European Parliament lost no time in
seizing the opportunity to affrm its prerogatives
and, since 1993, has worked on the CFSP at the
expense in particular of those who might be part-
ners and help to strengthen parliamentary supervi-
sion of intergovernmental initiatives in these
questions, namely the national parliaments and
the WEU Assembly. One of the aims of the Euro-
pean Parliament is to acquire prerogatives in
supervising the CFSP budget, which it does not at
present possess. Its ability to take action is never-
theless real, as Turkey discovered in discussions
held in February 1995 on its proposed customs
union with the European Union which in no way
detracted from the difficulties encountered in
what were already sensitive negotiations3s.
86. In security and defence matters, the Euro-
pean Parliament is proposing the gradual replace-
ment of intergovernmental by community proce-
dures, the absorption of WEU by the European
Union, the submission of military operations deci-
ded by WEU to authorisation from the European
Parliament and the intensification of co-operation
with the WEU Assembly, the latter eventually
being replaced by the European Parliament3e. At
the same time it is calling for more systematic
democratic control of the decisions of the Euro-
pean Union, in association with the national par-
liaments. To this end, it is proposed, in a docu-
ment by the Institutional Committee on the
Development of the Union, to include directly in
the Treaty on European Union a revised version of
Declaration 13 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty
on the rOle of national parliaments, urging
governments to allow sufficient time to enable
them to decide on the new European Union legis-
lation without unduly delaying the decision-
making process*.
87. The text also proposes that national parlia-
ments be more closely associated with the annual
37. Apart from the WEU Assembly which has only a consul-
tative 16le.
38. Greece was opposed to signing the agreement with Tur-
key as long as the Union failed to give firm undertakings
regarding the future accession of Cyprus.
39. European Parliament: Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Security and Defence Policy; sub-committee on security and
disarmament; PE 211.388, l9th December 1994,pages3-4.
40. European Parliament: Courmittee on Institutional
Affairs; &aft report on the development of the European
Union; part A: draft resolution; Rapporteur Mr. David Mar-
tin; PE 211.919/A, l6th March 1995, pages 7-8.
legislative programme and, with the intergovern-
mental conference in view, asks for a consultative
conference of parliaments to be convened, which
might be held at the start and end of the conferen-
ceor. These approaches to national parliaments are
nevertheless set in the context of a prospective
increase in the European Parliament's powers,
making it the mainspring of parliamentary super-
vision in Europe.
88. This aim is set out clearly in another draft
report of the Institutional Committee, adopted in
May 1995, which states, in reference to parlia-
mentary supervision:
" The foreseeable emergence of resfficted
circles of integration in the areas of mone-
tary union, WE-U or the Schengen area
poses a serious threat to the very existence
of parliamentary control. Whenever Union
policies are pursued within a specific insti-
tutional framework and for a period of
several years by a restricted number of
member states, it is therefore vital to set up
an ad hoc body to exercise parliamentary
conffol. Such id hoc bodies'which would
have to be restricted in size and composed
exclusively of members of the European
Parliament from the member states concer-
ned, could be administered by the secreta-
riat of the European Parliament, which
would thus play a pivotal r6le in a genuine
European system of parliamentary control
(ESPC). "0r.
89. These proposals are an accurate reflection
of the European Parliament's wish to increase its
prerogatives at all levels of operation and in all
areas of responsibility of the European Union. In
security and defence matters, the present intergo-
vernmental character of the CFSP prevents it from
exercising close supervision of Council initia-
tives, hence the demand for the second pillar of
the Union to be brought into the community and
for the integration of WEU in the structures of the
latter. This is a sensitive subject affecting both the
prerogatives of states and national parliaments
and those of the WEU Assembly, which is the
only European parliamentary institution wholly
concerned with security and defence questions.
(ii) The Western European Union Assembly
90. The WEU Assembly remains an institution
apart, as the only European parliamentary body
with acknowledged ffeaty powers in security and
41. Idem, page 13.
42. European Parliament: Committee on Institutional
Affairs; draft report on the operation of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union with a view to the 1996 intergovernmental confe-
rence - implementation, Part A: Motion for a resolution;
Rapporteur Mr. Jean-Louis Bourlanges; PE 211.920lA, 10th
April 1995, page 14.
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defence matters. Article IX of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty states that " the Council of Western
European Union shall make an annual report on
its activities and in particular concerning the
control of armaments to an Assembly composed
of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers
to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe ".
91. Over the years, the Assembly has widened
its areas of responsibility to all major areas rela-
ting to security and defence. However, it shared
WEU's relatively low profile throughout most of
the cold war years, despite its recommendations
asking the Council to shoulder its responsibilities
more effectively.
92. The Maastricht Treaty and the implementa-
tion of the decisions on the CFSP mean that the
Assembly must define and assert its rightful place
within the new structures of Europe. For, although
its responsibilities are not called in question, its
sphere of action must be shared with other institu-
tions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE and the
European Parliament.
93. The Assembly is the European forum
where national parliamentarians ian air their
points of view and ideas, thus contributing to the
emergence of a European parliamentary identity
in security and defence matters. In this context, in
Paris, in October 1994, the Assembly brought
together the chairmen of defence and foreign
affairs committees of all the member countries of
WEU, irrespective of status. These initiatives,
together with its recommendations to the Council
of Ministers, allow the Assembly to take a posi-
tion in the debate forming the prelude to the inter-
governmental conference, although it is to be
regretted that the Council has not responded to the
Assembly's request to take part in the work of the
WEU " think tank " responsible for preparing the
organisation's contribution to the conference.
94. This situation has implications for relations
with the European Parliament, as proposals have
been made for the latter to absorb the Assembly,
although the modified Brussels Treaty is still in
force and will very likely remain so after 199803,
as the President of the Assembly, Sir Dudley
Smith, stated at the opening of the Paris colloquy.
It is logical and desirable for the Assembly, as an
integral part of WEU, to be asked to be involved
in revising the declaration adopted by the minis-
ters at Maastricht. At the same time it is necessa-
ry to consider the reforms that will be necessary to
enable it to play its full part as the parliamentary
43. The WEU Council of Ministers takes a different view to
the Assembly and believes the fifty-year time limit under
Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty starts in 1948 and
not 1954.
component of the sole European defence organi-
sation.
95. This is no easy matter given the uncertainty
over the future of WEU, whose existence is not
threatened, but whose future nature and relations
with the European Union are as yet unknown. In
this area, the intentions of governments differ and
only the United Kingdom Government has openly
taken a position on the question in its memoran-
dum, by asserting its preference for intergovern-
mental co-operation in relation to the CFSP and
the European defence policy and stating that
WEU should remain separate from the European
Union. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ger-
many, Mr. Klaus Kinkel *, and the Netherlands
Governmentas have for their part stated they are in
favour of the integration of WEU in the European
Union. The 1998 deadline also holds uncertainty
as it is not known whether the modified Brussels
Treaty will be maintained in its present form or
possibly revised.
96. [n any event, one of the problems to which
a solution will have to be found in the medium
term is that of national representation in the
Assembly, which is at present the same as the par-
liamentary delegations to the Council of Europe.
In the event of the modified Brussels Treaty being
revised, it might be desirable for the composition
of the Assembly to reflect that of the defence and
possibly also foreign and European affairs com-
mittees of the national parliaments. Links with the
delegations to the North Atlantic Assembly
should also be sought in order to ensure a com-
mon parliamentary representation of the Euro-
pean pillar of the alliance in that institution.
97. Nor is the present consultative r6le of the
Assembly entirely adequate to ensure parliamen-
tary supervision with the panicipation of national
parliaments in decisions concerning European
security and defence. The possibility of giving
consultative opinions on decisions already taken
or to be taken in future by the WEU Council
would be a political factor of greater impact than
the present procedure of recommendations to the
Council. In the event of a military operation, of
the Petersberg type for example 06, requiring
44. Die Z,eit, 9th March I 995.
45. Bulletin Europe, No. 6453, lst April 1995, page 2; Report
of the Netherlands Government on the common foreign,
security and defence policy ofthe European Union: towards
more energetic action abroad ".
46. WEU's military missions are defined in paragraph 4 of
Part II of the Petersberg declaration which provides that:
" Apart from contributing to the common defence in accor-
dance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V
of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of
WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU,
could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks;
peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis-mana-
gement, including peace-making "; Document 1322,29th
June 1992.
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troops to be sent to a region in the throes of
conflict, consulting the Assembly, coupled with a
vote in national parliaments authorising the
deployment of troops in the framework of such
missions would constitute the element of Euro-
pean parliamentary supervision that is at present
lacking.
98. By thus sfrengthening the link between the
Assembly and the national parliaments, such pro-
cedure also preserves and affirms the intergovern-
mental nature of European security and defence,
without diminishing its effectiveness, and elimi-
nates the democratic defrcit at national and Euro-
pean levels of which intergovernmental co-opera-
tion stands accused. This also assumes that the
quality of the relationship between the Assembly
and the Council, including the Secretariat-Gene-
ral and other WEU bodies, is improved, particu-
larly as regards information. It is in this perspec-
tive that an Assembly composed of representatives
from national defence and foreign affairs commit-
tees acquires its full meaning.
99. Proposals in this direction have moreover
been presented in a study carried out jointly by
the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the
European Strategy Group, which might be consi-
dered as a contribution to the 1996 conference. In
this collective work the authors suggest estab-
lishing a joint parliamentary defence committee
formed by representatives of the European Par-
liament together with members of the defence
committees of national parliaments. According to
the authors, such a committee might gain more
budgetary and control powers than the present
Assembly of WEU, which might be reformed to
that endo7. This will clearly be a matter of conti-
nuing debate.
47. Towards a corlmon defence policy - study by the Euro-
pean Strategy Group and the WEU Institute for Security Stu-
dies, 1995, page 68.
100. In its report adopted in Lisbon on 16th May
1995 on the future of European security and the
preparation of Maastricht [I 
- 
reply to the fortieth
annual report of the Council, the Political Com-
mittee of the Assembly considers, on the contrary,
that " one must reject any proposal tending to
create mixed parliamentary institutions " 08.
According to the Rapporteur, " this solution would
not only have the disadvantage of creating a two-
speed [European parliamentary] assembly, but, far
from improving efficiency, would contribute also
to a blurring of responsibilities. " On this mafter,
the committee stated that it favoured the creation
of a second European chamber, alongside the
European Parliament, composed of " delegations
from national parliaments, with responsibilities
that are different from and complementary to those
of the European Parliament "oe which would deal
with security and defence questions.
101. The decisions to be taken by the 1996 inter-
governmental conference will affect the future of
WEU and also that of the Assembly. But, at the
same time, it is necessary to maintain and optim-
ise parliamentary supervision and participation at
both national and European level, with the help of
a reformed WEU Assembly with wider responsi-
bilities and which is even more representative.
This report is not directly concerned with the
wider political arguments on future relations bet-
ween the EU and WEU, but there can be little
doubt that any steps tow:uds bringing defence
matters within the competence of the European
Commission and European Parliament might
endanger the effective scrutiny of defence and
security matters by national parliaments and the
WEU Assembly, through which the sovereignty
of nation states continues to be expressed in the
late twentieth century.
48. The future of European security and the preparation of
Maastricht II - reply to the fortieth annual report of the Coun-
cil; Document 1458, paragraph 84, l6th May 1995.
49. Idem; draft recommendation, paragraph I.8.
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Draft Order
on the Baltit Assembly
The Assembly,
(i) Noting with interest the progress achieved by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in inter-state and inter-
parliamentary co-operation with a view to joining European and transatlantic co-operative structures;
(iil Welcoming the driving- r6le played by the Baltic Assembly in this area in fostering a rapprochemenr
between the three states and between their peoples and their full participation in establishinli system of
security and stability in Europe;(iii) Emphasising the progress made in pursuing the process of reforming their economic and security
structures with a view to their rapprochement with the European Union, NATO and WEU;
Q!. Welcoming the signing of association agreements between the three Baltic states and the EuropeanUnion as an important step towards their integration in the Union; - ,(v) Noting the fears expressed by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania regarding their security;
(vi) 
- 
W-elcoming initiatives taken by the three countries in co-operation in security and defence matters
and the formation of a Baltic states joint battalion for United Nations operations;
(vii) Stres_sing the-importance of aid-from NAIO and WEU countries for developing such co-operation
and strengthening the joint security of the three states and of Europe as a whole; ^ 
,(viii) Rec4ling Order 90-affirming that " more intensive co-operation between the WEU Assembly and i
the Central European parliaments constitutes an important element in the process of integration ofihese
countries in the sffuctures of European political and defence co-operation ';,
I. Ixsrnucrs rrs Pnespex'mr CouurrrBB
1. To ensure development of close co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the Baltic Assembly
in security and defence matters;
2. To promote contacts between like committees of the two Assemblies;
3.^ 
. 
To envisagg the possibility of receiving officials of the Baltic Assembly in the Office of the Clerk
o{ qhe Assembly for a period and according to arrangements to be defined bdtween the two institutions,
with a view to training them in the procedures and working methods of the WEU Assembly;
II. Rrquesrs ns CoprurrreB olr BuocsrARy AITFARs eNo AorrmusrRArroN
To include in the Assembly's budget for the 1996 financial year, in accordance with Order 90, a pro-
vision for setting up an. Assembly support fund for parliamenta:ry co-operation with the parliamenti of
associate partner counffies.
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I.Introductian
1. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, associate
partners of WEU since the Council of Ministers
created this status of association with the Central
European countries at the Kirchberg meeting on
9th May 1994', occupy a special place in Europe.
Their specific character is due not to geographic
location but to their common history for, unlike
the other countries of the region, they existed as
sovereign independent states for twenty-two years
before an intemrption which lasted almost fifty,
during which time they formed part of the Soviet
Union.
2. Nevenheless, neither mass deportations nor
their relative isolation succeeded in weakening
their hopes of rejoining the international commu-
nity of states and regaining their place in Europe
as sovereign nations. Progress since 1991 in the
political and economic spheres, achieved through
major national effort, demonstrates their will to
integrate into European co-operation structures.
3. Since Latvia became a member of the
Council of Europe, in January 1995, the three
countries now have a presence in European orga-
nisations although their possible accession to the
European Union, with which they will sign asso-
ciation agreements in June 1995, and membership
of NATO, with which they have links through the
partnership for peace programme, seem unlikely
before next century.
4. At the same time, significantly, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, anxious that there should be
no recurrence of the conditions leading to their
earlier annexation by the USSR, have instituted
three-way co-operation between themselves
and on an inter-regional basis. They thus gave
new impetus to the Baltic Council, created on
l2th May 1990, in co-ordinating the process lead-
ing to the independence of the three countries. On
6th March l992,they joined the Council of Baltic
Sea States, established on the initiative of Germa-
ny and Denmark, comprising states bordering on
the Baltic sea'z.
1. Document 1442: Kirchberg declaration, II. Document on
a status of association with WEU for the Republic of Bulga-
ria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Repu-
blic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of
Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak
Republic, 24th May 1994.
2. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania,
Norway, Poland, Russian Federation and Sweden.
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(submifred by Mn Masseret, Chairman and Ropporteur)
5. The Baltic Council has, in addition to the
Council of Ministers and its secretariat, a parlia-
mentary arm, the Baltic Assembly. To a greater
extent even than intergovernmental co-operation,
this institution is called upon to play a major r6le
in the development of co-operation between the
three states. Through discussions held in this
forum and the resolutions it adopts directed to the
Council of Ministers, and by virtue of the im-
portant r6le parliament plays in the national poli-
tical life of these states, the Assembly exercises
considerable influence on the actions of national
governments.
6. The Baltic Assembly also intends to deve-
lop its external relations by intensifying contacts
with other regional and European interparlia-
mentary institutions. Through such relations, the
Assembly promotes a better understanding of the
special characteristics of the three countries and
of the unit they form within the region. At the
same time, it draws upon the experience of older
institutions, for example in procedural matters
and in relation to the organisation of work.
II. Estoni4 Latvin and Lithuania:
from political to parliamentary co-operation
7. The three states do not form a homogenous
whole despite a rather superficial tendency to pre-
sent them as such. Their economies, cultures and
languages differ and, apart from their geographic
position, all they seem to share is a common his-
tory under Soviet occupation. Moreover, these
differences proved a major handicap in the 1920s
and 1930s by creating an obstacle to closer co-
operation between them 3 and partly contributing
to the circumstances of their annexation by the
Soviet Union 
- 
virtually without a blow being
struck.
8. In 1991, having regained their indepen-
dence, they found themselves back where they
started, but with an economic, environmental,
social and political heritage that was harder to
manage. Their respective situations are once
again different. While Lithuania has succeeded in
reaching satisfactory settlement of the problems
of the Russian military presence and the question
3. A treaty on concord and co-operation was signed by the
three states in Geneva in 1934, but never applied because of
disagreement between them. Six years later, in 1940, they
were annexed by the Soviet Union.
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of the status of its Russian-speaking and other
minorities, Latvia and Estonia had to engage in a
long-drawn out process of negotiation with the
Russian Federation over these matters, a process
they recently concluded, not without difficulty o.
(a) Inter-state co-operation
9. The awareness of the need for co-operation
between the three states came fairly shortly after
independence. Faced with the same difficulties
and resolved to create, internally, the conditions
required for joining European and transatlantic
political, economic and defence institutions, Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania decided to co-ordinate
their policies with a view to preparing for entry on
the most favourable terms and, at the same time,
strengthening their negotiating position with the
Russian Federation over the withdrawal of Rus-
sian troops and the status of Russian-speaking
minorities.
(i) The Baltic Council
10. The Baltic Council was created in 1990, by
reference to the 1934 reaty on concord and co-
operation between the Baltic states, with the aim
of co-ordinating the efforts of the three countries
to regain their independence from the Soviet
Union and thus re-establish continuity of their
statehood, broken in 1940. In 1991, after the fail-
ed Moscow coup of 19th-21st August, Estonia,
Lawia and Lithuania once again became sovereign
states.
11. However, real co-operation between the
three countries began to develop only in 1994
with the signature of several important political,
economic and defence agreements. This can in
part be explained by the will, paramount at the
outset, to assert their national identity, at times at
the expense of their neighbours. Once the eco-
nomic and political situation stabilised, however,
inter-state co-operation began in earnest.
12. A free trade agreement was signed between
the three countries in Tallinn on 13th September
1993 for developing inter-state trade and harmo-
nising customs policies and visa requirements for
the transport of goods and free movement of
nationals of each country. This is an important
step that augurs well for signature of association
agreements with the European Union.
13. There have been major developments in
political and military co-operation in 1994 since
the withdrawal of the remaining Russian troops
stationed in Estonia. The heads of government
of the three countries, meeting in Tallinn on 13th
June 1994, adopted the statutes of the Baltic
4. Latvia's late entry to the Council of Europe is largely due
to the delay in resolving the question of the status of the resi-
dent Russian-speaking minority in Latvia.
Council governing its operation at ministerial
level. On l3th September 1994, the Baltic Coun-
cil of Ministers adopted a resolution calling for
the development of a common foreign and secu-
rity policy. This policy, coupled with economic
co-operation, aims to sfiengthen regional co-oper-
ation and foster integration into European and
transatlantic economic, political and security
strucn[es.
(ii) Prospectsfor inter-state co-operation
14. Progress achieved in 1994 in co-operation
benveen the three countries and development of
their economic and political relations with Euro-
pean and transatlantic institutions represents a
major contribution to the region's stability, the
effects of which will undoubtedly be beneficial to
integration and in their relations with the Russian
Federation.
15. Differences are, nevertheless, still observ-
able between them, although it is normal and desi
rable that a degree of competition should exist,
especially in the economic sphere. In foreign
policy, particularly in their relations with the Rus-
sian Federation, differences ofapproach are appa-
rent, for example with regard to the status of Rus-
sian-speaking minorities, or settling the question
of the deparnre from their respective territories of
Soviet, then Russian, Eoops, withdrawal having
been relatively rapid in Lithuania's case, more
proracted in that of Latvia and Estonia.
16. Sensitive areas concerning, for example,
harmonisation of border control procedures
between the three states are not yet entirely resol-
ved in spite of a declared willingness to do so and
requests to this effect from the Baltic Assembly.
There is little attempt to play down these diffe-
rences which are tackled more or less openly by
those with responsibility whether in official mee-
tings or before parliamentarians or media. This
encourages the search for solutions and greater
fransparency in relations between countries. Thus,
the Baltic Assembly adopted a resolution at its 6th
plenary session, held in Riga on Zlst and 22nd
April 1995, on the harmonisation of border
control procedures and calling for the establish-
ment of a joint computerised information system
in this area, mirroring the action taken in the
context of the Schengen agreements and Euro-
pean procedures for the free movement of goods
and persons.
17. Inter-state co-operation is still restricted
which partly explains any hesitancy and also
continuing differences of assessment of certain
areas of common interest. Apart from bringing the
three states closer together, development and ins-
titutionalisation of the links between them affords
them greater room for manoeuvre within their
regional environment than if they acted alone.
This is an essential advantage to them in their
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approach to the European and hansatlantic orga-
nisations of which they ultimately hope to become
full members.
(b) I nte r-re gia nal c o-ope ration
18. The development of inter-state co-oper-
ation has facilitated the reintegration of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania into their natural geopoli-
tical environment: the Baltic Sea area. Tlvo regio-
nal organisations with which the three countries
co-operate, both for economic purposes and in the
interests of the stability and security of that part of
Europe are the Nordic Council and the Council of
Baltic Sea States. At ttre same time, they are acti-
vely seeking to join European and transatlantic
organisations for co-operation and security.
(i) Nordic and Baltic co-operation
19. The Nordic Council, established in 1952, is
composed of Denmark, Finland,Iceland, Norway
and Sweden. It has a parliamentary Council, the
seat of which is in Stockholm, and a Council of
Ministers with a secretariat in Copenhagen. The
aim of the Nordic Council is to promote political
co-operation between the Nordic countries and it
plays an important r6le vis-b-vis the three Baltic
countries.
20. The Council has established a number of
economic, cultural and environmental pro-
grammes directed towards Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, within the framework of political, eco-
nomic and parliamentary co-operation. Hence, a
parliamentary co-operation agreement was signed
in Palanga, Lithuania, on 3oth May 1992 between
the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic Council,
covering a number of fields ranging from culture
to security and includir]B the environment, the
economy, communications and energy. Since
the entry of Finland and Sweden into the Euro-
pean Union on 1st January 1995, the Nordic
Council also serves as a point of contact between
the three Baltic countries and the Union.
21. The Council of Baltic Sea States, establish-
edin 1992 on the initiative of Germany and Den-
mark, aims to assist the process of economic and
political reform currently underway in the three
Baltic countries, Poland and the Russian Fede-
ration. The intention is also, through this approach,
to promote regional stability and security. Further-
more, the presence of Poland and the Russian
Federation facilitates discussion with the three
countries, for example on border issues.
22. In security matters, inter-regional co-opera-
tion lay at the root of the agreement signed by
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom on
llth September 1994, on the formation and trai-
ning of a battalion to participate in United Nations
peace-keeping operations. The heads of govern-
ment of the three Baltic countries signed a trilate-
ral agreement in Riga, on 14th September 1994 on
participation in this joint battalion, known as
BALTBAI, which was formed in February 1995 5.
(ii) European and transatlantic co-operation
23. Accession to the European Union, WEU
and NAIO is the major foreign policy objective of
the three states and the expression of a common
aspiration, although their approach may not
always be co-ordinated. An important stage along
the way is the signing of Europe agreements with
the Union, which was one of the objectives of the
French presidency of the Union for the first half
of 1995. Application of these agreements places
the three countries on an equal footing with other
Central European countries that already benefit
from them 6.
24. In security matters, WEU and NAIO, the
first through its associate partner status, the
second via the partnership for peace prograrnme,
have associated the three countries in their work
without, however, offering them security guaran-
tees. Although this may fall shon of expectations,
it would nevertheless be dangerous and mislea-
ding to give further commitments in this area,
while the political will and necessary means are
not forthcoming.
25. Incidentally, it should be noted that asso-
ciate partner status affords substantial partici-
pation in WEU's activities, unlike the observer
status Austria, Finland and Sweden now have.
Nevertheless, the latter are full members of the
European Union and are thus called upon to take a
position at the 1996 intergovernmental conference
on the common foreign and security policy and
consequently on WEU, confirmed, since Maas-
tricht, in its rOle as the defence component of the
Union.
III. The Baltic Assembly: rdle and prospects
26. The Baltic Assembly held its first plenary
session in January 1992. Since then it has met
regularly, twice a year, and adopts resolutions
addressed to the Baltic Council of Ministers.
These resolutions are not binding, but, due to the
influence of the parliaments in the national politi-
cal life of each state, their impact is considerable
and ministers must take account of them.
27. Its r6le of interparliamentary legislator has
further expanded since the meeting of the Praesi-
dium of the Assembly in Riga on 25th and 26th
September 1993, when it was decided to address
5. Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 23 No. 9,4th March 1995.
6. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania
and the Slovak Republic.
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resolutions to the parliaments with a view to their
being incorporated in national legislation. This is
an innovatory and interesting aspect and one
which illustrates the close links between the
Assembly and the parliaments of each country.
28. The Assembly also attributes great impor-
tance to extemal relations and is seeking to deve-
lop contacts with other interparliamentary institu-
tions in Europe so as to enable it to present the
three Baltic countries' views on topical issues
conceming Europe and also to demonstrate their
wish for integration in European organisations for
co-operation in political, economic and defence
matters.
(a) The political rdle of Baltic
inte rparliame ntary c o- operation
29. The creation of the Baltic Council in 1990,
drawing on the 1934 agreements, aimed to co-
ordinate the movement for a return to indepen-
dence in the then Soviet Republics of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. Once the project had been
successfully completed, it was necessary to give
the Council a new r6le. The newly-gained inde-
pendence was precarious and deterioration in
relations with the Russian Federation led to
increased co-operation between the three states
that might not otherwise have occurred, given the
differing situations of each from an economic,
political and cultural point of view.
30. Nevertheless, true co-operation has gra-
dually been established, with creditable results in
view of the short time involved and the diffi-
culties the three countries have had to deal with at
home and abroad. By introducing a parliamentary
dimension in the framework of inter-state co-
operation, the three states have contributed to
intensifying their relations, with the Assembly in
turn taking initiatives inviting governments to act,
leading to practical results.
(i) Co-operation between the Baltic Council
and the Baltic Assembly
31. In Riga, on l3th September 1994, the heads
of government of Estonia, Lawia and Lithuania
signed an agreement between the three countries
on parliamentary co-operation and co-operation
between governments. This agreement defines the
areas and modalities of such co-operation, and
also the respective r6les of the Council and of the
Assembly.
32. The Baltic Assembly is defined as the ins-
trument of co-operation between the national par-
liaments (Article 3). The Council and Assembly
meet in joint session at least once a year within
the framework of the Baltic Council (Article 6)
and the ministers must then submit a report on
co-operation implemented during the past year
and on proposed future activities and initiatives
(Article 6). There is a perceptible similarity here
with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty 7.
33. The Assembly submits proposals and recom-
mendations to the Council and its members may
put questions to the Baltic Council of Ministers on
inter-state co-operation during plenary sessions.
The two institutions transmit information to one
another through their respective secretariats
(Article 7). The Assembly is entitled to make its
views known on questions relating to co-oper-
ation between plenary sessions (Article 8).
34. On regional co-operation, the agreement
provides that the Council and the Assembly must
endeavour to develop their relations with the Nor-
dic Council, the Council of Baltic Sea States and
other institutions in pursuit of the ultimate goal of
integration into European structures (Article 9).
(ii) The way the Assembly operates
35. The Praesidium of the Assembly, meeting
in Tallinn on 3lst October 1993, adopted rules for
the latter, better adapted to the new conditions
created by the development of political co-oper-
ation. These rules define the Assembly as a
consultative and co-ordinating institution which
expresses its views by submitting proposals and
recommendations to the governments and parlia-
ments of the three states and to international and
regional organisations.
36. It consists of 60 parliamentarians, 20 from
each country, appointed according to the proce-
dures in force in each parliament. Meeting in ple-
nary session, the Assembly appoints the Praesi-
dium, its Chairman, the committees and members
thereof and the secretariat. The Chairman nomi-
nates the Secretary of the Assembly who is elect-
ed by the latter.
37. The Praesidium is the most important body
of the Assembly. Comprising two members from
each delegation, the Chairman and Vice-Chair-
man of the latter, it co-ordinates the work of the
Assembly between sessions, prepares the sessions
and monitors implementation of the resolutions it
adopts. The Praesidium also has responsibility for
external contacts and relations between the parlia-
ments and governments of the three countries. [t
submits a report on its activity for consideration
by the Assembly.
38. There are six committees for: legislation;
economic and social affairs; environment and
energy; communications; education, science and
culture; foreign and security policy.
7 . 
* The Council of Westem European Union shall make an
annual report on its activities and in particular conceming the
control of armaments to an Assembly composed of represen-
tatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative
Asscmbly of the Council of Europe ".
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39. Additionally, ad hoc or standing commiG
tees may be established such as the Assembly's
budget and audit committees.
40. The secretariat, consisting ofthe Secretary
of the Assembly in Riga and the Secretaries of the
national delegations, ensures the smooth running
of the regular business of the Assembly. The
Clerk of the Assembly is elected for a three-year
term of office, renewable for one further term.
Members of the Assembly may also form political
groups (with a minimum of four members from
two countries).
41. The Assembly also places great emphasis
on cultural activities in the three countries, award-
ing prizes in art, literature and the sciences. These
awards were instituted at the October 1993
session and consist of a medal, a diploma and a
sum worth approximately 5 000 ecus. The names
of the prize-winners and their works are published
in the official journal and distributed in the three
countries. Under present economic conditions,
this represents a not inconsiderable contribution
to making the literary, artistic and scientific crea-
tive works of each country accessible to the wider
public, enables the prize-winners to pursue their
activity and encourages the emergence of new
talent.
(b) The Bahic Assembly: regional and European
politiaal penpectives
42. The link between the Baltic Assembly and
the national parliaments provides the former with
substantial scope for political action. Resolutions
adopted, once submitted to the parliaments, are
the subject of debate and lead to positions being
taken that bring additional pressure to bear on
governments to act in the areas concerned. One of
the advantages of Baltic interparliamentary co-
operation is its effect both internally and on the
regional and European scale.
(i) Inter-state secuity anddefence co-operation
43. Through its statutes and by reference to the
agreement on parliamentary and governmental
co-operation of 13th September 1994, the Baltic
Assembly has wide powers in the framework of
political co-operation between the three Baltic
countries. It has thus adopted positions at a fairly
early stage on subjects with implications beyond
the framework of the state, at times eliciting reac-
tions from or calling for positions to be taken by
other countries and international parliamentary,
political and security organisations.
M. In inter-state relations, the Assembly is
paying increasing attention to military co-oper-
ation between the three countries and to resolving
the question of harmonising their respective poli-
cies on visas and border controls. This last item
has several times been the subject of declarations
by the Baltic Council of Ministers and progress
has been made recently in this connection. The
question is a crucial one, as the situation which
prevailed until now acted as a brake on the free
movement of goods and had repercussions on the
development of trade between the three states and
the outside world.
45. Security and defence are two priority issues
for the three states. Although they have limited
economic and human resources, they must try to
re-establish national armies to act as a deterrent to
a possible aggressor. It was clear that without
increased co-operation in this area, the armed
forces of the three countries would be reduced to
inadequately equipped and poorly-trained para-
military units, with the possible exception of one
or two 6lite units. An initial important measure in
this connection which has received support from
several NAIO and Nordic countries, was the ini-
tiative taken in 1994 to create a joint Baltic batta-
lion, BALTBAT E. The Assembly in its turn
requested, in a resolution adopted in Vilnius on
13th November 1994, that the three countries
should prepare a mutual defence agreement, an
initiative which, if it leads to firm results, will
have a positive effect on the stability of the states
concerned and the region to which they belong.
(ii) Regional and European policy
Relations with the Russian Federation
46. If the major objective of the foreign policy
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is integration
into the European Union, WEU and NAIO, this is
not merely on economic and domestic policy
grounds or for reasons of international prestige; it
is also because they feel themselves under threat
from the Russian Federation, with which they
have disputes of various kinds to resolve. The
Chechen crisis, to name but the most recent
example e, has obviously done much to confirm
them in this attitude.
47. Estonia is in conflict with the Russian
Federation over border questions dating back to
the implementation of the 1920 Treaty of Tartu
under which Soviet Russia recognised Estonia's
independence. Latvia is concerned about the pre-
sence on its territory of a Russian-speaking popu-
lation without Latvian nationality, regarded by
Latvians as illegal immigrants who came to the
country during the years of Soviet occupation.
Lithuania is concerned with the Kaliningrad ques-
tion and the Russian Government's claim to a
8. Jane's Defence Weekly, YoL23, No. 9,4th March 1995.
9. The Russian Federation's interventions in Tajikistan,
Georgia and Moldova (Trans-Dniestr), and statements refer-
ring to the defence of Russian interests in the " near abroad "
are a constant source of concern to the three Baltic states.
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right of passage for its military forces between its
own territory and Kaliningrad.
48. This issue was the subject of a resolution of
the Assembly on 13th November 1994, asking for
the Kaliningrad question to be dealt with in a
multilateral framework and for a multinational
conference to be convened on the issue. Further-
more, the Assembly decided in favour of reinstat-
ing the old names in the former Koenigsberg
region. Russia was quick to react. On 15th
November the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, issued a
declaration denouncing what he considered to be
blatant intervention in the internal affairs of the
Federation of Russia and reaffirming that Kalinin-
grad was an integral and inalienable part of Rus-
sian territory.
49. The conflict in Chechnya only complicated
further the relations between the three Baltic
countries and the Russian Federation. On 7th
November l994,the Chechen presidency launch-
ed an appeal to the Baltic Assembly asking it to
ffansmit Chechnya's call for independence to the
United Nations, a call which was discussed at the
Assembly's November 1994 session without a
definite position being taken on how to respond.
The intervention of the armed forces of the Rus-
sian Federation, to which close attention was paid
by the three Baltic states, led, on 9th January
1995, to a position being taken by the Praesidium
of the Assembly directed to the OSCE 
'0, asking it
to establish a mission to enquire into human rights
violations and criticising the actions of the Rus-
sian armed forces. At the 6th session, held in Riga
on 21st and 22nd April 1995, the Assembly
adopted a resolution inviting the OSCE to raise
the question of the right of self-determination of
the Chechen people in the United Nations and
accusing the Russian Federation of genocide.
50. The declarations of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Russia, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, on the
possibility of having recourse to force to defend
Russian-speaking communities that might be
under threat within states that were formerly part
of the USSR ", were also a source of major
concern to the three Baltic countries and the
Assembly, at its 6th session, adopted a declaration
in this connection calling upon " all democratic
states and international organisations to give an
open, clear and unambiguous evaluation of those
Russian Federation actions and expressed inten-
tions that violate human rights and pose a threat to
the security of other states " 12.
51. The instability of the political situation in
Russia, the return to a more national foreign policy,
10. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
ll. The Times, l9th April 1995; Le Figmo, 20th April 1995.
12. Baltic Assembly; Riga, 22nd April 1995.
the afErmation of divergencies in relations with
the United States and the states of the European
Union over the Bosnian and Chechen conflicts or
the enlargement of NATO help to increase the
feeling that it is urgent to bring about a rapproche-
ment between the three Baltic states and the insti-
tutions for European and transatlantic co-oper-
ation. [n this perspective, the Baltic Assembly has
increased its contacts with other parliamentary
institutions in Europe, in parallel with action by
the governments directed towards the European
Union, NAIO andWEU.
European co-operation
52. Co-operation with the states of the Nordic
region is an important aspect of the Assembly's
work and the latter has called for a deepening of
relations between the Baltic Council and the Nor-
dic Council with a view to strengthening joint
security and preparing for integration into Euro-
pean structures'3. Integration in the European
Union is at the heart of the foreign policy of the
three countries and at its November 1994 session,
the Assembly adopted a resolution urging govern-
ments to co-operate further in order to accelerate
the negotiation process leading to the signing of
Europe agreements with the European Union.
53. With a view to rapprochement with the
European institutions, the Assembly and the Bene-
lux Interparliamentary Consultative Council'a
signed a joint declaration on parliamentary co-
operation in The Hague, on 18th November 1994.
In conformity with this document, the two
Assemblies gave a mutual undertaking to co-
operate in the following areas 
'5:
- 
the development of democratic institu-
tions;
- 
exchange of experiences, information
and raining prograrnmes in parliament-
ary matters;
- 
co-operation in legislative matters;
- 
co-operation in foreign policy matters;
- 
communications;
- 
energy, economy and environmental pro-
tection;
- 
culture, education and science;
- 
cross-border co-operation.
13. Three of the five members of the Council are members
of the European Union: Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Ice-
land and Norway are members of NAIO and associate mem-
bers of WEU.
14. The Council is composed of parliamentarians of Bel-
gium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
I 5. Benelux Interparliamentary Consultative Council; report
on activities 1994, l3th January 1995, page 12.
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The declaration also lays the foundations for close
co-operation between the Praesidium of the
Assembly and the Bureau of the Council, and
between their committees and secretariats. The
development of this type of relations with the par-
liamentary institutions of Western Europe is an
important stage on the road to integration into the
European Union and other co-operative struc-
tures. To this end the Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion on 22nd Aprrl, recommending that the Baltic
Council of Ministers proceed to bring the legisla-
tion of the Baltic states into line with European
legislation and co-ordinate their actions in rela-
tion to the European Union.
54. On 15th May 1994, the Baltic Assembly
appealed to the WEU Assembly to develop co-
operation between the two institutions following
the decision taken by the WEU Council of Minis-
ters at Kirchberg on 9th May 1994 to grant Cen-
tral European countries associate partner status. [n
this document, the Baltic Assembly asked to be
considered as a collective partner in co-operation
with the WEU Assembly. The lafter, for its part, is
prepared to establish a close relationship with its
Baltic counterpart, while retaining its own speci-
fic character as a European parliamentary institu-
tion drawn from national parliaments and specia-
lising in security and defence matters.
55. This co-operation may be pursued in diffe-
rent ways such as exchanges of contacts and
information between committees of the two
assemblies, or regular attendance by delegations
in their plenary sessions; at secretariat level, the
WEU Assembly might envisage receiving offi-
cials of the Baltic Assembly for a period of train-
ing, the duration and arrangements for which
would be defined by the two institutions. Imple-
mentation of this co-operation is set in the wider
framework of contacts between the WEU Assem-
bly and the parliaments of associate partner coun-
tries. The Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations, in view of the nature of iti acti-
vities, has an important r0le to develop in this
direction.
56. The attention the committee paid to these
problems led to two reports on the subject'6 and,
on a proposal from the committee, the Assembly
adopted an order at the June 1994 session reques-
ting that a provision be included in the Assem-
bly's budget for the 1995 financial year " for sett-
ing up an Assembly support fund forparliamentary
co-operation work " with the associate partners t7.
These activities, undertaken jointly with national
parliaments, would thus be extended to include
interparliamentary co-operation structures in
Cenfral Europe. This co-operation must be encou-
raged with a view to better preparing these coun-
tries for integration into European and ffansatlan-
tic political, economic and security structures.
57. From this point of view the Baltic Assem-
bly is an encouraging example of parliamentary
co-operation, owing to its aims and taking into
account the practical results obtained in a short
time. The development of co-operation between
the three Baltic states in economic, political and
security matters is in large part due to the work
undertaken by the Assembly through its resolu-
tions and their practical follow-up. It contributes
to the rapprochement of the three countries and to
strengthening their awareness of their common
destiny, an essential factor for their successful
integration into European and transatlantic orga-
nisations. In this perspective, one can but wish for
close co-operation to be established with the
WEU Assembly, the parliamentary component of
European defence, with the common aim of
strengthening security and stability in Central
Europe and throughout the entire continent, given
the extent to which interests in this area are now
shared by all.
16. Document 1365 on the development of relations
between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of Central
European Countries, Rapporteur; Mr. Kempinaire, lTth May
1993. Document 1414 on parliamentary co-operation with
the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation, Rappor-
teur: Sir Russell Johnston, 4th May 1994.
17. Order 90, June 1994.
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APPENDIX I
Co-operation between Baltic countries 
- 
the Bakic Assembly
The Baltic Assembly was born in Tallinn,
the capital of Estonia, on 8th November 1991 as
an instrument of co-operation between the parlia-
ments of the three Baltic states 
- 
Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania.
It has a consultative as well as a co-ordina-
tion function in respect of issues and matters
which are of mutual interest to all three states. The
Assembly's activities are equally financed by all
three states and Assembly sessions are convened
twice each year on a rotation basis.
Structurally the Assembly is formed by the
delegations from Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithua-
nia's parliaments with 20 deputies from each.
Each of the parliamentary delegation members
work in one of six working committees 
- 
Legal;
Socio-economic; Ecology and Energy; Communi-
cations; Education, Culture and Technology, and
Foreign Relations and Security committees.
The Praesidium of the Assembly with the
assistance of the Secretariat co-ordinates the work
of the Assembly's institutions and committees
between Assembly sessions and organises the pre-
paratory work for the Assembly sessions them-
selves. Each delegation nominates two delegation
members to the Assembly Praesidium.
The President of the Baltic Assembly is
elected on a rotation basis for a six month period,
that is, from one session of the Assembly to the
next.
To date the Assembly has held six sessions
following its establishment in Tallinn, November
8th, 1991:
- 
1st session in Riga, 24th-26th January
1992;
- 
Znd session in Palanga,3lst May 1992;
- 
3rd session in Tallinn, 3lst October
t993;
- 
4th session in Jiirmala, l3th-15th May
1994;
- 
5th session in Vilnius, 1lth-l3th Novem-
ber 1994;
- 
6th session in Riga, 2lst-22nd April
1995.
The first two sessions, which occurred when the
Baltic states had only recently regained their inde-
pendence from the USSR, were mainly concemed
with issues relating to the removal of Russian
troops from the Baltic states. It was only at the
third session (again in Tallinn) that the Assembly
came of age in the sense that:
l. all members of the delegations were from par-
Iiaments which had been elected after the restora-
tion of independence, and
2. the session addressed itself in large measure to
issues other than those of foreign relations and
security.
The fourth and the fifth sessions continued this
direction and approved documents reflecting both
external and internal issues and problems, the
most important of these being the document
concerning the establishment of the Baltic Coun-
cil of Ministers which, together with the Baltic
Assembly, will form the Baltic Council. Another
important document was the establishment of the
Baltic Assembly prizes for literature, art and
sclence.
Between sessions the work of the commit-
tees and the Secretariat goes on. The Praesidium
and the committees meet on average at least twice
in the inter-sessional period. These meetings are
arranged and co-ordinated through the Baltic
Assembly Secretariat in co-operation with the
national delegation secretariats.
The Baltic Assembly as an international
organisation has established formal relations with
similar organisations in Europe. In 1992, the
Assembly signed a formal agreement of co-oper-
ation with the Nordic Council. This was an impor-
tant agreement not only in political terms but also
in terms of practical assistance and advice in the
formative stages of the Assembly's work.
A formal agreement with the Benelux
Interparliamentary Assembly was signed on 18th
November 1994.
To conclude this brief overview of the activities of
the Baltic Asscmbly, it should be emphasised that
the work of the Assembly is important not only in
the sense of furthering co-operation betrveen the
Baltic states but also in presenting a united Baltic
viewpoint to Europe and the world.
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APPENDX II
Regulations of tlg Baltic Assembly of the Republic of Lithuania,
Republic of Estonia and Republic of Latvia
Main provisions
The Baltic Assembly shall be a body for co-
opqration among the parliaments of the Republic
of Lithuania, the Republic of Estonia and the
Republic of Lawia.
The Baltic Assembly shall be aconsultative
and co-ordinating institution set up to discuss
common issues and joint projects.
The Baltic Assembly may express its policy
in the form of addresses, proposals or recommend-
ations to the parliaments and governments of the
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Estonia
and the Republic of Latvia, as well as to interna-
tional and regional organisations
The working bodies of the Assembly shall
be its sessions, the Praesidium and the Secietariat
of the Baltic Assembly.
The official languages of the Assembly
shall be Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian. The
working language of the Baltic Assembly shall be
agreed on by consensus among the delegations.
The sessions of the Baltit Assembly
The Baltic Assembly shall be made up of
s11ty parliamentarians of the Baltic states: twenty
delegates each from the Republic of Lithuania,
the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of
Latvia.
The parliaments represented in the Baltic
Assembly shall each establish their procedure for
making up the delegations. The Baltic Assembly
shall be deemed legitimate when no less than two-
thirds of each of the delegations to the Baltic
Assembly take part in its work.
The sessions of the Baltic Assembly shall
be convened twice a year. Special sessions may
be convened at the request of one of the states, in
which case the time and the venue of the session
shall be established by the Praesidium of the Bal-
tic Assembly. Mem6ers of the govemments of
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia dealing with the
issues of Baltic co-operation and, upon necessity,
other members of the govemments shall be invii-
ed to attend the sessions of the Baltic Assembly.
Representatives of the parliaments and
adminisfative units of other states may be invited
to the sessions of the Baltic Assembly with the
status ofguests and observers.
The session of the Baltic Assembly shall
appoint the Praesidium, the Chairman of the Prae-
sidium of the Baltic Assembly, the committees of
the Baltic Assembly, their members and the
Secretariat upon their nomination by the
Baltic Assembly. Upon the nomination by the
Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly the seision
shall elect the Secretary of the Baltic Assembly.
Records shall be made of the Assembly
sessions. The records of the session shall b-e
signed by the Chairman of the Praesidium and his(her) deputies. The records shall be in the work-
ing languages of the Assembly.
Initiatian and resolution of issues
The right to submit draft documents for dis-
cussion during the sessions of the Baltic Assem-
bly shall be vested in the committees, party
groups, and the delegations of the Baltic Assem-
bly. Drafts may also be submitted by the presi
dents of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, and by
their respective governments; the latter shall sub-
mit their drafts via the members of respective
governments who deal with issues of Baltic co-
operation.
The policies of the Baltic Assembly and its
working bodies shall be adopted by voting. Mem-
bers of the Baltic Assembly shall vote individually;
however, upon request by one ofthe delegations, all
issues, with the exception of procedural questions,
shall be resolved by consensus among the delega-
tions. Decisions which do not require consensus
shall be deemed adopted by a majority vote.
Co-operation agreements with other inter-
national and regional organisations shall be adopt-
ed only by consensus of the members of the Baliic
Assembly.
The Praesidium
Assisted by the Secretary, the Praesidium
of the Baltic Assembly shall co-ordinate the work
of all the Baltic Assembly bodies in between the
sessions, shall prepare sessions of the Baltic
Assembly, and shall supervise the implementation
of resolutions adopted by the Baltic Assembly.
The Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly shall
maintain ties with intemational organisations, as
well as the parliaments and governments of
Lithuania, Estonia, Lawia and other states.
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The Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly
shall be made up of two members from each
national delegation: the chairman and the deputy
chairman of the delegation, appointed by the
national parliaments.
During the sessions of the Baltic Assembly
the Praesidium shall appoint from its members a
chairman and two deputy chairmen. The Chair-
man of the Praesidium shall be a member of the
delegation whose country is to host the next ses-
sion of the Baltic Assembly. The deputy chairmen
shall be from each of the other states.
The Praesidium shall meet no less than four
times a year.
The Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly
shall submit a report on its activities to each
session of the Baltic Assembly for the evaluation
thereby.
Records shall be made of the meetings of
the Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly and distri-
buted to all members of the Baltic Assembly
during all sessions. The records shall be signed by
the Chairman of the Praesidium and his (her)
deputies during the same or the next meeting of
the Praesidium. The records shall be prepared by
the secretariat of the country that hosted the Prae-
sidium meeting.
The commifrees of the Bahic Assembly
The Baltic Assembly shall set up the follow-
ing standing committees:
(i) l-eeal;(ri) Social and Economic Affairs;(iii) Environment and Energy;(iv) Communications;(v) Education, Science and Culture;(vi) Security and Foreign Affairs.
The Baltic Assembly may decide to set up
other standing and ad hoc committees, including a
budget and audit committee to confrol the expen-
ditures of the Baltic Assembly.
The Baltic Assembly shall set the main
guidelines for the work of the committees.
The committees of the Baltic Assembly
shall meet no less than four times a year.
At the end of the session, each committee
shall elect its chairman and inform the session
thereof. A committee shall be usually chaired by
a member of the committee from the country that
will host the next session of the Baltic Assembly.
The chairman of a committee shall co-ordinate the
work of the committee. Documents adopted by a
committee take the shape of addresses which rnay
be directly passed on to the Baltic Assembly, as
well as to the parliaments of the member states of
the Baltic Assembly.
Each delegation shall nominate its mem-
bers to the committees. Other members of the
Baltic Assembly, representatives of the govern-
ments and experts may be invited to the meetings
of a committee.
The Secretarial
The Secretariat shall ensure the regular
activities of the Baltic Assembly.
The Secretariat of the Baltic Assembly
shall consist of the Secretary of the Baltic Assem-
bly based in Riga and secretaries of the Baltic
Assembly delegations from the parliaments of the
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Estonia
and the Republic of Latvia. The candidacy of the
Secretary of the Baltic Assembly shall be nomi-
nated by the Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly
and submitted for approval by the session of the
Baltic Assembly. The Secretary of the Baltic
Assembly shall be elected for a term of three
years with the right to be re-elected for a second
term. The activities of the Secretary of the Baltic
Assembly shall be equally financed by the three
parliaments. The working premises of the Secre-
tary of the Baltic Assembly shall be provided by
the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia. The ses-
sions of the Baltic Assembly alone shall decide
the issues of increasing the Baltic Assembly
expenditures, divided into three equal parts,
as well as issues of establishing additional staff
positions.
The Secretary shall draw up annual expen-
ditures estimates which are subject to approval by
the Baltic Assembly.
Co-operation arnong pariy groups
Members of the Baltic Assembly may unit-
ed into regular or ad hoc groups which will be
fieated on equal terms with the committees during
the discussion of drafts submitted to the Baltic
Assembly. A party group may consist of no less
than four members from two states.
Party groups shall be registered by the
Secretariat of the Baltic Assembly.
Co-operation between the Bahic Assembly
and the Bahic Council of Ministers
Co-operation between the Baltic Assembly
and the Ba1tic Council of Ministers shall be
implemented through the haesidium of the Baltic
Assembly and its standing committees and be co-
ordinated through the Secretariats of the Baltic
Assembly and the Baltic Council of Ministers.
The Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Coun-
cil of Ministers, together called the " Baltic Coun-
cil ", shall hold annual joint sessions. The time
I
I
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and place of the joint session together with its
agenda shall be co-ordinated through the respective
Secretariats based upon agreements reached bet-
ween the Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly and
the presiding Baltic state of the Baltic Council of
Ministers.
The Baltic Council of Ministers shall, at
each annual joint session, submit a report on Bal-
tic co-operation concerning the past year's co-
operation and plans for further co-operation.
At the annual joint sessions as well as
between them, the Baltic Assembly members,
individually or in the name of either the state dele-
gation, the individual standing committee or
registered Baltic Assembly political faction or
bloc, may submit questions, either verbally or in
writing, to the Baltic Council of Ministers on mat-
ters conceming Baltic co-operation.
The Baltic Assembly may make appeals,
proposals and recommendations to the Baltic
Council of Ministers.
The exchange of current information bet-
ween the Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Council
of Ministers shall occur via their respective Secre-
tariats.
Final provisions
The regulations of the Baltic Assembly may
be altered at a session of the Baltic Assembly only.
The activities of the Baltic Assembly shall
be terminated only upon a respective decision by
the parliaments of the Republic of Lithuania, the
Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Latvia.
Baltic Assembly
Praesidium Chairman
Egidijus Blcrausxas
Republic of Lithuania
Tallinn, 3 I st October 1993
With additions adopted at Vilnius,
Baltic Assembly
Deputy Praesidium
Chairman
Maris Buoovsxrs
Republic of Latvia
13th November 1994.
Baltic Assembly
Deputy Praesidium
Chairman
Ulo Nucrs
Republic of Estonia
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APPENDIX III
Statutes on the Bakic Assembly prizcs for
lilerature, the arts and scionce
1. General provisions
1.1. The Baltic Assembly prizes for literature,
the arts and science (henceforth the prizes) were
established upon the suggestion of the Baltic
Assembly session of 31st October 1993, in order
to facilitate the development of literature, the arts
and science in the Baltic states, to assess the most
distinguished achievements in these fields and to
disseminate these achievements in the three Baltic
states.
The prizes have been established in order to:
-'demonstrate the mutual interests of the
countries in this region for the upholding
of their national identity and self-esteem
by supporting outstanding achievements
in literature, the arts and science;
- 
maintain a continuous interest among the
people in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
and about developments in their neigh-
bouring countries by creating the possi-
bility to learn about their neighbours'
achievements;
- 
strengthen co-operation among the Bal-
tic states in the fields of literature, the
arts and science;
- 
create an interest among a growing num-
ber of people for the acquisition of the
intellectual values and languages of the
Baltic nations;
- 
raise the general level of literature, the
arts and science in the Baltic countries.
1.2. The prizes are to be awarded within the
framework of the mutual international co-oper-
ation programme of Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia, upon the basis of the resolution passed by the
joint judging committee (experts) approved by the
Baltic Assembly.
1.3. Financial resources are allocated by the
Council of Ministers of the Baltic states and are
recommended not to be less than 5 000 ecus for
each prize.
The nominal value of the prizes shall be set
annually in accordance with the resources alloca-
ted in the budget. The monetary pize to be pre-
sented to the winners shall be tax exempt.
2. Procedure for awarding the prizes
2.1. The Baltic Assembly prize for literature
shall be awarded annually at the session of the
Baltic Assembly for a novel, a play, a collection of
poems, short stories or essays, or any similar writ-
ten composition in one of the Baltic state lan-
guages. The work must have been published for
the first time in the original language within the
past two years but no later than six months before
the date the prize is to be awarded.
Requirements for the work to be submitted
and the list of documents to be attached shall be
set out in the rules of the competition which shall
be drafted by the joint judging committee
(experts) and shall be approved by the Baltic
Assembly Secretariat.
2.2. The Baltic Assembly prize for the arts shall
be awarded annually at the session of the Baltic
Assembly for an original work of art or a series of
works created within the past two years in fine
ams, applied arts, in music, architecture or cinema.
It also may be awarded to a $oup of performers,
to soloists, actors or other performing artists for
an outstanding artistic achievement accomplished
within the past two years.
2.3. The Baltic Assembly prize for science shall
be awarded annually at the session of the Baltic
Assembly for a significant original work or a
research series in the humanities, social or natural
sciences and which is considered to be a conffibu-
tion to the research of the Baltic region or is of
international importance and has been published
within the past three years. Nomination for the
prize for science may include large fundamental
scientific works (monographs) which, although
not published within the last three years, are
considered to advance human knowledge in that
particular field.
3. The joint judging committee (experts)
3.1. The joint judging committee (experts) of
the Baltic Assembly prize (henceforth the Joint
Judging Committee) shall consist of nine people.
The applicants for each prize (in literature, the arts
and science) shall be assessed by the respective
experts. Each country shall independently deter-
mine the three persons to be delegated to the com-
mittee and the procedure for their selection.
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3.2. The members of the Joint Judging Commit-
tee shall be outstanding specialists in the fields of
literature, the arts and science.
3.3. The experts and altemate experts shall be
changed every three years.
After the first three years, counting from
the date of the establishment of the Joint Judging
Committee, every year, until the propff rotation
of judges is attained, one Joint Judging Commit-
tee member from each country shall be released,
by lot.
One and the same person may be nomi-
nated for the Joint Judging Committee for no
more than two consecutive terms.
3.4. The Joint Judging Committee shall elect a
chairperson and two vice-chairpersons from their
midst who shall change each year in accordance
with the procedure for their rotation (among the
countries).
3.5. The Joint Judging Committee meetings
shall be convened at least once a year and shall be
recorded in writing in the languages of all three
countries and translated into English. The Joint
Judging Committee decides its own internal
working procedures.
The Joint Judging Committee meetings
shall take place alternately in Tallinn, Riga and
Vilnius.
3.6. The Joint Judging Committee meetings
shall have full powers if at least two representa-
tives from each country participate.
In addition to the regular meetings for
awarding prizes, the Joint Judging Committee
may convene other meetings if the necessity
arises. The committee meetings may be conve-
ned upon the suggestion of the Baltic Assembly,
the Joint Judging Committee chairperson or thejury representatives from any of the respective
countries. Every year members of the Joint Jud-
ging Committee shall be entitled to discuss the
rules of the competition and the procedure for
awarding prizes, and to propose amendments to
the statutes.
The Joint Judging Committee shall be
entitled to make a decision not to award any one
of the prizes. The prize shall also not be awarded
in the year concerned if the Joint Judging Com-
miffee has not been able to reach an agreement,
that is, to make a concrete decision by a simple
majority vote. The unused resources shall be
transferred to the following year's budget.
ln any case, the Joint Judging Committee
shall make its decisions and the substantiation for
them known to the public.
3.7. The prize nominees from each country
shall be assessed by National Judging Commit-
tees. Only the National Judging Committee shall
be entitled to select works for submission to thejoint Baltic competition and the works shall be
submitted together with all the necessary inform-
ation (the biography of the nominee, reviews, and
other related documents).
3.8. Works and their authors shall be nominated
for the prize by the Joint Judging Committee. The
Joint Judging Committee shall assess the works
nominated by the respective National Judging
Committee of each country.
4. Nominating tltc work and awarding the prize
4.1. Works shall be submitted to the National
Judging Committee in accordance with the rules
of the competition before 15th March of that year.
In one month's time, the National Judging Com-
mittee shall assess these works and no more than
the best two works from each field shall be nomi-
nated for review by the Joint Judging Committee.
In order to assess a musical work, fine art
and theatrical productions, concerts, exhibitions
and performances may be organised.
4.2. The decision on awarding the prize shall be
submitted by the Joint Judging Committee to the
Baltic Assembly Secretariat no later than two
weeks before the spring session of the Baltic
Assembly.
The prizes may also be awarded at the Bal-
tic Assembly autumn session in October. In this
case, the works must be submitted to the National
Judging Committee before 15th August of that
year.
4.3. The same person may not receive the prize
more than once.
5. Presenting the prize
5.1. The prize 
- 
a special medal, diploma and
monetary pize 
- 
shall be presented by the Chair-
man of the haesidium of the Baltic Assembly at a
Baltic Assembly ceremony, and the names of the
prize winners and information on their achieve-
ments shall be published in the official press of all
three Baltic states.
5.2. The literary work, the author of which has
been awarded the Baltic Assembly prize, shall be
published (communicated to the public) within
two yearc from the reception of the prize in the
languages of both neighbouring countries.
The country in which the literary work has
been created shall render financial assistance in
publishing the work, thus recognising the interna-
tional importance of the Baltic Assembly prize.
The award-winning works in the arts and science
shall be given publicity in the same manner with
the support of the respective country.
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6. The administration and Secretariat of the
J oint I ud gin g C ommitte e
6.1. The Joint Judging Committee shall be co-
ordinated by the Baltic Assembly Secretariat,
which also provides assistance to the National
Judging Committee.
6.2. Each year, the Joint Judging Committee
shall request from the Council of Ministers of the
Baltic States the resources necessary for the
prizes, for ensuring the necessary work of the
experts, organising exhibitions and concerts and
for similar needs.
6.3. The administration of the Joint Judging
Committee shall be conducted and the accounts of
the financial resources shall be kept in accordance
Chairman of the
Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Maris Bupovsxrs
Republic of Latvia
with the laws of the respective countries and the
regulations of the Council of Ministers of the
Baltic States.
7. Duties of the loint ludging Committee
7.1. The Joint Judging Committee, in conjunc-
tion with the Baltic Assembly Secretariat, shall be
responsible for the proper utilisation of allocated
funds.
7.2. The Joint Judging Committee shall provide
the Baltic Assembly with a report on its activity.
The statutes on the Baltic Assembly prize
for literature, the arts and science shall be adop-
ed, amended and, if necessary, suspended by the
Baltic Assembly.
Deputy Chairman of
the Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Ulo Nucrs
Republic of Estonia
Deputy Chairman of
the Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Egidijus Brcxausxes
Republic of Lithuania
lurmnla (Kemeri), I5th May 1994
Includes amendments, adopted in Vilnius, 13th Novembr 1994.
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Appeal by the Bakic Assembly
to Westem European Union
The Baltic Assembly, meeting in Jurmala
(Kemeri) from 13th-l5th May 1994, welcomes
the efforts of Western European Union to co-oper-
ate with the Baltic states 
- 
Estonia, Latvia and
Chairman of the
Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Maris Buoovsrcs
Republic of Latvia
Jurmala ( Kemeri), I 5th May 1994
APPENDD( TV
Texts adopted by the Bahic Assembly
Deputy Chairman of
the Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Ulo Nucrs
Republic of Estonia
Deputy Chairman
of the Praesidium
of the Baltic Assembly
Maris Buoovsxrs
Republic of Latvia
Lithuania 
- 
in the sphere of European security,
especially 9th May 1994 agreements which
granted the Baltic states associate partnership in
Western European Union, and appeals to the
Assembly of Western European Union to consider
the Baltic Assembly as its collective partner in
such co-operation.
1. Resolution
concerning the demilitarisation of the Kaliningrad region
and its future development
The Baltic Assembly is of the opinion that the future of the Kaliningrad region is of concern to all
of Europe and it requires joint actions.
Proceeding from this, the Baltic Assembly:
1. Suggests that the demilitarisation of the Kaliningrad region should be treated as an essential ele-
ment for the security process in Cenral Europe and the entire continent.
2. Supports the motion for a resolution concerning respect for placenames as the cultural heritage of
Europe, and the restoration of old placenames in the Kaliningrad region, which is under discussion at the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Therefore, the Baltic Assembly appeals to the Baltic Council of Ministers and urges it to convene
an international round-table conference on the issue of the dernilitarisation of the Kaliningrad region and
its future development.
Deputy Chairman of
the Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Egidijus Btcreusras
Republic of Lithuania
Deputy Chairman
ofthe Praesidium
of the Baltic Assembly
Ulo Nucrs
Republic of Estonia
Chairman of
the Praesidium
of the Baltic Assembly
Egidijus Blcreusxes
Republic of Lithuania
Wlnius, 13th November 1994
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2. Statement
The Baltic Assembly expresses its deep concern about the threats to use Russian Federation mili-
tary forces in neighbouring countries under the guise of an alleged necessity to protect the human rights
of the Russian minorities and Russian-speakers living there, expressed by the Russian Federation's Forei-
gn Minister, Mr. A. Kozyrev on 18th April 1995.
Drawing the attention of the states of the world and international organisations to the fact that:
- 
the Russian Federation often demonstrates through its actions and statements its aggressiveness
in the international arena;
- 
in many of is statements concerning other, especially neighbouring, states the Russian Fede-
ration is not complying with universally-recognised norms of international law;
- 
human rights are being violated in the Russian Federation on an exfreme scale 
- 
its fioops are
killing civilians; and
- 
the abovementioned actions of the Russian Federation have not been restrained by the negative
reactions of the majority of states and international organisations,
the Baltic Assembly urges all democratic states and international organisations to give an open, clear and
unambiguous evaluation of those Russian Federation actions and expressed intentions that violate human
rights and pose a threat to the security of other states.
I
j
Deputy Chairman of
the Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Arnold Rirrrel
Republic of Estonia
Riga, 22nd April 1995
Deputy Chairman of the
Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Arnold Rlrtirel
Republic of Estonia
Riga, 22nd Apfl 1995
Chairman of the
haesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Maris Buoovsrrs
Republic of Latvia
Chairman of the
Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Maris Buoovsxrs
Republic of Latvia
Deputy Chairman of
the Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Egidijus Brcxeusx.rs
Republic of Lithuania
Deputy Chairman of the
Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly
Egidijus Brcxr,usras
Republic of Lithuania
3. Resolution on Chechnya
The Baltic Assembly,
Realising that the Russian Federation has ignored all international calls for putting a stop to the
murderous war and genocide in Chechnya by its forces and is in effect trying to use international organi-
sations to cover up its actions in Chechnya and to organise mock elections there;
Resolutely condemns aggression in Chechnya which 
- 
no matter under what guise it takes place 
-
may end with the physical extermination of a small nation;
Appeals to the OSCE and other international organisations to consider it their moral duty to make
every effon to stop the war and genocide in Chechnya immediately.
Furthermore, the Baltic Assembly calls on the Russian Federation to halt the genocide of the people
of Chechnya and to withdraw its army and militarised police forces from the territory of Chechnya and
appeals to the OSCE to raise the issue in the United Nations of the right of the Chechen nation to self-
determination and to freedom from colonialism.
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APPENDX V
Appeal to the Organisationfor
Security and Co-operation in Europe
The Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly is
watching with great alarm the deepening of the
Chechnya conflict, the increase in the number of
casualties among the civilian population there and
the increasing violations of human rights.
In connection with these events, the Praesi-
dium of the Baltic Assembly:
l. Appeals to the leadership of the OSCE
member countries and proposes that the OSCE
examine the possibility of setting up a mission of
the OSCE, as provided by the document of the
OSCE Moscow conference on the human dimen-
sion of 3rd October 1991, with the aim of inves-
tigating the facts of mass violation of human
Maris Buoovsrts
President of the Baltic Assembly
Riga,9thJanuary 1995.
rights in Chechnya and working out recommend-
ations on the prevention of such violations.
2. Draws attention to the incompatibility
of the actions of the armed forces of the RF in
performing internal missions with the code of
conduct signed by all the OSCE member coun-
tries at the Budapest meeting which obliges them
sfictly to adhere to the provisions of international
conventions not to violate human and civil rights
and also to take due care to avoid injury to civi-
lians. and their property in performing internal
nussrons.
On behalf of the Praesidium of the Baltic
Assembly,
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APPENDIX VI
Agreement on padiamentary cuoperation betw een
the Bahic Assembly and the Nordie Council
This agreement on parliamentary co-oper-
ation is to determine the priority areas of co-
operation of mutual interest to both parties. Prio-
rity areas may be revised on a yearly basis.
Amendments to this agreement of parliamentary
co-operation are to be approved by the Praesi-
diums of the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic
Council.
The Praesidiums have agreed to co-operate
within the following priority areas:
(a) Development of democratic institutions
Parliamentary democracy :
- 
parliamentary scholarship programme
Legislative co-operation :
- 
assistance in the establishment of Baltic
legislative co-operation,
- 
exchange oflegal experts,
- 
exchange oflaw literature,
- 
protection of human rights.
(b) Co-operation in specialised areas
Environmental protection :
- 
action programme forcleaning the Baltic
Sea,
- 
development of modern purification
technology.
Security policy:
- 
withdrawal of foreign military forces,
- 
nuclear safety in the Baltic Sea area.
Culture and education:
- 
scholarship programme for students.
Trade and market economy:
- 
exchange of experts on economic co-
operation.
Agriculture:
- 
restructuring of agriculture.
Communications:
- 
construction of Via Baltica
Energy:
- 
renationalisation of energy consumption.
Organisational forms of parliamcntary co-
operation:
- 
Representatives are to be invited to parti-
cipate at parliamentary sessions, semi-
nars and other international events
aranged by the Baltic Assembly or the
Nordic Council whenever topics of
mutual interest are to be discussed;
- 
The Praesidiums of the Baltic Assembly
and the Nordic Council meet whenever
needed to discuss and settle general prin-
ciples for their co-operation;
- 
The joint working committee, chaired
by the presidents, will meet whenever
needed;
- 
Committee level conffacts, meetings and
co-operation should take place whenever
needed;
- 
Secretariat level contacts to take place on
a regular basis;
- 
Training and technical assistance to
the national secretariats of the Baltic
Assembly.
- 
Information exchange on a regular basis:
- 
by the national secretariats to the Bal-
tic Assembly;
- 
by the Nordic Information Offices as
local points.
Technical realisation
- 
Joint meetings will be chaired by host
organisation;
- 
Number of participants should be limited
and not exceed the number of invited
delegates;
- 
The national administration will be in
charge of travel costs (in the Nordic area:
only flights to the Nordic capitals);
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- 
Hotel accommodation and meals are
paid by the host organisation;
- 
All other arrangements will be specified
by separate agreement.
This agreement on parliamentary co-opera-
tion between the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic
Council has been written in two identical and
equally valid copies in English and Russian
signed in
Palanga, 30th May 1992 Helsinki,
On behalf of On behalf of
The Praesidium of the The Praesidium of the
Baltic Assembly Nordic Council
Aurimas Teunq,x'res Iikka SuotrlnmuPresident President
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Common declaratian of parliamentary co-operation between
the Bahic Assembly and the Benelux Consultntive Interparliarnentory Council
This declaration expresses the will of the
Baltic Assembly and the Benelux Consultative
Interparliamentary Council to establish parliamen-
tary co-operation and sets the directions, the priori-
ties and the common interests of this co-operation.
All amendments to this declaration will be
discussed and decided by the Baltic Assembly and
the Benelux Consultative Interparliamentary
Council.
The Baltic Assembly and the Benelux
Consultative Interparliamentary Council declare
to promote co-operation between the national
assemblies represented at the Baltic Council and
the Benelux Consultative Interparliamentary
Council in the fields mentioned under A and B.
Therefore they will, in concertation, propose ini-
tiatives to their national assemblies, their national
governments and for what concerns the Benelux,
the general-secretariat of the Economic Union.
A. The development of democratic institutions
1. Exchange ofexperience concerning parlia-
mentary activities, information and training pro-
grarnmes.
2. Legislation:
- 
co-operation in the co-ordination of the
legislation of the Baltic and Benelux
countries;
- 
foster exchange programmes for legal
experts;
- 
exchange of documentation concerning
legislation and legal reference materials;
- 
protection of human rights.
B. Co-operatian in special areas
l. Foreign policy: stimulation of the measures
promoting the rapprochement between the Baltic
states and Europe.
2. Communications:
- 
stimulation of co-operation between the
ports of the Baltic states and Benelux;
- 
reactivation of the co-operation between
the cities and the municipalities of the
Baltic states and Benelux;
- 
visa procedures among the countries.
3. Energy, market economy and environ-
mental protection.
4. Culture, education and science.
5. Transfrontierco-operation.
The Baltic Assembly and the Benelux
Consultative Interparliamentary Council declare
to co-operate as follows:
C. On the level of co-operation forms
1. The Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly or
the Bureau of the Benelux Consultative Interpar-
liamentary Council can invite representatives of
the Baltic Assembly or the Benelux Consultative
Interparliamentary Council to the parliamentary
sessions organised by both parties.
2. The Praesidium of the Baltic Assembly and
the Bureau of the Benelux Consultative Interpar-
liamentary Council shall meet whenever necessary
to discuss cofllmon issues.
3. With the agreement of the Praesidium of
the Baltic Assembly and the Bureau of the Bene-
lux Consultative Intelparliamentary Council joint
committee meetings can be organised.
4. The meetings of the Secretariats of both
assemblies shall be approved by the Praesidium of
the Baltic Assembly and the Bureau of the Bene-
lux Consultative Interparliamentary Council.
D. On the level of the procedures
1. In cases of exchange of delegations, the
host Assembly makes beforehand, in concertation
with the other Assembly, a detailed programme of
activities. The programme provides for joint
meetings organised by the host Assembly which
are the object of preparatory notes distributed in
advance by both Assemblies.
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A written report is made afterwards on
every exchange of delegations.
2. The number of participants for exchanges
as is meant under C of this declaration is deter-
mined in concertation and on a reciprocal basis.
The composition of the delegations is
determined by representativeness and expertise.
The Hague, 18th November 1994
In the name of the Baltic Assembly
M. Buoovsrus
President
3. Travel expenses to the meetings shall be
covered by the participants. Hotel expenses (bed
and breakfast) of the official guests are covered
by the host Assembly.
This declaration has been written in Dutch,
English, Estonian, French, Latvian and Lithuanian.
The six texts are authentic and of equal value.
The Hague, lSth November 1994
In the name of the Benelux Consultative
Interparliamentary Council
Drs. D.J.D. Dsrs
President
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APPENDIX VIII
The Baltic states and Kahningrad
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Document 1461 23rd May 1995
Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
wilh aview to accommodaling associate members and
associate pafinerc of WEU
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges2
by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur
TABLEOFCONTENTS
Dnqrr DecrsroN
on changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to
accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU
ExpleNnronv MruonaNpuna
submitted by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur
AppeNox
Voting rights of associate members in the WEU Assembly
l. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions.
2. Members of the commiuee: Mr. Thompson (Chairman); Mr. Amaral (Vice-Chairman); Mrs. Aguiar, MM. Berendt, Bolinana,
Mx. Brasseur, MM. Carcarino (Altemate: Benvenuti), Couveinhes, Cuco,Denrau,Lord Finsberg,MM. Haack, Hughes (Alter-
nate:Wray), Junghanns (Altemate: Lwwner),Liapis,Irjeune, van der Maelen, Mignon, Mrs. van Nieuwenhoven, Sir trvine Pat-
nick (Altemate: Baroness Gould of Potternewton), MM. Sainz Garcia, von Schmude, Mrs. Scopelliti, MM. Soldani, Sofoulis
(Alternate: Korahais), Speroni, Weyts, Zijlsta.
Associate member: Mr. Mimaroglu.
N.B. Ilre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
155
DOCUITENT 1461
Draft Decision
on changes to the Clwrter and Rules of Proccdure of the Assembly with a vicw to accommodating
associale memben andassociate partners otWEU
The Assembly,
(i) Having taken note of the arrangements agreed between the WEU Council and associate members of
this organisation on the one hand and between the Council and associate partners on the other;(ii) Anxious to receive in appropriate conditions representatives of associate member and associate
plltners of WEU and to take account of the wishes expressed in this respect by the Council on 9th May
t994:
(iii) Recalling that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treity empowers the Assembly, composed of
representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the (Parliamentary) Assembly of the Council of Europe
to examine the annual report on the WEU Council's activities;
(iv) Considering that the representatives of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance must have a
more favourable status than that of countries which are not members of that alliance,
DpcroBs
L To amend its Chaner as follows:
In Article II (c) of the Charter of the Assembly, delete " without voting rights in plenary sessions ";
II. To amend its Rules of Procedure as follows:
1. In Rule 15.3, delete " without voting rights " and insen " and deliberate ";
2. In Rule I7, add a new paragraph (h) toreadas follows:
" Rules 50 and 51 on budgetary questions shall not apply to representatives of associate member
countries. "
Former paragraph (/2,) becomes paragraph(i).
3. In Rule 4l,paragraph 2, delete " fourth ". After " the United Kingdom (5) " add a new sentence to
read as follows: " The fourth permanent committee shall be composed of 28 members divided as follows:
Belgium (2), France (4), Germany (4), Greece (2),ltaly (4), Luxembourg (1), the Netherlands (2), Porru-
gal (2), Spain (3), United Kingdom (4). "
4. In Rule 18 on observers, number the existing paragraph (a) andadd two new paragraphs as follows:
" (b) Representatives of parliaments of WEU observer and associate partner countries to the
Assembly shall have permanent observer status.
(c) Permanent observers.of associate partner countries shall sit in committees without voting rights.
The Presidential Committee shall fix the number of their representatives in sessions and in com-
mittees and the way they shall participate in the activities of the Assembly. "
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E xp lanato ry M e mo randam
(submifiod by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur)
1. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and
Privileges has had the task of making proposals to
the Assembly so as to set out the voting rights of
associate members. In spite of three attempts, it
has not been possible to reach finality, and since
work began as long ago as 1993, a category of
associate partner has been created.
2. It is a matter of regret that these new forms
of membership, associate member, observer and
partner, were created by the Council of Ministers
without any form of prior consultation with the
Assembly. Common courtesy 
- 
and common
sense 
- 
would surely have dictated this course of
action so that the Assembly, which is an integral
part of WEU, could have given some preliminary
thought to the subject. The fact that the associate
partner status followed on merely compounded
- 
and confused 
- 
the situation and prior consulta-
tions with the Presidential Committee should
have been held.
3. Too much time has already been wasted in
fruitless discussion on issues which have no direct
bearing upon the duty given to the Committee on
Rules of Procedure and Privileges, and unless the
Assembly is to look incompetent and incapable of
resolving these issues swiftly, decisions must now
be taken.
4. It may be argued that we start from a deci-
sion taken earlier and which has, to some extent,
been overtaken by events, but the Assembly is
master of its own procedure and cannot continue
pursuing fruitless points any longer.
5. It seems pointless to rehearse at length the
history of what has happened to earlier recom-
mendations of the Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure and Privileges as many events have been
overtaken.
9. Logic and common sense dictate the follow-
mg:
1. Full members have all rights accorded to
them in the charter, statute and rules.
2. Associate members must, therefore,
have less rights than full members.
3. Associate partners have, therefore, to be
given less rights than associate members.
7. Thus, I suggest that associate members
should possess full rights in committees and ple-
nary sessions including voting, except upon bud-
getary matters and on the reply to the annual
report of the Council.
8. Associate partners shall be entitled to
attend and speak at committees and in plenary but
without voting rights.
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APPENDIX
Voting rights of associate members in the WEU Assembly'
prepared at the request of the Clerk of the Assembly
distribated at the request of Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur
1. Should representatives of associate mem-
bers in the WEU Assembly have voting rights
there? Does their status, as defined by the various
acts of the WEU Council of Ministers, grant them
the right to speak and vote?
It is proposed to examine this question
from a strictly legal standpoint; a political assess-
ment of such matters falls outside the aims and
scope of this study.
2. In order to be able to answer this question,
it must first be established which rules of law are
applicable and their sources. These sources are:
(a) T\e 1954 modified Brussels Treaty;
(b) The 1991 Maastricht declaration of the
Brussels Treaty powers on the invita-
tion to European members of NAIO to
become associate members of WEU;
(c) ThePetersberg declaration of 19th June
1992 on relations between WEU and
the other European member states of
the European Union or the Atlantic
Alliance;
(d) The document on associate member-
ship approved at the WEU Ministerial
Council on 20th November 1992 and
given substance on the same date by the
adoption of a text called the document
on associate membership of WEU
concerning the Republic of Iceland, the
Kingdom of Norway and the Republic
of Turkey, by the ministers for foreign
affairs of the latter three countries and
the countries known as the Brussels
Treaty powers. The content of this
document was supplemented by an
addendum inserted in the minutes of
the above meeting of the WEU Minis-
terial Council on 20th November 1992
in connection with the document on
associate membership;
1. lrgal opinion by Professor Henri Adam, former legal spe-
cialist with the Council of Europe and the United Nations
(r.INCTAD).
(e) T\e Kirchberg declaration of 9th May
1994 of the countries known as the
Brussels Treaty powers " following on
from the document on associate mem-
bership of 20th November 1992".
3. The Brussels Treaty obviously does not
contain rules governing associate member status.
Moreover, the document adopted in Rome stipu-
lated (in paragraph 3) that it would not involve
any modification of the Brussels Treaty. Further-
more, the Council of Ministers, in its answer to
the Assernbly's Written Question 300, recalled
t}re terms of the Petersberg declaration according
to which associate members had not become
contracting parties to the Brussels Treaty. Howe-
ver, it cannot be adduced from the foregoing that
the modified Brussels Treaty has no application
whatsoever in relations between the afore-
mentioned powers and associate members, once
the former have acted and agreed relations with
members styled as associate, in accordance with
and by application of the said freaty.
Furthermore, given that the " document "
expressed a reservation as to the application of
Article VIII of the treaty, is any interpretation pos-
sible other than that the remaining provisions are
exempted from the reservation?
4. It should also be noted that the Brussels
Treaty of 17th March 1948, following its revision
on 23rd October 1954, became the founding docu-
ment, the charter, of an intemational organisation
(Articles VItr and D(). The high confiacting Parties
became members of WEU, with a system, an
ordering of relations which ceased to be confiactual
and instead became organisational or institutional,
at least as far as relations stemming from certain
provisions of the aforementioned treaty were
concerned. Thus when referring to the status of
associate member we should not lose sight of this
change, brought about, in part at least, in the rela-
tions between the signatories of the Brussels Trea-
ty. It might be appropriate to place the status of
associate member in this new context of the Brus-
sels Treaty, in accordance with Article 31.2.a of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties.
5. It would be legally erroneous to claim that
associate members are and should remain apart
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from the Brussels Tieaty, the charter of an interna-
tional organisation, of which they are now mem-
bers 
- 
albeit associate members 
- 
but members
nevertheless. It would be difficult to argue that
associate members have no relational rights with
the contracting parties to the Brussels Treaty, when
there is no legal basis for the organisation known
as WEU other than the abovementioned treaty.
How could they have been invited to become asso-
ciate members of an organisation, in other words
to become part of it, while not being, in principle at
least, parties to the founding legal documents by
means of which it is governed (inter alios acta)?
6. Such an interpretation might encounter
several difficulties: first, the principle of good
faith in interpreting international agreements
(Article 31.1 of the convention referred to above);
second, the link established between the Brussels
Treaty and the invitation to become an associate
member of WEU and acceptance thereof. This
link was expressly underlined by the WEU Coun-
cil of Ministers in its answer to the Assembly's
Written Question 300 (end paragraph 4). lndeed,
according to the aforementioned answer the invi-
tation to become an associate member was based
on the principle laid down in the preamble of the
Brussels Treaty to the effect that the contracting
parties were resolved to promote the unity and
encourage the progressive integration of Europe.
Because of this reference to the Brussels Treaty, it
becomes very difficult to sustain the thesis of the
absence of any connection between associate
members and the Brussels Treaty.
7. Lastly, the links between associate mem-
bers and the Brussels Treaty follow from the
concept, expressed by an image, of WEU as the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The idea
of the " European pillar " has been taken up and
repeated, starting with The Hague platform (27th
October 1987), in the Maastricht declaration (10th
December l99l), the Petersberg declaration (19th
June 1992), the Rome declaration (20th Novem-
ber 1992) and in the document of the same date
adopted in Rome and finally in the Kirchberg
declaration of 9th May 1994. This concept domi-
nates relations with associate members, who are
all necessarily members of the Atlantic Alliance,
and members of WEU. From this established link
the latter has deduced two legal consequences:
first the inapplicability of Article V of the Brus-
sels Treaty in relations between members of WEU
and members of NAIO that have become asso-
ciate members (Petersberg declaration); and
second the reciprocal strengthening of the securi-
ty guarantees and defence commitments under
Aticle V of the Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of
the Treaty of Washington as stated in the Kirch-
berg declaration of 9th May 1994.
8. It is clear that, in rejecting any formalist
approach, any literal method of interpreting the
Brussels Treaty, the contracting parties have
expressed their intention of allowing associate
members to benefit from military and other assis-
tance under Article Y on the basis of their assis-
tance obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty of
Washington. It is by the technical procedure of
referring back to the latter that the Brussels Treaty
is to be interpreted and applied. Hence associate
members might be defended and assisted, in the
event of their being the victims of aggression, in
the same conditions as WEU member states2.
Such is the plausible legal interpretation of the
concept expressed by the image of WEU as the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
9. Thus one notes the successive contra-
dictory interpretations of the Brussels Treaty
within the space of two years, between Peterberg
and Kirchberg, doubtless corresponding to the
evolution of the concept of European defence,
govemed by a notion that the latter should be res-
tricted solely to the Community that seems to have
developed from one declaration to the next. All
these changes are occurring because Article VIII
of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 had made
two alterations to the legal r6gime of the treaty:
First, it had transformed contractual rela-
tions into institutional and organisational rela-
tions, and this modification allowed expressly for
a power of implementation, on the basis of inter-
pretations of the Brussels Treaty, which could not
otherwise have existed, at least as an attribute of
an organisation or a function of an institution.
10. Then the progressive integration of Europe,
initially a ground for the Brussels Treaty powers,
became a power, an area of responsibility of WEU
- 
enshrined not only in the preamble but also in
the substantive text of the treaty. Therefore,
through the exercise of a responsibility conferred
on WEU under Article IV of the protocol signed
in Paris onZ3rd October 1954, and again referred
to under Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty, it has been possible to define the legal
position of the European states not parties to the
Brussels Treaty and create an associate member
status, entirely outside any procedure for revising
the Brussels Treaty.
11. It should be noted that the Brussels Treaty
did not provide for any procedure for its revision
except in the case of new members acceding to
the treaty. A revision was brought about in the
protocol of accession of Greece, signed in Rome
on 20th November 1992 following insertion of a
reference in Part III, A, of the Petersberg declara-
2. Therc is an expressed intention to apply the procedures
laid down in Article V of the Brussels Treaty in implement-
ing Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington. The associate
members having noted this expressed intention, an intema-
tional agreement was thereby concluded. It remains to be
seen whether reciprocity applies in the absence of a declara-
tion on the part of the associate members.
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tion to prevent that state having the benefit of
Article V in its differences with NATO member
states3. Thus, in the absence of any provision for
revision of the Brussels Treaty, the latter operated
implicitly in the three cases mentioned (taking
account of those referred to in the footnote
below). The contracting parties therefore applied
Article 39 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of Treaties, adopted in Vienna on 22nd
May 1969.
12. It is also noteworthy that the Brussels
Treaty was also modified, not only implicitly or
by an ad hoc revision procedure, but also by way
of interpretation contrary to law (confia legem) in
its application. This precedent is that of the trans-
fer of the exercise of WEU's responsibilities in
social and cultural matters to the Council of
Europe in 1959.
13. In a communication to the Assembly of
WEU dated 24th April 1959 (Document 987), the
Ministerial Council notified it of the ffansfer deci-
sion as follows: " The exercise of the powers of
WEU in the social and cultural fields will be
transferred to the Council of Europe ... " (Assem-
bly Document 149, paragraph 13). The Assembly
protested against this decision, which was not
merely a violation but also a revision of the Brus-
sels Treaty, specifically of Article II, from the
moment WEU relinquished, in favour of another
organisation, the exercise of responsibilities
assigned to it under its Charter, its founding docu-
ment (Document 149, paragraph 33). This reduc-
tion in WEU's statutory activities was therefore
denounced on grounds of respect for the ffeaty.
However, the Council of Ministers chal-
lenged the Assembly's competence in this matter.
It informed the Assembly that it considered the
transfer decision wholly valid and as falling
within the scope of Article VIII.I which provides
that the Council may consider matters concerning
the execution of the treaty and of its protocols and
annexes (Document 149, paragraph 50).
14. This constitutes an application of the rules
provided for under the Vienna Convention refer-
red to above. In point of fact, according to Article
31.3 of the latter, the content of a treaty is not
limited to its text. It also includes " any subse-
quent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application
of its provisions " [sub-paragraph (a)].Similarly,
any subsequent practice in the application of the
3. It should be noted that the protocols of accession of Greece,
Portugal and Spain had revised Article XII of the Brussels
Treaty, which provided that any state invited to accede to the
treaty became party to it by depositing an instrument of
accession with the Belgian Government. However, the afore-
mentioned protocols dated accession from the date of receipt
of the last ratification, acceptance or approval, notified to the
Belgian Government.
treaty may be considered as supplementing the
content of the latter modifying the very text of the
agreement (see Article 31.3 sub-paragraph (b) ot
the above United Nations Convention). Thus the
1959 precedent of relinquishing the exercise of
WEU's social and cultural activities illusfiates the
extent of the Council of Ministers' powers of
interpretation and revision.
15. To the power generated by the dynamics of
the contractual relationship, well described in
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention,
must be added the implicit powers inherent in
intemational institutions which make it necessary
to resort to a functional rather than a textual inter-
pretation of the treaty.
Indeed, by taking up, in the 1954 revision,
in the substantive text of the Brussels Treaty the
function provided for in its preamble, namely the
adoption of the necessary measures to promote
the unity and encourage the progressive integra-
tion of Europe (new Article VIII) the Council was
provided with the necessary implicit and functio-
nal powers to encourage such unity and promote
integration of Europe extending beyond the fron-
tiers of the Brussels Treaty powers. The proce-
dure to be followed to this end involves, not
signature and ratification of protocols, but a
Council decision taken in conformity with the
provisions of the treaty wherein lies its substance
(Article VI[).
16. There is no need whatsoever for the
Brussels Treaty to have instituted an associate
member status for European allied states that are
not Brussels Treary powers to join WEU, by una-
nimous decision of the Council of Ministers, as
associate members, under a status defined also by
the Council of Ministers, from the moment it is a
measure adopted for the purpose of " encouraging
the progressive integration of Europe " whose
limits extend far beyond Western Europe.
It is precisely the Europe that sffetches to
the East and North of the most westerly point of
the continent to which the status of associate
member is directed as an instrument of unity and
progressive integration.
Associate members or partners may there-
fore be admitted to WEU without revision of the
Brussels Treaty by virtue of the powers expressly
and implicitly acknowledged as belonging to the
Council of Ministers.
17. However, these powers are limited, first by
the purposes attributed to their exercise and then
by the unanimity required in each case for the
adoption of the measures envisaged. Furthermore
let us add, for the record, without insisting overly
upon it, that since the treaty provides for a revi-
sion procedure only with regard to the accession
of members, it follows that the treaty does not
require signature or ratification of an international
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agreement, the theory of the contrary act4 apart,
for the creation of a WEU associate member sta-
tus, the Council of Ministers having to this end the
necessary powers and competences at its disposal.
18. Associate member status was defined by
the declarations adopted by the Council of Minis-
ters (Petersberg, Kirchberg and Maastricht) and
given substance, and its content enriched, in the
various " documents " adopted in Rome. It should
be noted that these declarations and documents
are in no way what are termed political docu-
ments, with no binding effects or consequences
for conferring status or developing subjective
legal positions [in this respect, see the judgment
of the International Court of Justice of lst July
1994 in a case between Qatar and Bahrein, para-
graph21 (2)1.
19. This is the case despite the idiosyncratic
form of these instruments. The document on asso-
ciate membership was not in the conventional
form of a bilateral or multilateral insffument bet-
ween conftacting parties. The document was sub-ject first to an approval procedure by the WEU
Council of Ministers, meeting in Rome on 22nd
November 1992. The same document was then
adopted at the joint meeting, also held in Rome on
the same day, of the ministers for foreign affairs
of WEU member states (acting individually) with
the ministers for foreign affairs of the three states
which had accepted the invitation in the Maas-
tricht declaration to become associate members of
WEU.
20. Admittedly, there was also to be a second
approval by the WEU Council of Ministers,
which met after the joint meeting of the twelve
ministers referred to (9 + 3), according to minutes
summarising the discussions between the twelve
ministers and providing a material record of the
agreements reached during these discussions.
These oral agreements became written ones by
being referred to in the abovementioned minutes
of the Council of Ministers and through their phy-
sical link with the document by the publication of
the latter as an addendum, as an instrument
(minutes), approved in connection with the docu-
ment on associate members.
21. To this document, in turn approved, adop-
ted and supplemented by approved minutes, was
added a declaration by the WEU Council of
Ministers, meeting at Kirchberg on 9th May 1994,
entitled: Declaration following on from the docu-
ment on associate membership of 20th November
1992. The statutory implications of this new
declaration of the Council of Ministers cannot be
challenged, nor can its juridical value, its binding
commitment be denied. Third states, beneficiaries
of these declarations having accepted and acted in
conformity with the provisions of the declaration,
international agreement is thus established bet-
ween the authors and beneficiaries of these decla-
rations without further joint adoption procedure
as there had been at Rome, at a meeting which,
moreover, will not be held.
22. If there is the slightest doubt about the
contractual nature of the process followed, one
only has to refer to the above minutes signed in
Rome which state: " The document on associate
members cannot be modified without the assent of
the associate members " (Addendum, final sen-
tence).
Similarly, the Kirchberg declaration, which
can be likened to a second addendum, contained
not in the minutes but in a declaration, includes a
provision which reads as follows: " Ministers
confirm that the arrangements contained in the
present declaration cannot be modified without
the consent of the associate members " (penulti-
mate paragmph of the declaration).
An agreement undeniably exists between
the members of WEU (not WEU as such) and its
associate members that are not full members, in
other words contracting parties to the Brussels
Treaty (in the strict sense of the latter) defining
the legal status of these associate members. This
agreement is inviolable and cannot be amended
unilaterally. It is an instrument containing interna-
tional commitments within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 1 of the abovementioned convention. Thus,
the International Court of Justice, in its decision
of 1st July 1994 in the case between Qatar and
Bahrein, gave relative value to the importance of
form in bearing out an international agreement by
referring to the Vienna Convention (see paragraph
23 of the abovementioned decision).
23. The absence of a signature at the bottom of
the document or of its subsequent ratification, in
other words the procedure normally followed for
concluding international agreements, does not
detract in any way from the binding juridical natu-
re of the untitled instrument that has been called
the " document ". This is the case in as much as
the states concerned had agreed that the process
used should express their consent to be bound by
the status thus defined (See Article 11 of the afore-
mentioned Convention on the Law of Treaties).
24. We have here an international agreement
governed by the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
It must be executed in good faith by all the states
concerned or involved (Article 29 of the same
convention). The procedure employed, the forms
4. The applicability of the contrary act theory is debatable in
the present case where an international organisation is invol-
ved. The law on international organisations makes provision
for admissions and accessions without revision of the foun-
ding treaty. Article XI of the Brussels Treaty, which consti
tutes a departure from this, may be explained by the idea of
various forms of accession to a system which has remained
essentially contractual.
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of expression used, the names given to the instru-
ments drawn up have little influence on the
content of the agreement and the consent given. A
particular diplomatic context which, as we have
noted, has evolved with the progression from one
declaration to the next, Petersberg to Kirchberg,
and certain reservations in national opinions over
conffacting new alliance obligations and offering
new military assistance guarantees, seemingly
explain the peculiarities of the procedures, names
and definitions used to describe the relations bet-
ween WEU and NATO and the status of associate
members of the European members of the latter
organisation vis-d-vis WEU. However, legal ana-
lyses enable one to see clearly that the " docu-
ments " adopted are definitely international
agreements or treaties. Similarly it is possible to
build up an entire r6gime of legal relations for the
states known as associate members of WEU,
without revising the Brussels Treaty, from the
moment the institutional competences acquired
by the Brussels Treaty powers can be exercised
for the purposes of creating an associate member
status in WEU.
25. The first question raised by such a status
concerns its content. What are the rights of asso-
ciate members in WEU? These rights obviously
do not derive from the Brussels Treaty which did
not provide for such a status, nor furthermore for
member status, since the establishment of WEU
as an international organisation was based on the
new Article VIII of the treaty and as a result of
decisions taken by each of the two bodies that
were created, namely the Council of Ministers
and the parliamentary Assernbly.
26. The 1948 Brussels Treaty did not provide
for full member status, much less therefore for
that of associate member. Member status as an
institutional status is the outcome of a succession
of decisions taken by the Council of Ministers
since its creation by the protocol signed in Paris
on 23rd October 1954. This member status, which
is of a " jurisprudential " nature reflects the condi-
tions under which the international organisation,
WEU, was created. At the outset this had, proper-
ly speaking, no founding document or charter. It
found legal support in a new provision inserted in
a treaty which had provided only for contractual,
but certainly not institutional, relations between
the parties. The entire organisational and institu-
tional framework, including the status of (need-
less to say full) member is the product of a series
of decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers,
established as the principal and indeed to a certain
extent the constituent body of WEU in accord-
ance with the (new) article of the Brussels Treaty.
27. Obligations of members of WEU are not
identical to those of the contracting parties of the
Brussels Treaty. The latter obligations derive from
the text of the treaty itself while the former
include, additionally, what is known as a derived
right, arising from the exercise of the powers of
the organisation under its statutess. The standing
of member is not completely merged with that of
contracting party. The same applies to joining
WEU as compared with accession to the treaty. It
should be noted furthermore that an important
part of the organisation, namely its budget 
- 
the
contributions which members are bound to make
and which are necessarily voted by national par-
liaments 
- 
has its legal origin in the competences
and powers granted to the Council of Ministers.
28. By keeping exclusively to the text of the
treaty whose ratification they had authorised,
could national parliaments refuse to approve the
necessary sums to pay the contributions to wEU's
budget? They could not. For with the changes and
the transformations that have occurred between
the Brussels Treaty powers from the fact of the
creation of an organisation (WEU), this seems
hardly possible. One might even wonder how
Article V might be applied given the transforma-
tion ofrelations from contractual to organisational
and institutional. In-depth consideration should
certainly be given to this issue.
29. What can be the content of associate mem-
ber status? Any answer to this question must start
from full member status. Reference in this
connection must be twofold: first, the source of
that status and then its content.
30. First, the source. Full member status has
been largely defined by decisions of the Council
of Ministers. The Brussels Treaty applies mutatis
mutandis in this definition, which for the rest
derives from the decisions and jurisprudence of
the Council of Ministers. It goes without saying
that the same must necessarily apply to the defini-
tion of associate member status. This is, more-
over, what happened with the successive declara-
tions adopted by the Council, at Maastricht,
Petersberg, Rome and finally at Kirchberg. The
source of the status is identical6 in both cases too:
the Council of Ministers as the WEU's principal
organ has the necessary powers to define the
content of WEU member and associate member
status; but with one difference, however: full
member status is frxed and modified by the exer-
cise of a " regulatory " power of the Council of
Ministers within the organisation as a whole,
whereas for associate members there is a further
contractual element in addition to this regulatory
dimension. The same process is employed at least
in part in respect of associate members as that
5. The Council's competence to consider matters relating to
the application and not just the application of the treaty.(Article YIII, paragraph I of the Brussels Treaty.)
6. The establishment of an organisational system obviously
has not had the effect of making obsolete the purely contrac-
tual provisions of the treaty.
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used for members that have acceded to the ffeaty,
whose status is determined contractually, in full,
between them and the Council of Ministers by
institutionalised application of Article XI of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
31. Second, the reference also applies in defin-
ing the content of the status of associate member.
Indeed the very notion of associate member
requires differentiation of the respective content
of member and associate member status. The
rights and duties implied by the latter will be of
lesser scope than the rights and duties implied by
the former.
This differentiation is dependent on the
decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers and
does not in any sense derive from the fact that
associate members would not be party to the
Brussels Treaty since everything, or almost every-
thing, is conducted at organisational level, at the
level of the organisation of the alliance and not at
the level of the Brussels Treaty as the legal basis
of WEU.
32. The principle on which the status of asso-
ciate member is based was set out at Maastricht
and Petersberg and given substance in the Rome
document: namely full participation in WEU's
activities. It follows that non participation is the
exception and as such must result specifically
from a special decision of the Council of Minis-
ters. All this is the logical consequence of a fun-
damental rule according to which a European
defence identity must be compatible with the
Atlantic Alliance. Thus any departure from the
principle of full participation conflicts with this
requirement for compatibility. It represents the
trade-off offered to the European allies of the
Atlantic Alliance, not members of the European
Union, for the development of WEU as the de-
fence component of the latter without weakening
the said alliance. The principle is therefore the
commitment by associate members to participate
fully in WEU's activities.
33. In the " document " the Council of Minis-
ters introduced certain limitations to this partici-
pation, although not to the commitment which is
the basic component of associate member status.
There was fust the limitation on participation in
WEU's main organ, the Council of Ministers. In
the first place the latter might meet without the
participation of associate members, if a majority
of member states, possibly determined by the cast-
ing vote of the Chairman, decides to hold a meet-
ing among themselves without the associate
members. They will have the right to speak ex
officio. They will also have voting rights but these
will be of limited effect. Their votes will be of no
significance if, from the outset, there is unanimity
or a consensus among the full members. They
therefore have the right to vote but no right of
veto, while full members can each, individually,
block a unanimous decision, a consensus reached
among the other members, unless the decision
concerns a matter to which another (majority)
voting procedure applies or for which one has
been agreed. [n such cases, by virtue oftheir sta-
tus the votes of associate members would automa-
tically be taken into account. In general they could
pafticipate in implementing the decisions adopted
unless a majority of full members, or half their
number with the casting vote of the President,
objected.
34. An ambiguity should be noted in the rules
on the voting rights of associate members. The
" document " (par. 3) refers to their association in
decisions taken by member states. Does this mean
in all decisions of the Council or those taken when
they are excluded from voting or when they are
manifestly opposed by a consensus? It would
indeed appear that the cases when it would be
possible for them to be associated in a decision
are those when decisions are adopted in their
absence (when they have been excluded from the
meeting) or adopted in their presence but without
their supporting vote but, having subsequently
changed their minds, they then had reason to sup-
port the majority or consensus position previously
reached by the full members.
35. This was the decision-making process the
principle of which the WEU Council of Ministers
had sanctioned when transferring the exercise of
its social and cultural activities to the Council of
Europe in 1959 (seeparagraph 14)-the so-called
partial agrcement procedure established in Reso-
lution (51) 62 of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe. This process enables unity
and cohesion to be maintained among the mem-
bers of the Council of Europe when there is no
unanimity and there are divisions among mem-
bers, some wishing to go ahead and others oppo-
sed to such a course. In such event, the resolution
enables the decision on which members are not
unanimous to be adopted, but only by those who
are in favour, all its implications, including those
relating to expenditure, being assumed by them.
However, those who were opposed continue to be
informed of the progress of work undertaken on
behalf of the Council of Europe under the so-
called partial agreement arrangement. The latter
are also able to be associated subsequently with
the action taken in accordance with the partial
agreement system and also with the agreements
themselves. Hence the Council of Europe's re-
establishment fund for refugees and surplus popu-
lations was created with a limited number of
member states and subsequently extended to other
member states who changed their position on this
fund. They were associated with the decision
creating the fund.
36. This association of associate members in
certain decisions or in their implementation, as
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provided for in the " document ", is clearly based
on the idea of partial agreements. It meets the
same need for unity in the organisation and acts as
a corrective to the same consequences of exclu-
ding those in the minority. It is an institutional
remedy in the voting system. There is no other
obvious explanation for the " document's " ambi-
guity.
37. Other restrictions on full participation by
associate members in decisions and actions of
WEU have been provided for expressly and are
set out in the " document ".
They concern the Planning Cell, communi-
cations (WEUCOM) and budget contributions.
However matters regarding space and the activi
ties in which associate members participate
already, the latter have been placed on an equal
footing with new members (at least until the end
of the experimental period) or full members. This
is for reasons of institutional continuity. In any
event their participation in military operations
with commitment of forces is on the same basis as
full members, including forces' security, planning
and associated exercises.
And, emphasising the evolving nature of
this status, the Council had no hesitation in deci-
ding at Kirchberg to withdraw the restrictions on
participation in the Planning Cell. Associate
members henceforth participate not from the out-
side, through liaison officers, but from the inside
through their own officers within the Cell.
38. Moreover, in order to allow associate part-
ners the fullest possible participation permitted by
their status, the Council went as far at Kirchberg
as to grant associate members the same guaran-
tees of aid and assistance as to the member states.
However, faced with the difficulty of extending
the application of Article V of the Brussels Treaty
to associate members, the Council resorted to a
stratagem. The difficulties were due to the fact
that granting military assistance to an associate
member might, under the constitutional system of
certain members, require the intervention of their
respective parliaments, which might not perceive
the international obligations of the state concer-
ned in the same way as the Council, in the absence
of an act of ratification of the status of associate
member of WEU'. Thus provision was made for
any associate member subject to aggression to be
assisted by WEU members on the basis of Article
5 of the Washington Treaty, although the obliga-
tion to assist in the event of aggression is not iden-
7. Yet, following the International Court of Justice, intemal
constitutional considerations have relative importance. Chal-
lenges to the compulsory value of an international
commitment based on its inconstitutionality are rejected. For
the Court, the intention expressed by a party to commit itself
prevails over provisions in force in its constitution (see the
abovementioned judgment in the case between Qatar and
Bahrein dated lst July 1994, parugraph24).
T&
tical in both cases, but the obligation to provide
assistance in face of aggression being identical,
the final source still being Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. This is an example of the tech-
nique of referral which, by the use of an inclusive
reference, allows a text other than the one which
should be applied to be used in determining the
applicable ruleE.
39. This represents a major effort at conver-
gence, not to mention unification of full and asso-
ciate member statuses in a highly sensitive area 
-
that of security guarantees. Thus, by operating,
not at a formal level, which, under certain consti-
tutions, would have required signature of a diplo-
matic instrument subject to ratification, but at a
practical one, that of providing assistance, the
desired result is achieved.
Moreover the Council was fully em-
powered, through the referral procedure, to
extend the provisions of Anicle V of the Brussels
Treaty to the WEU associate members, from the
moment it had acquired powers to " consider mat-
ters concerning the execution of the treaty ".
Under this provision of Article VIII of the treaty,
it is not a matter of purely and simply applying the
fteaty, but of questions concerning such applica-
tion, which goes far beyond the text itself.
40. Taking the process of assimilation of the
two statuses still further on a practical level, at
Kirchberg the Council also re-affirmed its will
fully to take into consideration the security inter-
ests of associate members. This decision affects
the preventive phase should associate members be
victims of aggression. It recognises, implicitly but
clearly, the ability to convene the Council to
consult with regard to any threat to peace (Article
VItr.3 of the Brussels Treaty).
4I. Clearly this provision is directed only
towards consultation between the confracting par-
ties to the Brussels Treaty which should not
involve the associate members. However such a
literal interpretation need not necessarily apply
once relations between the said parties have be-
come organisational and cease to be exclusively
contractual. WEU associate members are part of
these organisational relations. The combination of
the Rome decisions (the document plus the
minutes providing in particular for the possibility
of making proposals in accordance with the prin-
ciple of full participation in Council meetings)
and the Kirchberg decisions on including the
security interests of the associate members in the
8. Although at Kirchberg the ministers obviously did not
glpressly and formally state that Article 5 of the Treaty of
Washington was applicable to associate members as a com-
ponent of their status, they nevertheless gave a clear hint in
stating that the security guarantees of the Treaty of Washing-
ton and of the Brussels Treaty were mutually and fully reii-
forcing not only in relations between members themselves
but also between the latter and associate members.
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objectives pursued in the Council's action, in
accordance with Article VIILI of the treaty,
should enable associate members to exercise the
ability provided for in Article VIII.3 to convene
the Council to consult with regard to any threat to
peace. Any other interpretation seeking to reserve
this ability to the contracting parties alone (the
full members) might, moreover, prove unrealistic
and of no practical value. Indeed, in the event of
such a threat, it would always be possible for an
associate member to approach a fairly understan-
ding full member to convene the Council and, at
the ensuing meeting, submit its proposals.
42. The above developments on the participa-
tion of associate members in the Council's work
are presented in order to provide a certain refer-
ence for the definition of associate member status
in the Assembly. However, the Assembly's work
on the status of associate members there, as set out
in the report dated 3rd November 1993 (Document
1390) clearly led the Council of Ministers to sug-
gest, at its Kirchberg meeting, a reappraisal of the
direction taken, the more so since, as the Assem-
bly is itself aware (see Document 1416 dated 10th
May 1994), this had raised extreme displeasure
among certain associate members (paragraph 9). It
is to be noted that at Kirchberg, the ministers, out
of consideration for the Assembly, did not wish to
request it to undertake such a reappraisal. The
govemments preferred to invite the Assembly to
do so " through its national delegations ". This
raises the question of the parliamentary Assem-
bly's room for maneuvre in this respect.
43. Several points of law need to be taken into
account in defining the status of representatives of
associate members in the Assembly: frst the rights
deriving from the parliamentary functions exer-
cised by the Assembly which have enabled it to
give itself a charter. The aforementioned functions
are not those of a national parliament nor of a "
supranational " parliament such as the European
parliament. Suffice it to say in this connection that
the WEU Assembly is the equivalent of the parlia-
mentary assembly of an intergovemmental organi-
sation, for example that of the Council of Europe.
This likeness is the more valid as the WEU parlia-
mentarians are the same persons as those of the
Council of Europe. The Assernbly is an " organ of
Western European Union " (second paragraph of
the Preamble to the Charter). It is undoubtedly the
organisation's parliamentary body. As in any orga-
nisation described as intergovernmental, there is a
principal organ with responsibility for the execu-
tione of the founding treaty, the budget and what
may be termed the organisation's external rela-
tions, each of the other organs retaining the auto-
nomy inherent in their functions (parliamentary,
juridical, technical etc.).
9. Also the interpretation, application and revision of the
founding documents of the organisation.
M. The Council of Ministers has responsibility
for settling questions relating to associate member
status in the light of the changes brought about in
the relations between the Brussels Treaty powers.
In the absence of provisions for an associate mem-
ber status in the organisation's founding instru-
ment, such status is governed by a form of " prae-
torian " law, through decisions of the Council of
Ministers. However these decisions are limited to
the status of representatives of associate members
in the Council and its subsidiary organs and the
Council has refrained from interfering in the oper-
ation of the Assembly out of respect for the latter's
autonomy, as it has formally acknowledged.
45. There are rules for the guidance of the
Assembly which constitute the point of departure
for defining the status of associate parliamenta-
rians. They stem from the " praetorian " law of the
association r6gime and are of general application
and not specifically to any given organ of WEU.
There are texts which have been adopted by the
Council of Ministers as WEU's principal organ.
They, or at least some of them, are intended for the
organisation as a whole. They are well known:
those adopted at Maastricht, Petersberg, Rome and
Kirchberg in as much as they are not specifically
concerned with any particular WEU organ.
Among these texts, the subject of ministerial
declarations in the four cities mentioned, there are
certain provisions for WEU as a whole which
apply to the Assembly, even in its definition of the
status of the parliamentarians appointed to sit in
the Assembly by the associate members of the
Assembly of the Council of Europe (or to other
parliamentary representatives); and this despite
Article IX of the Brussels Treaty which limits the
composition of the WEU Assembly to parliamen-
tary representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers
to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. By
ministerial declarations, such as Maastricht and
Kirchberg, WEU's principal organ has adopted
measures and concluded agreements with the
member states described as " associate ". The
Assembly cannot just ignore these by not admit-
ting their parliamentarians to its deliberations, the
more so since the Council has, for its part, admit-
ted to its fold ministers from associate member
countries. By virtue of theirpresence they have the
right to speak and vote. The Assembly cannot
therefore create a status which would result in the
parliamentarians of associate members being
excluded from its deliberations. Their participation
might be different, and differentiated, from that of
full members. However, in the main, the Assembly
has to follow, although exceptions may be made
which do not call the principle into question.
46. The ministerial declarations also cannot be
ignored because they are central to the aims of
WEU. Through this association, it is intended to
pursue the progressive integration of Europe and
to sffengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
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Alliance. To the extent that the status of associate
member in the Assembly for allied European
states fails to serve this purpose, it cannot be
considered as in conformity with the law of the
organisation.
47. To exclude parliamentarians from the asso-
ciate members of the WEU Assembly would be to
fail to acknowledge the Council of Minister's
powers under Article VtrI of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty. One could not proceed to interpret
Article IX literally while failing to take account of
the powers contained in new Article VIII. It is in
application of the same Article VIII that the
ministerial decisions contained in the aforemen-
tioned declarations have been taken and they are
valid for all WEU bodies.
48. According to the Maastricht declaration,
associate member status must be such as to allow
full participation in WEU activities. Such full par-
ticipation has been achieved in the Council of
Ministers, in accordance with the forms and pro-
cedures set out in the Rome document. Hence this
full participation must also find expression in the
associate member status the Assembly is called
upon to establish.
To refuse the parliamentarians of associate
members the right to vote, i.e. to speak and vote,
would be tantamount to refusing the full partici-
pation of parliamentarians of associate members
in its proceedings. To what extent does the status
worked out by its Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure and Privileges in 1993 and 1994 reflect this
requirement for fullness? Put another way, what
are the statutory restrictions placed on the r6gime
of parliamentarians of associate members that
would accurately reflect the difference between
member and associate member, given the require-
ment for voting rights in a parliamentary body?
49. The Council of Ministers had foreseen cer-
tain restrictions on participation of Ministers of
associate countries in its work. The Assembly
might therefore draw on this example while
taking account of the fact that in the Council the
unanimity rule applies, whereas in the Assembly
there is no right of veto or requirement for unani-
mity, all decisions being on the basis of a major.
ity, absolute or relative. A dominant r6le, incom-
patible with the associate status of members
termed associate in the Council of Ministers, as a
result of their right of veto, was considered as
excessive, and excluded. In the Assembly there is
no veto to exclude. The Council had the more rea-
son to be restrictive given that it is a principal
body of the organisation with responsibility for
questions that are vital to its members, with
powers that are both executive and " legislative "
exercised on behalf of the organisation as a whole.
The Assembly having no such powers, the
proposed restrictions on the rights of associate
members therefore seem difficult to justify.
50. Indeed, the Assembly is not a principal
body and its powers are consultative, despite its
political importance. Reference to the r6gime in
the Council of Ministers would therefore seem to
be necessary, given the respective powers of the
nvo WEU bodies.
51. Another reference by way of information
for the Assembly in defining the status of parlia-
mentarians of associate members is provided by
that of the parliamentarians of states associated
with the Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Reference to this latter is instructive. Indeed, the
parliamentarians of associate members are part of
the composition of the Assembly and have the
same rights as the parliamentarians of full mem-
bers (see Article 5.b of the statute of the Council
of Europe). Associate members do not participate
and are not represented in the Committee of
Ministerst0 but in the Assembly they are represen-
ted on an equal footing with full members. This
precedent of the Council of Europe, although not
legally binding on the WEU Assembly, cannot not
be taken into consideration as a reference by the
WEU Assembly in its political assessments. It is
of course for the Assembly to assess whether it is
politically timely to allow associate members
voting rights, but it must also take account of the
requirement of the rule of full participation for
them.
52. An initial interpretation of this made in
Document 1390 was not approved by the minis-
ters who wished the matter to be examined fur-
ther. A second interpretation, given in Document
1416, could not be adopted for lack of the neces-
sary quorum. Moreover the parliamentary debates
took place concomitantly with those of the minis-
ters and therefore in ignorance of the latter. Can
the request for re-examination although not
addressed directly to the Assembly but communi-
cated to it (Assembly Document 1422) remain
outside its discussions, bearing in mind its auto-
nomy? The implications of that autonomy and the
political importance of the parliamentary func-
tions of its members do not allow the legal analyst
to offer srictly legal conclusions on the basis of
which the Assembly would have to reach a deci-
sion on the question raised, while the latter also
acts in accordance with a policy conceived within
the context of its political autonomy vis-i-vis the
ministers.
53. However this may be, a new factor has to
be taken into account in any legal and political
analysis, namely the exercise by the ministers of
the powers conferred on them by Article VItr of
10. Associate member status is provided for intemational
bodies with Limited sovereignty.
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the Brussels Treaty in new fields and to an extent
unequalled in the past. The Maastricht, Peters-
berg, Rome and Kirchberg declarations undoub-
tedly demonstrate in the clearest possible way the
will of the Council of Ministers to build a new
European architecture, taking account both of the
evolution of the European Union and its identity
requirements and that of the Atlantic Alliance and
the over-riding concern to preserve it. The Coun-
cil has therefore been able to exercise all the res-
ponsibilities and competencies belonging to it as
an authority empowered to consider not only the
application of the treaty but also matters concern-
ing its application and obviously its interpretation,
in accordance with well established juridical prac-
tice.
54. Strengthening the security of the Brussels
Treaty powers would certainly be among the aims
to which the exercise of these responsibilities
newly attributed to it by the 1954 protocol might
be directed. The 1948 treaty had provided the
Council with the powers of a diplomatic confe-
rence, enabling it to consult on all matters dealt
with under that treaty. Moreover, the 1954 Coun-
cil acquired the power to consider " the progress-
ive integration of Europe ". Its powers were thus
widened to the whole of Europe. Under these
conditions, all action taken by it to offer a status,
not foreseen by the treaty, to states that are not
signatories of the Brussels Treaty, is entirely in
accordance with its wider territorial and functio-
nal powers.
55. To this enlargement must also be added the
change in the legal nature of the Council, which
frst became ministerial and subsequently ceased
to be " consultative " as it had been in the text of
Article VII of the 1948 Brussels Treaty. The
Council, created by the 1954 protocol is empowe-
red to take binding decisions on behalf of the
conffacting parties, without having to resort to the
procedure of drafting and ratifying a new intema-
tional agreement, supplementing and modifying
the previous one, i.e. the Brussels Treaty. These
new powers were discharged for the fust time in
1959, when WEU ceased to exercise its functions
in social and cultural matters in favour of the
Council of Europe.
56. A further change in the nature of the Coun-
cil occurred with the creation of an intemational
organisation, called WEU, of which the Council
became the principal organ. This status of princi-
pal organ is expressed, in particular, by the fact
that it became the supervisory body of the Arma-
ments Agency which it was mandated to create
and was required to present an annual report to an
Assembly which had no right to censure it but
could only adopt opinions and recommendations.
Thus, in accordance with the law of intergovern-
mental organisations, it obtained the competence
attributed to the principal organ of the organisa-
tion. As such, the Council recognised the auto-
nomy of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU,
deriving from the nature of its functions.
57. The Council, as principal organ, acquired
the necessary powers to create (or generate) subsi-
diary or non subsidiary bodies (Agency for the
Conffol of Armaments) whose legal nature is wor-
thy of overall consideration. Therefore, with its
wider territorial powers, extending to states not
signatories of the Brussels Treaty, its power to take
obligatory, binding decisions which are both exe-
cutive and " legislative " and its status as principal
organ of WEU, it was possible for it to establish an
associate member status, with rights and duties, in
the legal order both intemal and extemal to WEU.
58. Consequently it would seem questionable
to maintain that the " document " and " declara-
tions " are political texts not enforceable in regard
to the Assembly. The Brussels Treaty has doubt-
less not been revised in accordance with a revi-
sion procedure which, furthermore, was not pro-
vided for, but which could possibly be followed
by applying the theory of the contrary act.
It was possible for the Council to create an
associate member status in full conformity with
the Brussels Treaty. This status is binding on all
the governments and all the national parliaments
of the Brussels Treaty powers. It is what might be
termed a right derived from the 1954 modified
Brussels Treaty and, as such, subject always to
certain peculiarities linked with the derived nature
of this right, it produces the same legal effects as
the Brussels Treaty. These effects are enforceable
in the states known as the Brussels Treaty powers
and their parliaments and in other WEU bodies,
from the moment they are grounded in the powers
granted to the Council of Ministers in the protocol
signed in Paris in 1954 and these powers have
been exercised in accordance with the ends for the
purpose of which they were granted, namely to
strengthen the security (of the Brussels Treaty
powers), promote the unity and encourage the
progressive integration of Europe (see Article
Vm.1 of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty).
59. Associate member status undeniably fulfils
the purposes assigned to the exercise of the
powers granted to the Council of Ministers fol-
lowing the revision of the Brussels Treaty.
Indeed, it strengthens the security of the
Brussels Treaty powers; it promotes the unity of
Europe and encourages its progressive integra-
tion, in other words that of all the allied European
states that are not signatories of the Brussels
Treaty. Furthermore, a progressive process could
not be achieved through rules fixed (ne variatur)
by the treaty but through successive decisions
adopted by an authority or institution of the orga-
nisation, empowered to act thus. This is achieved
since the associate members reaffirmed at the
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same time as the WEU member states (in the
declaration made in Rome and included in the
preamble of the document signed there on 20th
November 1992) the commitments which bind
their countries in order to ensure peace and secu-
rity in Europe. There is no better way of repeating
the first paragraph of Article Vm.l of the Brus-
sels Treaty.
Conclusions
60. a. The various decisions of the Council of
Ministers incorporated in the Maastricht, Peters-
berg, Rome and Kirchberg declarations and partly
given substance in the " document " signed in
Rome, provide an adequate legal foundation for any
possible decision by the Assembly to allow the par-
ticipation of parliamentary representatives of the
associate members of WEU. To this end the Assem-
bly has no need to implement any formal revision
procedure of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty.
b. The Assembly may base any decision it
reaches not on a literal interpretation of Article IX
of the aforementioned treaty but rather on the suc-
cessive decisions ofthe Council referred to above,
adopted in accordance with Article VIII of the
treaty. The explanatory interpretation of Article
IX which seems to prevail among certain mem-
bers is clearly in contradiction with present-day
intemational law as handed down by the Intema-
tional Court of Justice. According to that body,
charters of international organisations must be
interpreted dynamically and teleologically, taking
account of the powers inherent in the organs of the
latter (see Case: Certain expenditurc, 1962, para-
graph 157).
c. Voting rights granted to parliamentary
representatives of associate members are based on
the principle of full participation by associate
members in the actions and work of WEU. This
principle governs associate member status in the
various WEU organs, subject to possible excep-
tions and differentiations. The right to speak and
vote of representatives of associate members may
not be counted among permissible derogations, as
the report adopted by the Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges moreover recognised
(Document 1390). lndeed, there are two fundamen-
tal parts to a presence in a deliberative body":
debate plus vote. There is no participation in the
deliberation of such a body without intervention in
debates and in voting, two operations which mark a
presence inside and not outside the Assembly. The
I 1. Article IX of the Brussels Treaty is quite brief regarding
the mission of the Assembly. As an indication in this respect,
one might refer to Article 22 of the statute of the Council of
Europe which defines its Parliamentary Assembly as a deli-
berative organ of the Council. The identity of representatives
from one Assembly to the other authorises this reference as
guidance for analysing the status of the Assembly of WEU.
latter is the case of observers, whereas the former is
that of members of the Assembly. If the status of a
parliamentary representative of an associate mem-
ber of the organisation allows him to sit in the
Assembly, this presence does not need to be identi-
cal to that of the representatives of fuIl members.
The difference is de jure. The extent of differences
or derogations is determined in accordance with
political and parliamentary considerations. Such
considerations are at the discretion of the WEU
Assembly. It is an autonomous but not separate
body. In intemational organisations, the parliamen-
tary body is not a separate power in face of the prin-
cipal organ. Yet compared with the other organs in
face of the principal organ, it is an organ that has
autonomy that the others do not have. This auto-
nomy stems from its composition and its function.
Because of its parliamentary composition, the
Assembly can only operate as a supervisory body
and one of moral censure. Its task is to translate the
opinion of the national parliaments as a whole on
the question under discussion as expressed through
their delegations.
The autonomy of the Assembly allows it to
determine, discretionarily and independantly of
the decisions of the Council of Ministers, the
r6gime of the parliamentarians of associate mem-
bers in its forum with differences that may not be
those retained by the Council for the participation
of ministers of associate members in its own
work. Thus a certain number of differentiations
retained in the draft decision of the Committee on
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly (Document
1390), those set out in section II (paragraph 3,
sub-paragraph 3.6) for defining the principle for
the participation of associate members in the acti-
vities of the Assembly may be based on the auto-
nomy of the Assembly. This is so as long as the
essential aspect ofparticipation in the deliberative
power has not been challenged. Likewise, the
Assembly cannot insist on the status of represen-
tatives in the Assembly of the Council of Europe
among the representatives of associate members
who sit in that body. If the identity of representa-
tion in the two Assemblies risks not being obser-
ved, the identical number of representatives of
associate members may also be set aside. Howe-
ver, this numerical differentiation could not be
deemed to be discrimination between associate
members or between the latter and full members.
This might be the case in the event of significant
differences in relation to the representations in the
Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Conversely, no juridical basis can be seen
for refusing the participation of parliamentarians
of associate members in voting on opinions and
recommendations of the Assembly.
Henri Aoau
23rd January 1995.
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Amendments l to 5
14th June 1995
Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedare of the Assembly with a view to
accommodating associate memberc and associate pafiners of WEU
AMENDMENTS I to 5'
tabled by Mr. Speroni
In the draft decision proper, leave out paragraph I.
In the draft decision proper, leave out paragraph II.1.
In the draft decision proper, after paragraph II.l, add:
" In Rule lT ,leave out paragraph (d). "
In the draft decision proper, after paragraph II.1, add:
" In Rule lT,leave out paragraph (e) and insert:
(e) Rules 31 on motions, 32 on amendments, 33 on the right to speak, 34 on procedural motions, 35
on the organisation of debates, 37 on majorities and 43 on procedure in committees 
- 
with the
exception of provisions concerning the election of the bureaux of committees and voting rights in
committee 
- 
and 44 on reports of committees shall apply to representatives of associate member
states, unless the hesidential Committee shall decide otherwise. "
In the draft decision proper, after paragraph II.1 add:
" In Rule l'7,leave out paragraph (f) and insert:
Rule 36 on methods of voting shall not apply to the representatives of associate member states. The
Presidential Committee may decide not to apply this paragraph to discussion of texts concerning
operations, activities or functions of WEU in which associate members participate on the same
basis as full members under the terms of the document on associate membership of WEU, signed in
Rome on 20th November 1992."
Signed: Speroni
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
l. See l5th sitting, 20th June 1995 (amendments withdrawn).
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Document 1462 24thMay 1995
Drafi budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1995
Opinion of the Council
REPORT'
submitted on belulf of the Commifrae on Budgetary Affairs and. Administration'
by Mn Rathbone, Chainnan and Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXruANETONY MSIVIORANDUM
submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur
Appr,uorces
I. Irtter from Mr. Schoysman, Head of the Finance Section, to Mr. Burgelin,
Clerk of the WEU Assembly
II. Recapitulatory table of amendments to the draft budget of the Assembly on
the basis of the Opinion of the Council
III. Trend of Assembly budgets from 1994 to 1995
IV. Implications of the various heads on the operating budgets for 1994 and
1995
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee:Ml Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alvarez, Anomeritis, Mrs. Baar-
veld-Schlaman MM. Biefnot, Branger, Brugger, Curto, Daniel, Mrs. Durrieu, Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: Cummings)Mrs.
Gaioni de Biase, MM. Guia Marques (Alternate: Robles Orozco), Mrs. Hoffmann, Mr. Horn, Sir Ralph Howell, MM. Rriedner
Lauricella, Irers, Magginas, Masson, Michels, Pinto, Recoder, Scaglioso (Altefiatei Benvenuti), Thissen (Altemate: Weyts), N.. .(Altemate : Mrs. l* nt z- C o rne tt e).
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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E xplanatary M e morandutn
(subnittod by Mn Ralhbone, Chairman and Rapporteur)
1. The draft budgets (ordinary and supplementary) of the Assembly for 1995 were examined by the
WEU Budget and Organisation Committee at its meetings on 2nd September, 10th October, 3lst October,
24th November, 9th December 1994 and 13th January 1995.
2. At its meeting on 14th February 1995, the Council confirmed the recommendations of the Budget
and Organisation Committee proposing a growth rate in the operating budget of the Assembly for 1995 of
6.2Vo (we Appendix I). In taking this decision, the committee specified what within these limits the
Assembly should include in particular the credits proposed in a supplementary budget to take into account
the expenditure resulting from the accession of Greece (Part I of the supplementary budget).
3. To bring the draft ordinary budget (including the appropriations requested for the accession of
Greece) for 1995 to this growth rate, it will be necessary to make a certain number of adjustments which
will take several factors into account the posts requested but not granted, lower adjustments, statutory
remunerations (with their imptcations for permanent and temporary staff- Heads I and II), experience in
the light of actual expenditure in 1994, and the need to direct the budget insofar as possible towards a
better correspondence between the budget adopted and expenditure.
4. The following adjustments in the appropriations requested can therefore be made (see tables
herewith):
(a) reduction in the appropriations under Head I (permanent staff) by F 916 900 to take into
account the statutory adjustments of remunerations, the regrading of two grade C4 posts to
grade 83 and the non-creation of the two gradeL2 and 85 posts requested;
(b) reduction in the appropriations under Head II (temporary staffl of F 211000 to take into
account the statutory adjustments of remunerations of temporary staff indexed on those of per-
manent staff and the result of actual expenditure in 1994;
(c) increase in the appropriations under Head III (expenditure on premises and equipment) of
F 119 000 to take into account the latest data available in regard to equipping the Chamber and
the need to modernise and renew equipment to respond more effectively to the needs stemming
from the enlargement of the WEU Assembly;
(d) reduction in the appropriations in Head IV (general adminisfrative costs) of F 64 600 to take
into account most recent experience;
(e) reduction in the appropriations in Head V (other expenditure) of F 125 000 to take into account
the level of actual expenditure in t994, certain specific requests to make reductions by the
Budget and Organisation Committee (sub-heads 25 and 27) and the maintenance of the increase
originally requested in sub-head 24 (ravelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the
President of the Assembly, Chairmen of committees and Rapporteurs) in view of the sharp
increase in per diem allowances payable to parliamentarians travelling for the Assembly.
5. The detailed changes to the draft ordinary and supplementary budgets (with regard to the appro-
priations requested to meet the expenditure resulting from the accession of Greece) are shown in the table
at Appendix II. All in all, as can be seen in Appendix III, the draft budget thus revised, compared with the
financial yeu 1994, shows an increase of 6.2Vo or F 2 040 482.
6. No change has been made in the pensions budget except for receipts which have been reduced by
the amount of confibutions to the pensions system corresponding to the new posts withdrawn from the
draft budget.
7. No decision has yet been taken regarding Part II of the supplementary budget proposed for 1995 for
fitting out the Chamber.
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APPENDX I
Intterfrom Mn Schoysman, Head of the Finance Section,
to Mr. Burgelin, Clerk of the WEU Assembly
8th March 1995
SuU.j".,' 1995 budget
At its meeting on 14th February 1995, the Permanent Council of WEU agreed to all the bud-
gets for 1995 presented by the Secretariat-General, including the budget of the Assembly.
It was specified that the budget of the Assembly is increasedby 6.27o (i.e. F 34 951 482) for
the operating budget and including part of the supplementary budget relating to the accession of
Greece.
A supplementary budget for the Assembly is still to be presented.
The budgets were set out in Document C (95) 10 and the approval of the Council is taken up
in CR (95)7 of 15th February 1995.
The two documents are enclosed herewith.
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APPENDIX II
Recapitulatory table of amen&nents to the draft budget of the Assembly
on the basis of the opinian of the Council
Heads and sub-heads Draft budgetfor 1995
Amendments
resulting from
the opinion of
the Council
Revised budget
HraoI-PenMeNeNrstArtr
Sub-Head:
I 
- 
Elacia colorioo 13 768 500
3224 5N
2665 5N
238 500
14 000
19 911 000
- 
668 500
- 
119 500
- 
17 500
- 
111 400
0
- 
916 900
13 100 000
3 105 000
2 648 000
t27 tw
14 000
18 994 100
2 
- 
Allowances
3 
- 
Social charges
4 
- 
Expenses relating to the recruitment
and departure of permanent officials .......
5 
- 
Medical examination
Hrao tr 
- 
f[pp6p,4pv 516s5
Sub-Head:
6 
- 
Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly
7 
- 
Interpretation staff required for Assembly
work between sessions
8 
- 
Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk
9 
- 
Social charges
Torar Hpan II
3 470 500
944 000
75 000
218 000
4707 500
-79 5W
- 
97 000
- 
50 000
15 500
- 
211 000
3 391 000
847 000
25 000
233 500
4 496 5N
Hr,cD III 
- 
ExpnNnmnn oN pREMrsEs AND EeurpMENT
Sub-Head:
10 
- 
Share ofjoint expenditure on the Paris
s99 000
10 000
889 000
60 000
20 000
60 000
39 000
600 000
2277 WO
0
t5 000
s 000
5 000
5 000
- 
25 000
75 000
39 000
119 000
599 000
2s 000
894 000
65 000
25 000
35 000
114 000
639 000
2 396 000
1l 
- 
Hireof committeerooms
12 
- 
Technical and otherinstallations for
Assembly sessions
13 
- 
Various services for the organisation
nf qessionc
14 
- 
Maintenance of the premises of the Office
nf the Clerk
15 
- 
Purchase or repair of office furniture ......
16 
- 
Purchase of reproduction and other office
enrrinmenf
17 
- 
Hire and maintenance of reproduction and
other equipment ...............
Torru- HBeo III
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Heads and sub-heads Draft budgetfor 1995
Amendments
resulting from
the opinion of
the Council
Revised budget
HSAD IV 
- 
Gnxenel ADMTMsTRATTvE cosrs
Sub-Head:
18 
- 
Postage, telephone, telefax and transport
of docrrmenfs 853 000
237 W0
I 100000
75 000
85 000
500
2 350 500
- 
75 500
- 
3s 000
23 9N
22000
0
0
-64ffi
777 500
202000
t 123900
97 000
85 000
500
228s 900
19 
- 
Duplication paper, headed writing paper
and other office supp1ies................
20 
- 
Printing and publication of documents......
21 
- 
hrrchaseof documenfs,.,....
)). 
- 
Offiaal ae
?i 
- 
Rrnk cheroes
Tornr HSAD IV
Hmp V 
- 
Orsrn EXPENDTTURE
Sub-Head:
24 
- 
Travelling and subsistence allowances
and insurance for the President ofthe
Assembly, chairmen of committees and
346 000
404 000
5 000
830 000
60 000
510 000
571 500
3 000
28 000
2757 5W
- 
21 000
0
- 
14 000
- 
30 000
- 
60 000
0
0
0
- 
125 000
346 000
383 000
5 000
816 000
30 000
450 000
571 500
3 000
28 000
2632 500
25 
- 
F-xnenses for nfnfi
26 
- 
Committee study missions
27 
- 
Offrcial journeys of members of the Office
of the Clerk
28 
- 
Expenses of experts and the auditor...........
29 
- 
Expenditure on information .......................
30 
- 
Expenses for political groups
31 
- 
Contingencies and other expenditure not
elsewhere provided for..............
32 
- 
Non-recoverable taxes...........
Tomr Heno V
Operating budget................
Receiots.....
32 003 s00
95 000
- 
1 198 s00
35 018
30 805 000
130 018
Net total operating budget........ 31 908 500
- 
t 233 518 30 674982
Pensions expenditure
Receinfs
5 258 000
I 037 500
500
- 
55 500
5 258 500
982 000
Net total pensions budget........ 4220 500 56 000 42765W
NBr cnaxo rorAl......... 36 129 W I 177 5t8 3495t 482
F
t'
t74
I
i
I
{
,l
T!l
ii
li
ti
l,
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APPENDIX Itr
Trend of Assembly budgetsfrom 1994 to 1995
Torar oF HEADS II ro V
OF OPERATTNG RIIDGFT I 1 810900 10 768 000 9.69
1995
a
t994
b ,,+
A. Operating budget
Head T, Permanenf sfaff 18 994 100
4 496 5N
2396m0
228s 9N
2 632 5W
18 369 000
3952500
2074000
2238 5N
2 503 000
3.40
t3.76
15.53
2.t2
5.t7
Head TI- Temnorarv staff
Heqd IIT F.xnendifirte nn nre.miqes and enrrinmenf
Heed IV General administretive cosfs
Head V. Other expenditure..........
Tofal exnenditure 30 80s 000
130 018
29 t37 W
95 000
5.72
36.86Reeeinfs
Npr rorar A 30 674 982 29 042000 5.62
B. Pensions budget
Pcncionc qnd leqwino cllnu/ 5 258 500
982 000
4 756 000
887 000
10.57
10.71Reeeinfc
4276 5N 3 869 000 10.53
Gel.rERAL NET TorAL (A + B) 34951 482 32 911 000 6.20
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APPENDIX IV
Implications of the various heods on the operating budgets for 1994 and 1995
1994 r995
Amount 9o on Amount Vo on
A B A B
Operating budget
Expenditure
HeadI 
- 
Permanentstaff
Head II 
- 
Temporary staff
Head III 
- 
Premises and equipment
Head [V 
- 
General adminisrative
costs
HeadV 
- 
Otherexpenditure
A. rorer
Receipts
18 369 000
3 952 500
2074000
2238 5W
2 503 000
63.M
13.57
7.t2
7.68
8.59
63.25
13.61
7.14
7.71
8.62
18 994 100
4 496500
2396m0
2285 9W
2 632 5N
6r.66
14.60
7.78
7.42
8.55
61.92
14.66
7.81
7.45
8.58
29 t37 0W
95 000
100.00 100.33
0.33
30 805 000
130 018
100.00 t00.42
0.42
B. Ner rorAl 29 042W0 100.00 30 674 982 100.00
Column A = Total of expenditure.
Column B = Net total (expenditure less receipts).
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Opinion on thc bud.gcts
of the ministcrial organs of Western European Union
for the financial year 1995
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration '
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapportour
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnnrr RgcorrtugnpnuoN
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the finan-
cial year 1995
ExpleNerony Meuonexouu
I. Introduction
II. General
III. Global budgetary prospects
IV. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1995 - Section A
V. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1995 - Sections B, C
VI. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1995 - Section D
VII. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1995 - Section E
VIII. The budget of the Institute for Security Studies for 1995
IX. The budget of the WEU Satellite Centre for 1995
X. Other 1995 budgets: WEAG, TPA, WEU operations 
- 
in progress and
unforeseen
XI. Action taken on Assembly Recommendation 563
AppeNorces
I. Recapitulatory table of Secretariat-General funds
II. Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Secretariat-General, Section A
III. Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Secretariat-General, Section B,
ex-PMO pensions
IV. Establishment table of the Secretariat-General
V. Organogram of the Secretariat-General
VI. Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Secretariat-General, Section E,
Planning Cell
VII. Recapitulatory table of the budget of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
VIII. Recapitulatory table of the budget of the WEU Satellite Centre
IX. Cost-sharing formulae for WEU budget contributions
X. Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Western European Armaments
Group (WEAG) [not available]
XI. Assembly Recommendation 563 and reply of the Council
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Memhers of the utntmittee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alvarez, Anomeritis, Mrs. Baar-
yeld-Schluncut, MM. Biefnot, Branger, Brugger, Curto,Daniel, Mrs. Durrieu, Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: Currrrnirrg.r), Mrs.
Gaiotti de Biase, MM. Cuia Marques (Alternate: Robles Oro:co), Mrs. Hoffmann, Mr. Horn, Sir Rollth Hov'ell,MM. Kriedner,
Lauricella, Leers, Magginas, Masson, Michels, Pinto, Recoder, Scaglioso (Alternate: Benvenuti), Thissen (Alternate: Werr.s), N...
(Alternate: Mrs. Le nt:.-Co rne tte).
N.B. Ihe names ofthose tuking part in the wile ure printed in italic's.
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Draft Recommendation
on the budgets of the ministerial orgaas of Western European Union
for the Jinancial year I 995
The Assembly,
Considering:
(a) that the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the
financial year 1995;
(b) that the budget of the Secretariat-General comprises five sections, of which section D relates to
medium- and long-term studies on space and has seemingly been left in suspense;
(c) that the budget documents do not contain full information on the various cost-sharing formulae
for calculating contributions by states;
(d) that on l5th May 1995 the Council of Ministers took decisions on the future of the Torrej6n
Satellite Centre, giving it permanent status as an organ of the Council;
(e) that the Council of Ministers agreed on the creation of a situation centre and an intelligence sec-
tion within the Planning Cell;
(f) that the Council intends to allocate WEAG an operating budget for the financial year 1995
in accordance with the normal procedure and that this budget should be financed by thirteen
countries;
(g) that the Council has approved an operating budget for transatlantic publicity activities (TPA)
and that this budget should be financed by thirteen countries;
(h) that the Council has approved the budget for the financial year 1995 for WEU's police opera-
tion in Mostar;
(i) that examination of the question of the budget for operation Sharp Guard is being conrinued;
(j) thar the Council has frozen a sum of BF 2 500 000 for financing the start of possible unforeseen
operations;
(k) that the Council has still not started the study for introducing a private health insurance scheme
instead of the French social security scheme, as recommended by the Assembly in Recommen-
dations 550 and 563 and envisaged by the Council in its reply to the latter recommendation,
REcorraveruos rHAT rHp Couxcll
I Inform it just as sqon as possible of the result of the discussions on all the cost-sharing formulae forfinancing the various WEU budgets;
2. Communicate to it swiftly the decisions that are taken regarding the Torrej6n Satellite Centre now
that the Ministers have agreed to give it permanent status;
3. Communicate to it all measures, especially budgetary measures, directed towards rapid implemen-
tation of the decision taken by the Ministers to create a situation centre and an intelligence-section within
the Planning Cell;
4. Communicate to it the result of the medium- and long-term studies on space and the decisions taken
on the 1995 budget concerning section D;
5. Communicate to it the decisions that are taken concerning the WEAG and operation Sharp Guard
budgets;
I ^ Inform il of_a1y criteria for the use, financing and subsequent developmenrs concerning the use ofthe frozen credit of BF 2 500 000 earmarked for financing the start of possible unforeseen operations;
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7. Urgently take the measures necessary for implementing its own intentions as stated in its reply to
Recommendation 563 to enable WEU personnel in Paris to be affiliated to a private health insurance sche-
me after cancellation of the convention now in force with the health insurance branch of the French social
security scheme;
8. Maintain the closest relationship and communication with the Assembly so that Ministers, secreta-
riat and Assembly appreciate bener, and can meet, the budgetary requirements of WEU's expanding,
higher profile r6le, and so that each can make their own most positive and constructive contribution to
those future developments.
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E xp lanato ry M e mo randum
(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The most recent meeting of WEU Ministers
and Section I of the Lisbon declaration adopted
by the WEU Ministers on l5th May 1995 dealt
very largely with WEU development. Two
aspects in particular should be noted with regard
to budgetary means: the development of WEU's
operational means and relations with the EU,
NATO and third countries.
2. Concerning operational means, the Council
of Ministers decided to provide the organisation
with new decision-making mechanisms and struc-
tures, particularly in politico-military matters, and
welcomed the report by the Secretary-General on
strengthening the secretariat in this area. This will
lead directly to increased costs in the future as
new posts are created, both in the secretariat and,
inevitably, in the staff of the Assemhly.
3. Ministers agreed the creation of i"situation
centre and an intelligence section within the Plnn-
ning Cell. Implementation of these decisr.
though expected, is likely to be delayed bf 'the
absence, at this stage, of appropriate budgetary
means for 1995.
4. Finally, Ministers agreed to give the Torre-j6n Satellite Centre the status of a permanent
WEU body. This decision should enable the
Space Croup of the Permanent Council to intro-
duce the new proposals for adapting the centre to
the requirements of a permanent body, the r6le of
which is crucial for the development of the intelli-
gence section and the situation centre and, more
generally, of the operational capabilities of the
organisation. Costs are certainly involved.
5. Regarding the enlargement of WEU and its
developing relations with the EU, NATO and
third countries, and taking account of decisions
aiming to involve a further seventeen countries in
the new conditions of European security, there
must be realistic funding to meet additional costs
for both secretariat and Assembly. The Assembly
will be able to fulfil its r6le effectively, particu-
larly vis-h-vis the Council, only if it is given the
means to obtain first hand information on the spot
from the authorities of the countries concerned
and to explain to those authorities and to political
decision-makers the logical evolution of WEU's
defence strategy. That will require additional bud-
get allocations to meet increasing meeting and
conference costs.
6. The Council of Ministers, moreover, stres-
sed the importance it attaches to the r6le played
by the Assembly in the debate on European secur-
ity and defence and to its valuable contribution to
consideration of future developments and stra-
tegy. This is likely to lead to increased committee
work 
- 
and costs.
7. If governments are anxious to develop
WEU and expand its membership, its abilities and
its activities, they must match those aspirations
with realistic funding in all its parts.
II. General
8. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter
of the Assembly:
" The Assembly shall express its views in
the form of an opinion or recommendation
on the annual budget of Western European
Union as soon as it has been communi-
cated. "
9. The present report, prepared in application
of this provision, relates to the four sections of the
budget of the Secretariat-General for 1995 and the
other budgets for 1995 for WEAG, TPA and
WEU operations and also to the budgets of the
subsidiary organs which have administrative
autonomy, namely the Institute for Security Stu-
dies and the Satellite Centre.
10. Analysis of these budgets is complicated by
the fact that WEU is still passing through a period
of dynamic adaptation to the new facts of the
international political situation created by the
evolution of the situation in Central and Eastern
Europe and its implications for the European
Union and the Atlantic Alliance, in the Mediterra-
nean and also the enlargement of the European
Union and the accession of Greece.
I l. In this highly fluid political conrexr, your
Rapporteur, as in the past two years, will confine
himself to an analysis of these budgets that might
provide a basis of reflection for the political
bodies.
12. In his overall presentation of the budget of
the Secretariat-General, the Secretary-General set
his requests, from the very start, in the threefold
context of the up-grading of WEU security stan-
dards, now that the organisation operates from
Brussels, to comply with those of NATO, improve-
ments in technical facilities necessary to cope
h
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with enlargement and the overall strengthening of
its activities:
" It is for this reason that the I995 Secreta-
riat-General budget shows substantial
growth in:
- 
related security requirements, including
work on the WEU building;
- 
postage and WEU communications, and
in the yearly cost of participation in the
TARE/IVSN secure network;
- 
the need for reproduction equipment to
support meeting rooms and for more sta-
tionery;
- 
the need to replace obsolete PCs and to
buy new software programmes.
The increase is also due to the:
- 
high (non-recurring) costs for travel and
interpreters for the ministerial meetings
in Madrid and Lisbon;
- 
salaries for new staff authorised in the
1994 budget which relate for the first
time to the whole year and not just a few
months only as in the previous financial
Year, "
III. Global budgetary prospects
13. The budget of the Secretariat-General for
the financial year 1995 has five sections:
Section A: Secretariat-General.
Section B: Pensions budget of the former ministe-
rial organs in Paris.
Section C: Agency for the Control of Armaments.
Section D: Space studies in the medium and lon-
ger term.
Section E: Planning Cell, Institute for Security
Studies, Satellite Centre.Other 1995 budgets for WEAG, Transatlantic
Publicity Activities, Mostar, Sharp
Guard, Unforeseen Operations.
14. Taken together, WEU's total budget
(including the Assembly) for the financial year
1995 stands at BF I 261280292,downby l.3%o
as compared with the same amount for 1994. In
terms of calls for contributions (bearing in mind
the sharp reduction in 1993 surpluses as compared
with those for 1992) the increase will be 13.9Vo.
15. If, however, the less traditional aspects of
WEU's activities such as the Mostar, Sharp Guard,
TPA or WEAG operations are not taken into
account, the overall WEU budget (including the
Assembly) for the financial year 1995 will be
BF I 197 892 625, a reduction of 4.6%o as compa-
red with 1994. 1995 calls for contribution will the-
refore (and for the same reasons as above) show an
increase of 9.67o in 1995 as compared with 1994.
IV. The budget of the Secretariat-General
for 1995 - Section A
16. As the recapitulatory table in Appendix I
shows, the total net operating budget
of the Secretariat-General for the financial year
1995 (Section A, Appendix II) stands at BF
284 456 932, an increase of 17 .477o as compared
with the 1994 budget.
17. In terms of calls for contributions and des-
pite a surplus of BF 13 000 000 in 1993 the
increase to member states will in fact be 19.87o.
18. It can be observed that the administrative
support provided by the Secretariat-General to
the Planning Cell and WEAG amounts to BF
58 400 750 for the financial year 1995. This sum
represents approximately 20Vo of Section A
budget.
19. Lastly it can be observed that the contribu-
tion of the national delegations occupying offices
in the WEU building will contribute a total
amount of BF 723 000 to the organisation's
budget.
20. Examination of the various Heads of Sec-
tion A of the budget for the financial year 1995
shows a net increase in staff. To the 7l posts iden-
tified in this report for the 1994 budget should be
added 3 further posts in respect of WEAG and I I
new creations bringing the total to 85 posts for
1995, plus 7 further posts for the EUCLID
research cell. In terms of grade this net increase of
ll posts breaks down as follows: 4 Grade A posts
(one in the Political Affairs Division and WEAG
and two translators) and 7 Grade B or C posts
(including one security guard).
21. Of the seven posts created under the
EUCLID programme, five are Grade A and two
Grade B.
22. The budget for personnel costs (see
Chapter A.l) for the financial year 1995 thus
stands at BF 298 505 519, an increase of 2l.63Vo
as compared to 1994.
23. The budget for travel for the financial year
1995 (Chapter A.II) has also increased very mar-
kedly to BF 7 253 470, i.e. an increase of 70.ll7o
as compared with 1994. The Secretary-General
has stressed that the sum requested is exception-
ally high due to the fact that the ministerial
meetings are to be held in Spain and Portugal.
24. There is an increase in the budget covering
other operating costs for the 1995 financial year
(see Chapter A.III) of 15.517o. ln particular it
can be noted that the budgets for the London
building (BF 2 435 000) increase by I 18.667o and
communications (BF ll 234 000, specifically
TARE) by 93.16Vo. The purchases budget (see
Chapter A.IV - BF 2289 100, specifically infor-
matics) increases by 3ll.9Vo.
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25. It can be noted finally that the budget
approved does not make provision for the creation
of a possible intelligence cell.
26. The budget of the Secretariat-Ceneral for
the financial year 1995 is completed by estimates
for pensions for 27 retired employees and for
severance pay, payment of which is anticipated in
1995. Taking account ofthe amount budgeted for
allowances (BF 5 100 000) and officials' contri-
butions to the co-ordinated organisations' pension
scheme (\Vo of basic salary) the net appropriation
for the pensions budget stands at BF 39 336 000.
V The budget of the SecretariahGeneral
for 1995
Sections B and C 
- 
Pensions budget
of the former ministerial
organs in Paris and of the Agency
for the Control of Armaments
27. Sections B (Appendix III) and C of the bud-
get of the Secretariat-General call for no particu-
Iar comment. Section B sets out the consequences
of the assumption by the Secretariat-General of
the costs of pensions paid to 74 retired staff of the
former Paris-based ministerial organs: these pen-
sions are entered in the budget in the sum of BF
12275 180, i.e. an increase of 2.50Vo as compared
with 1994. It can be observed that this budget also
includes the contributions of officials of the
Secretariat-General and the Planning Cell and the
contributions of the sole ACA official. The secre-
tariat notes that the draft budget does not take into
account the possible payment of a pension to the
ACA agent in 1995. If this were to occur the
necessary amounts would be transferred in due
course from the ACA (salaries) budget to the
PMO pensions budget.
28. Section C shows amounts relating to the
operation of the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments (ACA) whose seat has remained in Paris.
Appropriations of FF I 184 634 under this head
cover the salary of a permanent A Grade official
with the duties of controller, the costs relating to
his official missions and information costs.
VI. The budget of the Secretariat-General
for 1995
Section D 
- 
Space studies in the medium and
longer term
29. In his budget proposals for 1995, the
Secretary-General states that there might be a call
for funds (ecus I 000 000, BF 40 000 000) with
the authorisation of the Space Group, for carrying
out further studies. The 1994 surplus of BF
I I 500 000 would then be deducted from that
amount.
30. In thegeneral recapitulatory table ofbudget
decisions submitted to the Council, the line cor-
responding to Section D shows no budget appro-
priations for 1995.
31. The Council might keep the Assembly
informed of the developments of work in this
area.
VII. The budget otthe Secretariat-General
for 1995
SectionE-PhnningCell
32. Section E covers, for the third consecutive
year, the budget estimate for the Planning Cell for
the 1995 financial year.
33. This budget, totalling BF 69 628 500 (see
Appendix VI) shows an increase from one year to
the next of 12.087o, with staffing levels unchan-
ged. This increase is explained by the enlarge-
ment of WEU, namely the fact that associate
member and associate partner countries currently
participate in co-ordination activities. Of the total
budget, BF 56 747 W (or 81.57o) was repaid to
the budget of the Secretariat-General in 1995 in
respect of its contribution to administrative support.
34. Finally, it may be observed that the budget,
as approved, makes no provision for the creation
of a situation centre.
VIII. The hudget of the Insfitute for Security
Studies for 1995
35. As the work of the Institute for Security
Studies is progressing normally, the budget for the
financial year 1995 overall (Appendix VII), with
staffing unchanged, has been updated in line with
general economic circumstances.
36. It should be noted that this budget does not
include any provision in terms of the budget
appropriations necessary for studying changes to
the health insurance scheme for Paris-based staff(for example the cost of studies) contrary to the
reply of the Council to the Assembly's Recom-
mendation 563 (see Appendix XI).
37. A summary of the budget estimates for the
Institute is set out in Appendix VII.
IX. The budgetfor the WEU Satellite Centre
for 1995
38. At the beginning of 1994 the Centre started
the second phase of its experimental period. Dis-
cussions at ministerial level concerning the future
of the Centre, initially foreseen for November
1994, were deferred and should now be held at the
meeting in May 1995. This delay has clearly led
E
I
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to repercussions on and difficulties for the man-
agement of the Centre.
39. The 1995 budget (see Appendix VllI), pen-
ding a decision on the future of the Centre and
with staffing levels unchanged, is merely an
adjustment to general economic circumstances.
The agreed sum compared with a sum of Ptas
I 891 210 000 for 1995, shows an increase of27o.
40. It provides however for the possibility of
creating nine additional posts subject to a two-
fold condition of agreement at the Council of
Ministers in May on the future of the Centre and
agreement in the Space Group on reorganising the
Centre's structures.
X. Other 1995 budgets: WEAG, TPA,
WEU operations 
- 
in progress and unforeseen
41. To the more traditional WEU budgets
financed by the contributions of nine (now ten)
countries must now be added those of WEAG,
TPA and WEU operations: Mostar and Sharp
Guard and unforeseen operations, which are
financed according to variable methods. It must
be noted that the cost-sharing formulae for the
contributions of participant countries have not
all been worked out or are not known to the
Assembly.
42. It may be observed that these budgets
represent a rapidly-increasing share of the overall
budget of WEU since from one year to the next
their share has increased from l.83Vo to 5.03Vo. lt
should however be noted that the comparison can-
not be pursued further on account of the fact that
the 1994 budgets for the Mostar and Sharp Guard
operations are not known. In spite of this absence
of information it can be observed that the increase
in " other budgets " does not seem to be the result
of a rapid growth in WEU's operational commit-
ments, since WEAG's budget alone accounts for
more than 73.5Vo of the other budgets.
A. WEAG and research
43. This budget of BF46 752275 for 1995 has
virtually tripled from one year to the next.
44. The estimate is for financing by thirteen
countries (Appendix IX).
B. Transatlantic publicity activitie s
45. This budget stands at BF 8 054 272 for
1995. The 2.4Vo increase represents an adjustment
to general economic circumstances.
46. The estimate is for financing by thirteen
countries (Appendix IX).
C. Current operations (Mostar and Sharp Guard)
47 . The budget estimates for 1995 for these
two operations remain fairly modest, totalling BF
6 081 120, of which over 85.5Vo is attributable to
the police force operations in Mostar. These fore-
casts appear for the first time in the total WEU
budget. It is therefore impossible to make compa-
risons over time.
48. It should also be noted that although the
1995 Mostar budget was approved by the Council
in September 1994, discussions are currently
being pursued on the 1995 Sharp Guard budget.
D. Unforeseen operations
49. The Council has also approved a budget
forecast of BF 2 500 000 for financing unforeseen
operations. This amount will be frozen until such
time as the Council decides an operation is to be
implemented and authorises the use of the appro-
priation, pending a decision on a specific budget.
XI. Action taken on Assembly
Recommendation 563
50. In approving Recommendation 563 (See
Appendix XI), the Assembly recommended that
the Council:
" l. Communicate to it any decisions that
are taken on the operation of the Torre-
j6n Satellite Centre after completion of
the experimental phase at the end of
1994;
2. Communicate to it the final arrange-
ments for the preparation and manage-
ment of WEAG's budget;
3. Take the necessary measures for WEU
staff in Paris to be affiliated to a private
health insurance scheme upon termi-
nation of the current agreement
with the health insurance branch of
the French national social security
scheme. "
51. The reply to this recommendation was
given in October 1994 (see Appendix XI).
52. The Assembly can but note the fact that the
Council will keep it duly informed of the deci-
sions it will take on the operation of the WEU
Satellite Centre after the completion of the experi-
mental phase.
53. The Assembly can but note that provisions
have been made for the preparation of the 1994
WEAG budget.
54. Regarding paragraph 3, the reply of the
Council coming after others such as that to
Recommendation 550, cannot be considered
satisfactory as this question is of major interest to
staff and to member states. Indeed the savings, for
the same contributions from those insured, would
be very substantial for staff and for member states
since staff and employer contributions would be
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halved. Contributions to the French social secur-
ity system at present account for approximately
F 2 000 000 of the Assembly's annual budget.
55. Moreover it is difficult to understand the
Council's reasoning, namely that such measures
" should be considered in the general context of
relations with the host country ". Although admir
tedly a change of health insurance scheme implies
a change in the administrative convention that at
present binds WEU to the host country, the for-
mulation and implementation of a staffing policy
is the organisation's responsibility and hence
exclusively that of the Council. Other intergo-
vernmental organisations, located in France, such
as the OECD or the Council of Europe, bound by
similar conventions, have in fact adopted a private
insurance system or are on the point ofdoing so.
56. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand
why a change of affiliation for staff in Paris rela-
ting to only one aspect of the national social secu-
rity system, sickness insurance (since they are
affiliated neither to the state pension nor to the
unemployment insurance scheme and only indi-
rectly to the family allowance system) should pre-
sent particular diffi culties.
57. The Assembly therefore continues to ask
the Council to request the Head of Administration
of the Institute for Security Studies to carry out
studies and negotiations with the French authori-
ties with the aim of allowing Paris-based staff of
WEU go change their affiliation as soon as pos-
sible, following the example of the situation for
the remainder of the staff of the organisation.
58. Furthermore, it must also be noted that the
Council has not hitherto acted upon its own sug-
gestion to request the Head of Administration of
the Institute for Security studies to carry out more
detailed studies.
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APPENDIX I
Recapitulatory table of Secretariat-General funds
1994 budgets
BEF
1995 budget
credits BEF
I 995 credits
to call BEF
(2):( l) (3)t994
WEU Secretariat (l) (2) (3) (4) (s)
A. S.G. 242 157 469 284 4s6932 271 456932 17.5 r9.8
A.l.A. Pensions 34 104 7 t0 29 252200 25 152200
- 
14.2 0.2
E. Planning Cell 62260 t00 69 628 500 68 3r8 940 r r.8 r0.9
Institute 96 877 989 105 476 532 t05 476 532 8.9 r 6.5
Satellite Centre 404 955 000 404 560 000 223 353 653
- 
0.1 9.2
Tornm I 255 085 237* I 197 892625* 994 698 955*
- 
4.6 9.6
* Including PMO pensions, ACA and Studies on Space.
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APPENDIX II
Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Secretariat-General, Section A
Outturn
199-3
(2)
Approved
budget
1994
(3)
Committed
30.09. r994
(5)
Expected
outturn
3t.12.1994
(5)
1995 budget
estimates
I 995
(6)
+/- BEF(6)-(3)
(7)
+l- Vo
(6)t(3)
(8)
Chapter A.l:
Personnel costs t94 514734 245 423733 r74 863 845 239 r98 418 298 505 252 53 08r 519 2t.63
Chapter A.ll:
Travel 4 698 025 473t 470 3 364 t44 4731 470 7 73t 470 3 000 000 63.41
Chapter A.lll:
Other operating
costs 94597 r85 12252t 9t8 r0r 8r0 9r6 r r8 761 654 t4 522960 19 00r 042 t5.5 I
Chapter A.lV:
Purchases I 076724 733 900 t 06t M2 r 430000 3 023 000 2 289 r00 3 r r.9t
Chapter A.V:
Security 59 920 r 533 000 1076699 2 600 000 3 202 000 r 669 000 r08.87
Income
Chapter A.VI:
WEU tax 67 265 t79 80 200 552 59 886 963 80 r6s 000 r04 092 000 2389t 448 29.79
Chapter A.VII:
Other receipts t 256324 52 s76 000 575 r98 52742290 65 43s750 l2 859 750
NET TOTAL 226 42s 085 242 t67 469 22t 7t4885 233 8t4 2s2 157 456932 42289 463 17.46
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APPENDIX III
Recapitulatory table of the budget of the Secretariat-Geneml, Section B, ex-PMO pensions (FF)
The provision for pensions in 1995 is based upon the 74 existing pensions, and a provision is made tbr 3 I st December pension
adjustments and inflation. The budget proposal does not take account ofthe possibility that a pension might have to be paid to the
ACA staff member in 1995. If this were the case, Ihe necessary credits would in due tirne be transt'erred fiom the ACA budget
(salaries) to the PMO pensions budget.
Expenditure Expenditure/income
r 993
Approved budget
t994
Budget proposals
1995
7c
L Pensions t0 95r 782.02 l0 9r3 s00 r r r87 000 2.5t
2. Allowances 6s9 6r3.00 705 000 723 0N 2.55
3. Leaving allowance 0.00 0.00
4. Supplementary insurance paid
by WEU 367 517.96 390 000 400 000 2.56
5. Bank charges 4979.33 5 000 5 000 0.00
Torel EXPENDTTURE Il 983 892.69 t2 0r3 500 r2 315 000 2.50
INcove
l. ACA Staff Contributions 87o 39 161.64 38 850 39 820 2.50
Tornl RECETPTS 39 t6t.64 38 850 39 820 2,50
Nrr rornl 11944 73t.05 ll 974 650 l2 275 r80 2.50
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APPENDIX IV
E stablis hme nt table of the Secre nriat-Ge neral
Post no. Title Grade of post
t0.
il.
9.
L
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
23.
24.
A.
15.
16.
B.
r9.
20.
C.
12.
2t.
25.
26.
27.
D.
I 50.
I 54.
l5l.
152.
t 53.
t60.
t6t.
I 62.
t63.
t64.
165.
t66.
II.
30.
31.
32.
Secretary-General
Deputy Secretary-General
Special Adviser to the SG
Personal Assistant to the SG
Personal Assistant to the DSG
Personal Assistant to the SG
P o litic al Affairs D iv is io n
Director for Political Affairs
Secretary to the Director
Assistant
Security Policy Section
Head of Section
Assistant
Defence Policy Section
Head of Section
Assistant
Policy and Planning Section
Head of Section
Research Assistant
Secretaries
Divisional Assistant
Secretary/shorthand typist
Secretary/shorthand typist
Secretary/shorthand typist
Se c retary/s ho rt hand ty pi st
Military Expert
WEAG
Head of Section
Assistant
Assistant
Secretary
Secretary
Research Cell (EUCLID)
Direc'tor
Deputy Director
Administrator
Administrator
Administrator
Secretary
Secretary
Council Secretariat
Head
Deputy Head
Assistant
8.4
8,4
8.2/3
A.3t4
A.2t3
A.3t4
A.2t3
B.4
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.2/3
4.3t4
A.2/3
A.2t3
8.2t3
8.2/3
4.4/5
A.3/4
A.2/3
A.2/3
A.2/3
8.3/4
8.2/3
4.4t5
4.3t4
A.2t3
HG
HG
A.6
8.3t4
A.2/3
4.3t4
A.2t3
r88
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E stablishme nt table of thc S e crenriat-Ge neral (c ontinued)
Post no. Title Crade of post
33.
34.
35.
36.
III.
40.
4t.
IV
50.
5t.
52.
53.
54.
59.
60.
6t.
55.
56.
57.
58.
V
70.
71.
72.
84.
76.
80.
90.
9t.
81.
92.
82.
83.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
VI.
t20
tzt,
122,
t23,
124,
Secretaries:
Secretary/shorthand typist
Secretary/shorthand typist
Secretary/shorthand typist
Se c re tary/s ho rthand rypi st
Press and Information
Head
Secretary
Trans latio n D e p artme nt
Head (Reviser)
Translator/Reviser
Translator/Reviser
Translator
Translator
Translator
Translator
Translator
Assistant-terminologist
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Adminis tratio n D iv is in n
Head of Division/Legal Adviser
Assistant for Personnel
Secretary
Telephonist/shorthand typist
Storekeeper
Maintenance Officer
General Handyman (Maintenance)
General Handyman (Maintenance)
Head of Registry
Archivist
Duplicating Clerk
Duplicating Clerk
Registn'Clerk
Telephonist/registry clerk
Messenger
Messenger
Driver
Driver
Finance and Budget Sectiott
Head of Section
Deputy Head of Section
Chief Accountant
Finance Assistant
Finance Assistart
Secretary
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.3t4
8.2/3
A.4
8.3t4
LT.5
t:I.4
tx.3t4
LT.3
LT.3
t:t.2t3
LT.3
LT,2/3
8.4t5
B.2t3t4
B.2t3t4
B.2t3t4
A.5
8.4t5
B.2t3t4
8.2t3
8.4t5
A.2t3
c.3t4t5
c.314
8.4t5
8.3t4
8.2t3
8.2t3
8.2/3
8.2t3
c.2t3
c.2t3
c.2t3
c.2t3
A.3t4
A.2t3
A.2t3
B.4
8.3/4
B.2t3t4
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E stablishme nt table of the Se c retariat-General (c ontinued)
(*) Only one post may be promoted to C.4 (Head of Security Guards).
Post no. Title Grade of post
Vil.
r 30.
t3l.
t32.
r 33.
134.
r 35.
r 36.
t37.
r 38.
r 39.
140.
t4t.
142.
143.
144.
t45.
Security Bureau
Head of Bureau
Deputy Head/Head of Communications
Communications Officer
Head of Security Guards
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Securiry Guard
A.3t4
A.2t3
8.3t4
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2l3t4 (*)
c.2l3l4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2l3l4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2t3t4 (*)
c.2l3t4 (*)
c.2/3/4 (*)
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SECRETARY.GENERAL
DEPUTY SECRETAR.Y-GENERAL
Pers. Assist. to the SG 84
Perr. A.s.si.st. to the SG B2/3
Pers. Assist. to the DSG 84
POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
Directol A6
Secretary to the Director B3/4
Assistant A2l3
Secretariat (*x)
Division assistant 84
3 Secretaries B3/4
I Secretun'82/3
ADMINI*STRATION
FINANCE
SECURITY
See chart on p. 2
COUNCIL SECRETARIAT
Head A4l5
Deputy Head A3/4
Assistant A2l3
3 Secretaries B3/4
I Secretan'82/3
TRANSLATION DEPARTMENT
Head LI5
2 Translators/Revisers LT4
3 Translators LT3
2 Translators LT2l3
I Assist. Termin. B4l5
3 Secretaries B2l3/4
Armaments Secretariat
Head A3/4
Assistant A2l3
Assistunt A2/3
Secretary B2l3
Secrctury B2/3
Security Policy Section
Head A3/4
Assistant A2l3
Research Cell (EUCLID)
Head A4/5
Deputt' Heucl A3/4
Administrator A2/3
Aclministntor A2/3
Administrutor A2/3
Sec'rerun' B3/4
Secretun' B2/3
Policy and Planning Section
Head A3/4
Assistant A2l3
Defence Policy Section
Head A3/4
Assistant A2l3
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Special Adviser to the
Secretary-General (*)
Military exp€rt (*)
Notes
('r') The incumbent is paid nationally and is with WEU on a temporary
basis, without altering the establishrnent plan.(+':') Secrelariat common to all sections on the |eti.
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SECRETARY-GENERAL
DEPUTY SECRETARY.
GENERAL
ADMINISTRATION
Head of Division 45 ('r')
Assistant tor Personnel B4l5
Secrcrary B213/4
Telephonist/Shorthand typist B2l3
SECURITY BUR,EAU
Fl€ad A3/4
Deputy Head/Head of CIS A2l3
FINANCE & BUDGET SECTION
Head A3/4
Deputy Head A2l3
Chief Accountant A2l3
Finance Assistant 84
F inuncc Assisutnt B-l/4
Secretary B2l.1/4
Maintenance Otlicer ,{2
General handyrnan C3/4/5
Ceneral handyman C3/4
Seculity Guards
Head of guards C4
I I guards C2l3
I 14uttrul C2/3
Communications
Communications Officer B2l3/4
5 NCos 1'r'r;
Registry
Head of Registry B4l5
R?.9i.$r,1' clerk B2/3
Telephonist/registry B2l3
Archives
Archivist B3/4
Reproduction
2 duplicating clerks B2l3
2 messengers C2l3
2 drivers C3/4
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('r') Head of Personnel & Administration and Legal Adviser.(++) The incumbents are paid nationally.
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APPENDIX VI
Rccapituhtory tablc of thc budget of thc Sccrctariat General, Scction E, Phnning Ccll (BEF)
OutUrn
1993
(2)
Approved
budget
199,4
(3)
Committed
30.09.1994
(5)
Expectcd
outtum
31.12.t994
(5)
1995 budget
estimates
1995
(6)
+/-BEF
(6>(3)
(7)
+l- Vo
(6)/(3)
(8)
Chapter E.l:
Personncl costs 66722N 6 304 100 4 515 94{) 609295A 6 631 900 327 8m 5.20
Chapter E.II:
Travel 2 000 000 2 750 000 t 452894 2 500 000 2 980 000 230 000 8.36
ChapterE.III:
Other operating
costs 19796250 55 205 000 2 094 886 54978314 61 636 600 6431 600 11.65
ChapterE.M
Purchases 285 000 300 000 196230 805 320 l 006 000 706 000 235.33
Income
Chapter E.VI:
WEUtax 22360f0 2290C[0 I 711 827 2293 627 2 481 000 191 000 8.34
Chapter E V.II:
Other receipts 174 000 145 000 52292 90 000 145 000 0 0
Nrr romr 26343 450 62t24tN 6 495 831 61992957 69 62E 500 7 5M4N 12.08
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APPENDIX VII
Recapitulatory table of the budget of the WEU Inst'ttute for Security Studies
Budget
r995
Chapter I 
- 
Personnel costs t7 737 2W
Chapter II 
- 
Travel 400 000
Chapter III 
- 
Functional expenditure 2 900 000
Chapter IV 
- 
Operating costs specific to the
Institute 854 000
Chapter V 
- 
Purchases r00 000
Chapter VI 
- 
Contribution by the Institute to
the joint charges for the building r 32r r00
Tornl ExpeuorruRe (Chapters I to VI) 23 3t2 300
Chapter VII 
- 
WEU tax 6 134900
Chapter VIII 
- 
Other receipts \ 1t0000
Tornl Recerprs (Chapters I to VI) 6244900
Net Operating t7 067 400
Pensions
Chapter P.l 
- 
Expenditure I 231 3N
Chapter P.ll 
- 
Receipts 637 000
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APPENDIX VIII
Recapitubtory table of the budget of the WEA Satullite Centre
Revised according to recommendations made by the Budget and Organisation Committee
Summary of estimated expenditure and income
Millions
of pesetas
Find
accounts
1993
Corresponding
credits
for 1994
Exp/inc until
lst Oct.
1994
Estimated
expflnc
for 1994
Credits
proposed
for 1995
Differencr
1995
& 1994
Vo
Difference
t995
& 1994
Esnuerro DoENDITURE
I. Personnel costs[. Travel
III. Gerpral operating
COSB
IV. Mission operating
cosB
V. Captal expenditun
Contingencies
3M.00
17.21
70.s9
48.09
1000.91
0.00
u5.51
30.00
84.96
347,10
744.N
0.00
395.75
12.17
47.24
32.34
52.25
0.00
555.79
24.n
93,67
195.40
698.00
0.00
736.13
29.40
80.47
384.21
661.00
0.00
90.62
- 
0.60
-4.49
37,n
- 
83.00
0.00
+14
-2
-5
+11
- 
1l
0
Total cunent costs 1480.80 I 851.57 539.75 1.566.86 t 89t.2t 39.64 +2
INcon,te
VI. WEUtax
VII. Other receipts
l13.62
90.20
206.00
25.75
143.49
51.55
196.47
45.60
238.79
34.18
32.79
8.43
+16
+33
Oprurnvc rNcoME 203.82 231.75 195.M 242.07 272.97 4t.22 +18
Nsr opERATnvc cosrs 1276,98 1619.82 344.7t 1324.79 1618.24
- 
1.58 =Q
httstotts
P.I Income
P. II Expenditure
11.l3
0.22
17.31
1.05
t3.57
3.21
6.07
18.46
23.39
35.57
6.08
34.52
+35
+3288
Nsr pBNsroN
[.rcowDsFrcn 10.91 16.26 r0.36 12.39 - 12.18 -28.M 175
Nnr HcsNDrruRE 1266.07 l 603.56 334.35 1312.40 1630.42 26.86 +2
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APPENDIX IX
Cost-sharing formulae for WEU bud.gct con(ributions
Country Revised formula Current formula
France
Germany
Italy
United Kingdom
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Greece
Portugal
Luxembourg
Iceland
Norway
Turkey
t6.75
t6.75
16.75
t6.75
t2.75
6.r5
5.90
2.N
2.00
0.30
0. r0
r.90
r.90
(r7.00)
(r7.00)
( r7.00)
( r7.00)
( r3.00)
(8.35)
(8.3s)
(-)
(2.00)
(0.30)
(-)
(-)
(-)
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APPENDIX XI
Assembly Recommendation 563 and reply of the Council
RECOMMENDATION 563'
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial year 19941
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that:
(a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the
financial year 1994;
(b) the budget of the Secretariat-General comprises five sections, of which section D relates to the
study on medium- and long-term studies on space and section E to the Planning Cell;
(c) the Torrej6n Satellite Centre has entered its second experimental phase and the Ministerial
Council is proposing to discuss the future of the Centre towards the end of 1994;
(d) the Council has allocated WEAG an operating budget for the financial year 1994 under a
special procedure and that this budget is financed by thirteen countries;
(e) the Council still has not undertaken the study recommended earlier by the Assembly leading
to possible approval of a private health insurance scheme instead of the French social security
system,
Reconauexos rHAT rue CouNcrL
l. Communicate to it any decisions that are taken on the operation of the Tonej6n Satellite Centre
after completion of the experimental phase at the end of 1994;
2. Communicate to it the final arrangements for the preparation and management of WEAG's budget;
3. Take the necessary measures for WEU staff in Paris to be affiliated to a private health insurance
scheme upon termination of the current agreement with the health insurance branch of the French
national social security scheme.
I . Adopted by the Assembly on l5th June 1994 during the first pan of the fortieth ordinary session (5th siuing).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Covi on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration (Document 1425).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendalion 563
l. The Council will keep the Assembly duly informed by means of regular reports on the decisions it
will take on the operation of the WEU Satellite Centre after the completion of the experimental phase.
2. The Council informs the Assembly that the 1994 WEAC budget has already been approved by the
National Armaments Directors (NADs), the Budget and Organisation Committee and the Council. Calls
for contributions were also issued after the approval.
As for the remaining budget-balance of the Permanent Secretariat of WEAG in Lisbon, this has
been transferred to WEU Brussels and will be reimbursed in 1994 (or carried over to 1995 if member
states prefer).
The WEAG budget is in preparation.
3. The Council considers that the necessary measures to be taken for WEU staff in Paris to be affilia-
ted to a private health insurance scheme should be considered in the general context of relations with the
host country; the Council could ask the Head of Administration of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
to consider this question in greater detail.
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Document 1464 24thMay I9iS
Ukraine and European securily
REPIORTI
submitted on behalf of the Defence Commifree '
Dy SirRussell lohnsnn, Rapporteur
TABLEOFCONTENTS
PnsFecE
Dnarr RscolvtrvcNDAfl oN
on Ukraine and European security
ExpI-eNeronv Mmlon eNputr,t
submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
tr. Reform of the economy
Itr. Debt and financial assistance
IV. Ukraine's foreign policy
V. Defence spending and the restructuring of the armed forces
VI. The division of the Black Sea fleet
VII. Implemencation of the trilateral statement on nuclear weapons
VIII. CFE implementation
IX. Ukraine's defence industry
X. The Crimean peninsula
XI. The Trans-Dniestr region of Moldova
XII. Energy situation and the problem of Chernobyl
XItr. Ukraine-Russian relations
(a) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)(b) Relations with Russia
XIV. Partnership agreement with the European Union
XV. Relations between Ukraine and WEU
XVL Conclusions
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2.Members of the committee:Mr. Baumel (Chairman); Mr. De Decker, Mrs. BaarveW-Schlaman (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle,
Mrs. Beer, MM. Bianchi, Briane (Altematei Galley), Brito, Cox, Dees, Dumont, Femandes Marques, Mrs. Fernandez Ramiro
(Alternate: Cuco),MM. Hardy,Hom, Jacquat, Kastanidis, Kelchtermans, La Russa, Mrl Lcntz-Contette,Ml,,/1. Lopez Valdiviel-
so, Marten, Lord Newall (Alternate: Si Russell lohnslon), MM. Parisi, Pavlidis (Alternate: Liapis), Pecriaux, Petruccioli, Schlo-
ten, Reis Leite, Sir Dudley Smith,Mr. Sole T[ra (Alternate: de Puig), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn (Alternate: Si Keith
Speed), MM. Vasquez, Vrettos, Zierer, N...
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Preface
In preparing the present report, the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly visited Kiev,
Ukraine, on 4th-6th April 1995. During this visit, the committee and your Rapporteur were exffemely for-
tunate to receive much kind help and assistance from all the authorities with whom they had discussions
and would like to take this opportunity publicly to thank all concerned for their kindness and co-operation.
The programme of the committee's visit included the following meetings and visits:
4th April 1995 Meeting with the Chairman of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, Mr. O. Monoz
Meeting with the Head of the Defence and State Security Committee, Mr. V. MouKHtrr,
and members of the committee and representatives from the Foreign Affairs Ministry
5th April 1995 Meeting with the First Deputy Minister of Defence, Commander of the General Head-
quarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General A. Lopere
Visit to a housing complex for the military staff of Ukraine's armed forces, built with
financial support from the German Government
Visit to a military unit
6th April 1995 Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. G. OupoveNxo
Meeting with the Deputy Minister of the military-indusrial complex, Mr. Valery P.
Knzlxov
Meeting with representatives of the Committee on Foreign Atrairs of the Supreme
Rada of Ulaaine
Visit to the Antonov aircraft works
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Drafi Recommendation
on Ukmine and European securit!
The Assembly,
(i) Aware of Ukraine's positive contribution to security and stability in Europe through the implemen-
tation of the trilateral declaration of January 1994 to dispose of all nuclear weapons on its territory and
through its decision to accede to the non-pr6fiferation treity as a non-nuclear stafe;
(ii) Noting that the continued existence of Ukraine as an independent state and its ability to make fur-
ther progress in transforming its economy and society depends greatly on international support and co-
operation;
(iii) Aware that the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty of friendship and co-operation between
Russia and Ukraine is of vital importance for the independence and security of Ukraine as well as for the
stability of the region;
(iv) Noting that in recent months Russia has apparently not been forthcoming in the negotiations prepa-
ring the abovementioned treaty;
(v) Aware that Ukraine will not be able to restructure and reorganise its armed forces and the defence
of its territory until a final agreement on the division of the Black Sea fleet and its infrastructure has been
concluded with Russia;
(vi) Deploring Russia's unilateral decision to extend its armed forces in northern Caucasus with the
newly-created 58th army in violation of the CFE Treaty;
(vii) Noting that any suggestions to modify the CFE Treaty should be discussed exclusively in the fra-
mework of the 1996 review conference;
(vfii) Regretting the continued presence of the Russian 14th army in the Trans-Dniesfr region, far beyond
the borders of Russian territory;
(ix) Noting that an early enlargement of NATO would not be conducive to stability in Europe and could
transform Ukraine into a buffer state between a newly-opposed East and West;
(x) Noting that in view of WEU's status as part of the process of European integration, closer links bec
ween Ukraine and WEU cannot be considered as threatening any third counnry in Europe;
(xil Aware that the WEU Council of Ministers attaches particular importance to appropriate relation-
ships with Russia and Ukraine;
(xii) Welcoming the decision of the Permanent Council of WEU on the organisation of the dialogue with
Russia and Ukraine, which will allow for exchanges of information on issues of common interest;
(xiii) Stressing, however, that, compared with Russia, Ukraine since its independence has shown a far
more positive attitude in its active policy towards building security in Europe,
Rscolvnmuos rHAT TIiE CouNc[.
1. Continue to intensify the security dialogue with Ukraine, paying attention in panicular to its speci-
fic r6le in the European security architecture;
2. Make clear in its security dialogue with Russia that the early conclusion of a reaty of friendship and
co-operation between Russia and Ukraine is of vital importance for security in Europe.
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Explanatory Memorandam
(submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur)
I.Introdaction
1. Since its existence as an independent state
in 1991, Ukraine has clearly demonstrated that its
overall policy is dedicated to the promotion of
peace and stability in Europe. The signing of the
ftilateral statement on 14th January 1994 and
accession to the non-proliferation treaty as a non-
nuclear state have been the most obvious manifest-
ations of this policy, but Ukraine has also made
efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem
of Crimean separatism. Minorities are enjoying
respect.
2. Nevertheless, in Western Europe, there are
still doubts over Ukraine's position in the Euro-
pean framework. Addressing the Assembly of
WEU in December 1993, the former Foreign
Minister of Ukraine stated that Ukraine conside-
red itselfto be an organic and inseparable part of
the Cenral and Eastern European region. He also
said that " a single all-European security space
can be created only by securing regional stability
in Central and Eastern Europe and by providing
this region's organic linkage with Western Euro-
pean security sffuctures ".
3. More than a yeff ago, in the Kirchberg
declaration of May 1994, the WEU Council of
Ministers agreed that the policy conducted by
Ukraine widened the base for the development of
dialogue and exchange of information with Ukraine
on issues of common concern. Since then, this
dialogue with Ukraine has indeed been developed
further.
4. In this framework, the Defence Committee
of the WEU Assembly considered it useful to pay
a visit to Ukraine in order to discuss a number of
issues with the political and military authorities in
Kiev. The results of this visit held in April 1995
are presented in the present report.
II. Reform of the econom!
5. After his election in July 1994, President
Kuchma made it clear that the reform of Ukraine's
economy is one of his main objectives. The
Supreme Rada's approval of a tough 1995 state
budget with a 7.3Vo fiscal deficit, as had been
agreed between President Kuchma and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, paved the way for more
financial support. On 9th April 1995, the IMF
approved credits for Ukraine up to a total amount
of $1.96 billion to support the government's eco-
nomic prograrnme for 1995. Of this total amount,
$1.57 billion is being made available as a one-
year stand-by credit, while another $392 million
is to be disbursed in a support programme for the
transition to a market economy.
6. Shortly before approving the 1995 budget,
the Supreme Rada passed a motion of no confi-
dence in protest against the government's radical
economic policy. Observers noted that itprovided
President Kuchma with an opportunity to replace
cabinet ministers opposed to economic reform.
The hesident is seeking to reduce the parlia-
ment's leverage in economic policy and to
increase his own executive power.
7. Under former President Kravchuk, the
Ukrainian Government has been reluctant to take
radical measures to restore the national economy.
Recent figures confirmed, however, that the
efforts of succeeding governments have met with
some success.
8. Inflation went down from 4 735Vo in 1993
to 842Vo in 1994 and Ukraine has a commitment
to the IMF to bring it down further to 2I0Vo in
1995. GDP diminished by 14Vo in 1993,23Vo in
1994 and a 5Vo reduction is expected for 1995.
The budget deficit went from 30.4Vo of GDP in
1992 to l0.lVo in 1993 and 9.67o in 194. The
government has promised the IMF to keep it
between 3 and4Vo in 1995.
9. Efforts are now being made to accelerate
privatisation, which had started only very reluc-
tantly under President Kravchuk. In fact, the
2 000 companies which were privatised during
1992 and 1993 could not be acquired by external
investors.
10. The government now intends to privatise
8 000 large and medium-sized companies in the
next two years. Under the new system, personali-
sed vouchers will be distributed to the population
which can be swapped for shares at regional pri-
vatisation cenfres responsible for co-ordination.
11. The new privatisation programme is sup-
ported by the European Union via its TACIS pro-
gramme (Technical Assistance for the Common-
wealth of Independent States), and by USAID(United States Agency for International Develop-
ment) and the World Bank.
12. As far as the agriculnrral sector is concer-
ned, agricultural products have now been privati-
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sed, which means that kolkhozes are responsible
for selling their products. They will receive the
full price, but state subsidies have been stopped.
A first start is being made with limited privatisa-
tion of farrnland, but the government is acting
carefully here because it wishes to avoid a com-
plete disintegration.
t3. On 1lth April 1995, the World Bank appro-
ved a $114 million loan to support a progftlrnme
envisaging to dismantle Ukraine's eight vertically-
integrated electric power monopolies and replace
them with four independent competing electricity
generators. Earlier, President Kuchma had publi-
shed a decree to set up a national electricity pool
authorising denationalisation of four plants and
creating 27 local electricity disfibution compa-
nies'.
14. As is the case in other former Soviet repu-
blics, foreign investors have been reluctant to
invest money in the Ukrainian market because of
shortcomings in legislation and unpredictable
overnight changes to trading rules and tax laws.
III. Debt andtinancial assistance
15. On 20ttr March, Ukraine and Russia signed
an agreement on the repayment of Ukraine's debt
of $4.2 billion to Russia. According to this agree-
ment, $2.7 billion will be paid offduring a twelve-
year period. A debt of $1.5 billion for deliveries
of natural gas by Russia's Gazprom company has
been converted into government bonds. Ukraine
has also promised to pay its energy bills for 1995.
16. Ukraine's financing gap for 1995 is estima-
ted at $5.5 billion. This will be covered by a $600
million loan from the World Bank, a debt settle-
ment with Russia and bilateral contributions
amounting to $800 million, of which the Euro-
pean Union should contribute $400 million. The
European Union contribution has not yet been
agreed, since some member states, in particular
France, have insisted on linking financial support
to the dismantlement of the Chernobyl nuclear
power station. On 13th April 1995, a basic agree-
ment on the closure and dismanflement of Cher-
nobyl's nuclear power station was reached, but
the financial consequences of the agreement
remain to be negotiated.
17. During recent months, there has been a pro-
tracted debate among European Union members
over financial assistance to Ukraine. From the
beginning, Germany, supported by the European
Commission, has pleaded for early and generous
financial aid in order to prevent Ukraine's econo-
mic collapse and to preserve the country's inde-
pendence.
Iaans received by Ulcainetrom international
financbl insfinfions ( I 99 j -9 5)
EBRD
1. Project of reconstruction of the interna-
tional airport Boryspil (22nd December
1993) 
- 
$5.1 million.
2. Project of development of small- and
medium-sized businesses (l6th Decem-
ber 1994) 
- 
100 million ecus.
3. Project of reconstruction of Kiev's mar-
keplace (l9th January 1994) 
- 
$14.8
million.
4. Loan for reorganisation of financial and
administration structures (25th June
1993) 
- 
$27 million.
5. Loan for regulation of payment crisis
(2ZndDecember 1994) 
- 
$500 million.
IMF
1. The support of Ukrainian payment
balance (24th October 1994) 
- 
$7 42 rntl-
lion.
2. " Stand-by " (7th April 1995) 
- 
$1.4 bil-
lion.
18. Of an 85 million ecu aid package promised
by the European Union and a $1.9 billion aid pack-
age promised by the G-7, nothing has yet been
received because of continuing negotiations over
the financial consequences of the closure and dis-
mantlement of Chernobyl.
IV Ukraine's foreign policy
19. In October 1994, outlining his economic
reform programme to the Supreme Rada, Presi-
dent Kuchma called for a " strategic partnership "
with Russia and Ukraine's fully-fledged participa-
tion in the strengthening and development of the
economic community within the bounds of the
CIS, arguing that the continuation of the " pre-
vious policy of self-isolation is economic and
political suicide "2. At the same time, he shessed
that enhanced co-operation with Russia and the
CIS should not be at the expense of relations with
the West nor allow any threat to Ukraine's territo-
rial integrity or independence.
20. The Ukrainian Government is perfectly
well aware that its concerns over Russia's attitude
and influence cannot be neutralised by alliances
with the West. The objective is therefore to make
Ukraine a non-nuclear, non-bloc, regional power
with diversified interests, capable of co-operating
with all partners to the detriment of none.
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21. The " Main Directions of Ukrainian
Foreign Policy " adopted by the Supreme Rada on
2nd July 1993, established the following four
priorities:
- 
cultivate good bilateral relations which
can help to renew old ties and as a result
facilitate Ukraine's integration into the
wider global and European order;
- 
intensify regional co-operation with such
organisations as the OSCE, the North
Atlantic Alliance and the European
Union. The partnership and co-operation
agreement with the European Union is
considered a first step towards full mem-
bership;
- 
participation in the CIS, while rejecting
any CIS supranational competences;
- 
full co-operation with the United Nations
and its specialised agencies.
22. On different occasions, Ukraine has stres-
sed its neutrality and non-bloc status and the pol-
icy of non-alignment adopted by the Supreme
Rada in the abovementioned document is still
valid. It is also argued, however, that non-align-
ment in a Europe no longer divided into two blocs
does not exclude co-operation with regional orga-
nisations. In Ukraine, this policy is called " active
neutrality ".
23. National security is a main concern for the
government which takes the view that any form of
co-operation with, and integration in, existing
European institutions and organisations will
enhance Ukraine's security and contribute to its
survival as a state. Participation in NAIO's part-
nership for peace initiative is now firmly under
way, and the partnership and co-operation agree-
ment with the European Union, signed on 14th
June 1994, awaits ratification in the European
Union member states. A structured dialogue has
been established with WEU and Ukraine hopes to
be admitted as a member of the Council of Eur-
ope in the near future.
24. A good working relationship has been esta-
blished with the OSCE and Mr. Max van der
Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities, has recently accomplished a mission
in Ukraine dealing with the situation in the Cri-
mean peninsula.
25. The policy of non-alignment does, how-
ever, prevent Ukraine from signing a collective
security agreement providing for h collective res-
ponse to agglession against any of its signatories,
as was signed by six CIS member states in Tash-
kent in May 1992. Likewise, it cahnot be a mem-
ber of NATO. Ukraine is not in favour of the
enlargement of NAIO to include certain Central
European states because it might transform
Ukraine into a buffer state and lead to Russian
pressure to sign a collective security agreement
similar to the Tashkent agreement.
26. Ukraine takes the view that enlargement of
NATO should be evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary, adding that enlargement may be less des-
tabilising in a few years' time, when Ukraine
hopes to have befter consolidated its own position
as an independent state.
V. Defence spending and the restructurtng
of the armedforces
27. Ukraine is considerably reducing its def-
ence budget because of a chronic shortage of finan-
cial resources, which has understandably a serious
impact on the restructuring of its armed forces.
28. ln 1994, 14741billion karbovantsy were
allocated to defence spending, while the military
had asked for 63 700 billion.
29. On 22nd March 1995, the Supreme Rada
adopted a defence budget envisaging substantial
new cuts in funding and troop levels. [n 1995,
defence spending will again fall below the
requests of the defence establishment to 2.67o of
GDP, or 120.000 billion karbovantsy (around
$800 million). According to the Defence Minis-
try, this would meet only lTVo of expected costs,
down from 34Vo in 1992. With this budget, it will
hardly be possible to cover pensions, salaries and
basic supplies while housing is still lacking for
70 000 military personnel. It will also be exfieme-
ly difficult to pay for equipment maintenance,
modernisation or disarmirment which, as a conse-
quence, will be postponed to a later date3.
U kraine's s hrinking military n
Troopatragih Cm,
,u
tG. o .a+.
}lrarffiE illl, .^
3. This does not refer to CFE Treaty arms reductions which
Ukraine is implementing as required by the treaty. Recently it
indicated that it may need western financial aid for full
implementation by November 1995.
4. Source: Financial Times, 24th March 1995.
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30. All these factors may slow down Ukraine's
objective to reduce its armed forces to 250 000
ftoops by 1997. These stood at 726000 troops
when the country became independent and
sfiengths are planned to be roduced to 400 000 by
the end of 1995.
31. The government is also aware of the fact
that releasing large numbers of officers and sol-
diers on a contracting labour market without pro-
viding them with adequate social protection may
create another element of social instability.
32. In July 1994, legislation was infroduced to
clarify the r6le of the Defence Ministry and dis-
tinguish it from that of the General Staff. The
Defence Ministry now has responsibility for iden-
tification of threats to Ukraine, management of
the military industrial complex and the conver-
sion process, and defining criteria for co-opera-
tion with other ministries. Shortly afterwards,
hesident Kuchma appointed Valery Shmarov as
Ukraine's first civilian Defence Minister.
33. With ethnic Russians forming a majority in
many units in the early stage of transformation of
the armed forces, a Social-Psychological Service
was established with responsibility for the pario-
tic education of military personnel or the " rebuil-
ding of morale with a Ukrainian spirit ". Predicta-
bly, a number of zealots overstepped the limits of
their task, which made the service rather unpopu-
lar among certain sections of the armed forces. It
has now been renamed the Main Administration
for Educational and Social-Psychological Work
and is taking a more pragmatic approach.
34. In the reorganisation of the armed forces,
the Carpathian and Odessa military districts were
replaced by two operational commands, Western
and Southern, each with three corps. The head-
quarters of the Kiev military disfiict has become
both the Ukrainian General Staff and the National
Ministry of Defence.
35. The airforce and the air defence branch of
the army have been combined in practically the
only major reallocation of r6les and resources to
have taken place outside the navy. The allocation
of troops between the former Soviet military dis-
tricts on Ukrainian territory has remained practi-
cally urrchanged since independence.
36. It is also noted that the organisation of a
command and control structure, subject to the
central authorities in Kiev, in accordance with a
concept of defence which shapes the armed forces
into a cohesive force reflecting the needs of the
state, will still take some time to be completed.
37. In fact, the armed forces as inherited from
the former Soviet Union are still more suited to
their raditional r6le of first strike offensive in a
western direction than to defensive operations in all
directions, as required by the new military doctrine.
38. When it emerged at an early stage that the
division of the Black Sea fleet would be a compli-
cated matter, taking years to resolves, Ukraine
decided to start creating its own navy based on an
April 1992 presidential decree. A naval command
was appointed, crews for Ukrainian naval ships
were formed and shipyards were commissioned to
build new ships. The navy headquarters, a naval
academy and some units were located in Sebasto-
pol. At the moment, the Ukrainian navy has about
ten large or medium-sized ships, more than forty
smaller patrol craft and several other surface
ships. Among the large and medium-sized ships
are a command and reconnaissance ship, a guided
missile cruiser, two frigates, and four desffoyers.
A new frigate was launched in 1994. Last year,
Ukraine took over the Black Sea fleet's 318th
division which is planned to provide Ukraine's
first coastguard unitu.
39. High inflation and a continuing shortage of
funds and energy are some of the problems which
the new Ukrainian navy is facing. There is a shor-
tage of housing and the navy has problems in
paymg wages.
40. In October 1993, the Supreme Rada adopted
a national military doctrine with a political, techni-
cal and economic section. This document argues
against the stationing of foreign ffoops on its terri-
tory or that of other states, without agreement and
states that " Ukraine will consider is potential
adversary to be any state whose consistent policy
constitutes a military danger to Ukraine "7.
41. The armed forces have a r6le in defending
Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity,
in protecting Ukraine's borders, its ports and ship-
ping in the Black Sea area and in maintaining
internal order. They must also be able to respond
to the need for peace-keeping in the region and to
integrate with allies and partnerst.
42. The guiding principles of the military doc-
trine's economic section are: the preservation of
the country's military-indusrial base for maxi-
mum benefit to the armed forces in line with
financial aid and material constraints; the attain-
ment of an advanced system of armament; an eco-
logically safe and economically feasible system
of arming forces and dismantling weapons; and a
rational conversion prograrnme.
43. Ukraine's intention of becoming a non-
nuclear state was carefully worded as follows:
" Having become the owner of nuclear
weapons through historical circumstances,
5. See Chapter VI of the present report.
6. RFE/RL Research report, 6th May 1994.
7. RFE/RL Research report, 28th January 1994.
8. Vyacheslav Pikovshek and Christopher Pett: Transforma-
tion of the Ukrainian armed forces, NAIO Review No. 5,
October 1994.
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Ukraine will never sanction their use and
excludes the threat to use nuclear weapons
from its foreign policy arsenal. In the
future, Ukraine intends to become a non-
nuclear state and links the reduction and
desftuction of nuclear weapons with appro-
priate actions by other nuclear states and
the granting by them and by the world com-
munity of reliable security guarantees. "
Meanwhile, Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-
nuclear state in December 1994'.
VI. The division of the Black Seatlcet
44. Immediately after the establishment of
Ukraine's independence in December 1991, Pre-
sident Leonid Kravchuk issued a decree on the
Ukrainian armed forces outlining the structure of
the armed forces. Ukraine claimed all former
Soviet military hardware and forces on its terri-
tory, with the exception of the strategic forces. As
a consequence, Ukraine claimed the ownership of
almost the entire Black Sea fleet, a claim disputed
by Russia, which argued that the fleet was a stra-
tegic force. When measures were taken and
conflicting decrees were issued by both sides lead-
ing to a chaotic situation, the Presidents of both
countries suspended their decrees in April 1992
and agreed to holding negotiations on the issue.
45. The Black Sea fleet is said to consist of
some 440 ships, including about forty major sur-
face ships, eighteen submarines and 250 smaller
ships, but the total number of ships to be divided
is 833, taking account of a large number of non-
combat and other small vessels. It also has some
300 naval aircraft and helicopters and 70 000 per-
sonnel. The majority of officers are Russian, but
60Vo of the conscripts are local recruits from Cri-
mea. It should be noted that, at present, a large
part of the fleet is not operational because of dis-
repair or lack of maintenance. The average age of
ships in the fleet is between fifteen and twenty
years and, with a continued lack of maintenance,
the fleet would be completely ineffective by the
year 2000. The negotiations over the Black Sea
fleet have now been dragging on for more than
three years. Of the many issues involved, mention
could be made of loyalty oaths to the two respec-
tive states, the fleet's infrasffucture, which is
worth more than the fleet's ships, the status of the
Crimean peninsula where most of the infrastruc-
ture is located and the financing of the fleet.
46. On different occasions, in particular June
1992, June 1993, September 1993 (Massandra)
and April 1994, an agreement was announced
which later fell apart or did not materialise.
47. The main bone of contention is access to
the attendant bases and, in particular, to Sebasto-
pol which hasS2%o of the fleet's infrastructure and
which is of historical and national significance to
both Russia and Ukraine. Russia has insisted that
Sebastopol will remain as the main base of the
Russian Black Sea fleet, not to be shared with
Ukraine. Access to the Crimean naval bases is an
issue of strategic importance. For Russia, it would
facilitate the exercise of influence in the Black
Sea region, including the Balkans.
VII. Implementatian of the trihteral statement
on nuclear weapons
48. Ukraine inherited 176 intercontinental bal-
listic missiles with nuclear warheads and 41 stra-
tegic bombers from the Soviet Union. Although
Russia was in full confrol of the launch codes and
Ukraine had neither the technology nor the finan-
cial means to store these weapons properly or to
gain connol over them, it was generally thought
to be an undesirable situation. Ukraine used the
presence of these strategic nuclear weapons as
leverage both to assert its newly-acquired position
as an independent state and to be granted financial
aid in case it decided to give them up.
49. In January 1994, aftercomplicated negotia-
tions, Ukraine signed a trilateral statement with
Russia and the United States to give up its strate-
gic nuclear arsenal in exchange for about Sl bil-
lion in nuclear fuel supplies and financial assis-
tance for disarmament. In the trilateral statement,
Ukraine undertook to tansfer to Russia at least
200 nuclear warheads for dismantling within ten
months. Ukraine also promised to eliminate,
within seven years, all nuclear weapons, inclu-
ding strategic offensive arms, on its territory. Rus-
sia, with Ukraine's co-operation, was to ensure
the servicing and safety of nuclear warheads pend-
ing their ffansfer to Russia for destruction. Russia
and the United States would work to place all
Ukraine's nuclear activities under the safeguard
of the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) in order to legalise the unimpeded export
of Russian fuel assemblies to Ukraine.
50. Shortly afterwards, on 3rd February 1994,
the Supreme Rada ratified the START I Treaty
and the Lisbon Protocol, which associated the
Soviet successor states with the START I Treaty.
Following ratification by the Supreme Rada on
16th November 1994, Ukraine acceded to the
Nuclear Non-holiferation Treaty (MT) as a non-
nuclear weapons state on 5th December 1995. In
the context of Ukraine's accession to the NPT,
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and
the United States have extended written security
assurances. These assurances concern the
commitment of these states to seek immediate
Security Council action in certain circumstances
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9. See also Chapter VII of the present report.
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involving the use, or threat of the use, of nuclear
weapons against Ukraine as a non-nuclear wea-
pons state party to the NPT.
51. At the same time, these states undertook to
recognise Ukraine's territorial inviolability and
not to infringe its sovereignty through economic
force. Ukraine's accession to the NPT also
enabled the START I Treaty to enter into force
between Russia and the United States on 5th
December 1994 and opened the way for ratifica-
tion of START II. The entry into force of START
lI may be delayed because of the negative impact
of Russia's violent military intervention in Chech-
nya on relations between Russia and the United
States. At the Russian-United States summit meet-
ing in Moscow on 10th May 1995, both Presi-
dents promised to push for ratification by their
respective parliaments before the end of 1995, but
with Russian parliamentary elections scheduled
for December, ratification is unlikely to take place
quite so soon. There is also shong hesitation in the
United States Congress.
52. Ukraine is now fully implementing the sta-
tement and is transferring its nuclear warheads to
Russia for destruction. According to Colonel-
General A. Lopata, all intercontinental ballistic
missiles on Ukraine's territory have been deact-
ivated. On the other hand, Ukraine has noted,
regretfully, that of a total amount of $500 million
promised by the United States for the dismantling
of nuclear weapons, it has so far only received
$100 million.
53. Ukraine is trying to negotiate the sale of its
twenty Tu-160 (Blackjack) and twenty-three Tu-
95H (Bear 2) srategic bombers to Russia in
exchange for spare parts for its Russian-supplied
weapons and maintenance for its Russian-made
aircraft.
V I I I. C F E implementation
54. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE), signed in Paris in November 1990,
was drawn up for the deployment of conventional
armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals. In the area defined in the treaty, the combi
ned member states of NATO and the combined
former Warsaw Pact states are each entitled to
have a maximum of 20 000 tanks, 20 000 artillery
units, 30 000 infantry fighting vehicles, 6 800
fighter aircraft and 2 000 attack helicopters. The
treaty also includes regional and flank limitations
in order to prevent threatening concentrations of
armed forces in specific areas.
55. The arms reductions envisaged in the treaty
were to be implemented in three phases: 207o by
September 1993, 60Vo by September 1994 and
INVo by November 1995. The flank limitations,
which exclusively concern Russia's military dis-
tricts of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) and north
Caucasus and the south-eastern part of Ukraine's
territory will come into force in November 1995.
56. At their Tashkent summit meeting in May
1992, the successor states of the Soviet Union
participating in the CIS divided among them-
selves the CFE treaty-limited equipment (TLE) of
the former Soviet Union. According to this divi-
sion, Ukraine is entitled to a maximum of 4 080
tanks, 5 050 infantry fighting vehicles, 4 040
artillery units, 1 090 aircraft and 330 attack heli-
copters.
57. Underthe terms of the CFE Treaty, Ukraine
is committed to remove from service almost 2 000
tanks, more than 1 000 armoured vehicles and
around 300 military aircraft. In general, Ukraine
has been complying with the disarmament sche-
dule until now, but the serious financial problems
of the armed forces may lead to requests for wes-
tern financial assistance to complete the dismantl-
ing of the remaining surplus of CFE Treaty-limi-
ted equipment.
58. Within the framework of the armed forces'
resffucturing, the Kiev, Carpathian and Odessa
military districts were reorganised in 1992, blut,
since then, the CFE Treaty-limited equipment
quotas set for these districts have remained in
force, which has resulted in an unbalanced and
rather illogical deployment of arms and equip-
ment across the counfiry. For example, the fteaty
allows for 680 tanks in the Odessa district, cove-
ring the southern part of Ukraine and 3 400 tanks
in the Carpathian and Kiev district, covering the
western part.
59. In September 1993, Ukraine was the first
state to re-open the subject of flank limitations. It
asked for a revision of the CFE Treaty, arguing
that CFE limits on the deployment of its arma-
ments inside its own borders are based on flank
limitations which have become irrelevant with the
dissolution of the two-bloc opposition in Europe.
Implementation of the treaty, it was argued, would
force Ukraine to defend one quarter of its terri-
tory with lTVo of itstanks,TTo of its infanty fight-
ing vehicles and227o of its artillery units.
60. Later, Russia also insisted on a revision of
the CFE Treaty which, according to Defence
Minister, Pavel Grachev, interferes with Russia's
sftategic interests. Russia argues that the treaty
does not provide sufficient forces and equipment
for the defence and protection of its south-western
border. As a consequence of flank limitations,
Russia is allowed to deploy only l5vo of its armed
forces in the military districts of Irningrad and
north Caucasus, which together cover more than
half of is European territory. According to the
CFE Treaty, Russia is allowed to deploy not more
than 700 tanks, 580 armoured vehicles and 1 280
artillery units at its south-western border in the
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north Caucasus district. At present, Russia consi-
ders the North Caucasus military district as its
most important line of defence.
61. A revision of CFE flank limitations could
therefore also lead to redeployment of Russian
forces in the north Caucasus military district bor-
dering on Ukraine, a consequence which would
certainly not contribute to an enhanced feeling of
security in Ukraine. Until now, NATO has rejec-
ted all requests to change flank limitations, refer-
ring any discussion on the implementation of the
CFE Treaty to the 1996 review conference.
62. On 26th April 1995, Russia announced its
decision to extend its armed forces in the north
Caucasus through the creation of a new force, the
58th Russian army, by June 1995. The 58th army
will be created on the basis of an existing army
corps in Vladikavkaz, north Ossetia, to which new
units will be added. lmplementation of this deci-
sion would constitute a violation of the CFE
Treaty.
63. Ukraine has implemented its CFE Treaty
obligations and does not intend taking any unila-
teral decision which would go against the treaty. It
insists, however, that there are anomalies in the
treaty which should be renegotiated. Potential
adjustments should take into account the positions
of all the European states and security organisa-
tions concerned.
64. In a statement after his summit meeting
with President Yeltsin on llth May 1995, Presi-
dent Clinton stated that he supported the Russian
request for modifications in the CFE Treaty. He
added that he wanted to " figure out a way to pre-
serve the integrity of the treaty, and compliance
with it, but in the end respond to the legitimate
security requests of Russia "'0.
IX. Ukraine's defence industry
65. In the former Soviet Union, Ukraine had
the second largest military industrial complex
with lSVo of the entire complex on its territory. A
total of more than I 800 enterprises employed 2.7
million workers, out of which around 700 facili-
ties employed 1.3 million, exclusively producing
military items. It is estimated that this sector of
the industry contributed one-third of Ukraine's
GNP. Among the most important industries were
the southern machine building plant, building
strategic missiles such as the SS-18, SS-20, SS-23
and SS-24, space shuttles and satellites and the
Black Sea shipyard in Mikolayev, where most
Soviet ships were built according to Russian desi-
gns. The Malyshev plant and design bureau in
Kharkov produced T-&,T-72 and T-80 tanks with
annour and guns from Russia. The Antonov
scientific-technical research complex in Kiev
built Antonov aircraft, including the largest trans-
port aircraft in the world.
66. Moreover, Ukraine had a large capacity for
producing ammunition, optical equipment, mili-
tary lasers and electronics. Ukraine's defence
industry received little to no orders in 1991 and
1992 and, as a result, its output declined three-fold
with many factories working only two or three
days a week. Continuing government subsidies
saved them from bankruptcy, but, at the same time,
these subsidies were creating hyper-inflation.
67. The disintegration of the Soviet Union into
different independent republics has caused pro-
blems in the supply of specific products which are
needed for the production of weapons systems,
while the rapid decline of the value of the Ukrai-
nian karbovantsy against the Russian rouble is
causing problems for payment. Facing the possi
ble social and economic consequences of a col-
lapse of this important branch of Ukraine's indus-
try, the government had no choice but to act.
68. A presidential decree ofJanuary l992pto-
vided a number of measures to help companies
achieve conversion. Conversion efforts were
directed mainly at enterprises which exclusively
produced military items. Activities for civilian
production should concentrate on agricultural
machinery medical and environmental equip-
ment, food packaging and processing and consu-
mer goods. The government also thought that
conversion could be successful in the production
of missiles and other items for the civilian aero-
space markets. A state fund for conversion was
established. In mid-1992, the Ukrainian Govern-
ment proposed a five-year conversion plan
consisting of 540 prograrnmes. Estimates of the
cost of the conversion progtamme have varied
from $5 billion for five years to $2 billion plus
650 billion coupons over ten years. It should be
noted, however, that in 1992the defence industry
only obtained one quarter of what it had requested
for conversion.
69. [n June 1994, the Ministy of Defence dis-
closed a preliminary prograrnme which aims at a
dual rdle for the defence industry: to satisfy the
equipment needs of the Ulaainian armed forces in
practically all fields in order to reduce its depen-
dency on Russia and at the same time produce for
the export markets.
70. At present, the ministry for the military
industrial complex has responsibility over the
remaining total of 1700 production units and
research establishments. Its priority tasks are
conversion and privatisation. In this framework,
the ministry is trying to establish relations with
Western European countries and the North Ameri-
can continent.
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71. After the trilateral agreement on nuclear
weapons of January 1994, a joint Ukrainian-
United States committee was established to dis-
cuss military conversion and nuclear weapon
issues. Ukraine also established a conffol r6gime
for nuclear exports in full accordance with inter-
national standards, which was a condition for the
development of relations with western partners.
Co-operation projects have now been concluded
with France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, the United States and others.
72. Many conversion activities have been
undertaken and there are the by now well-known
examples of missile factories having converted
part of their activities to the production of rolley
buses and watches, and a nuclear submarine
equipment factory turned over to the production
of antennas, burglar alarms, car radios, food
mixers and microwave ovens.
73. As a specific example, mention is made
here of ajoint venture announced in January 1995
between a company from the United Kingdom, a
company from the United States and the LJkai-
nian Defence Ministry. In the new company,
Alliant Kiev, the foreign partners provide techno-
logy, capital and know-how, while Ukraine's
army provides arms and labour to dismantle
conventional munitions and reclaim the metals
and explosives for profit. Over the next five years,
Alliant Kiev plans to desffoy 220 000 tons of
munitions ".
74. An important part of Ukraine's military
industrial complex is its well-developed space
industry, building launch vehicles, space shuttles
and satellites which, understandably, it does not
want to give up. Therefore, in 1992, President
Kravchuk published a decree to establish the
Ukrainian National Cosmic Agency (LINCA) to
ensure that the existing human and technical
resources in this field would not be lost.
75. The UNCA developed a national space pro-
grarnme envisaging co-operation with Russia and
Kazakhstan, manufacture of space products such
as launch vehicles and satellites for the world
market and co-operation with western countries in
space technology and joint programmes. A posi-
tive step towards possible co-operation with wes-
tern companies and space prograrnmes was taken
when, on 17th May 1994, Ukraine adhered to the
missile technology control r6gime which pledged
it to prevent missile technology proliferation. A
co-operation prograrnme has been signed with
A6rospatiale to improve the performance of the
Ariane launch vehicle's rocket motors and other
co-operation agreements have been concluded
with NASA. Meanwhile, there is intensive co-
operation in space programmes with Russia and
Kazakhstan.
76. Given the fact that 80Vo of its defence
industry was dependent on Russian parts, Ukraine
is aware that its defence industry can only survive,
even partially, if it co-operates with the Russian
defence industry. InJanuary 1993, therefore, both
countries signed an agreement on joint co-opera-
tion in a number of activities such as aircraft pro-
duction, rocket and space technology, electronics
and aircraft engines. One of the most interesting
co-operation programmes between Ukraine and
Russia in this framework is the development of
the AN-70 transport aircraft. A second prototype
is being built at the Antonov scientific-technical
research complex in Kiev. The AN-70, equipped
with four turbo-fan engines, can carry 30-35 tons
over a distance of 4 000 to 5 000 kilomeffes, at a
speed of 750 kilometres per hour. With a weight
of 130 tons, it is capable of landing on short run-
ways and transporting troops and equipment into
the heart of potential combat zones. Assembly-
line production was planned to start in 1996-97,
but the programme may be delayed after the
recent crash of the frst prototype. On the world
market for military transport aircraft, the AN-70
will be a competitor for the future large aircraft(FLA), now being developed by a European
consortium.
77. Other branches of Ukraine's defence indus-
try have been less fortunate.
78. The Sebastopol marine plant, a naval ship-
yard for repair and upgrading, is now working at
one-third or one-fourth of its capacity. The Cher-
nomorskye shipyard in Nikolayev on the Black
Sea has stopped building aircraft carriers and crui-
sers and is now focusing on the construction of
smaller vessels.
79. The problems with the aircraft-carrier
Varyag are illustrative of problems in the Ukrai-
nian military industrial complex. The Varyag was
under construction at the Chernomorskye ship-
yard when the Soviet Union collapsed. Arms and
electronic equipment for the carrier were to be
provided by Russia. It was 60Vo completed in
January 1992, but since then little progress has
been made, in particular, because of a shortage of
money. Russia has offered the ca:rier to Ukraine,
but Ukraine prefers to sell it to a foreign customer.
If no customer can be found 
- 
China has been sug-
gested as a potential buyer but this could not be
confirmed during the Defence Committee's visit
to Kiev 
- 
Ukraine will sell the carrier for scrap.
80. In an effort to sell its defence industry pro-
ducts on the export market, Ukraine has now
developed a 3 000 ton patrol vessel which was on
show at the International Defence Exhibition in
the United Arab Emirates in March 1995. Other
smaller vessels have also been developed for
export, such as a fast and manoeuvrable hydrofoil.
The Malyshev plant in Kharkov has now develo-
ped the T-84 tank, an improved version of the11. Financial Times, 20th January 1995.
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well-known Soviet T-80 tank, which is available
for export.
81. With these and other equipment, Ukraine is
planning to increase its arms exports from $100
million in 1993 to $10 billion by the year 2@0.
82. It cannot be denied that the Ukrainian
Government has taken strides to tackle the prob-
lems of its huge military industrial complex with
quite elaborate programmes for conversion, co-
operation and export, but the objectives of this
ambitious restructuring will be attained only if the
reform of the country's economy, including priva-
tisation, takes root and if the government is able to
indicate clearly what kind of defence industry it
needs for its national security policy and to pro-
vide the financial means to implement it.
X. The Crimean peninsula
83. As is known, Crimea lost its autonomous
status in the Soviet Union in 1945. In 1954, Cri-
mea was transferred from the Russian Federation
to Ukraine in a symbolic gesture to mark three
centuries of union between both neighbours. After
Ukraine's independence in September 1991, the
Crimean Supreme Soviet declared Crimea to be a
constituent part of Ukraine.
84. When, after Ukraine's independence, the
economic situation deteriorated even more rapidly
than before, the separatist Republican Movement
of Crimea (RDK), led by Yuri Meshkov, had an
easy job in mobilising support from large parts of
the population for a more separatist policy. It
should be noted that 65-707o of Crimea's 2.7 trLtl-
lion population is Russian and that many of them
thought they would be better off in a Crimean
peninsula with closer relations, or even reunified,
with Russia.
85. On 9th July 1993, the Russian Supreme
Soviet declared Russian sovereignty over the
Ukrainian pon of Sebastopol, the main base of the
Black Sea fleet, but this parliamentary declara-
tion, welcomed by many Russians living in the
Crimea, was criticised by the Russian Govern-
ment which stated that it deviated from its official
policy.
86. In January 1994, Yuri Meshkov, leader of
the Republican Party of Crimea, was elected Pre-
sident of the Ukrainian Republic of Crimea. Mr.
Meshkov immediately called for the establish-
ment of an independent Crimea in union with
other CIS states. The Supreme Rada of Ukraine,
however, voted on 24th February 1994 that the
Ukrainian Republic of Crimea should nothave the
right to conduct its own foreign, defence and
monetary policies and that it was " not a bearer of
state sovereignty ". In March 1994, President
Meshkov held a referendum 
- 
declared illegal by
Ukraine 
- 
with about 807o of the Crimean popula-
tion voting in favour of secession.
87. In May, the Crimean parliament restored
the controversial Crimean Constitution, which
was approved by referendum in 1992. At that
moment, the Russian President Yeltsin backed
this move, stating that Crimea was a sovereign
republic. Latet Crimean and Ukrainian officials
started negotiations with the aim of reducing ten-
sion between the two sides.
88. Apparently, the Russian attitude towards
Crimean separatists changed after the election in
July of President Kuchma, who was determined to
improve relations with Russia in all possible
fields while maintaining Ukraine's independence.
89. When in August 1994 the town council of
Sebastopol declared that the city had " Russian
legal status " and was " de jure part of the Russian
Federation ", this declaration was rebuffed by the
Russian Government. Ukraine's President Kuch-
ma reacted pragmatically by saying that certain
issues had to be resolved at state level.
90. In September, the Crimean Parliament,
dominated by Russians, came into a lasting
conflict with President Meshkov over executive
power. The Ukrainian Supreme Rada amended
the Ukrainian constitution which would enable it
to cancel any Crimean legislation which would
conflict with the Ulaainian constitution. In
November, legislation was adopted which would
automatically invalidate Crimean legislation
deemed to conflict with Ukrainian law.
91. All these decisions, however, did not result
in a more forthcoming and co-operative attitude
from Crimea's political authorities and Crimea
continued to refuse to bring its laws into line with
those of Ukraine. Finally, on 17th March 1995,
the Ukrainian Supreme Rada abolished Crimea's
constitution and sacked President Meshkov,
saying that he should be charged with abuse of
office.
92. It should be noted that both President
Meshkov and the Crimean Parliament have lost
much of their popular support in recent months
because they failed to improve the regional eco-
nomy.
93. Russia, still in the process of asserting its
authority over the breakaway republic of Chech-
nya in a bloody military operation, could do little
else but leave Ukraine to seftle its own affairs.
The deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma inter-
preted perfectly the Russian authorities' feeling
when he said that Crimea was an internal Ukrai-
nian matter and that Russia would continue to res-
pect Ukraine's territorial integrity and existing
borders.
94. Russia's first deputy Prime Minister, Oleg
Soskovets, who visited Kiev on 20th March des-
zto
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pite calls from the Crimean parliament to cancel
his visit, declared that " intemal political events in
Ukraine are Ukraine's business " ".
95. On 2nd April, President Kuchma put the
Crimean regional government under his direct
control. He further reinstated Anatoli Franchuk,
who had lost a vote of no confidence in the Cri-
mean parliament the week before, as Prime
Minister of the Crimean Government.
96. The Crimean Parliament was given until
15th May to present a new constitution in order to
replace the abolished 1992 constitution which
established Crimea's autonomy.
97. On 15th April 1995; however, President
Yeltsin indefinitely postponed the signing of the
Ukrainian-Russian co-operation treaty planned
for the end of April. President Yeltsin said that he
would sign only after he was convinced " that the
relations between Simferopol and Kiev do not
infringe the interests of the Crimeans "13.
98. Later, on 18th April, the Russian Foreign
Ministet Andrei V. Kozyrev, stated that Russia
could use a range of diplomatic, political and eco-
nomic means to protect Russians abroad and he
added that " There may be cases when the use of
direct military force may be needed to protect our
compatriots abroad "'0.
XI. The Trans-Dniestr rcgian of Moldova
99. A thorny problem at Ukraine's western bor-
der is the Trans-Dniesff region, where ethnic Rus-
sians and Ukrainians had been the main suppor-
ters of proclamations of independence in 1990
and 1991. This region had the status of autono-
mous republic within Ukraine until 1940, when it
was united with Bessarabia, a part of Romania
annexed by the Soviet Union which then became
the Soviet Republic of Moldova.
100. Moldova proclaimed sovereignty in 1990
and declared independence in August 1991. The
perspective of a possible future reunification of
Moldova and Romania was one reason for pro-
claiming Trans-Dniestr's independence, first in
1990, then in December 1991. A military cam-
paign by Dniestr leaders to take confrol of the terri-
tory of the self-proclaimed republic on the Dniesfr's
left-bank led to violent armed clashes in the first
half of lDZ.The r61e of the Russian 14th Army
during this period has never clearly been asserted.
101. On 21st July, an agreement brokered by
Russia and the CSCE was signed. Moldovan,
Russian and Trans-Dniestr peace-making forces
were deployed, but, despite many negotiations, a
12. Financial Times, 23rd March 1995.
13. International Herald Tribune, l6th April 1995.
14. International Herald Tribune, l9th April 195.
solution acceptable to all parties involved has not
yet been found. The new Moldovan constitution,
which came into force in August 1994, estab-
lished a special autonomous status for the Trans-
Dniestr region based on the principle of territorial
integrity, but Trans-Dniestr insists on recognition
of independence, confederate links to Moldova
and the right to create its own armed forces.
102. On 10th August 1994, an agreement was
reached in negotiations between Russia and Mol-
dova providing for the Russian 14th Army to be
withdrawn from Moldova and the Trans-Dniestr
region within three years. The agreement was
signed by the Prime Ministers of both countries at
a ceremony in Moscow on 21st October 1994 and,
in November last, the Russian Defence Ministry
announced that the 14th Army's troop strength
had been reduced by hall from four battalions to
two. On the other hand, it is said that the three-
year period for withdrawal has not started yet
because of a dispute between Moldova and Russia
over the agreement's interpretation.
103. ln a26th March 1995 referendum, a large
majority of the Trans-Dniestr population (94Vo of
the votes cast) voted in favour of a permanent pre-
sence of Russia's 14th Army on its territory consi-
dering it to be the best protection against Moldova.
lO+. Although a reunification of Moldova with
Romania, provoking a full secession of Trans-
Dniestr, is now generally considered to be an
increasingly remote possibility, Ukraine is still
concerned with the volatile situation in this
region. It is concerned about the position of
Ukrainians in the Trans-Dniestr region, but also it
is aware that Russians in the Trans-Dniestr area
have supported Russian separatists in Crimea. If
the Russian 14th Army is indeed withdrawn from
the Trans-Dniesff area, an agreement will have to
be concluded between Russia and Ukraine for the
transfer of Russian troops through Ukrainian ter-
ritory. Preliminary discussions on such a potential
agreement have already started.
XII. Energy situation and the problem
of Chernobyl
105. Since Ukraine's independence, the coun-
try's coal- or gas-fired power stations (accounting
for 59Vo of energy production) are functioning
only partially because of reduced coal and natural
gas supply. Hydroelectric power stations produce
only 5Vo of the country's electricity. Nuclear
power stations provide 337o of Ukraine's energy
requirements, but Ukraine is facing considerable
difficulties in this area.
106. The two reactors still operating in Cherno-
byl 
- 
number 1, the oldest of the four and number
3 which is next to the sarcophagus covering the
remains of reactor number 4 
- 
still provide lVo of
2tr
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Ukraine's energy. On the other hand, the Euro-
pean Union has made the closure of Chernobyl a
condition for releasing the $100 million loan
which it granted to Ukraine in 1994 and for provid-
ing further loans in 1995.
I07. New nuclear power stations are under
construction at Zaporozhye, Rovno and Khmel'
nitskiy. Zaporozhye, financed by Ukraine itself,
should be completed by the end of 1995, but the
two others will not be operational before the end
of 1998 at the earliest. Rovno will be completed
with the assistance of the European Union and the
Group of Seven supports the completion of
Khmel'nitskiy.
108. When the full Chernobyl power station is
closed down, reactor waste and contaminated
machinery will have to be disposed of safely. Wes-
tern estimates for the cleaning operation vary bet-
ween S2 and $3 billion, but Ulaainian offrcials have
put forward figures benveen $4.5 and $5 billion.
109. On 13th April 1994, a delegation represent-
ing the European Union and the Group of Seven
met in Kiev with representatives of the Ukrainian
Government to discuss the closure of Chernobyl.
Ukraine agreed to close the Chernobyl nuclear
power station by the year 2000 in exchange for
western agreement to help build a gas-fired power
station to replace the nuclear one and to build a
new tomb around reactor number 4 which explo-
ded in 1986 in order to supplement the current
protective cover which is decaying. The details of
the agreement reached are not known at present,
but it should open the way for further financial aid
from the European Union.
110. It is thought, however, that complicated
negotiations over financial aid will still take quite
some time. The United States seems to be reluc-
tant to provide more money beyond what was pro-
mised at the G-7 meeting in Naples in July 1994.
The European Union and the EBRD may be more
forthcoming, but the amounts mentioned have not
in any way been in the range of the $4.5 billion
mentioned by the Chairman of Ukraine's nuclear
power agency.
111. Natural gas supply from Russia has caused
numerous problems for Ukraine since it became
an independent state and the issue is still of great
importance for Ukraine's economic development
and its relations with Russia. In March 1995, it
was agreed that part of Ukraine's debt to Gaz-
prory, Russia's natural gas export company,
would be converted into government bonds. Gaz-
prom is a key instrument in Russia's policy to
obtain economic control over former Soviet terri-
tories which are no longer under Moscow's politi-
cal and military control. Gazprom would like to
convert these bonds into stakes of between 35 and
507o in key Ukrainian enterprises, including the
enterprise which owns the 33 000 kilometres of
crucial gas pipelines running through Ukraine and
two gas reservoirs. Ukrainian officials have made
it clear that Gazprom may participate in privatisa-
tion, but that it will not be allowed to acquire
interests in the pipeline company. President l(uch-
ma has stated publicly that " the issue of debt can-
not be used to undercut our independence "'5.
lI2. It is rue that, even in present circum-
stances, Russia can cut off natural gas supplies to
Ukraine at any moment, which is indeed a formi-
dable instrument of power. On the otherhand, it is
noted that 95Vo of Russian natural gas exports to
the west run through Ukrainian pipelines, giving
Ukraine sufficient possibilities for counter-
measures in the event of intemrption in gas supply.
113. At present, Ukraine has an annual require-
ment of 40 million tons of crude oil, now largely
supplied by Russia. In an effort to diversify ids
energy sources, Ukraine has now decided to build
a new oil terminal at Odessa which will handle 12
to 20 million tons of crude oil per year once
construction is completed at the end of 1996. The
oil would initially come to Odessa via the
Bosporus.
Il4. Expansion of the terminal's capacity to
40 million tons per year is planned, but this hinges
on construction of a possible pipeline through
Turkey which should transport Iraqi and kanian
oil to Turkey's Black Sea port Samsun.
115. Ukraine wants to raise its domestic oil out-
put from 4 million tons in 1994 to 7 million tons
in 2000 and increase its natural gas production
above the 17 billion cubic mefies of 1994 while it
hopes to expand its domestic coal and nuclear
energy sectors.
116. In January 1995, Ukrainereached an agree-
ment with Turkmenistan for delivery of 1l billion
cubic mefies of natural gas in 1995. The remain-
der of its needs for 100 billion cubic metres of
natural gas will be covered by Russian imports
and domestic production.
X I I I. U kraine - Rus s ian relations
(a) Commonwealth otlndependent States (CIS)
ll7. Together with Russia and Belarus, Ukraine
was a founder member of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) when it was proclaimed
in Minsk on 8th December 1991. tJkraine consi-
dered the CIS an instrument for managing the pro-
blems associated with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and facilitating the transition of the new
republics towards complete independence.
118. Ukraine has been suspicious of proposals
for closer integration within the CIS, feiuing that
2t2
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they might lead to federal or confederal structures
enabling Russia to regain hegemony in the region.
Ukraine did not therefore sign the Minsk agree-
ment on the status of general purpose forces of
February 1992, declaing that its intention was to
establish completely independent national armed
forces. It also did not sign the CIS collective secu-
rity agreement of Tashkent in May 1992. It has
always refused to join any CIS collective security
body or to participate in CIS joint peace-keeping.
119. On the other hand, it is aware that its indus-
try and economy cannot survive without close
links with other republics of the former Soviet
Union. As a consequence, it is interested in the
development of rading and economic links
within the CIS, but only if its sovereign equality
and partnership are respected.
120. However, at the moment it is only an asso-
ciate member of the CIS economic union. When,
in September 1994, the CIS agreed to establish a
payments union and an interstate economic com-
mittee, Ukraine made it clear that it could only
become an associate member of the interstate eco-
nomic committee, taking part only in selected dis-
cussions and that the time was not ripe for partici-
pating in the payments union16.
lzt. At the last CIS summit meeting held in
Alma Ata on 10th February, an informal memo-
randum was adopted and only three of the thirteen
proposals for closer security were passed. A hard
core of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia is deter-
mined to develop close relations, formalised in
bilateral and trilateral agreements on security and
economic issues, which Ukraine so far has not
wished to follow.
122. A pact for peace and stability within the
CIS, which should have been the main achieve-
ment of the Alma-Ata summit meeting, was dilu-
ted considerably into a non-binding memoran-
dum. In bilateral agreements, Russia and
Kazakhstan have promised to remove internal
borders and allow free movement of their citizens
across each other's borders. The Russian army
will also conduct joint operations and border
paffols with Kazakh forces and have access to
four testing ranges within Kazakhstan. Such
agreements are anathema for Ukraine.
123. At present, it is difEcult to predict what r6le
the CIS is going to play. It is noted that if Russia
chooses to shape it into the main vehicle for its
political, military and economic relations with the
other republics of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine
may have to accept closer political and military
links within the CIS framework to obtain the eco-
nomic co-operation and access to its traditional
markets that it needs for the recovery and further
development of its very depressed national econ-
omy. Such political and military commitments
could limit its freedom in seeking closer links with
western European and Atlantic institutions.
(b) Relations with Rassia
124. Large parts of what is now Ukraine have
been affiliated with and dependent on Russia and
later the Soviet Union. Only at the time of the
Russian revolution in l9l7 did it have a brief
period ofindependence before being involved in a
civil war from 1918 to l92I which ended in a
communist victory and Ukraine becoming part of
the USSR.
125. During Soviet rule, Ukraine's territory was
enlarged with eastern Galicia and Volhynia from
Poland, northern Bukovina and Bessarabia from
Romania and finally with the Crimean peninsula
from Russia in 1954.
126. A minority of 11.5 million Russians, repre-
senting 22Vo of Ukraine's total population, lives
mainly in the eastern part of the country. In the
Crimean peninsula Russians constitute a 70Vo
majority of the population. As a result of its histo-
ric links with Russia which have also determined
its present state frontiers, political traditions,
armed forces and the structure of its industry, agri-
culture, ffade relations and economy, Ukraine has
an ambiguous relationship with Russia.
I2l. Notwithstanding almost general agreement
among the population on the need to maintain and
protect Ukraine's independence, it is also obser-
ved that the western part of the country identifies
with Central and Western Europe, while the eas-
tern and southern parts are more interested in
links with Russia and the CIS.
128. For Ukraine, there have been, and still are,
many reasons to feel uneasy with regard to Russia.
Russia's policy shows a clear tendency towards re-
establishing its former influence in the region.
Russia's policy towards other former Soviet repu-
blics is often assertive, if not condescending,
sometimes with a strong flavour of neo-imperia-
lism. Repeated Russian statements regarding its
claims for peace-keeping and the protection of
Russians, if need be by the use of military force,
have not been particularly reassuring.
129. The political and economic situation in
Russia is still volatile and unstable. There is no
clear view of what may happen in the near or
more distant future. Developments resulting in
political upheaval and economic chaos would
have an important influence on Ukraine.
130. Ukraine is aware that Russia has a direct
influence on issues related to the existence bf
Ukraine as an independent state, such as energy
supply, the situation in the Crimean peninsula and
the division of the Black Sea fleet. The sheer size16. Financial Times, l0th-llth September 1994.
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of Russia's economy and its important r6le as a
supplier and a market leave Ukraine with no choice
other than close co-operation. Moreover, it is
noted that Russia plays a leading part in the
restructuring of Europe's security environment.
I3l. In the first years of Ukraine's existence as a
separate state, there was an outspoken policy to
emphasise independence and to avoid anything
beyond the most necessary contacts with Russia.
Later, influential voices in the industrial and mili-
tary establishment and the Russian-speaking part
of the population argued in favour of intensifying
relations with Russia, building on the undeniably
close historic, political, economic and cultural
links which had always existed, without insisting
on reintegration.
132. In July 1994, President Kuchma was elec-
ted on a prografllme including the establishment
of closer special partnership relations with Russia.
Since then, he has implemented this policy with a
pragmatic approach of closer economic relations,
in particular in areas offrade, conversion, techno-
logy development and industrial co-operation,
while strongly maintaining state sovereignty and
independence. Priority was given to negotiations
with Russia on a comprehensive treaty of friend-
ship and co-operation.
133. On 6th February 1995, Russia and Ukraine
agreed on a preliminary draft for this freaty which
should be signed by the Presidents of both coun-
tries on the occasion of President Yeltsin's long-
awaited state visit to Kiev. The treaty, which is
considered a most important step towards the nor-
malisation of relations between Ukraine and Rus-
sia, has been negotiated since July 1994.
134. The issues covered include recognition of
the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the non-viola-
bility of its frontiers and a number of economic
agreements which should improve ffade contacts
and secure Russian energy supplies and Ukrainian
payments. A solution is also said to have been
found for the dual citizenship rights of the Rus-
sian minority in Ukraine when Russia gave up its
insistence on a formula which Ukraine categori-
cally refused to accept.
135. Negotiations on the division and location of
the former Soviet Black Sea fleet and on the pre-
sence of Russian military forces in the Crimean
peninsula are still continuing. Russia wants Sebas-
topol to be the main base for the Russian Black Sea
fleet, but this solution is opposed by [Jkraine.
136. During the Defence Committee's visit to
Ukraine in early April 1995, the Ukrainian Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs emphasised that the negoti-
ations were being held in a positive atmosphere
and that the Russian Government, with the perso-
nal commitment of President Yeltsin, wished to
reach agreement.
I37. Since then, however, the situation may
have changed as a result of remarks made by the
Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, to the
effect that Russia could not rule out the use of
force to defend ethnic Russians living in other
republics on the territory of the former Soviet
Union. Ukrainian politicians have described IvIr.
Kozyrev's statement as provocative and anticip-
ate a deterioration in relations with Russia. In
Kiev, it is believed that the subdued western reac-
tion to Russia's military intervention in Chechnya
has emboldened Russia to adopt a harsher policy
towards other former Soviet republics ''.
138. Apparently, negotiations between Russia
and Ukraine are at such a difficult stage, if not
stalled, that recently Ukraine asked the United
States for mediation'8. Russia is unlikely to agree
to such mediation.
X I V Paftn ers hip agre eme nt
with the European Union
139. On 14th June 1994, the then President of
Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, signed a co-operation
and partnership agreement with the European
Union. It is no secret, however, that substantive
European Union aid in the future is linked to clos-
ing unsafe nuclear reactors, in particular the two
RBMK reactors which are still operating in Cher-
nobyl.
140. The agreement grants Ukraine most-favou-
red nation fteatrnent. A review conference will be
held in 1998 in order to examine progress made in
Ukraine towards a market economy and mention
has been made of the possibility of establishing a
free-trade zone between the European Union and
Ukraine in the future.
l4l. In the immediate future, the agreement
governs Ukraine's exports to the European Union
of sensitive materials such as coal, steel, nuclear
fuel and textiles. It also contains articles seeking
to liberalise conditions for establishing companies
from European Union member states in Ukraine.
An interim agreement signed on the same day
ensures the coming-into-force of commercial
clauses, but the formal co-operation and partner-
ship agreement will come into force only after
ratification by all European Union member states,
Ukraine itself having ratified it already.
142. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister and mem-
bers of the Supreme Rada asked the delegation
from the WEU Assembly to do everything pos-
sible to speed up the ratification process in the
European Union's member states because the
partnership agreement is a crucial instrument in
improving Ukraine's economic situation.
17. Financial Times,22nd-23rd April 1995.
18. Financial Times, 8th May 1995.
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XV. Relatians between Ukraine andWEU
L43. From the outset of Ulaaine's existence as an
independent state, WEU has followed develop-
ments closely, knowing that due to its geographical
situation and its position as the second-ranking of
the former Soviet republics, Ukraine would have a
r6le to play in Europe's new security architecture.
144. The signature of the trilateral statement on
14th January 1994 on the elimination of nuclear
arms from Ukraine was considered to be an
important contribution to security and stability in
Europe. In its Kirchberg declaration of 9th May
1994, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that
the fulfilment of these commitments widened the
basis for the development of dialogue and exchange
of information with Ukraine on issues of common
concern. They instructed the Permanent Council
to " examine appropriate ways in order to achieve
this objective ".
145. In the following months, the Ukrainian
Government presented a document with its views
on future relations with WEU, including practical
proposals intended to facilitate the attainment of
Ukraine's ultimate objective of fully-fledged par-
ticipation in WEU activities as an associate part-
ner. Ukraine regretted that in the Kirchberg decla-
ration, the Council had limited associate
partnership to the six Central European countries,
plus the Baltic states. It argued that this decision
artificially separated Ukraine from the rest of
Europe, thus destabilising the situation in Europe
as a whole. Aware that associate partnership was
granted to those countries which had concluded,
or would conclude, a Europe agreement with the
European Union, it further argued that this form-
ula no longer corresponded to the political
changes which had since taken place. Ukraine
argued that the chosen line of conduct on associa-
te partnership should be modified when applied to
political co-operation in order to include Ukraine.
Finally, it noted that Ukraine's participation in the
CIS should not be regarded as an obstacle.
146. Although the Council of Ministers did not
react immediately, its Noordwijk declaration of
14th November 1994 stated: " In order to increase
transparency and promote stability throughout
Europe, Ministers underline the particular impor-
tance of establishing appropriate relationships
with Russia and Ukraine. "
147 . On 7th March 1995, the Council decided that
contacts with both Russia and Ukraine, while not
duplicating dialogue in other forums, should allow
for the development of existing dialogue with WEU
and for exchanges of information on issues of com-
mon interest. Consultations are to be held between
the Permanent Representative of the Presidency, the
Secretary-General and the Russian and Ukrainian
Ambassadors respectively, taking into account the
calendar of principal WEU meetings.
148. Other meetings, visits and contacts at diffe-
rent official and diplomatic levels might be held
to conftibute to the abovementioned dialogue.
The WEU Institute for Security Studies has been
asked to give greater priority in its future work to
contacts with Russia and Ukraine and the Council
welcomed " efforts by the Assembly aimed at fur-
ther developing contacts at the parliamentary
level ".
XVI. Conclusions
149. Although Ukraine could have ranked
among the most important states in Europe due to
its population, size and history, it has only just
started its existence as an independent state,
firying to carve out its rOle in the concert of Euro-
pean nations.
150. The process of asserting its own position is
particularly difficult and painful because of the
fact that for centuries it had been an integral part
of the Russian and, later, Soviet empire. The part-
ition of joint political, economic and military pro-
perty between Russia and Ukraine is not finished
and this process will probably take several more
years. In particular, Ukraine's economy is so nar-
rowly connected with the Russian economy that,
at present, it has little chance of surviving without
continued close co-operation. The division of the
Black Sea fleet and its infrastructure is another
issue for seemingly endless negotiations.
151. On the other hand, it can be noted that
Ukraine has made remarkable progress in the little
more than three years of its independence.
152. The implementation of the trilateral state-
ment on nuclear weapons of January 1994 is pro-
viding the world with a positive example of
nuclear disarmament. Within a yea\ it was fol-
lowed by Ukraine's accession to the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state, which
opened the way for implementation of the
START I Treaty and for ratification of START II.
153. Ukraine also continued to implement its
obligations as regards the CFE Treaty, notwith-
standing its economic problems and serious hesi-
tations over the viability of flank limitations for
its own security and defence.
154. As regards its security policy, Ukraine has
stated firmly that it is against the re-establishment
of two different blocs in Europe and it has stressed
its neutrality and non-bloc status. Therefore, it did
not sign the 1992 Tashkent agreement on collect-
ive security, nor does it insist on membership of
NATO. In what it is calling a policy of active neu-
trality, Ukraine is conducting a number of activi-
ties which designate it as an active participant in
the process of building security in Europe.
Ukraine is participating in the United Nations
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peace-keeping efforts in the Balkan region. It was
the first CIS member state to join NATO's part-
nership for peace and it also signed a co-operation
and partnership agreement with the European
Union, while striving for some form of close co-
operation with WEU. Ukraine is also giving acti-
ve support to OSCE activities.
155. Ukraine's policy towards minorities has
been rated positively by both the Council of Eur-
ope, of which it hopes to become a member soon,
and the OSCE.
156. At present, Ukraine is facing two huge pro-
blems which receive priority attention: energy
supplies and recovery of the national economy.
They are closely linked with President Kuchma's
other priority issue: normalisation of relations
with Russia.
157. Ukraine's monetary and budgetary policy
is now in compliance with International Monetary
Fund guidelines and a new, ambitious privatisa-
tion programme is about to start. For its energy
supply in oil and natural gas, Ukraine is heavily
dependent on Russia and Turkmenistan, also
because they extend credits which are not avai-
lable on the world market. Ukraine has started to
seek additional and alternative suppliers in the
Middle East and elsewhere, but has not yet been
able to tackle the serious energy waste which is
one of the unpleasant legacies of the Soviet eco-
nomic system. Chernobyl continues to be a major
stumbling-block for the provision of credits and
aid from the West, which are urgently needed for
economic recovery.
158. The establishment of good relations with
Russia would provide the key to solving many of
Ukraine's problems. There is no certainty as to
whether Russia is really prepared to provide
Ukraine with satisfaction on many economic
issues, which are vital for the country's survival as
an independent state, without imposing its own
political and military conditions. History has
shown that Russia has always needed Ukraine to
assert itself as an empire and superpower in the
region and the world. Will it be prepared to aban-
don this rdle while it is clearly re-establishing its
influence beyond its southern borders?
159. The issues being discussed with Russia
include economic co-operation, energy supply,
the Russian minority in Ukraine, and the division
of the Black Sea fleet and its infrastructure. With
nationalism and the influence of the military in
the ascendance, Chechnya still burning and elec-
tions approaching, Russia is not likely to be a forth-
coming negotiator. Despite the strenuous efforts
of the present Ukrainian Government and the
signing on 6th February 1995 of a preliminary
draft for a treaty offriendship and co-operation, it
may still take some time before all disputed issues
have been solved. Ukraine's recent request for
United States mediation is a clear indication of
Russia's intransigence in the negotiations.
160. What should be Europe's and, in particular
WE[J's, attitude in relations with Ukraine?
161. In the past year, the West has become
increasingly aware that an independent, democra-
tic and prosperous Ukraine can play a positive
r6le in enhancing Europe's security. The United
States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher,
even called Ukraine " the linchpin of European
security ".
162. The European Union has signed a co-ope-
ration and partnership agreement with Ukraine
which has not yet been ratified by any of its mem-
ber states. A final agreement on the closure of
Chernobyl is now considered the acid test for
Ukraine's determination to reform and break with
the past. But Chernobyl also provides energy
which is a rare commodity in Ukraine. If Europe
wants Chernobyl to be closed down, it will unfor-
tunately have to pay for it: Ukraine does not have
the money. Acceleration of reforms in Ukraine is
greatly dependent on international support and
co-operation. The European Union has the capa-
bilities and resources to do so, and to go ahead
with Ukraine would enhance stability and secu-
rity in Europe.
163. The other field where Europe can extend its
help is security, in particular through WEU. It is
noted, however, that in its Kirchberg declaration,
WEU drew a line through Europe. Only the nine
Cenffal and Eastern European states which had
concluded, or were to conclude, Europe agree-
ments, preparing them for their integration and
eventual accession to the European Union, were
offered an associate partnership with WEU.
Ukraine regretted this decision not only because it
thought that it was artificially separated from the
rest of Europe, but also because it did not want to
become a buffer state between Russia and the rest
of Europe.
164. WEU has now decided to establish an insti-
tutionalised regular dialogue with Ukraine. It would
seem that, at the moment, WEU cannot go beyond
this dialogue which should be an intensive one.
165. Ukraine has clearly stated that it wishes to
be neutral and non-aligned. One could argue that
Ukraine's desire to forge closer links with WEU is
fully justified. On the other hand, it is clear that
Ukraine will fust have to sort out its relations with
Russia and the CIS. At the moment, WEU is not
an organisation of neuhal states and a member or
associate partner of WEU cannot possibly be part
of the CIS at the same time. Moreover, WEU is
not only the defence component of the European
Union, but also the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. To choose WEU means giving up neu-
trality. The question is whether Ukraine is free to
make its own choice.
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Amendment I 21st June 1995
Ukraine and European secur@
AMENDMENT I. 
'
tabled by Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. Eiirci
1. Leave out paragraph (rx) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
l'-No{ng t!4t en]argement of NATO should be accompanied by a special arrangement between
NATO and Russia inorder to provide stability in Europe and to avoid transfo*irg Ukraine into a
buffer state between East and West;"
Signed: Johnston, Edrsi
1. See 18th sitting,22nd June 1995 (amendment agreed to).
217
Document 1465 ZithMay 1995
The Eastern Mediterranean
REPORT'
submifred on behalf of the Defence Committee 2
by Mr. Cuc6, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PnerncE,
Dnerr RscoIvtr\,GNDATIoN
on the Eastern Mediterranean
Expr-aNerony Mpuoneuouu
submitted by Mr.Cuc6, Rapporteur
Introduction
Penr Oxr: Tunxry
I. Political parties and the rise of lslamic fundamentalism
(a) Human rights
(b) The Kurdish problem
II. Defence spending and the Turkish armed forces
(a) Army
(b) Ai force
(c) Navy
III. Relations with other countries in the region
(a) The Transcaucasian region
(i) Georgia(ii) Aznrbujan(ili) Armenia(iv) The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh(u) Conclusions
(b) The Central Asian republics
(c) The south-eastern neighbours
(i)(ii)(iii)
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); Mr. De Decker, Mrs. Baarttel"d-Schlaman (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle,
Mrs. Beer, MM. Bianchi, Briane (Alternate: Galley), Brito, Cox, Dees, Dumont, Fernandes Marques, Mrs. Fernandez Ramiro(Alternate: Cucd),MM. Hardy, Hom Jacquat, Kastanidis, Kelchtermans, La Russa, Mrl ltntz-Comette, MM. Lopez Valdiviel-
so, Marten, Lord Newall (Altemate: Sir Russell lohnston),MM. Parisi, Pavlidis (Alternate: Liapis),Pecriaux, Petruccioli, Schlo-
ten, Reis Irite, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Sole Tura (Altemate: de Puig), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn (Alternate: Sir Keith
Speed) MM. Vasquez, Vrettos, Zierer, N. . .
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
218
Iran
Iraq
Syria
I
I
I
i
i
DOCUIVIENI1465
(d) TheBalkans
(i) The conllict in former Yugoslavia(ii) Bulgaria
(e) Russia
IV. Turkey and the European Union
(a) The Customs Union
(i) Bases of economic integration(ii) Recentdevelopments
( iii) Practical arrangements(iu) Wider stakes
V. Turkey and WEU
(a) Turkey, CJTF and WEU
(b) The status of associate members of the WEU Assembly
VI. Turkey's rOle in water and energy supply
(a) Water supply in the region
(b) Energy sources in the Caspian region
VII. A Turkish initiative: The Black Sea economic co-operation zone
(a) Historical perspective
(b) Potential gains from economic co-operation
(f) Economic advantages(ii) Political advaniages and problems
Penr TWo: Gnrsce
L Greece and the Balkans
(a) Albania
(D) FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
(c) Bulgaria
II. Greece's perception ofTurkey as a security threat
III. Defence spending and defence policy
(a) Defence spending in Greece
(b) The r6le of the Greek navy in the Mediterranean
IV. Greece and WEU
Panr Trnpr: Cypnus
I. The political situation
II. The military situation
PaRr Foun: Drspures BETwEEN Tunrey eNo Gnspcs
I. Disputes in the Aegean Sea
(a) The Aegean islands
(b) The status of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea
(i) Lemnos and Samothrace(ii) Lesbos, Chios, S6mos and Nikaria(iii) Dodecanese
(c) The limits of territorial waters
(d) The continental shelf
(e) Nr space and related matters
(r) Air space(ii) Flight information region
219
DocUIrr{ENI1465
IL The Turkish minority in western Thrace
III. Turkey and Greece in NAIO
Conclusions
(4,) Turkey
(b) Greece
(c) Disputes between Greece and Turkey
(d) Discussion in the committee
Appemotcr,s
I. Defence expenditures in Greece and Turkey
II. The Balkans and the Middle East
III. Tigris and Euphrates basin
IV. Present-day Cyprus
220
DOCUMENT 1465
Prefaae
. ry prepa1ng the present.repglt, your Rapporteur was extremely fortunate to receive much kind help
and assistance from all the authorities consulted and would like to tike this opportunity publicly to thank
all concerned for their co-operation.
The Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:
lst-Znd March 1995 
- 
Anlara
Mr. Baki Tuc, Chairman of the National Defence Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,
and members of the committee
Major General Oktar Arar'rnu, Head of Stategy and Force Planning Department, Ministry of Defence
H.E. Mr. Yalim ERaLe, Ambassador, Director-General Defence and Security, MinisEry for Foreign Affairs,
and members of his staff
Professor Stikrii GUnn, Professor of International Relations, University of Ankara
28th March 1995 
- 
Athens
Mr. Karolos PRpouLres, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Gerasimos AnsEMs, Minister of Defence
Mr. Nikolaos Kourus, Deputy Minister of Defence
Lieutenant-General Nikolaos SreMsouLrs, Deputy Chief HNDGS
Mr. TimoooRAKIs, Secretary-General, Community Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mrs. Vasso Papexoneou, Chairman of the Greek Parliamentary Delegation to the WEU Assembly, and
members of the delegation
Mr. P. KRmxos, Deputy Speaker of the Hellenic Chamber of Deputies
Mr. E. VERwAKIS, Chairman of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hellenic Chamber of
Deputies, and members of the committee
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Draft Recommendntion
on the Eastem Mediterranean
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the accession of Greece to WEU as a full member and the concomitant entry into force
of Turkey's associate membership of WEU on 6th March 1995;
(ii) Concerned, however, that the many unsolved disputes between Greece and Turkey constitute_a per-
manent threat to peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and stand in the way of an effective
European security and defence policy in the region;
(iii) Stressing that the only realistic means of achieving a global settlement of all disputes between Greece
and Turkey would be to stop revanchist ideas once and for all in respect of past history and to follow the
example oi France and Germany in acknowledging that there is no longer any question of looking back,
but of preparing for the future;
(iv) Noting that a breakthrough in negotiations between the Greek and Tirkish communities of Cyprus
could be the key to a much-needed improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey;
(v) Approving the course set by the United Nations, whose initiatives to solvethe Cyptog question pro-
vide firsi for theinmoduction of confidence-building measures and subsequently for a global agreement on
the basis of ideas leading to the creation of a two-zone federal state, founded on equality between the
Greek and Turkish communities;
(vi) Stressing that confidence-building measures can only be implemented in parallel wi-th_a progressive
withdrawal of Turkish armed forces from northern Cyprus and their replacement by United Nations Peace-
keeping forces with a view to a future demilitarisation of the whole island;
(vii) Noting that negotiations should be accompanied by a full census of the population of the island of
Cyprus by tlie EuropEan Population Committee (CDPO), as proposed by the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, in order to solve the problem of settlers;
(viii) Welcoming the decision of the Permanent Council of WEU to engage in a dialogue with Cyprus that
will evolve with the development of links between Cyprus and the European Union, but regrctting that
Turkey has dissociated itself from that decision;
(ix) Stressing that a continued massive presence of Turkish armed forces is one of the important issues
standing in the way of a solution of the Cyprus question;
(x) Noting with concern that the FYROM is still not a member of the OSCE, an organisation to which
the WEU Council attaches great importance in its Lisbon declaration, particularly on account of its poten-
tial as a primary instrumeni for early warning, conflict-prevention and crisis-management, as well as in
promoting the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights;
(xi) Noting that the FYROM has already amended its constitution in order to satisfy European Union
conditions for its recognition as a state and that Greece acknowledges that the FYROM does not constitu-
te a military threat;
(xii) Concerned that the continuation of Greece's trade embargo against the FYROM is jeopardising the
much-needed development of the FYROM's economy which could easily result in further destabilisation
of the situation in that country and, subsequently, in the region;
(xiii) Welcoming existing good relations between Greece and Bulgaria and the recent improvement in
relations between Greece and Albania;
(xiv) Convinced that Turkey has long ago made the basic choice to be a secular state respecting human
rights and the rules of democracy, but, at the same time, noting that it still has problems carrying these
principles into effect;
(xv) Condemning all forms of terrorism, even if used as a means of attaining political objectives;
(ni) Stressing that a clear distinction should be drawn between the intolerable terrorism practised by the
PKK on the one hand and the legitimate aspiration of the Kurdish people freely to express its cultural iden-
tity within the Turkish state on the other;
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(xvii) Welcoming the withdrawal of all Turkish-toops 
-f.gryJruqi tqrritory in accordance with Turkey,sgnglgepe-nt! towards (te- Europe3rn Union's troika on 23rd March 1995, but concerned by statements'by
the Turkish President, Suleyman Demirel, who, if need be, does not rule out the possibility of furttreimiii-
tary operations on haqi territory;
(xviii) Stressing the importance of respecting the territorial integrity of all states in the region;
(xix) Noting that a satisfactory global solution can be found to the claims of Kurdish nationalists in the
region-only. if all the states concerned accept-a mole pluralist and more decentralised system of govern-
ment allowing their citizens free enjoymenf of a cultural identity that is rightfully theirs;
(xr)- Noting that the continued existence of a so-called " security zone" in northern Iraq has resulted in
legal uncertainty and political chaos which is seriously threatening stability and security in the region;(oi) Aware that an early.reintegration o{hag as a normally functioning state in the region, providing full
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, t6gether with ai'evolution of"state
institutions towards a more democratic syitem, would greatly .oniriUuTiio rtuUifity-in the border area
between Turkey and Iraq;
(xrii) Sressing that.the fytdt^tf, que-stion,.if not solved properly by granting the Kurds some rights of
cultural self-expression and a form-of political and administrativ-e autdnomy ihat does not impingE upon
the territorial integrity of theTurkish state, will continue to threaten security-and stability in fuite!, timit-
ing the. governmenJ'q possibilities of conducting a balanced security and iefence pofi6y and beiirg inte-
grated into Europe's intergovernmental and supianational structures;
(xxiii) \gtirg the importance of all European allies having a co-ordinated policy in the present conflict inBosnia-Herzegovina;
(xxiv) Concerned by the violation of the CFE Treaty represented by Russia's announcement of the crea-
tion and build-up of the 58th Russian Army in the norttiern Caucasus and the threat it thus brings to bear
on stability in the region,
Rrcoumros rHAT rrm CouNcu-
1. 
- 
Plpe the promotion of a settlement of exi,sting disputes between Greece and Turkey high on its
agenda, knowing that the continuation of these disputes ivill prevent the establishment of'an "effective
European security and defence policy in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean;
2. Remind both Greefe and Ttrrkey that, according to the Petersberg declaration, their mutual relations
should be based on th.e fundamental principles of se[tlement of their differences by peaceful means and
refraining from resorting to the threafor use of force;
3. Remind Greece of the importance the WEU Council attaches to the place of the OSCE in the Euro-
qejm security architecnue and urge this WEU member state to stop vetoing the FYROM's accession to the
OSCE;
\ Use the di?lggue now started with Cyprus to promote, as a matter of urgency, a solution of theCyprus question following the course set by the United Nations;
I In the dialogue with Russia, state clearly that no decision which might lead to a violation of the CFE
lreaty can.be tolerated and that possible modifications to this treary can b6 discussed only at the 1996 CFETreaty review conference;
6. Remind Turkey that a- progressive withdrawal of the Turkish military occupation forces from the
ngrthe.rn Pq*g{ Cyprus - which is to start negotiations on accession to the European Union six months
!ft"t 4g l996.intergoveflunental conference,-logically to be followed by accesiion to WEU - will beinevitable in view of the obligations. under Part I[ of the Petersberg declaration to refrain from resorting
to the threat or use of force in relations between member states and associate member states; the abovE
wi${a.ryal being followed by a reduction in forces and equipment throughout Cyprus leading io a Oemiti-
tarised island.
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Introduction
l. With Greece having acceded to full mem-
bership of WEU on 6th March 1995, and Tirkey
having become an associate member on the same
date, WEU has taken on a new dimension which
will force it to pay increasing attention to problems
in the Eastern Mediterranean. First and foremost,
it will be faced with differences between Greece
and Turkey on a wide range of subjects. But it will
also have to deal with many other issues.
2. One of these is Greece's foreign and securi-
ty policy which has not always obtained the full
understanding of its European partners.
3. The case of Turkey may be even more com-
plicated. Turkey is a member of NAIO and has
concluded an agrcement with the European Union
on the establishment of a customs union, but full
membership does not seem to be imminent. In the
Council of Europe, in particular, Turkey is sffon-
gly criticised for its human rights record and
shortcomings in its constitution regarding demo-
cratic rights. The European Union has also asked
Turkey to make progress in this field.
4. Being a security and defence organisation,
WEU, while sharing the views of the Council of
Europe and the European Union as regards human
rights and democracy in Ttrkey, has the obliga-
tion to consider Turkey's r6le in the region from a
slightly different angle. In this report, the chapters
on Turkey will therefore focus on the security and
defence aspects of Turkey's policy in a wider
sense. The present report also again sffesses that
Turkey occupies a strategic geographical position
which makes it a vital ally for Europe in its secu-
rity and defence policy.
5. Cyprus, finally, is still a divided island
which has been a subject of discord between Tur-
key and Greece throughout the more than thiny
years of its existence as an independent state.
Obviously, the status of this island is still a key
issue in relations between both states. If Cyprus
becomes a full member of the European Union, it
will have to choose between becoming an
observer or a full member of WEU.
6. The objective of the present report is to pro-
vide an account of the position of Cyprus, Greece
and Turkey in the region and their possible r6le in
Europe's defence and security policy, leaving
other issues to be discussed by the various bodies
concerned.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Cuc6, Rapporteur).-
Plnr 0ro: Tunxrv
I. Political partics and thc rise
of I s lamic fundam e ntalis m
7. At the moment, Turkey's political life is
passing through a period of turbulence in which
the relative strength of the main political parties is
undergoing important changes.
8. The True Path Party, which won 277o of
votes in the 1991 general elections, further dimi-
nished to 22.5Vo in the 1994 municipal elections.
The Social Democratic Populist Party, hit by cor-
ruption scandals and by its failure to have its eco-
nomic and human rights policy adopted by the
government, has been losing supporters. It had
already decreased from}0Vo of the votes in 1991
to l3.2Vo in l994.In January 1995, an effort to
merge with the Republican People's Party failed,
but a new effort succeeded. In March of this year,
the two merged parties agreed on a renewed coa-
lition with Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's True
Path Party, with Mr. Hikmet Cetin having become
Deputy Prime Minister and for the time being, it
seems that the existing coalition government has a
good chance to complete its full term in autumn
t996.
9. Support is growing for the extreme right
National Action Party under the leadership of
Alparslan Turkes, with an ultra-nationalist pro-
gramme including an outspoken policy against
Kurdish nationalists. It is also respectful of the
values of Islam and appeals to many non-funda-
mentalist Muslims. It has only 16 seats in parlia-
ment, but obtained 8.4Vo of votes in the municipal
elections of 1994 and might become the major
right-of-centre party in the next general elections.
Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party is another
party with growing support.
10. The Motherland Party, now under the lea-
dership of Mesut Yilmaz, which obtained almost
40Vo of the votes in the general elections of 1987,
fell to 247o in the general elections of 1991 and
2I.2Vo in the municipal elections of 1994.
11. In fact, the Islamic Refah Party, ireaded by
Necmeddin Erbakan, is the only big party whose
support has been steadily growing in recent years,
upfrom lTVoin 1991 to l9Voin1994.
12. In an opinion poll taken at the beginning of
1995 published by the newspaper Milliyet, the
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I-slaguc Refah Party obtained22.4Vo, followed by
the Democratic Left Party.
13. Voter support for the Islamic Refah Party
has been steadily growing since the 1987 general
elections and, in fact, it is the fastest growing poli-
tical party in Turkey. After municipal elections in
1994, it has taken control of many local govern-
ments, including those of Istanbul and Ankara. As
is the case in other Islamic countries around the
Mediterranean, the Islamic fundamentalist party
in Turkey offers subsidised bread, health clinicd,
hostels for students and other services where
government institutions are deficient. One of its
main atfractions has also been its anti-comrption
platform. The Refah Party has the objective of
establishing an Islamic republic, which will resist
closer links between Turkey and the European
Union, wants to pull Turkey out of NATO and
forge closer ties with other Muslim states.
14. The growing importance of the Islamic
Refah Party as a political factor is partly caused
by the country's economic situation and the inabi-
lity of both national and local government to cope
with the problems of a rapidly-growing urban pro-
letariat with little prospect of employment and
gften appalling living conditions. The Refah Party
is also trying to win Kurdish votes, distancing
itself from Turkish nationalism by implying that
an Islamic republic would satisfy the demands for
Kurdish identity through " Islamic brotherhood ".
15. One should guard against the simplification
frequently suggested in the mass media which
presents Islamic fundamentalism as a well-lubri-
cated, violent and merciless organisation orches-
trated by Iran with the help of other radical
r6gimes. Most, if not all experts, agree that there
is no pan-Islamic fundamentalism and there is litt-
le evidence of strategic co-ordination. Through-
out history and still today, the Islamic world has
distinguished itself through internal strife and
lack of unity.
16. Certainly, as any political party, the Refah
Party's objective is control of power, but it has
chosen to participate in the democratic process.
Turkey's greatest assets in building a modern and
prosperous nation have always been its secular
society and democratic institutions, started under
Kemal Atatiirk's leadership. Through their parti-
cipation in the democratic process, Turkistr Isla-
mic fundamentalists are obtaining responsibilities
and opportunities to show whether their ideology
has practical value. They will be held accountable
by voters and, at the same time, they are beco-
ming used to pluralistic politics.
17. On the other hand, any Turkish Govern-
ment has an urgent duty to fight against comrp-
tion, dislocation, unemployment and inequity,
factors creating an ideological vacuum which is a
fertile breeding ground for Islamic fundamenta-
lism. It will have to fight against uncontrolled
migration from rural areas to urban centres and
against a population growth which cannot be
absorbed by the economy'.
18. Recently, there have been serious clashes
involving the Alawites, who account for 10 to 15
million of Turkey's population of over 60 million,
a Shiite community practising a less strict form of
lslam and in favour of the secular state. They are
disliked by the fundamentalist minority among
the mainly Sunni population. Sunni Muslimi
killed 37 Alawites during a riot in the city of Sivas
in 1993, and between 20 and 30 were killed in
incidents in Istanbul on l3th March 1995 and the
following days which are believed to have started
with attacks by a fundamentalist Sunni group.
Such clashes are certainly connected with reli-
gious fanaticism but they cannot reasonably be
seen as part of a political scheme to destabilise the
Turkish state, as some observers have tried to
make believe.
(a) Human rights
19. Although far from being the main subject of
this report, it has to be mentioned that the human
rights situation in Turkey remains an issue of
concern to its closest western allies. Reference is
made in particular to recent reports of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, such
as those of the Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Committee on the consequences of the dissolution
of the Party for Democracy (DEP) in Turkey, by
Mr. Jurgens (Document 7II2) and the report on
the visit to Ankara of the ad hoc committee on
Resolution 1041 submitted by Mr. Martfnez,Pre-
sident of the Assembly (Document7l59, Adden-
dum I).
20. Recently, three reports were published
confirming a situation which leaves room for
considerable improvement.
21. In March 1995, Turkey's independent
Human Rights Association published a report
which documented some 1 000 cases of torture
and nearly 300 summary executions committed
during l994'z.
22. In February 1995, the United Nations spe-
cial investigator into torture, Nigel Rodley, repor-
ted that torture appeared to be widespread in Tur-
key with electric shocks, sexual assault, food
deprivation and death threats among the most
common forms. Still, the Turkish Government
denies widespread torture, stating that it pursues a
legitimate fight against terrorism.
l. According to the 1990 census, the urban population
increased by 43.lVo in the period 1985-90 and the annual
average population growth rate is 2.2Vo
2. Turkey's Daily News, 2nd March 1995.
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23. Amnesty International stated in a report
released on 8th February 1995 that torture,
" disappearances " and extra-judicial killings in
Turkey are increasing sharply. It has blamed the
security forces for perpetrating such crimes " with
impunity throughout the country ". It also stated
that PKK guerrillas carry out summary executions
and kill civilians despite their promise in Decem-
ber 1994 to observe the Geneva Conventions3.
24. Other European institutions, in particular
the Council of Europe and the European Union,
have repeatedly insisted during recent months that
Turkey should respect its commitments to make
significant progress in constitutional and legislat-
ive reforms.
25. There is little use in adding much more to
those earlier requests than to say that, according to
prevailing opinion and experience in Western
Europe, full respect of democratic and human
rights by the state and its institutions is one of the
best guarantees against internal destabilisation
and insecurity in a country.
26. On 2nd May last, Turkey's Minister for
Foreign Affairs stated in the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey:
" Turkey is resolved to move forward in
democracy and human rights in accordance
with the expectations of the Turkish people.
Indeed, the process of democratisation
staned is being pursued irrevocably in the
Grand National Assembly of Turkey. "
This is a very welcome declaration and it is only
to be hoped that the results of this process will
soon be apparent.
(b) The Kurdish problem
27. Since 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK) has been fighting violent guerrilla warfare
combined with terrorist operations, concentrated
mainly in the south-eastern part of Turkey. Its
objective is to establish a separate Kurdish state.
Over the years, Turkey's fight against the PKK has
developed into a massive operation in which an
estimated 315 000 soldiers, special forces and state
sponsored village guards are involved at a yearly
cost of $8.2 billion or one-fifth of the T[rkish state
budget. An estimated 15 000 people have been
killed in guerrilla operations and counter-offen-
sives. In the past three years, both sides in the
conflict have stepped up operations into all out war.
28. In October l992,the PKK for the first time
made an almost battalion-sized massive attack
against Turkish border posts which resulted in the
death of 257 PKK supporters and 60 security
force members.
29. Turkey's Government forces responded
with a large scale cross-border offensive against
PKK camps in Iraq, co-operating with Iraqi-based
Kurdish guerrillas of the Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK). Although these operations were not com-
pletely successful, on 20th March 1993, the PKK
leader, Abdullah Ocalan, called for a temporary
ceasefire and negotiations. Fighting activities
were reduced, but were resumed full scale after
thirty-eight soldiers were killed in a deadly ambush
staged by the PKK on 24thMay 1993. In its follo-
wing campaign, the PKK expanded its activities
to cover the whole eastern part of Turkey from the
north, near the Armenian border, to the south,
near the border with Iraq. In spring 1994, the Tur-
kish Government forces intensified their counter-
insurgency programme with new operations
employing a total of 240 000 troops from the 2nd
and 3rd armies and from western units. Opera-
tions included air raids and hot pursuit of terro-
rists across the border.
30. Another tactic still in use is to remove the
population from mountain villages and hamlets
and destroy their dwellings, which denies the
PKK information, food and shelter. The objective,
as announced by Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, is
to move this mountain population to collective
villages for which the European Resettlement
Fund has offered Turkey $227 million.
31. On 20th March 1995, Turkey embarked
upon its largest military operation against the
PKK on Iraqi territory when 35 000 Turkish
troops, backed by heavy equipment and fighter-
bomber aircraft launched an attack across the nor-
thern Iraqi border against PKK baseso. According
to the Turkish Government, the objective was to
eliminate PKK terrorist bases across the Turkish
border. Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, said: " We
are determined that, in this final operation, the job
will definitely be done. " It is said that, at the
same time, the Turkish Government wanted to
give a warning to the Kurdish factions in Nonhern
Iraq to do their job and control the PKK on their
territory in exchange for Turkish support. Turkey
also wishes the Iraqi Kurds to start negotiations
with the kaqi Government.
32. The operation came under criticism from
Turkey's European allies and later also from the
United States. The French Foreign Minister, Alain
Jupp6, speaking on behalfofthe European Union,
said that the European Union was " worried by the
massive character of the intervention " and
concerned about the " damage done to the civilian
population ". Germany, which since 1964 has pro-
vided Turkey, at no cost, with military equipment
4. A little later, an additional 25 000 troops were sent to the
Tunceli province in eastern Turkey in order to fight other
groups of PKK rebels.3. Financial Times, 8th February 1995.
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worth a total value of $4.2 million, has stopped
any further deliveries and suspended financial aid
for the construction of two MEKO frigates for
Turkeys.
33. On 6th April 1995, the European Parlia-
ment adopted a resolution with 411 votes in
favour, none against and six abstentions, which
said that it: " strongly condemns Turkey's milita-
ry intervention in northern Iraq and the resulting
violations of international law and human rights. "
The resolution further stated: 'i The state of
human rights in Turkey is too grave to allow for
the forrnation of the proposed customs union at
present. "
34. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe on 26th April 1995, adopted a Recom-
mendation condemning Turkey's military inter-
vention which it regarded as " contrary to interna-
tional law " and expressed " its anxiety for the
safety of the civilian population ". The Assembly
considered that Turkey " should immediately
withdraw its forces and commit itself to seeking a
peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem ".
35. Withoutpushing too hard, the United States
Government made it understood that it wanted an
exit date. It left no doubt that it viewed the PKK
rebels as terrorists and understood why Turkey
would want to act against them, but it was " extre-
mely concerned " lest this operation would harm
Ankara's further integration with Europe6.
36. The United States Deputy Secretary of
State, Strobe Talbott, provided his view of the
situation when he addressed an audience in Ankara
on 11th April 1995. According to Mr. Talbott, this
massive Turkish operation would not be the end
of PKK's separatist fight. A long-term solution to
the rebel threat along Turkey's south-east border
lay with a new order in Baghdad. In the meantime,
only haqi Kurds could conffol the border and pre-
vent the PKK from infiltrating terrorists into Tur-
key. Kurdish factions in northern Iraq should stop
their internal violence.
37. The United States was opposed to the esta-
blishment of an independent state for ethnic
Kurds, but autonomy or another system of self-
government might eventually be negotiated in
states where Kurdish communities live. He added:
" All citizens of a state, whatever their nationality,
religion or language should feel themselves to be
full citizens. If a state can meet that standard, then
it is much less likely to have a problem with
secessionist terrorists 7. "
38. Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister, Hikmet
Cetin, set a completely different tone when he
Le Figaro, 30th March 1995.
International Herald Tribune, llth April 1995.
International Herald Tribune, l2th April 1995.
addressed a London audience on 8th April 1995.
Mr. Cetin rejected claims that the Turkish opera-
tion in northern Iraq violated international law,
saying that there was a legal vacuum in that part,
caused by the creation of a Kurdish " safe haven "
north of the 36th parallel. The solution was for the
Iraqi Government to comply with all United
Nations resolutions and so regain its legal authori-
ty over the whole of its territory. Mr. Cetin further
refused to accept that in Turkey there existed a
conflict between the government and the Turkish
minority in the south-east. He ruled out any chan-
ge in government policy, such as permitting edu-
cation in the Kurdish languages.
39. On 4th May 1995, Turkey's Defence
Minister, Mehmet Golan, announced that all Tur-
kish troops had withdrawn from Iraqi territory six
weeks after the beginning of the operation in
which the army claims to have killed at least
555 PKK fighters, destroyed their bases and train-
ing camps in the area and seized sophisticated
weapons. It was reported that on 3rd and 4th May,
a high-ranking Iraqi-Kurdish delegation met
Turkish officials in Ankara to discuss control of
the Iraqi side of the border after a full Turkish
withdrawal.
40. Later, on 9th May 1995, the European
Union issued the following declaration:
" The European Union, which regards the
stability and territorial integrity of the states
of the region as a matter of importance, has
noted with satisfaction the announcement
of the total withdrawal of Turkish troops
from northern Iraq, in accordance with the
undertakings given by Turkey to the troika
on 23rd March. It hopes that Ankara will
deal similarly with the other concerns voi-
ced by the European Union in recent
months concerning democracy and human
rights, thus creating more favourable
conditions for the bringing about of the
desired rapprochement between the Euro-
pean Union and Turkey, with a view in par-
ticular to the implementation of the agree-
ment on Customs Union. "
41. The European Union's reference to the
territorial integrity of the states in the region may
have been meant to remind Turkey of the stand-
ing policy that borders in the region should not
be changed. On 2nd May last, President Suley-
man Demirel declared that Turkey would like to
correct its frontier with Iraq in order to ensure its
impermeability'. At the moment, it is not known
whether this was an indication of a change in
Turkey's foreign policy or a declaration made
8. The Independent, 7th April 1995.
9. Le Monde, llth May 1995.
5.
6.
7.
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with considerations of internal political strife in
mind.
42. Itis observedthateven ifTurkey succeeded
in eliminating the PKK in northern Iraq, its war on
Turkey's own territory will not end soon. The
campaign against the separatist Kurds in south-
eastern Turkey is often accompanied by discrimi-
nation and violence against the civilian popula-
tion. Complete villages are being desroyed and
their inhabitants resettled. Human righs organisa-
tions and also the Council of Europe have repor-
ted murder, torture and other human rights viola-
tions. Such behaviour is driving people into the
hands of separatist movements and even the PKK,
which has a steady supply of guerrilla recruits.
Nobody can deny that the PKK is responsible for
objectionable violent terrorist attacks, summary
executions, hostage-taking and destruction of
civilian property.
43. The Turkish Government has the right and
the obligation to protect its population against
terrorism, but it should also accept that the pro-
blem of Kurdish nationalism cannot be solved by
military operations. Turkey might have prevented
the Kurdish nationalist problem from growing
out of proportion into a state security problem if
it had granted the Kurds greater rights of cultural
self-expression including the indiscriminate use
of the Kurdish language. Succeeding Turkish
governments, however, have stressed the ethnic
Turkish character of the state, which left no room
for any institutional expression of other ethnic
identities.
M. [t has been pointed out that in many wes-
tern European states ethnic minorities have obtai-
ned cultural rights of self-expression without this
resulting in the dissolution of the state. The Spa-
nish constitution granted nationalities and regions
of the state a wide measure of autonomy within
a decentralised Spain, but still solidly united as
a state, and as a consequence the popularity of
radical Basque nationalism resorting to violence
has diminished considerably.
45. The establishment of a separate Kurdish
state in south-eastern Turkey is very hard to ima-
gine, also because of strong resistance from Iran,
Iraq and Syria, each with important Kurdish
minorities on their territory. Moreover, it is
known that many of Turkey's 15 million Kurds
are living in parts of Turkey other than the south-
eastern region. It seems inevitable, however, for
some form of local and regional autonomy, inclu-
ding cultural rights, to be granted to Kurds living
in the south-east of the country in order to meet
the requirements of a democratic state in which
the rights of religious minorities, as stipulated in
the Treaty of Lausanne, and of ethnic minorities
are recognised.
II. Defence spending
and the Turkish armedforces
46. Turkey feels that, taking into consideration
the many changes which took place in the Black
Sea area and at its eastern and southern frontiers
after the end of the cold war, its traditional r6le of
flank counbry has been transformed into one of a
front nation.
47. [n the early 1990s, Ttrrkey decided to start a
major modernisation and restructuring of its
armed forces. Defence expenditures were increas-
ed and the national defence industrial base was
enlarged.
48. The Tirkish army is now implementing a
reorganisation in which the division command
level is being replaced, with a few exceptions, by
more flexible brigades. Manpower has been redu-
ced to a peacetime strength of 500 000, but the
operations against the PKK have caused an increa-
se of the length of conscript service by five months.
Figures regarding defence spending in Turkey are
given in Appendix I of the present report.
49. Turkey is closely observing negotiations
between Russia and Ukraine on the division of the
Black Sea fleet and the use of bases and shipyards
in Ukraine. A satisfactory solution for both parties
is considered to be an important factor for stabili-
sation in the region. Relations between the Tlrkish
and Russian naval forces have improved and both
countries have signed an agreement on the preven-
tion of incidents on and over the high seas with
both Russia and Ukraine. Turkey has noted Rus-
sia's declaration that it considers the Black Sea and
the Caucasus as first priority shategic areas.
50. The cascading of CFE surplus equipment
from other NATO countries has considerably
increased the equipment numbers of the Turkish
armed forces. Turkey received M-60 tanks, Leo-
pard-I tanks, M-l10 203 mm self-propelled guns,
UR-416 armoured personnel carriers, AH-1
Cobra attack helicopters and UH-60 Black Hawk
utility helicopters. Orders were placed for Russian
Mi-17 and French 54,-365 Cougar helicopters.
The navy commissioned eight United States
Knox-class destroyers. In the airforce, all the
F-104 Starfighters have now been retired from
service. Deliveries of new F-16s continued and
more F-4s were received from Germany.
51. The restructuring and modernisation of
Turkey's armed forces is explained in more detail
in the following paragraphs.
(a)Amy
52. The army's objective is to create forces
with high mobility, fire power, shock reaction and
endurance. They should be capable oflong-range
target detection, identification and recognition.
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The restructured forces should be flexible, easy to
control and multi-purpose, capable of effective
and rapid mobilisation. It is envisaged to employ
professional personnel for critical missions.
53. While no changes were made in the number
of armies and corps, the infantry-heavy organisa-
tion of regiments and divisions has been abando-
ned and new self-sufficient armoured and mecha-
nised battalions and brigades have been created.
54. The Turkish army is being re-equipped
with the help of funds from various national
sources, United States credits, United States sou-
thern region aid, German military assistance pro-
grammes and through CFE Treaty transfers from
other NATO member states.
55. Important modernisation projects being
implemented are:
- 
the purchase and co-production of the
Sikorsky Black Hawk and the Eurocop-
ter Cougar, both utility helicopters, and
procurement of the Cobra and Super
Cobra for protection/escort missions and
anti-tank defence;
- 
updating of existing M-48 tanks and ove-
rhaul and delivery of 822 M-60 tanks
from the United States and Leopard
tanks provided by Germany;
- 
domestic manufacture of armoured com-
bat vehicles and improved armoured per-
sonnel carriers;
- 
procurement of tank trailers, needed for
inter-region flexibility of armoured and
mechanised units;
- 
modernisation of existing 155 mm self-
propelled howitzers and conversion of
105 mm howitzers to 155 mm self-pro-
pelled howitzers;
- 
procurement of multiple launch rocket
systems, capable of launching both roc-
kets and tactical missiles.
56. Other equipment programmes are being
planned or implemented in army aviation, target
acquisition, identification and recognition, C3I
and air defence.
(b) Airforcc
57. At present, the lst and 2nd Tactical Air
Force Command constitute the primary strike
power of the Turkish air force. They comprise a
total of nineteen NAlO-assigned combat squa-
drons, made up of six F-4, seven F-16, three
F-104 and three F-5 squadrons, armed with Side-
winder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles, and
Maverick, Rockeye, Durandal, CBU, LGB and
conventional bomb ammunition. Additionally,
two of the present F-16 squadrons have Lantirn
capability.
58. Moreover, there is a training command,
consisting of six squadrons with different types of
aircraft, an air logistics command and four air
transportation squadrons, equipped with C-130
and C-160 medium transport aircraft and CN-135
light transport aircraft and UH-IH helicopters for
special tasks.
59. A modernisation prograrnme envisages a
number of important update and procurement
activities. F-104 and F-5 aircraft which have com-
pleted theireconomic life will be phased out when
the number of F-16 aircraft 
- 
procurement of
which began in 1986 under joint Turkish-United
States production 
- 
reaches the desired level. Fur-
thermore, efforts to equip F-16 aircraft in service
with state-of-the-art elecffonic warfare equipment
have reached the final phase. A total of 240 F-16s
have now been ordered. Modernisation efforts to
upgrade F-4 and F-5 aircraft still in use are under-
way.
60. The acquisition of A-10 aircraft scheduled
to enter into service for effective support for the
land forces has also reached its final phase. The
acquisition of CN-135 light ransport aircraft has
begun under joint Turkish-Spanish production. In
addition, air force participation in the joint
European future large aircraft (FI-A) project will
replace C-l30lC-160 aircraft which will complete
their economic life in the year 2000.
(c) NavY
61. Turkey expects the future extended exploi-
tation of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region
and the development of the Black Sea economic
co-operation area which seeks to integrate the
economic and commercial interests of the Black
Sea region with those in the Mediterranean basin
to have far-reaching consequences.
62. The protection and security of the sea lanes
of communication in the Black Sea will continue
to be one of the Turkish navy's essential tasks.
The addition of new international oil terminals in
Turkish seaports located in the eastern Mediterra-
nean in the future will further increase the impor-
tance of protecting the sea lanes of communica-
tion in the region and widen the tasks carried out
by the Turkish navy in co-operation with other
allied naval forces.
63. With the preceding considerations in mind,
the Turkish navy is now undertaking an important
modernisation programme with the following
main procurement projects :
- 
construction of a fifth, sixth, seventh and
eighth Meko 200 class frigate, to enter
into service between 1995 and 1998;
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- 
construction of four 1 400 ton subma-
rines, to be equipped with harpoon gui-
ded missiles and Tigerfish torpedoes,
bringing the total number of submarines
to ten. The 10th submarine is to be com-
missioned in 1998;
- 
construction of five more Dogan class
fast patrol boats, equipped with guided
missiles, bringing the total number to
thirteen, of which the last is to be com-
missioned in 1999;
- 
construction of a second auxiliary oil
replenishment ship, to be commissioned
in 1995.
64. For the longer term, the procurement of
additional frigates, new anti-submarine warfare
helicopters, six mine-hunter ships and the replace-
ment of maritime paftol aircraft is being planned.
III. Relations with other countries in the region
(a) The Transcaucasian region
(i) Georgia
65. Turkey maintains relations of co-operation
and good neighbourliness with Georgia, respec-
ting the principles of territorial integrity, protec-
tion of human rights and the solution of conflicts
by peaceful means also in the recent inter-ethnic
conflicts which have plagued this newly-indepen-
dent state.
66. In the Abkhazian conflict, Turkey supports
the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-Gene-
ral's special representative to find a peaceful solu-
tion and to settle the political status of Abkhazia.
It also supports the efforts of the OSCE mission to
find a political solution for South Ossetia.
67. Since Georgia's independence, Turkey has
provided humanitarian aid totalling around $18
million. In February 1993, the Turkish Exim bank
opened a credit line of $50 million and it stands
ready to open a credit line for a similar amount. In
order to help Georgia overcome its shortage of
energy supply, Turkey has provided electric ener-
gy to a total value of $80 million.
68. Moreover, Turkey is setting up long-term
co-operation programmes which should be the
basis of further economic links between the two
neighbours and other states in the region. Mention
should be made of co-operation in the fields of
energy, transport, telecommunications, trade and
the opening of new border crossings.
(ii) Azerbaijan
69. On 9th November 1991, Azerbaijan was
the first newly-independent republic on the
territory of the former Soviet Union to receive
Turkish recognition. With the signing of a proto-
col on 13th January l992,Bakt was the frst of
the new capitals to receive a Turkish embassy. As
early as November 1991, a Turkish-Azeri busi-
ness council was established in order to develop
commercial relations between the two counffies.
70. There can be no doubt that of all the coun-
tries in that region, Turkey has the closest rela-
tions with Azerbaijan. This is partly due to the
existence of an important Azeri community
within Turkey which acts as an efficient lobby. At
the same time, however, the Turkish business
community has a strong preference for trading
with Azerbaijan which has a vigorous small busi-
ness culture, is geographically close to Turkey
and speaks a Turkish language very similar to
Anatolian Turkish.
71. In Azerbaijan, digital telephone systems
and communications via the Ttirksat satellite were
established with Turkish assistance. The Turkish
Eximbank in 1992 granted an export credit of
$100 million and a project credit of $150 million,
while a $100 million credit was granted to the
autonomous republic of Nakhitchevan.
72. It should be mentioned that Turkey is
concerned over the internal political situation in
Azerbaijan'0.
73. In October 1994,there was a series of vio-
lent incidents which had all the appearance of a
coup attempt in which the Interior Ministry's
OMON special purpose militia, led by Ravshan
Javadov, played an important r6le. President Gei-
dar Aliyev imposed a state of emergency and a
curfew in Baku and later dismissed Prime Minis-
ter Surat Guseinov because of his involvement in
the alleged coup attempt.
74. After these incidents in October l994,Pre-
sident Geidar Aliyev claimed, on 5th October,
that Russia was deliberately destabilising Azer-
baijan by covert means in order to force the coun-
try to permit the deployment of Russian froops on
the Iranian border and to gain a larger stake in the
Caspian oil deal.
75. In March 1995, there was a new outburst of
street fighting caused by the Interior Minisffy's
militia under Ravshan Javadov because of a dis-
pute with the government over plans for the mili-
tia's disbandment. The militia called for President
Aliyev's government to be replaced by a coalition
government. Interior Minister Ramil Usubov
stated that the militia, which allegedly has been
smuggling strategic materials out of the country,
had " joined up with criminal gangs ".Meanwhile,
the situation has calmed down again, but when
President Aliyev on the occasion of his visit to the
10. The conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is
dealt with in chapter Itr of this report.
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European Union on 18th April 1995 pressed for
closer political ties, the President of the European
Commission reiterated that the European Union
would not make agreements with any Transcauca-
sian state as long as the region remained unstable ".
(iii) Armenia
76. The conflict between Azeris and Arme-
nians, and similarly between Armenians and
Turks, have ancient and well-known historical
roots. The present dispute between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh has clearly
affected Turkey's relations with Armenia. They
deteriorated in particular when in spring 1993
during the fighting over Kelbajar, Armenian forces
opened a second land corridor between Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey closed the air cor-
ridor to Armenia. It also stopped the free passage
of trains and aircraft for humanitarian aid when
Armenia occupied Kelbajar in April 1994.
77. Turkey recently stated that it is ready to
take steps aimed at building confidence in its rela-
tions with Armenia, but only on condition that
Armenia is willing to do the same. Offrcials of
both countries have met to discuss the issue. Tur-
key has declared that it will establish diplomatic
relations with Armenia only after the withdrawal
of Armenian forces from occupied Azeri territory.
It says that Armenia should also lift its objection
against Turkish participation in a planned multi-
national peace-keeping force for Nagorno-
Karabakh.
78. Turkey started preparing to ease its embar-
go on Armenia by reopening an air corridor allo-
wing delivery of United States humanitarian aid.
This development is said to be connected with the
Turkish bid, strongly supported by the United
States, for an oil pipeline which should link the oil
fields of Azerbaijan with Turkey's Mediterranean
port of Ceyham, crossing Armenian territory12.
(iv) The conJlict in Nagorno-Karabakh
79. Nagorno-Karabakh, a region inhabited by
Armenians, was attached to Azerbaijan following
a decision taken by the Caucasian desk of the
communist party in 1921. Later, in 1923, Nagor-
no-Karabakh obtained the status of autonomous
region of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azer-
baijan. For many years, there has been a policy of
Azerification. As a consequence, the share of
Armenians in its population diminish ed from 9 5Vo
in l92l to 75Vo in the early 1980s.
80. Stimulated by the perestroika movement in
the Soviet Union, a resolution was adopted by the
Council of Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1988
asking to be attached to Armenia. There were
International Herald Tribune, l9th April 1995.
Financial Times, 24th April 1995.
several anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan in
1988 and 1990 and many Azeris left Armenia to
go to Azerbaijan. Altogether, an estimated
200 000 persons were forced into exile.
81. The Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet suspended
Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomy in November
1991, but in December 1991, the republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence fol-
lowing a referendum with 99Vo of t}re votes in
favour. In t992 fighting intensified into a full
scale war and the Azeri troops were soon forced
into retreat and defence. Violence and hostilities
since 1988 are said to have resulted in the deaths
of an estimated 25 000 soldiers and civilians and
the displacement of one million others'3. It is
thought that at present ethnic Armenian forces
occupy l0 000 square kilometres of Azerbaijan
territory, including a strip of Azeri land dividing
the enclave from Armenia on top of the 4 400
square kilometres of Nagorno-Karabkh's territo-
ry. Although Armenia has denied involvement in
the conflict, both Turkey and Iran, but also increa-
singly Russia, have held Armenia responsible.
82. On 27th July 1994, the Defence Ministers
of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the military leader
of Nagorno-Karabakh signed an agreement giving
legal status to, and indefinitely extending, a cease-
fire agreement reached in Moscow on 9th-11th
May 1994.
83. A meeting of the OSCE Minsk group'o in
Moscow on 9th-llth February 1995, did not
manage to smooth over the differences between
the parties concerned over the political statute of
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The emphasis
of Armenia on granting a political statute to
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, and its direct
participation in the negotiations seems to be a
major obstacle to reaching a comprehensive
agreement.
84. At the OSCE summit meeting in Budapest
on 6th December 1994, it was decided to send a
3 000 strong OSCE multinational peace-keeping
force to Nagorno-Karabakh. No agreement has
been reached yet over the composition of the
force, but it seems to be agreed that no one state
could contribute more than 30Vo of the troops.
Russia had earlier insisted that it should provide
most of the troops. The deployment of the peace-
keeping force will only take place if the cease-fre
will have been changed into a permanent ffuce and
after United Nations Security Council approval.
85. In fact, Turkey has its doubts about Rus-
sia's r6le in the conflict, being aware of Russia's
13. Human Rights Watch, Seven years of conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh, New York 1995.
14. The OSCE Minsk group consisting of a number of
OSCE member states, including Russia and Turkey and the
" interested " parties in Nagorno-Karabakh, started its peace
initiative in 1992.
11.
12.
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strategic interests in the region, combined with its
desire to deploy troops in Azerbaijan. Russia has
made no secret of its intention to protect the sou-
thern frontiers of the forrner Soviet Union's terri-
tory against rising Islamism and to have an impor-
tant stake in the exploitation of Azerbaijan's oil
and its transport to the world markets.
86. Russia had made mediation efforts in the
conflict as early as September 1991, but these
were considerably stepped up at the expense of
the mediation activities of the Minsk group after
President Aliyev came to power in a military coup
in June 1993.
87. At the beginning of March 1995, however,
there were violent clashes between Armenia and
Azeri forces in the north of Azerbaijan 
- 
the first
important violation of the cease-fire in force since
May t994.In May 1995, however, on the occasion
of the one-year existence of the cease-fire agree-
ment, both parties exchanged prisoners of war.
(v) Conclusions
88. The Transcaucasian region, where Europe
and Asia meet, has always been considered of
great sEategic importance by its direct neighbours
Russia, Turkey and Iran.
89. For Russia and later for the Soviet Union, it
was a buffer zone against the Muslim world in the
south, a concept which seems to be continued by
the new post-communist Russia. It considers
Transcaucasia as situated within its zone of
influence. Russia's objective is to have the CIS
recognised as a regional organisation in the fra-
mework of chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter, which could be given a mandate to inter-
vene in the CIS by the Security Council, the inter-
vention being financed by the United Nations.
90. Although Azerbaijan has declared repea-
tedly that it does not want any foreign troops on
its soil, Russia, with President Aliyev's agree-
ment, is still using the huge early warning station
in Gubeli in north Azerbaijan which it certainly
would not like to give up, given the six years of
construction and $2 or $3 billion investment nee-
ded to reconstruct it elsewhere on Russian territo-
ry. At the same time, on 1lth June 1994, Azerbai-jan agreed with the Russian Defence Minister to
participate in a unified air defence system for
Trans-Caucasia.
91. Because of their involvement in armed
conflicts, both Georgia and Armenia have had no
choice other than to give in to Russian pressure to
be allowed to deploy Russian troops on their terri-
tory. As a consequence, Russia has now deployed
divisions on Georgian and Armenian territory.
With the announcement in Moscow of the crea-
tion of the 58th army of northern Caucasus, there
will be even more Russian troops in the region.
Azerbaijan has not yet ceded to Russian pressure,
but it remains to be seen how long it will be able
to resist.
92. Turkey, which has narrow cultural and eco-
nomic relations with Azerbaijan, wishes before
anything else to prevent a resurgence of Russian
influence in Transcaucasia and in particular in
Azerbaijan. Both Turkey and Armenia are trying
to normalise their mutual relations, but Turkey
has made it clear that this would be possible only
if Armenians were to withdraw from occupied
Azeri territory because Turkish public opinion
would not allow any weakening of support for
Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the Armenian
minority in Turkey will insist on Turkey recogni-
sing the 1915 genocide as a condition for reconci-
liation.
93. Iran knows that it has to act cautiously in
order not to create unrest among the 20 million
Azeris living in Northern Iran. While it is mode-
rately in favour of the Armenians, it is providing
humanitarian aid to the Azeri refugees of the
Nagorno-Karabakh confl ict.
(b) The Central Asian republbs
94. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, Turkey had hoped that the Central Asian
Turkic republics'5 and the Transcaucasian repu-
blic of Azerbaijan, with which it shares cultural,
linguistic and religious ties, would form a sub-
regional bloc under Turkish leadership. Turkey
has now realised that expectations on both sides
were raised too high, acknowledging that it is
financially and technically unable to meet many
of the republic's needs. The state of the Turkish
economy does not allow for extensive aid pro-
granrmes and the internal situation in the country,
with high inflation, growing Islamic fundamenta-
lism and the fight against Kurdish separatists,
demands prior attention.
95. Two " Turkish summits " have now been
held, the frst in Ankara in October 1992 and the
second in Istanbul on 18th-19th October 1994. A
third summit is planned to be held in Bishkek in
August 1995.
(c) The south-eastent neighbours
(i) Iran
Rivalries in Central Asia and the Caucasus
96. Turkey and Iran are both close to the new
independent republics of the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia, on account of the existence of cultural,
historic and religious ties.
232
15. These republics are: Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Turkmenis-
tan and Uzbekistan.
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97. Rivalry undeniably exists between Turkey
and Iran, particularly in Central Asia which for
long has been the place of encounters and conflict
between the Turkish and Persian worlds. Russia's
hegemony has therefore been contested in what
was formerly its own exclusive sphere of influ-
ence over which Turkey and Iran are now
competing.
98. There is an awareness among the Turkish-
speaking peoples of Central Asia that they belong
to the same cultural commurtity. In the area, there
is, however, also a Farsi-speaking culture which
enjoys cultural prestige but is politically in the
minority.
99. Different trends are evident from one for-
mer Soviet Republic to another. Generally spea-
king however Turkey wishes to see the republics
become market economies and adopt a pro-wes-
tern political line. The message disseminated by
Ankara advocates a moderate Islamic view in
order counter the risk of a slide into radical Islam.
Iran, for its part, intends to promulgate the messa-
ge of Islam and export an ideology that is inde-
pendent of the West.
100. From the early 1990s, Turkey has adopted
an approach that aims to increase commercial and
cultural exchanges with central Asia. Indeed Tur-
kish products dominate virtually all of the area's
markets.
101. Moreover Turkey is presenting the creation
of the Black Sea economic co-operation area't as
the means of creating an area of regional political
stability facilitating its anchorage to the West
through economic and commercial integration.
I02. From the early nineties onwards, han, for
its part, has strengthened the regional dimension
of its economic diplomacy guided by the " prag-
matic wing " of the r6gime. The Iranian strategy
therefore gives priority to winning back markets,
particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The
break-up of the Soviet Union gave new impetus to
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
(OEC) which the Muslim republics of the former
Soviet Union joined at Tehran's suggestion. In
this way, Iran is in point of fact trying to create a
huge common Islamic market in the region.
103. Although Turkey is associated with the
OEC, it wants at the same time to play its own
hand. It made this clear by organising the first
summit meeting of Turkish speaking countries in
Istanbul in October 19921'.
lO4. These considerations show the stake repre-
sented by the region in the policy of influence
of two important countries harbouring the same
16. See Chapter VII of the present report.
17. The agreements concluded, however, were modest and
cautious.
regional ambitions and pursuing competing courses
of action.
105. Although many in the West are concerned
over Iranian influence in Central Asia, including
in particular the export of militant Islamism, it
should be noted that Iran has acted cautiously and
has concentrated on trade agreements and quite
successfully. It has signed a co-operation agree-
ment with Turkmenistan to lay a pipeline for the
fiansport of Turkmen gas through Iran to Europe.
It is also discussing an oil pipeline project with
Kazakhstan. Weekly flights between Central
Asian capitals and Tehran have been established,
new border crossings opened, roads repaired and
new roads, railways and bridges are being prepa-
red. The main objective of Iran's policy in this
region is to prevent Turkey, and through it the
West, from gaining a foothold in the Central
Asian republics strong enough to pose a security
threat.
106. Notwithstanding the efforts made by both
states, competition between Iran and Turkey for
influence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus
has been limited because both states lack the
resources to invest in the region in order to win
influence. Iran has not emphasised its ideological
or religious interests in Azerbaijan and Turkme-
nistan. It has concenffated mainly on cultural and
economic links and transit agreements.
Azerbaijan
107 . The most obvious of their rivalries sets Tur-
key and han on opposing sides as regards Azer-
baijan, which has a certain continuity in its links
both with Turkey and Iran and with central Asia.
A large part of Turkey's attention is in fact mono-
polised by Azerbaijan in relation to which Turkey
is able to claim ties of blood and a community of
language'E. Iran for its part emphasises shared
religion and the fact that lSVo of han's population
is Azeri.
108. Although 70Vo of the Azeri population are
Shiites, thus providing a certain link with Iran,
suspicion of religious fundamentalism is real and
the Iranian model is generally rejected. This fact
does not prevent Iran from making repeated
attempts to impose its presence in cultural, politi-
cal, economic, social and religious matters.
109. Indeed, it is the development model of the
Turkish non-secular state that has been adopted
by the Azerbaijan Government and the majority
of the Azeri population. This statement, however,
must be qualified insofar as the Islamic activism
coming from Turkey is far more clear-sighted
than that promoted by Iran ''.
The Azeris are Turkish-speaking.
Cahiers de I'Orient, No. 30, 1993.
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110. As regards the conflict over Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, it should be noted that Iran is strongly in
favour of a peaceful solution because of concern
lest it spill over into its own territory and create
interest in its own large Azeri community.
111. Recently the signing in Bakou, of an agree-
ment between Turkey and Azerbaijan has streng-
thened Ankara's participation, to kan's disadvan-
tage in an oil consortium dominated by American
and British companies for exploiting the rich
deposits of the Caspian sea2o.
ll2. The substantial progress Turkey has made
in the Caucasus relies heavily on firm American
diplomatic support, one of the most prominent
concerns of which is to stem the spread of Islam.
It is a matter of avoiding destabilisation at local
levels that might draw in the whole of Central
Asia and creating a cenffe of stability through the
emergence of a regional power, Tirrkey, as a coun-
terweight to Iran's ascendency.
The Kurdish problem
113. The Kurdish question contributes to bring-
ing Iran and Turkey closer together. The flow of
Kurdish refugees to the Iranian frontier in Decem-
ber 1991 obliged Turks and Iranians to co-operate
to find a solution to this thorny problem.
lI4. Although Turkish military intervention
against PKK camps is intended to crush the sour-
ce of what Turkey considers to be dangerous des-
tabilisation, Iran's publicly-stated objective is
rather to eliminate the risk of contamination.
115. The two countries are generally in step
regarding the Kurdish question. The Islamic
Republic seems to have assumed a permanent
right of pursuit of Kurdish guerrillas into Iraqi ter-
ritory.
116. Like Turkey, Iraq rejects the idea of an
autonomous Kurdistan that might one day be-
come an independent entity and, according to
Iran, threaten the internal situation in the country.
Il7. The country's artillery and airforce conse-
quently inflict numerous raids at regular intervals
against the areas which, according to the authori-
ties in Tehran, are harbouring Kurdish rebels, an
allegation which the Iraqi Kurds have always
denied. It seems that, like Turkey, Iran remains
determined to arouse fear among its opponents.
118. While a matter of shared concern, the Kur-
dish question also constitutes a factor of tension
and hostility between Turkey and Iran. Turkish
policy and initiatives towards the Middle East
remained relatively low-key in 1993 and 1994,
except in relation to questions having a more or
less direct influence on the Kurdish problem. Tur-
key, kan and Syria have been meeting regularly
since their summit meeting of 14th November
1992in order to review the position of those refer-
red to by Turkey as the PKK terrorists. The Turk-
ish authorities strongly suspect Syria and Iran of
using them to weaken Turkey. At the same time,
the repeated tripartite summit meetings confirm
that the views of the three countries converge on
this point, fearing that the process of adminis-
frative autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan might lead to
a contagious dismemberment.
119. Lastly, Iran's reaction to the Turkish mili-
tary intervention in March 1995 has been muted
and cautious. Tehran has in fact asked for the
" withdrawal " of Turkish forces from Iraq. Iranian
radio also announced that the presence of Turkish
troops in Iraq was likely to complicate further the
situation in the region. This position is supported
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, Ali
Akbar Velayati. The Iranian President for his part
has merely stated the importance Iran attaches to
Iraq's territorial integrity.
Interior developments and the restructuring and
modernisation of I ran's armed forces
l2O. Under President Rafsanjani, the Iranian
Government is concentrating its efforts on revita-
lising the shattered economy by introducing mea-
sures of liberalisation and openings to western
markets. Consolidation of the Islamic republic at
home is the government's priority. The aggressive
and radical foreign policy, combined with stre-
nuous efforts to export the revolution by intrigue
and force, have been toned down considerably.
The failure of the government's policy to improve
the country's economic situation and the popula-
tion's living standards has increased the influence
of radical Islamists and the conservative religious
faction, but President Rafsanjani is still frnnly in
power and has only had to make limited conces-
sions to the conservatives.
l2l. The United States continues its efforts to
isolate han because of its alleged support of terro-
rist groups, opposition to Middle East peace talks
and search for a nuclear capability. On the other
hand, it should be noted that American oil compa-
nies, buying an estimated 800 000 ba:rels a day of
Iranian crude oil (roughly a quarter of Iran's total
output), are the largest purchasers of Iranian oil
and American companies are the sixth largest
trading partner for Iran.
122. Feeling uncomfortable with many of its
neighbours and having learned the lessons of the
Iraq-Iran war and of the coalition victory over
kaq, Iran is now implementing a programme to
modernise and professionalise its armed forces.
Forced by economic and financial problems, the
programme envisages the creation of smaller and
more professional armed forces. A re-equipment
prograflrme is under way with Russia, China and
h
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North Korea as the main suppliers. Priorities are
the upgrading of armoured warfare capabilities,
the building of a modern airforce, enhanced ability
to deny access to the Gulf to hostile shipping and
the expansion of its surface-to-surface missile
arsenal.
123. It is said that the Iranian Government
considers effective armed forces a vital instru-
ment to protect the country while the social and
economic reconstruction of the country is taking
place.
124. In particular, the United States has strongly
criticised the procurement of three " kilo " class
diesel-electric submarines from Russia. It should
be noted, however, that these submarines will be
of only limited value, their crews being trained
only for limited sub-surface deployments, while
they are vulnerable to modern anti-submarine
warfare forces. They may, however, play an
important rOle in a strategy of denial and naval
guerrilla warfare in the Gu1f. Iran has stationed
troops equipped with surface-to-surface and sur-
face-to-air missiles on islands located near the
Strait of Hormuz which could, in combination
with other military activities, threaten the free
flow of oil from the Gulf to the western world.
I25. Following its experience in the Iran-Iraq
war, where its troops suffered from chemical
attacks, Iran has now developed a full offensive
and defensive warfare capability with various
delivery systems, including artillery shells, air-
craft spray tanks and missile warheads. Biological
weapons production is under way.
126. There has been no proof of an imminent
Iranian military nuclear capability, but there can
be little doubt that the country has an interest in
researching the possibility of such a capability.
Recent experience has shown that kaq and North
Korea have also been able to hide their military
programmes from IAEA inspections.
127. Russia, China and Pakistan have signed
peaceful nuclear co-operation agreements with
Iran. The resulting programmes, however, may
help it to produce plutonium, a key component for
nuclear warheads. Nuclear technology has also
been acquired from some European companies
and from former Soviet republics such as Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. On
the other hand, Iran has yet to build a nuclear
reactor that can be used to develop the main com-
ponents for nuclear weapons and it is still lacking
essential missile technology.
128. Russia has signed a contract to help Iran
with the completion of a nuclear reactor at
Bushelvi on the Gulf coast and it intends to build
at least two more nuclear reactors in Iran in the
near future. Recent efforts by the United States to
put pressure on Russia to stop selling nuclear
technology to Iran have failed. While the United
States has accused Iran of being engaged in a
" crash prograrnme " to acquile nuclear weapons,
Russia argues that the United States is protecting
its own trade and nuclear industry and is trying to
prevent competitors to do business on Iran's capa-
cious market2'.
129. At the recent United States-Russian sum-
mit meeting in Moscow on 10th May 1995, Presi-
dent Yeltsin has declared that Rdssia would sepa-
rate the " military aspects of its nuclear contract
with han from the 'peaceful ones' ". As a conse-
quence, Russia will abandon plans to sell Iran a
gas centrifuge, but it remains committed to the
sale of at least two light-water nuclear reactors.
130. The United States is also trying to persuade
China to renounce from negotiations on a conffact
to provide Iran with two 300 megawatt nuclear
reactors. China has rejected the United States'
arguments, declaring that it acts in accordance
with international practice and that there is no law
forbidding such co-operation 22.
131. On 30th April 1995, the United States Pre-
sident, Bill Clinton, announced a total ban on all
United States trade and investment links with
Iran, accusing Iran of heavily sponsoring terro-
rism and having embarked upon a crash program-
me to develop nuclear weapons. In t994, United
States exports to Iran amounted to a total of $326
million, and its oil companies purchased Iranian
oil for a total of $4 billion. Secretary of State War-
ren Christopher called on other nations to " end
all of their concessionary credits, which allow
Iran to divert scarce resources to military pro-
grammes and to sponsoring terrorism " 23.
132. Governments of European Union member
states have not reacted favourably to the United
States call for a trade embargo. They have com-
mitted themselves to a " critical dialogue " while
maintaining trade relations, taking the view that
isolation will not help to make Iran change its
behaviour. In general, Turkey agrees with the
European Union member states' view and it is not
planning to follow the United States example. At
the very moment the United States decided on its
trade embargo, Turkey announced its agreement
with Iran according to which Iran will supply
2 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year from
1998, 8 billion from 2001 and l0 billion from
2002. The agreement was concluded for 23 years
and includes the construction of a gas pipeline.
I33. It is noted here that the restructuring of
Iran's armed forces and the implementation of the
re-equipment programme will take some time and
21. International Herald Tribune, lSth March and lOth April
1995.
22. l*Monde, 19th April 1995, International Herald Tribu-
ne, 30th March 1995.
23. International Herald Tribune, 2nd May 1995.
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the country does not constitute an immediate mili-
tary threat to its neighbours. Moreover, the whole
programme is mainly directed at creating a deter-
rent against a possible new Iraqi aggression while
it is also making an effort to balance the massive
arms procurement programmes of many Gulf
states after the war against Iraq.
Conclusion
134. There can be no doubt that with its geogra-
phical location, natural resources and large popu-
lation, Iran is an important power in the region
and an important neighbour of Turkey.
135. In spite of differences in political systems,
relations between the two counties strengthened
after the end of the cold war. Turkey is the most
important channel for Iranian imports from the
West. After a fall in bilateral trading in 1986-87,
trade recovered from the early 1990s.
136. Turkey's policy is to maintain good rela-
tions with Iran on the basis of non-interference in
internal affairs and mutual respect. It believes that
this will serve the bilateral interests of the two
countries and contribute to peace and stability in
this volatile region. The Turkish Government
wishes to engage in bilateral and regional co-ope-
ration with Iran which could be a positive conri-
bution to improving the climate in the region.
With this understanding, Turkey wishes to enhan-
ce its co-operation with han within the Economic
Co-operation Organisation which it considers as a
purely economic institution 20.
137. As with Syria, Turkey has established with
Iran a mechanism to maintain a continuous dia-
logue on border security issues and on the ques-
tion of terrorism. This mechanism has been insti-
tutionalised through a joint committee between
the Ministries of the Interior of the two countries
and a high security commission. It has resulted in
an improvement in co-operation between the two
countries on border security issues.
138. The frequent tripartite meetings held over
the last two years between Iran, Syria and Turkey
also include an economic dimension concerning
the development of trade between the two coun-
tries in the framework of an attempt to normalise
their relations.
139. Since the strengthening of President Raf-
sandjani's powers, Iranian propaganda has beco-
me rather more muted than in the past. Turkey
nevertheless continues to regard Iran as a rival
regional power, capable, when in its own interest,
of intensifying its policy of intervention in the
internal affairs of Turkey.
(ii) Iraq
P e rsistenc e of the Kurdish problem and the Turkish
intervention of March 1995
140. In the 1970s and far into the 1980s, Turkey
and Iraq have practised some form of tacit, and
even sometimes overt, military co-operation in
their struggle against Kurdish nationalism. In
October 1984, both countries concluded a " hot
pursuit " agreement which allowed each side to
" pursue subversive groups in the territory of the
other up to five kilomefres ".
l4l. After having been excluded from the Ttrkish
Syrian economic agreement in 1987, which also
included a guarantee on the Euphrates water flow
to Syria, Iraq changed its co-operative attitude
and from 1988 the PKK operated at will from
Northern Iraqi territory. In the aftermath of the
Gulf war, more than 400 000 Kurds who were
living in Iraq fled into Turkey. Since 1992, Turkey
has made frequent incursions into Iraqi territory in
order to destroy the PKK facilities in northern
Iraq.
142. Ever since April 1991, the United States,
France and the United Kingdom, operating from
Turkish territory have imposed an air exclusion
zone on the forces of Baghdad, thus denying the
kaqi army overflight of the Kurdish zone situated
north of the 36th parallel. Finally united, the Iraqi
opposition ratified the existence of a " federate "
Kurdish state at the Salaheddin congress in Octo-
ber 1992. Neighbouring states, Turkey, Iran and
Syria, warned the Kurds at that time against any
desire for independence, but the existence of a
Kurdish enclave where the Iraqi Government
could not exert its authority obliged the protecting
forces to allow for the setting up of a political pro-
cess leading to the creation of a cenffal adminis-
tration for this region.
143. After a May 1992 general election for the
legislative council of the Kurdistan autonomous
region in Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party(KDP) of Masud Barzani and the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani, setting
aside rivalries, formed a coalition government. In
the spring of 1994, this coalition fell apan when
the KDP was accused of pocketing customs duties
levied on truck transports from Iraq to Turkey and
the PUK in revenge fleeing with the Central
Bank's deposits. Since then, the two factions have
been openly fighting each other with an intemrp-
tion between August and December and a formal
cease-fire agreement in November 1994 which
also resulted in a new coalition cabinet. In
December 1994, hostilities started again and Irbil,
the capital of haq's Kurdish enclave was occupied
by the PUK. In mid-February 1995, the KDP star-
ted an unsuccessful offensive to expel the rival
PUK from Irbil. Negotiation offers from President
Saddam Hussein were rejected by both sides.
rl
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!4. Turkey is associated with the Frconomic Co-operation
Organisation, which was reactivated by Iran in lgEl-lggZ,
Pakistan being the other participant and the Central Asian
republics having been invited to participate.
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lM. It should be recalled that since the end of
1992,the Turkish army, with the collaboration of
the Kurdish Peshmergas of Iraq, has undertaken
military operations on Iraqi territory in order to
flush out the PKK militants from their Iraqi bases.
These offensives did not prevent the militants of
that party from returning to occupy the mountains
along the border between Turkey and Iraq.
145. From then on, close co-operation has been
established between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds,
especially with the Kurdish democratic party(KDP) to prevent PKK attacks against Turkey
from lranian territory.
146. In March 1994, the Iraqi authorities devi-
sed a plan for forcing a passage between Nossoul
and the Turkish border so as at one and the same
time to isolate Kurdish resistance and to break the
international embargo. Contingents from the
Republican Guard were massed at the edge of the
" security zone", ready for action with the pro-
bable connivance of the Iranian and Turkish
armies. The rise in tension increased Turkey's
embarrassment which, although a country on
which the plan hinges, nevertheless intends to
manage the Kurdish problem according to its own
strategic interests.
147. Several times since February 1994, the Tur-
kish Government has stated that Turkey would
not tolerate the instability caused by the fighting
between the KDP and PUK, fearing that the PKK
might take advantage of it to reorganise in the
mountain area on the Turkish-Iranian border.
I48. The Turkish auttrorities stated that this option
did not threaten haq's territorial integrity. Turkey
feared that generalised warfare benveen the diffe-
rent Kurdish factions in Iraq might lead to a mass-
ive new exodus of Iraqi Kurds into its territory.
149. It also suspected the PUK of allowing the
PKK, which has several camps in Iraqi Kurdistan,
a degree of liberty. The Turkish authorities have
long been concerned over the possibility of PKK
fighters infiltrating Turkey and use this as a justi-
fication for the need to " neuffalise them before
they try to cross the border "25.
150. On 20th March, the Turkish authorities
decided on a massive intervention by their army
into Iraqi territory and launched a huge military
operation in pursuit of the PKK insurgent forces.
The area of intervention of the 35 m0 men and the
Turkish airforce was located inside the exclusion
zone defined in 1991.
151. Immediately after the beginning of the Tur-
kish military intervention, the entire range of poli-
tical parties, from the nationalist far right (NHP)
to the opposite extreme (Democratic Party of the
Left, DSP), stated that it is in favour of maintai-
ning Turkish troops in northern Iraq. The Turkish
Prime Minister, Mrs. Ciller, for her part maintai-
ned her initial message stating that the aim is to
" bring this operation to an end (...) once the
region is rid of the terrorists and the camps have
been destroyed ".
152. The legal and political instability that the
allies maintain in Iraq has always disturbed Tur-
key which has often stated its preference for the
territorial integrity of kaq to be maintained as a
bulwark against the development of a Kurdish
administration that might lead to the emergence of
an independent Kurdistan.
153. The Turkish authorities consequently want
a reconciliation between the Iraqi Kurds and the
Baghdad government26. Turkey considers that it is
necessary to pacify conflict between Iraqi Kurds
so that Turkey can establish new forms of co-oper-
ation with them. According to the former Turkish
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr._Kqayal_gin, dis-
cussions are in progress between Baghdad and the
Iraqi Kurds. Battling with the problem of instabi-
lity in the North of Iraq, Turkey is turning to the
Iraci Kurds with a view to reviving the agreement
sigrred with them in 1992 after the joint offensive
against the PKK 27. Moreover, a senior Turkish
official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated
in early April that his government intended to
give responsibility for Turkish/Iraqi border secu-
rity to the group led by Massoud Barzani, Head of
the KDP, after the withdrawal of his own troops 28.
Renewed contacts between Turkey and the Iraqi
Kurds is not to Baghdad's liking and the latter has
severely criticised Turkey for entering into dis-
cussion with " traitorous and illegal Kurdish
gangs ".
154. The Iraqi reaction in the face of the Turkish
military operation boiled down to condemnation
by Baghdad of the invasion of the Iraqi zone by its
neighbour's army. Iraq regarded the operation as
" a violation of its sovereignty " and " an attack
on its territorial integrity " 2e. The Baghdad autho-
rities therefore demanded the withdrawal of the
Turkish army, in parallel with the cessation of
American interference. For Baghdad, Turkey
belongs, moreover, to the pro-western circle. Iraq
maintains that is feels hemmed in " by an unequal
confrontation to the North and East with two non-
Arab powers, Turkey and Iran "30.
26. Turkey wants the autonomy agreement Saddam Hussein
signed with the Kurds in 1970 and 1974 to be implemented.
27. tr Monde, 13th April 1995.
28. ln 1992 a decision was taken to create joint border
control posts but it was never followed up.
29. Statement issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of
baq,22nd,March 1995.
30. Perceptions de s6curit6 et strat6gies nationales au
Moyen-Orient, edited by B. Kodmani Darnish, IFRI.
25. Mr. Suleyman Demirel, hesident of the Republic of Tur-
key, Lr Mmde, 23rd November 1992.
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155. At the end of April 1995, Turkey withdrew
20 000 troops from haqi territory declaring that the
army had succeeded in its mission to wipe out PKK
camps, arms depots and supply routes. On 4th May,
it was announced that the remaining troops across
the far eastern part of the border were also with-
drawn. Turkey recognised, however, that it would
not be an easy task to keep control of the mountai-
nous border area. This subject was discussed with a
high-ranking Iraqi-Kurdish delegation visiting
Ankara on 3rd and 4th May 1995.
156. Although Turkey has always maintained
that the territorial integrity of Iraq was not in
doubt, President Suleyman Demirel surprised
many when, on 2nd May 1995, he declared that
Turkey would like to correct its frontier line with
Iraq in order to ensure its impermeability. He
added that the new frontier should follow the foot
of the mountains on lraqi territory and include the
province of Mosul, which Turkey had given up in
1926,bil which according to the President, " still
belongs to Turkey "''.
I57. Iraq immediately reacted by saying that it
had no intention whatsoever to discuss frontier
changes with Turkey and that it would oppose any
possible unilateral Turkish decision on this sub-ject " with all legitimate means ".
158. The Arab League strongly deplored Presi-
dent Demirel's declaration which " might worsen
tension in the region " and it reaffirmed its attach-
ment to the territorial integrity of Iraq32.
Economic relations and the United Nations trade
embargo
159. Economic relations between Turkey and
Iraq thrived during the 1980s when Turkey beca-
me the principal conduit for Iraqi oil exports
while receiving 6OVo of its oil supplies from Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was also a tremendous stimulus
for the growth of trade between the two countries.
Iraq was Turkey's principal trade partner in the
region until the outbreak of the Gulf war.
160. The United Nations embargo against Iraq
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait therefore
had serious consequences for the Turkish econo-
my. The Iraq-Turkey pipeline from Kirkuk to
Ceyhan was shut down and has since remained
closed. At the moment, Iraqi-Tirrkish negotiations
are being held on the possible repair and eventual
re-opening of the pipeline.
161. Turkey has fully observed the United
Nations trade embargo against Iraq since it came
into force in August 1990 following Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait. According to government state-
ments, because of lost trade with Iraq, Turkey
LeMonde, llthMay 1995
LeMonde, llthMay 1995.
has missed business opporrunities amounting to
$20 billion. The economic aid promised by the
West " is reaching it only in dribs and drabs " 33.
Turkey, like Russia, France and China, has stated
that it would like to see a graduated response to
lraq's graduated compliance with United Nations
resolutions which are aimed at ridding Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction and of its ability to
build such weapons.
162. It recently became known that, although
near to full compliance with the United Nations
resolutions on nuclear and chemical weapons,
Iraq has acquired enough growth or diagnostic
media to cultivate up to 3.3 tons of bacteria which
could be used for biological weapons. Moreover,
the United States has been able to demonstrate
that Iraq has rebuilt factories capable ofproducing
chemical weapons or missiles.
163. On 13th March 1995, the United Nations
Security Council decided to maintain economic
sanctions against Iraq because it had not yet com-
plied with United Nations resolutions.
164. The United Kingdom and the United States
argue that a broader judgment should be made of
Iraq's overall record of compliance with United
Nations resolutions, including Resolution 688
which demanded an end to the repression of the
Iraqi civilian population and even of Iraq's likely
behaviour if sanctions are lifted.
165. On 12th April 1995, the commission whose
task is to verify Iraqi compliance with United
Nations resolutions presented a report to the Secu-
rity Council in which among other things it said:
" The only conclusion that can be drawn is
that there is a high risk that they [items and
materials required to produce in Iraq biolo-
gical warfare agentsl had been purchased
and in part used for proscribed purposes
- 
the production of agents for biological
weapons. "
166. Two days later, the United Nations Security
Council voted unanimously to offer Iraq easier
terms under which to sell oil to meet its urgent
need for medicine, food and other relief goods.
Part of the revenue of the oil sale was to be ear-
marked for the establishment of a compensation
fund for victims of the invasion of Kuwait and for
paying the costs of United Nations monitors wat-
ching Iraq's compliance with United Nations
Security Council resolutions. Another part of the
revenue was to be used for cleaning and mainte-
nance of the oil pipeline from Iraq to Turkey's
Mediterranean coast port Yumurtalik.
167. kaq promptly rejected the oil sale proposal,
reportedly because president Saddam Hussein
t.
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lion,IRIS, 1995.
l,
:
'l
j'
;
rl
rl
I
l
DOCUMENT 1465
feared that limited oil sales would undermine his
campaign for the full removal of sanctions g. Onl]th May 1995, the United Nations Security
Council again confirmed the maintenance of th-e
embargo.
168. A continuation of the sanctions will most
probably not help to improve stability in the
region. Although President Saddam Hussein's
r6gime may still hold power for some time with
the backing of its security services, loyalists in the
Ba'ath party and its Tihriti power base, the econo-
mic crisis will certainly undermine its authority.
At present, however, there seems to be no viable
alternative r6gime. A collapse of Saddam Hus-
sein's rdgime could therefore easily lead to a dis-
solution of Iraq into its Sunni, Shi'a and Kurd
component pans. This would cause both Turkey
and Iran, in turn, to intervene. Neither of these
countries could tolerate the existence of an inde-
pendent Kurdish entity. Turkey would no doubt
seek to control the Kurds in northern kaq. Iran
would try to dominate the Shi'a south where a
power struggle might develop between the Iraqi
National Congress seeking a broad-based coali-
tion involving secular and Sunni groups and the
Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SAIRI) which is ultimately committed to
creating an Islamic republic in southern Iraq. The
remaining Sunni part of Iraq with the still consi-
derable national armed forces in its hands, would
no doubt try to reassert control over both northern
and southern parts of the country.
169. In conclusion, it should be noted that in the
case of continued sanctions against Iraq, pros-
pects for stability are grim. Turkey's position in
favour of lifting the sanctions at least partly is
understandable.
(iii) Syria
170. Although there are no longer any major dis-
putes between Turkey and Syria, a number of
disagreements and tensions still exist preventing
true normalisation of the relations between the
two counffies from being achieved. These consist
specifically of the territorial dispute over the
Sandjak of Alexandretta, the water issue, dealt
with in Chapter VI of the present report and sup-
port for the PKK.
The t e rrit o r ial d,tis p ut e
l7l. The most trivial question and that of least
concern relates to the Sandjak of Alexandretta.
Syria has not forgotten the loss of this territory
today largely Arab-speaking, over which it still
maintains a claim.
172. Part of the Ottoman province of Syria
under French mandate, the territory was ceded to
Turkey in 1939 in the framework of the policy
granting guarantees against Germany. Syria has
never recognised this annexation. However,
although the Sandjak of Alexandretta still appears
on military maps as part of national territoryfit no
longer seems to represent a serious source of disa-
greement and is ultimately only one factor contri-
buting to hostility in Turkish/Syrian relations.
The Kurdish question
173. Since the start of the conflict with the PKK,
the Turkish authorities have subscribed to the
theory that the source of the problem in question
is external. In their view, it should be possible to
crush the Kurdish rebellion rapidly if the latter
were cut off from its bases in the Lebanese Bekaa
valley, Syria and Iraq.
174. It is true that for many years Syrian leaders
have provided real support to the PKK which had
originally formed close links with the PLO and
the first PKK fighters were trained in Lebanon.
After the expulsion of the Palestinians from Leba-
non in 1982, " the inheritance passed to Syria " 3s
in particular because with the territorial dispute
with Turkey.
175. After the signing in 1987 of a protocol of
agreement on security matters between Turkey
and Syria, the Syrian authorities exhibited a
degree of caution before renewing their support to
the PKK. Five years later, hoping to reach an
agreement more easily and isolated by the dislo-
cation of the Soviet Empire, Turkey renewed its
diplomatic initiatives, stating again that " the
licence given by Syria to the PKK terrorists was
not acceptable "36.
176. According to one point of view widely held
in Turkey, Syria is specifically motivated by terri-
torial claims on certain parts of South-East Tur-
key and in particular the Hatay region.
177. Turkey sought a negotiated solution with
Damascus. The two countries decided to streng-
then their good-neighbourly relations according
to principles of mutual respect and non-interven-
tion in domestic affairs. This took the form of an
agreement, signed in April 1992, comprising per-
manent exchange of information in various fields,
with a view to the fight against terrorism, inclu-
ding mutual security, particularly as regards a
military settlement of the Kurdish question. This
policy also tends towards the closer rapproche-
ment that Turkey wants to pursue with the Muslim
world.
178. It was furthermore decided, following the
visit by Turkish Government authorities to
35.
36.
M. Vassier, Cahiers de l'Orient, No. 30.
Suleyman Demirel.34. International Herald Tribune, 17th April 1995.
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Damascus in April 1992, that the Bekaa camps
would be outlawed. Nevertheless, although the
Mahsum Karkmoz military Academy has defini-
tely been closed, other camps have been opened
elsewhere.
179. Furthermore, despite the signing in April
1994 of a protocol according to which it agrees to
halt its aid to the PKK, Syria appears to have
begun once again to support this organisation in
more discreet manner. Of all the countries suspec-
ted of supporting the PKK, Syria is the one which
has provided the most frequent and regular sup-
port to tenorist goups operating in Turkey, while
keeping the risks of a serious deterioration in rela-
tions between the two states under conffol.
Conclusions
180. In summary, apart from the conflict over
water exacerbated by Syria's support for the PKK,
Turkey, owing to its economic and military
weight, its water resources, its status as an ally of
the United States, its interest in the future of Iraq
and in the development of its relations with Israel,
is perceived by Syria as a major player in relation
to which it will need to reorganise its strategy.
However this may be, as matters now stand,
recent normalisation of Turkish-Syrian relations
is still superficial, indeed has little credibility.
181. Probably Syria will maintain this indirect
pressure on Turkey until the balance of forces
shifts in its favour, enabling it to exact a number
of claims, including those in connection with
water, and even territory. It should therefore be
emphasised that a great deal more will be required
to defuse the deep-seated suspicion arising from
seventy years of open hostility between Turkey
and Syria.
182. The Kurdish question is likely to remain a
major factor in the conflict that still persists in
spite of exchanges of visits by ministers. It is
highly unlikely that PresidentHafez El Assad will
let go of such a trump card. The PKK is too
valuable an asset for Syria to dispose of it lightly,
even more so given that many Syrian Kurds are
fighting in the ranks of the PKK 37. The Syrian
President has found an outlet for the Syrian Kurds
and at the same time has a means of pressurising
its Turkish neighbour which is more powerftrl and
has better backing than Syria.
(d)The Balluns
183. The present conflict in former Yugoslavia
has clearly brought to the fore Turkey's interest in
the Balkans. The extension of the Ottoman empi-
37. Of the I 500-2 000 PKK activists that were forced to
leave their bases on the Turkishflraqi border in November
1992,one third were Syrian.
240
re over a large part of the Balkans for many cen-
turies has left traces of a long common history in
many aspects of Balkan life, culture, population
and religion.
184. Turkey estimates that in the entire Balkans,
there are almost two million persons of Turkish
origin, not all of them Muslims, and that, of its
total population, about nine million are Muslims.
185. It is exffemely difficult to make a reliable
estimate, given the fact that many demographic
data are not up to date, while mass migrations
caused by ethnic cleansing have contributed to
much confusion. The following figures neverthe-
less provide an approximate picture of the distri-
bution of Muslims and ethnic Turks in different
Balkan states.
Albania3
population: 3 182417 (census 1989)
3.3 million
(government estimate 1991)
Muslims: During communist rule, there
was a ban on worship. Accord-
ing to 1945 data,7Z.8Vo of the
population was Muslim.
Bosnia-Herzegovinasn
population: 4364 572 (1991 census)
Muslims: 43.7%o (1991 census) = I 907 318(this includes a small number
of ethnic Albanian and Turkish
Muslims). Most of these Mus-
lims are Bosniaks, a Serbo-
Croat-speaking people who
adopted Islam during the Otto-
man occupation.
Bulgaria$
population: 8 989 165 (1990 data)
Turks:
Muslims:
FYROM O'
population:
Turks:
Muslims:
8.5Vo (1981data) = 764 079,
if applied to 1990 population
l3%o (t99testimate) = I 168 591,
if applied to 1990 population
1936877 (census 1994)
77 5N
582200
38. Source: Eastem Europe and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States 1994, Europe Publications Ltd., London
1994.
39. Source: See footnote 38.
40. Source: see footnote 38.
41. Source: Government of FYROM.
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Romania
Ttrrks: 55 000
(official government data)
Federal Republic of Yugosl.aviaoz
population: 10 406 7 42 (1991 census)
Muslims: +l-20Vo
(1991 census) = 2 081 348
Of these Muslims, lTVo were
ethnic Albanians and 37o Slav
Muslims.
(i, The conflict informer Yugoslavia
186. When the crisis in former Yugoslavia was
still at an early stage in 1991, Turkey insisted on
the maintenance of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slrvia within its then existing borders. After it had
become clear that a continuation of the former sta-
tus quo was no longer possible, Turkey recogni-
sed the four new independent republics without
making any distinction.
187. In the present conflict, Turkey has always
str:ongly criticised the Serbs, arguing that their
violent and aggressive methods for incorporating
tenitory by force and creating new artificial fault
lirres between different ethnic communities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina could easily lead to funher
de:stabilisation and new conflicts. Turkey takes
the view that the multi-ethnic and multi-religious
scciety which has always been a characteristic of
the Balkan society, should be preserved. It is a
st'ong supporter of the federation between Croats
artd Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a confe-
deration between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovi-
rur The contact group's peace plan is considered
the best possible basis for peace in Bosnia- Herze-
govina and, in that framework, Turkey has played
an active rOle as a go-between for the Islamic
conference, of which it is a member, and the
contact group. Turkey has repeated time and again
that the Serbs should not be rewarded with terri-
tory taken by force.
1ti8. When, in September 1992, it was decided
to send a United Nations humanitarian protection
force (UNPROFOR) to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tur-
ke:y immediately offered to send troops, but due to
he:sitations on the part of United Nations Security
C,cuncil members, their deployment was authori-
sed only two years later, in summer 1994. Altoge-
ther, the Turkish contribution to UNPROFOR is
atnut 1 500 troops. At present, a Turkish battalion
ol'500 troops is deployed in Zenicha. One of the
battalion's first activities of great symbolic value
was the restoration of the local Christian church.
In the framework of operation Deny Flight, Turkey
placed eighteen aircraft at the disposal of NATO.
189. The arms embargo against Bosnia-Herze-
govina, which is part of the arms embargo against
all republics of former Yugoslavia, imposed by
the United Nations Security Council's Resolution
713 of 25th September 1991, has been the subject
of a protracted dispute between the allies.
190. Tirkey has been in favour of earlier propo-
sals to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia-Her-
zegovina and at the same time use the possibility
of air strikes against Serbian positions. In June
1993, a draft resolution to lift the embargo, which
was presented to the Security Council by non-ali-
gned and Muslim countries, was defeated. New
United States initiatives to that end in sufilmer
1994 were opposed by European Union member
states and Russia. Although it was admitted that
the embargo included an element of injustice for
the Bosnians, whose equipment is inferior to the
Serb's equipment in quality and numbers, it was
argued that lifting the embargo would cause more
problems than advantages for the Bosnians. Lif-
ting the embargo, it was argued, would cause the
withdrawal of three quarters, if not all, of the
UNPROFOR troops, reunite all the Serbs in the
different republics of former Yugoslavia, ruin the
cohesion of the five states participating in the
contact group and further destabilise the situation
in that region.
191. After proposing, in September 1994, post-
poning the possible raising of the embargo, the
Bosnian President Izetbegovic, has since adopted
a " stop-go " attitude. On 1lth November, the
United States announced that its naval ships in the
Adriatic would no longer monitor the embargo
against Bosnia. The resumption of hostilities
since the beginning of May 1995 caused the United
Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, to urge a " fundamental review " of the
LJNPROFOR mission.
I92. It should be noted that recent events have
reinforced the existing popular support for raising
the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but it seems that at present, the Turkish govern-
ment, in general, is in line with the opinion of the
contact group and there are no major differences
with the European Union over policy towards the
conflict in former Yugoslavia.
(ii) Bulgaria
193. Following a period of fairly stable relations
during the communist era, Turkey's relations with
Bulgaria sharply deteriorated with effect from 1984
due to a forced assimilation campaign aimed at the
roughly over one million sffong Turkish commu-
nity, which was then carried out by the communist
government under Todor Jivkov. Ethnic Turks
were forced to give up their Turkish-Islamic
identity for a new Bulgarian one. Some resisted
and lost their lives, others were detained. Around
300 000 Turks were forced to flee to Turkey.42. Source: see footnote 38.
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194. Later on, in the climate of glasnost and per-
estroika that began to prevail in Eastern Europe,
this much criticised campaign became an impor-
tant factor in accelerating the downfall of the
communist government in November 1989.
195. The new Bulgarian Government under the
leadership of President Jelyu Jelev, admined that
the policy of assimilation was a grave political
mistake and declared its will to restore the rights
of the Turkish minority and to correct the wrong-
doings of the past.
196. As Bulgaria moved towards democracy,
Turkish-Bulgarian relations improved rapidly.
This positive development was marked by mutual
high-level visits. Since the establishment of a
democratic government in this country, Turkey
and Bulgaria have signed a number of basic
agreements and documents, such as the treaty of
friendship, good-neighbourly relations, co-opera-
tion and security of May 1992, the Sofia and Edir-
ne documents on security and confidence-buil-
ding measures of December l99l and November
1992 and a number of economic and technical
agreements. The Edirne document deals in parti-
cular with the following issues: 1. confidence-
and security-building in the areas adjacent to the
common border; 2. increased sharing of military
information; 3. promotion of military contacts.
I97. In the framework of Turkish-Bulgarian
military co-operation agreements, the Turkish and
Bulgarian navies have conducted joint mine exer-
cises and search and rescue exercises. Moreover,
the two countries have made positive progress in
new negotiations on their sea border, which had
been in stalemate for many years.
198. The socialist government under Prime
Minister Jan Videnov, which acceded to power
following the general elections on 18th December
1994, has so far signalled no changes of policy
towards Turkey.
199. After the downfall of the communists, the
Turkish minority gained their democratic rights.
Some of its day-to-day problems were solved.
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF),
a predominantly Turkish political party, at present
occupies 15 seats in the Bulgarian Parliament.
20c. Turkey stipulates, however, that the rights
of minorities in Bulgaria have not been secured by
specific legal means, since the Bulgarian constitu-
tion makes no reference to minority rights. It has
also noted that despite remarkable improvement,
there is still discrimination against minorities in
daily life. Ethnic Bulgarians generally receive the
supervisory jobs, while the minorities are among
the frst to be laid off, and provocative references
to Turks and Turkey in the media are still cornmon.
201. The MRF has strongly criticised the
appointment of the Education Minister in the new
government as he is known to have been among
the theoreticians of the assimilation policy during
the communist era. This nomination and a number
of subsequent events have disturbed the Turkish
minority.
202. Notwithstanding the abovementioned criti-
cism, Turkey is satisfied with the present level of
its relations with Bulgaria and sincerely wishes to
further improve them in every field, based on the
principles of friendship and good neighbourli-
ness. It views the Turkish minorities in the Bal-
kans as a bridge of friendship between the coun-
tries.
203. At the same time, Turkey feels that, for the
time being, the situation of the Turkish minority
in Bulgaria should be monitored closely.
(e) Russia
2M. In May 1992, Russia and Turkey concluded
a treaty on bilateral relations which at that time
was said to herald the beginning of a new era in
relations between the two states. They had rea-
ched agreement on the conflict in Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, condemning the seizure of the Lachin corri-
dor by Karabakh Armenian forces, stressing that
the conflict could only be resolved by peaceful
means. It was also said that Russia acknowledged
Turkey's legitimate interest in the Transcaucasus
and Central Asia in view of its political, econo-
mic, cultural and political ties with both regions.
205. This extraordinary honeymoon atmosphere
did not last very long, and indeed it seems that
there are too many incompatible interests in both
states in the region for their relations to remain
completely undisturbed. On the other hand, each
one has too much internal trouble even to think of
a major bilateral confrontation and it seems, the-
refore, that in the foreseeable future, they will
always firy to keep their rivalries under control.
206. The main issues subject to rivalries are
conflicts in the Transcaucasus, in particular
Nagorno-Karabakh, and the transport and exploi-
tation of oil in the region. Both Turkey and Russia
participated in mediation efforts to find a solution
for the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, but on the
other hand, Turkey has openly accused Russia of
supplying military aid to Armenia, while Russia
has said that Turkey was providing military aid to
Azerbaijan, warning it " to keep out of our Azer-
baijan "or.
207. Turkey has not appreciated the ousting in
June 1993 of Azerbaijan's pro-T\rkish President,
Abulfaz Elchibey, aware of the widely believed
involvement of Russia in his succession by Geidar
Aliev.
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208. As mentioned in chapter VI of the present
report, oil in the region is a continuous bone of
contention. Both Russia and Turkey are striving
for the largest possible participation in the exploi-
tation in Azerbaijan's oil fields. For the transport
of oil and natural gas from the Caspian region to
the world market, both countries have competing
proposals for pipelines across their own territory.
Turkey is using its Bosporus key to the Black Sea
to limit the shipping of oil from Russia's port of
Novorossiisk to the Mediterranean under Russian
protest and a solution is not yet in sight. It is
observed that for its natural gas needs, Tirkey, at
present, relies mainly on Russia.
209. On the other hand, it should be noted that in
March 1994, Turkey and Russia agreed to expand
their co-operation on combating terrorism, drug-
trafficking and organised crime. Later, on 20th
April 1995, a bilateral agreement was signed on
military-technological and military-industrial co-
operation. Turkey has ordered Russian military
equipment such as helicopters and armoured per-
sonnel carriers needed in its fight against the
PKK, and also in its striving to find alternative
equipment sources since it discovered that allied
purveyors, such as Germany or Norway, may cut
off deliveries in protest against the violence of
operations.
210. When, as a result of military co-operation
agreements which both Georgia and Armenia had
no choice but to sign, Russian troops were again
deployed on the territory of these independent
republics, Turkey observed that Russia's armed
forces were back at its border as if nothing had
changed since the end of the cold war.
2lI. Russia's announcement on 26th April 1995
of the creation of the new 58th army to be
deployed in north Caucasus by June 1995 in vio-
lation of the CFE (conventional forces in Europe)
Treaty's flank limitations was not welcomed by
Turkey.
212. Following earlier declarations by Russian
Government officials on the need to revise the
CFE flank limitations, the Turkish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs declared on 19th April last that
the non-implementation of CFE Treaty obliga-
tions would have a negative influence on the sen-
sitive balance resulting from mutual sacrifices.
According to Turkey, it would also do harm to sta-
bility in Europe as envisaged by the treaty and
have negative consequences for the climate of
confidence and security which was the ultimate
objective ofall the signatory states. Turkey final-
ly noted that the CFE review conference in 1996
could be an occasion to adapt the ffeaty to new
circumstances which have developed since the
signing of the treaty in 1990, but only provided
such adaptations do not affect its basic structure
and provisions.
213. In conclusion, it can be observed that Tur-
key will remain concerned over a possible resur-
gence of Russian imperialist policy in the Trans-
caucasus and Central Asian regions. Russia will
certainly remain suspicious over Turkey's efforts
to build close relations with the now independent
former Soviet republics in that region. Both coun-
ffies seem to be aware, however, that they have
more to gain in co-operation than in Urying to exa-
cerbate discrepancies, even more so as long as
their internal situation is subject to instability.
IV. Turkey andthe European Unian
214. Despite having undergone a fioubled period
since the Turkish military intervention in Kurdis-
tan in March 1995, relations between Turkey and
the European Union have nevertheless gained
substance, particularly in the following areas.
215. Turkish nationals probably make up the lar-
gest foreign community in Europe, with 4 million
people and a significant percent4ge ofthe popula-
tion in several countries. This flow of immigrants
results in agreements being signed at various
times with different countries oo. Although in
general it has slowed down since the years of the
oil crises and the increase in unemployment, the
number of Turkish nationals nevertheless conti-
nues to grow, in particular because they are joined
by family members. Experts anticipate a lasting
presence and progressive assimilation.
216. As for ffade, the European Union has cap-
tured an increasing share, now the largest, oftrade
with Turkey. The Gulf crisis and the break-up of
the USSR have accentuated this underlying trend.
Trade between the European Union and Turkey
more than quadrupled between 1983 and l993,to
reach $20.2 billiono'.
217. Of all foreign investment in Turkey, 607o
comes from member countries of the European
Union6, atread of the United States or Japano'.
218. The exceptional situation of Turkey, loca-
ted at the cross-roads of three major economic
units 
- 
the European Union, Central Asia and the
former Soviet Caucasus and the Middle East 
-
strengthens the sphere of influence of the Turkish
state and increases opportunities for trade. This
new factor nevertheGss obliges Ankara to sort
out its strategic priorities in the area of external
economic relations. As one expert has said:
" It appears that Turkey continues to make the
customs union the main goal of its external eco-
44. Since l99l with Germany, 1965 with France.
45. Futuribles, November 1994.
46. $4.6 billion.
47. l5%o and 5?o respectively.
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nomic policy, using regional stakes as a bargain-
ing counter vis d vis the interests of its European
partnersa8.
(a) The customs unian
(i) Bases of economic integration
2I9. The negotiations between Turkey and the
European Community for establishing a customs
union have not just been to determine economic
criteria in conformity with the principles set out in
the Treaty of Rome, the treaty on the single mar-
ket or for the economic and monetary union. Tur-
key's European r6le also has a political dimension
through the country's now long-standing rOle as
an intermediary.
220. In 1963 oe, the EEC and Turkey in fact
signed an association agreement (the Ankara
Agreement), which by and large originated from
the wish of members of the EEC to keep Turkey
in the sphere of influence of Western Europe. This
agreement was completed in 197050 by the signing
in Brussels of an additional protocol opening the
prospect of full accession. From the outset the
intention was to achieve the customs union within
32 years. After a long period of stagnation due to
procrastination by the Twelve and bilateral ten-
sion with Greece over the Cyprus question, an
official application for accession to the EC was
lodged in 1987 by Turgut Ozal, then head of
government, but the EC did not consider it timely
at that moment. Although it had contributed to
raising the stakes for Turkey's participation in a
united Europe, the fall of the USSR has in no way
lessened the geopolitical interest of this collabor-
ation.
221. The June 1992 Council of Europe summit
meeting in Lisbon and the decision announced in
1993 by the Council of the EC-Turkey Associa-
tion to reactivate the Ankara Agreement confirm
the re-evaluation of Turkey's sffategic r6le in the
framework of the new European sffucture.
(ii) Recent developments
222. On 6th February 1995, the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of the fifteen European Union
countries concluded an agreement of principle,
smoothing the way towards a customs union with
Turkey and accession negotiations with Cyprus. It
was thought that this might lead to strengthening
relations between Europe and Turkey, which the
European Union regards as having a major geos-
trategic r6le and unblocking the Cyprus dispute
which had been bogged down for twenty years.
48. Philippe B6raud, Cahiers de I'Orient, No. 30,2nd quarter
1993.
49. On 12th September.
50. On 23rd November.
223. In order to induce Greece to give up its
long-standing veto against a customs union with
Turkey, the fifteen agreed to link the Turkish cus-
toms union issue with negotiations on the acces-
sion of the Republic of Cyprus to the European
Union. Having supported this in principle, the
Greek Government nevertheless rejected the
" package ". As " certain Greek demands were
felt to be reasonable while others were not "5', a
revised draft compromise was examined on
28th February 1995, which provides, on the basis
of work done by the permanent representatives
and bilateral talks between the Greek Government
and the French presidency of the Council, for:
- 
the opening of negotiations with Cyprus
over its accession, to start six months after
ttrc end of the intergovemmenal conference
on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty;
- 
a structured dialogue with Cyprus prior
to the opening of negotiations;
- 
financial assistance to Turkey and the
establishment of a customs union bet-
ween the European Union and Turkey by
lst January 1996.
224. As regards textiles, Greece is requesting
financial compensation worth 400 million ecus to
enable it to cope with the repercussions of the
future opening up the community market to Tur-
kish textiles. Several member states have rejected
Greece's demand, arguing that the position of
their own textile industries is precarious. The
solution might lie in a declaration of the European
Commission containing a commitment to exami-
ne, if necessary, the situation that will result from
the opening of the market to Turkish textiles.
225. Finally, on 6th March 1995, the Europeans
signed an agreement on a customs union with
Ankara, widely acclaimed in Turkey, except in
hard-line anti-western Islamic circles, and for which
the Prime Minister, Mrs. Ciller, received the credit.
226. Before it can be put into practice, this agree-
ment must, however, be ratified in autumn 1995 by
the European Parliament which has made its sup
port conditional upon substantial progress on
human rights and democratisation in Turkey.
( iii ) Practical arrangements
227. The following must be achieved in practice
benveen now and the end of 1995:
- 
free movement of goods within the entire
area covered by Turkey and the enlarged
European Union, which implies the
removal of customs duties and other
quantitative restrictions;
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- 
harmonisation of customs tariffs with the
cofirmon external tariff and preferential
or defensive policies towards third coun-
tries;
- 
strengthening of co-operation in various
fields (energy, protection of the environ-
ment, the fight against drugs, banking
sectors, etc.);
- 
convergence of legislation on trade and
in areas such as competition, intellectual
and industrial property, public tenders,
technical regulations, anti-dumping rules
and trade marks.
228. Turkey is preparing for this undertaking; in
fact each year it has amended its customs duties
with the European Unions2.
(iv) Wder stakes
229. The stakes are in fact far wider, if the then
European Commissioner, Mrs. Scrivener, speak-
ing in September 1993, is to be believed when she
said that the customs union was not a means of
delaying the goal of Thrkey's eventual accession
to the Community;on the contrary it gave Turkey
a greater share now in the future of the Communi-
ty than was possible by association. The customs
union therefore seems to be a decisive step in
confirming Turkey's place alongside the Euro-
pean Union and facilitating subsequent develop-
ments.
230. Is it possible to regard the process entered
into with the customs union as a step towards
accession? According to the theory of economic
integration, customs union is in fact the second stage
of integration, following on from the initial one of
establishing a free trade area. This prospective
accession nevertheless raises a number of ques-
tions: is the Turkish economy in a position to
handle the constraints of a customs union bringing
together a majority of countries whose level of
industrialisation is very high?
231. What difficulties will arise from the next
stage, the common market, which necessitates
free movement of people and capital? In all pro-
bability it will be the pace of development of the
Turkish economy, which, by narrowing the gap
between Turkey and the members of the European
Union and thus weakening the pressure of emi-
gration and at the same time attracting foreign
investment, will determine the feasibility of
achieving a common market. What, in short, will
be Turkey's place in new European developments
that envisage simultaneous deepening and enlar-
gement?
52. ln 1994 it had achieved close to 807o of the target fixed
by the European Union.
232. The political stakes attaching to economic
integration seem in some ways of greater signifi-
cance now than during the cold war. The Euro-
pean Union is banking on Turkey's contribution
to stabilising the disturbed regional equilibrium:
in the Middle East, where Turkey over the years
has maintained traditional ties of proximity with
the Arab countries, developments are of interest
to the economies of European Union members;
in Cennal Asia and in the Caucasus, where the
Turkish state often provides a point of reference,
or has even a pivotal r6le in monitoring the course
of the economic restructuring process in the newly
independent republics; and finally in the Balkans
where Turkey could provide a useful complement
to the prevailing views in the European Union.
233. In short, economic and financial negotia-
tions between Turkey and the European Union
have a marked geopoiitical dimension. " Both the
Turkish and European sides are faced with a new
environment and fundamental challenges for the
future, which cannot in any sense be dealt with
adequately simply by retaining the old strategic
options53 " Turkey's r6le would then appear to be
that of a pole of stability amidst an environment
of uncertainty and a political reference point
capable of counteracting fundamentalist extre-
nusm.
234. Furthermore, by opening up prospects for
the accession of Cyprus, the European Union has
made a serious and positive effort in providing an
impetus that could be decisive for a subsequent
political settlement of the Cypriot question under
United Nations sponsorship.
V Turkey andWEU
235. Although Turkey has made it clear that its
objective is to become a full member of WEU, it
is conscious of the fact that, as a consequence of
decisions taken at the Maastricht summit meeting
of December 1991, it can only be an associate
member for the time being. In implementation of
the document on associate membership of WEU
of 20th November 1992, and the declaration
following on from the document on associate
membership which was issued after the WEU
Council's ministerial meeting at Kirchberg,
Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994, Turkey is partici-
pating fully in WEU activities.
236. Turkey has transmitted a full list of Turkish
forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) to the WEU
Planning Cell with the understanding that the
actual deployment and employment of these
forces will be subject to authorisation by the
245
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Turkish Grand National Assembly under constitu-
tional stipulations.
237 . At present, there are in particular two issues
where Turkey is trying to improve its position
within the WEU framework: one is linked with
the implementation of the CJTF concept, the other
with the rights of the Turkish associate members
of the WEU Assembly.
(a) Turkey, CITF ana WEU
238. Turkey fully supports the combined joint
task force (CI.[D concept as proposed at the NAf,O
summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994.
239. It has observed, however, that employment
of CJTFs in the framework of WEU could cause
problems. According to Article 3 of the document
on associate membership of WEU of 20th
November 1992, Turkey 
- 
as an associate mem-
ber 
- 
can participate fully in activities mentioned
in that article. This includes participation in the
implementation of decisions taken by WEU mem-
ber states and participation, on the same basis as
full members, in WEU military operations to
which they commit forces. Such participation is
subject to the provision that a majority of the
member states, or half of the member states
including the presidency, may decide otherwise.
240. Application of the abovementioned provi-
sion of Anicle 3 could lead to the exclusion of
Turkey from a military operation by WEU in
which it makes use of CJTFs, including NAf,O
assets, of which Turkey participates as a full
member of NATO.
241. In order to prevent the occurrence of such
anomalous situations, Tirkey refers to Article 4 of
the document on associate membership, which is
as follows:
" The Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of
Norway and the Republic of Turkey will
have the same rights and responsibilities as
the full members for functions transferred
to WEU from other fora and institutions to
which they already belong. "
242. Although Turkey recognises that this
article refers to functions and not to operations, it
is proposing that in the case of operations in
which NATO's CJTFs are being used by WEU,
associate members would have the same rights
and responsibilities as the full members of WEU
in application of the spirit of Article 4 of the docu-
ment on associate membership.
(b) The status of associate members of the WEU Assenbly
243. When Turkey signed the document on
associate membership, a satisfactory status was to
be created for the representatives of associate
member countries of WEU in the Assembly. The
internal discussion started with a report 6n the
enlargement of WEU by Mr.Ward, United King-
dom, on behalf of the Political Committee. After
the adoption by the Assembly, in June 1993, of
Recommendation 536 and Order 85, the Assem-
bly's Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges was asked to prepare proposals on the status
of representatives of associate members.
24. Without referring to the different proposals
since made, it is noted here that the basic idea has
always been that, in accordance with the decisions
taken by the WEU Council, the Assembly could
not grant associate members a status completely
equal to the status of full members. Turkey, how-
ever, has insisted that its representatives in the
Assembly should have full voting rights.
Conscious of the prevailing opinion in the Assem-
bly, Turkey has argued that if its representatives
cannot be granted full voting rights, they should
be granted the right to vote on all issues except
those mentioned in Rule 36(a) of the Assembly's
Rules of hocedure. Tirrkey takes the view that
this second-best solution would come closest to
T\rrkey's position in the WEU Council, where it
cannot block the consensus.
245. On this matter, reference is made here to a
report prepared by Lord Finsberg on behalf the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
for the June 1995 session of the Assembly.
VI. Turkey's rdle in water and energy supply
(a) Woter supply in the region
246. With its mountainous regions and high
plains in the east of the country where both the
Euphrates and the Tigris have their origins, Turkey
occupies a strategic position in the water supply
of the region, in panicular of Syria and Iraq.
247. Over 98Vo of the Euphrates flow and 45Vo
of the flow of the Tigris originate in Tiukey and
together both rivers account for one third of Tur-
key's surface water supply.
248. In order to stimulate the agricultural and
industrial development of the underdeveloped
eastern part of the country, Tirkey is now imple-
menting the south-east Anatolia hoject (GAP).
With a total invesunent estimated at between $32
billion and $40 billion, it consists of thirteen main
projects: six in the Tigris and seven in the
Euphrates. A total number of twenty-one dams
and nineteen hydroelectric power generating sta-
tions should provide irrigation and electricity for a
vast region. The largest barrage, named after
Kemal Atatiirk, was put into service in 1992. It is
expected that the Euphrates, with the GAP com-
pleted and in full service, will provide 307o less
water in Syria and 25Vo less in haq.
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249. In 1987, a protocol was signed between
Turkey and Syria, according to which Turkey
guarantees that the waterflow of the Euphrates at
the border between the two countries will not be
less than an average of 500 cubic metres per
second.
250. The GAP will inevitably compete with
continuing Syrian and Iraqi plans to increase their
irrigated agricultural areas. On the other hand,
Syrian irrigation schemes using the Asi (Orontes)
river have virtually halted the flow of the river
into Turkey's Hatay province, an area which is
claimed by Syria. 90Vo of the average annual
discharge of the Asi is used by Syria.
251. It should be noted here that the first terrorist
activities of the PKK coincided with the start of
building the Atatiirk dam. It is generally assumed
in Turkey that Syria provides active support to the
PKK in order to exert pressure on Turkey in the
issue of water supply.
252. Border security and Kurdish nationalism
preoccupy the states in the region to a greater
extent than concern over the consequences of
Turkey's GAP and it can be noted that the states in
the Tigris-Euphrates basin have directed their
energies into decrying the unreasonable actions of
their neighbours rather than into solving the
problem of domestic water distribution.
253. Turkey's water projects are largely motiva-
ted by a quest for cheaper, domestically-produced
energy. The Euphrates and the Tigris account for
4OVo of Turkey's hydroelectric energy potential
and they are expected to supply 257o of electricity
in Turkey if the GAP project is fully imple-
mented.
254. The GAP's objective is to develop the rela-
tively impoverished region of south-east Anatolia
for agriculture and agro-industrial production and
to raise the standard of living of the Kurdish
population in the area. While the project was
conceived as the economic answer to Kurdish
demands for self-determination, Syria and Iraq
have to some extent perceived it as a means of
international political leverage.
255. Syria and Iraq are also concerned about
deterioration in water quality since some irriga-
tion water will flow back into the rivers contai-
ning higher levels of pesticides, fertilisers and
chlorides.
256. On the other hand, it should be noted that
the implementation of the GAP faces a number of
constraints. It is financed almost entirely from
Turkish sources which has contributed to the
country's high inflation rate. Accompanying pro-
jects to improve infrastructure and education do
not keep pace with the building of dams. Land-
ownership is still distributed very unequally and
there is a lack of training and credit facilities for
farmers which prevents many from taking advan-
tage of the new opportunities.
257. Syria sees the expansion of irrigation and
domestic food production within the Euphrates
region as an economic priority. It seems, however,
that a realistic assessment of Syria's likely water
requirements from the Euphrates does not exceed
the water supply of a yearly average of 500 cubic
meffes per second, agreed upon with Turkey in
1987. In April 1990, a Syrian-Iraqi agreement was
concluded according to which Syria would receive
42Vo and Ir:aq 58Vo of annual Euphrates water
flows entering Syria at its border with Turkey.
258. Iraq fears that GAP and hydraulic projects
in Syria will reduce Euphrates flows by two-thirds
to 11 cubic kilometres per year and even as low as
7 cubic kilometres per year, which could irrigate
only 36.87o of Iraqi lands watered in 1990.
259. In its relations with Syria, Turkey has been
reluctant to make concessions on water issues,
feeling that water is a useful tool in negotiations
on Syria's support for opponents of Turkish
government policy, in particular the PKK, and on
Syrian irredentist claims to the province of Hatay,
part of the former French mandate of Syria which
was ceded to Turkey in 1939.
260. According to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,
Turkey is obliged to consult Iraq before under-
taking any hydraulic works and the Ankara Treaty
of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness, signed
by Tirrkey and lraq in 1946, stipulated that haq
was to be consulted before Turkey carried out any
development projects on the Tigris or Euphrates.
261. When Turkey unilaterally took its decision
to go ahead with the GAP, both Syria and Iraq
considered this to be an aggtessive and insensitive
action. Later, in 1982, Turkey and lraq established
a Joint Technical Committee, which Syria joined
in 1983, and which has since met at regular inter-
vals for general project discussions and data
exchange. Problems of competing claims from the
different parties have, however, not been solved
pd the existing bilateral agreements are limited
m scope.
262. While Syria and Iraq are calling for a unila-
teral agreement, Turkey continues to argue that its
1987 agreement with Syria is adequate for down-
stream requirements and that Syria and lraq should
use their water supplies more efficiently. Turkey
considers the Tigris and Euphrates as sovereign
resources which it may exploit as it sees fit. An
agreement to share the water from the Euphrates
would, in Turkey's opinion, impose Iraqi and
Syrian sovereignty on a Turkish asset. In July
t992,when the Attattirk dam was put into seryice,
the Prime Ministet Suleyman Demirel, said that
" Turkey and Iraq have no more righs over Turkish
water than Tirrkey over their oil. " On the other
hand, Turkey is in favour of bilateral joint ven-
247
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tures in water and energy development and co-
operation in practical matters such as data mana-
gement and water-saving studies.
263. Finally, the very ambitious Ozal pipeline
for peace project starting with the Ceyhan and
Seyhen rivers for irrigating the Adana region will
never be carried into effect. Indeed this project
involved building two canal systems, one through
Syria and the other towards Iraq and the Gulf.
264. At present it is very unlikely that issues
connected with the waters of the Tigris and the
Euphrates will escalate into a conflict, but Turkey
will certainly continue to use water as a negotiat-
ing tool as long as the security of its borders and
the Kurdish question have not been solved in a
satisfactory manner.
(b) Energ soarces in the Caspitn region
265. The Eurasian region may be expected to
become an important source for the energy needs,
in particular oil and gas, of Europe and other
western countries. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the establishment of independent
states in that region has created a new situation
which as yet is rather unsettled, if not unstable.
Many power struggles are still taking place
within and, as is the case in Armenia and Azer-
baijan, even between states. At the same time,
foreign, mostly western, oil companies are trying
to get a stable foothold in the region while, in par-
ticular, Russia, Turkey and Iran are involved in a
competition for influence.
266. Most of the known oil and gas reserves of
the former Soviet Union are located in Russia. Of
the recent estimates of 162 billion barrels of pro-
ven, probable and possible oil reserves on the ter-
ritory of the former Soviet Union, Russia has 137
billion, Kazakhstan 15 billion, Azerbaijan 4 bil-
lion, Turkmenistan 3.2 billion and the remaining
CIS countries 2.8 billion.
267. It is thought, however, that the region
around the Caspian Sea, including the Caucasus
and the Central Asian republics, where many
reserves have not yet been identified nor tested,
could develop into an oil and natural gas produ-
cing region which could rival some of the nations
around the Persian Gulf. Experts estimate, for
example, that Kazakhstan may possess the world's
third largest concenffation of oil after the Persian
Gulf and Siberia. Western oil companies, provi-
ding capital and modern technology are now
moving towards iurangements which will permit
the joint development of these reserves. The ques-
tion of how to get the oil and gas from the Caspian
region to the world market still awaits a satisfac-
tory solution. Russia, Turkey and Iran are each
particularly interested in having pipelines run
through their territory.
268. Atpresent, the European Union has to meet
nearly half of its energy requirements with
imports. According to projections made by the
International Energy Agency (IEA), it is most
probable that, in the future, the European Union
will become even more dependent on imports.
Obviously, it is important to make sure that the
sources for energy imports will be sufficiently
diversified since many external production
regions are prone to political instability.
269. It is estimated for instance, that the Euro-
pean Union's present natural gas demand of 220
billion meffes3 per year could increase to 300 or
even 450 billion metres3 in the year 2010, with
indigenous natural gas production, at present
around 135 bcm per year, most probably dimini-
shing to 120 bcm by the year 2010. Presently,
more than 20Vo of Europe's continental gas needs
are imported from the former Soviet Union's ter-
ritory via pipelines across Ukraine and the Czech
and Slovak republics, but there have been tempo-
rary reductions in supply caused by disputes in
these countries over payment and transit tariffs.
270. In the first place, because ofits geographi-
cal position, Turkey is most probably destined to
play an important role in the energy trade between
suppliers in the Caspian region and their Western
European customers and this position will have a
profound influence on Turkey's relations with the
European Union.
27I. Different solutions have been proposed for
transporting oil from the Caspian region to the
West. Russia obviously prefers pipelines to go to
its Black Sea port of Novorossiysk from where
tankers could tansport the oil through the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean to international oil
markets. Turkey is not in favour of this solution
because of the limited safety regulations for oil
tankers sailing through the Bosporus.
272. Turkmenistan, which is an important
exporter of natural gas, is looking for an alter-
native to the present gas pipeline through Russian
territory, not the least because of its frequent
disputes with Russia over transport charges.
273. In Azerbaijan, the output of the current pro-
ducing oil fields is in natural decline, but with the
inflow of western technology and capital, there
are good prospects for the exploitation of new
fields. A barrier to further development of the oil
fields in both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is the
absence of a good pipeline system to transport the
oil out of the area.
274. At present, there are three important
exploitation deals in the region, the viability of
which is wholly or largely dependent on pipeline
routes out of the region: a $20 billion Chewon
project at the Tengiz oil fields in Kazakhstan; a
$7.4 billion project of ten foreign oil companies
and the Azerbaijan Government, ratified by the
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Azeri Parliament on 15th November 1.994, to
exploit reserves off Baku and a combined British
Gas-Agip deal to develop the Kazakhaganah gas
field in Kazakhstan.
275. The Russian Energy Minister, Yuri Shafra-
nik, has stated publicly that Russia must have a
major stake in all energy exploitation projects in
that region. Russia's pressure has already resulted
in its participation in the Azeri oil deal and in the
Kazakhaganah gas deal. Moreover, Russian pres-
sure has been able to block any pipeline deal so
far.
276. The composition of the international
consortium for the exploitation of the Azeri oil
field near Baku is a clear example of the many dif-
ferent interests involved and pressures exerted. It
started as a deal between the Azeri state oil com-
pany Socar and Anglo-Saxon oil companies, the
Norwegian Statoil company and a 1.75Vo share of
Turkey's TPAO. Then Russia, after having put
pressure on Azerbaijan, obtained a lU%o stake for
its Lukoil company. When kan managed to obtain
a 5Vo stake offered by Azerbaijan, Turkey felt
obliged to raise its own share. In March 1995, it
was satisfied when Azerbaijan gave it 5Vo extra,
bringing Turkish participation to a total of 6.75Vo.
Meanwhile, the United States opposed the SVo
offer to Iran.
277. The different pipeline schemes from Eur-
asian exploitation fields to western markets now
under consideration 
- 
each requiring multi-billion
dollar financing 
- 
are the following:
- 
Upgrading the existing pipeline which
carries Russian and some Chevron oil to
Novorossiysk, Russia's main oil export-
ing port on the Black Sea. This line could
carry oil from both Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan.
Turkey is severely opposed to this idea
since it would strongly increase tanker
traffic through the Bosporus which,
according to Turkey, has already reached
its maximum capacity. Both for environ-
mental and safety reasons, Turkey has
introduced new regulations on the pas-
sage through the Bosporus which beca-
me operational in July 1994, stipulating
that tankers with harmful chemical
loads, nuclear-powered vessels or ships
with nuclear-related material need to
request permission to pass through
from the Turkish Ministry of the Envi-
ronment.
- 
Transporting Eurasian oil and gas through
pipelines to Novorossiysk, then by tanker
to Samsun or another port on Turkey's
Black Sea coast and from there via pipe-
line to Iskenderun on the Mediterranean.
Russia has proposed a variant to tranship
oil from Novorossiysk to the Bulgarian
Black Sea port of Burgas and from there
by pipeline to the Greek Aegean pon of
Alexandroupolis.
- 
A line from Baku via Georgia to its
Black Sea port of Batumi, then by ship to
Burgas and again to Alexandroupolis.
The flaw here is that under present cir-
cumstances the Georgian Government is
not able to guarantee the security of the
pipeline on its territory.
- 
A project for a pipeline from Azerbaijan
through Iran and Nakhichevan to the port
of Ceyhan on the southern coast of Tur-
key. This pipeline would be large enough
later to accommodate exports from
Kazakhstan.
One problem of this proposal is that it
would run through a region in Turkey
where Kurdish terrorism is still active. It
is also noted that American participants
in the pipeline project would not be able
to ship oil through Iran or to its own
stakes in Iranian pipelines. Hence the
concerted efforts to put an end to the war
over Nagorno-Karabakh and to bring
about the withdrawal of Armenian troops
from occupied Azeri territory. This could
open the way for the pipeline to go
through Armenian territory.
- 
Turkmenistan, Turkey, Russia, Iran and
Kazakhstan have set up an operating
company, the Turkmenistan transconti-
nental pipeline company which is trying
to raise finance for a $6 billion and 2 500
kilometre pipeline through Iranian and
Turkish territory to carry natural gas
from Turkmenistan to Europesa.
- 
Beginning January 1995, Russia and
Kazakhstan announced a plan with
Oman participating, to build a new pipe-
line from the Caspian sea to Russia's
Black Sea coast. This clear Russian
success also indicated that Kazakhstan
realised that without significant Russian
participation it would not easily manage
to exploit its large oil and gas reservess5.
278. The former Soviet Union had constructed
an impressive network of oil and natural gas pipe-
lines, but at present an important part of this net-
work is in need of repair, rehabilitation or even
replacement. Accidents along these pipelines are
frequent, there is no corrosion protection, and
energy waste at compressors is a serious problem.
Inevitably, the construction of new oil and gas
Financial Times, l8th January 1995.
Financial Times, 24th January 1995.
54.
55.
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pipelines from the Eurasian fields to the western
markets seems to be a priority issue.
279. For the time-being, the use of the Russian
network may be the only viable way as long as the
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and
the conflict in former Yugoslavia have not been
solved. On the other hand, for environmental and
safety reasons, Turkey, as mentioned above, is
strongly opposed to increased tanker traffic
through the already congested Bosporus.
280. Russia has proposed a multinational co-
ordinating committee to decide on the exploita-
tion of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea56.
At the initiative of Russia, representatives of all
the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea met on
12th October 1994 in an effort to try to hammer
out their differences over claims to the region's
natural resources.
281. Russia has sfressed the unacceptability of
unilateral action by any one govemment border-
ing the sea and it is smongly supported in this view
by lran. In a complete volte-face, Russia has also
expressed its concern for ecological damage to the
Caspian Sea as compared to the communist era,
when the Soviet Union exploited the Caspian
fields near Baku without any regard for ecological
consequences.
VII. A Turkish initiative:
The Black Sea economic co-operation zone
(a) Hhtorical penpective
282. The move towards the regional integration
of counfries surrounding the Black Sea was initiated
by Turkey in 1990. The project began to materia-
lise after the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania
expressed their interest in economic co-operation
in the Black Sea region in the wake of economic
transformation. The countries interested started
negotiations on technical matters, such as poten-
tial fields of co-operation, tariff reduction and
freedom of movement. They held four meetings
between December 1990 and July 1991 and even-
tually compiled a document outlining the most
important contours of the planned multilateral
agreement. The disintegration of the Soviet Union
increased the number of participating states to
nine and, on 25th June 1992, Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova,
Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine (a total of
11 countries) signed the declaration of Black Sea
economic co-operation (BSEC) committing
themselves to new multilateral co-operation based
on the principles of market economy.
283. This extensive and ambitious prograrnme
of economic co-operation covered ffade, indus-
trial co-operation, science and technology, envi-
ronment, transportation, communication and
information technologies, exchange of economic
and commercial data, standardisation, energy,
mining, tourism, agriculture and agro-industries,
veterinary and sanitary protection, health care and
pharmaceutics. The main purpose of the BSEC
was to improve political stability and economic
welfare in the region through economic co-oper-
ation. It was regarded as a step towards integra-
tion into the world economy. Articles V and VII
of the declaration explicitly state that BSEC is not
an alternative to existing integration projects but
a complementary process to achieve a higher
degree of integration into the western economy.
284. Economic co-operation is being promoted
gradually given the wide range of economic pro-
blems of the member countries which are in Ean-
sition to marketeconomies. Any state which reco-
gnises the provisions of the declaration can
become a member of BSEC or can be partially
involved in certain projects. The assumption
behind this initiative is that the private sector must
be the driving force for co-operation among the
member states. The r6le of governments is to pro-
vide the necessary legal, economic, commercial
and fiscal framework to promote the free trade of
goods and services in the region by removing any
kind of barier to trade; to facilitate the free move-
ment of (business) people; to provide an appro-
priate environment for the free flow of capital by
taking precautions to prevent double taxation. The
governments must also take an active rOle in the
implementation of joint projecs for the develop-
ment of infrastructure in the region and the
protection of the environment (especially the
preservation of the Black Sea).
285. Meanwhile, an institutional and financial
framework has been created, including a BSEC
permanent international secretariat, a BSEC co-
ordination centre for the exchange of statistical
data and economic information and a Black Sea
hade and development bank. In December 1992,
the business communities of the participating
states established a BSEC Council which has been
granted observer status in the BSEC. The objecti-
ve of the Council is to develop proposals, pro-
grammes and projects in all the different fields of
co-operation. In February 1993, the parliamentary
assembly of the BSEC was established which may
stimulate national parliaments to pass legislation
needed for the implementation of BSEC legis-
lation.
(b) Potential gains trom economic co-operation
( i) Economic advantage s
286. The BSEC zone consists of counries com-
plementing each other. Except for Greece and
Turkey, the other members had close trade rela-
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tions with each other in the past. However, this
does not mean that they were natural trading part-
ners: under communist rule, these counfiies had
protected industries and all ffade was conducted
through state orders. Most of these indusfries are
not competitive by international standards and a
lot of the ffade in the region is diverted ffade. Co-
operation as envisaged in the declaration would
establish new trade patterns and overcome this
fiade diversion.
287. The present volume of trade in the region
can be increased considerably. Let us focus on the
case of Turkey, which in the past had very little
trade with the former Soviet Union (FSU) and
other former communist countries. Of all its rade
with FSU republics, the largest frade volume is
with Russia and that only accountsfor 3Vo of Tur-
key's total exports in 1992 and 4.5Vo of its
imports. Turkey's trade with these republics
accounts for only circa 7Vo of its total trade in
1992. At present, the restrictive trade r6gime of
the FSU could be one reason for such a low trade
level. The current economic situation in these
countries also places constraints on trade in
convertible currency. It will take some time for
trade in the region to be revitalised since a solu-
tion to the region's financial problems is an in-
escapable prerequisite to economic co-operation.
There is as yet no legal infrastructure to facilitate
the transfer of money and capital in the region.
This is the reason wliy the BSEC members gave
priority to the establishment of a Black Sea trade
and development bank (BSTDB).
288. The BSTDB is designed to finance both
inffa-regional and external rade and to facilitate
the transfer of capital into the region. The share of
capital of each country was set at 16.57o for Greece,
Russia and Turkey, 13.5Vo for Bulgaria,
Romania and Ukraine, and 27o for Albania,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova.
Countries are allowed to increase their capital
share as they complete their economic ftansition.
The paid-in capital of the bank being initially low,
it was decided that it would finance trade rather
than investments. In this manner, the bank could
play a significant r6le in sffengthening trade in the
region which is blocked because of a convertible
currency shortage. The bank can invest in short-
and long-term projects in the region and can also
function as a guarantor. This is a key factor consi-
dering that the region is seen as a high-risk area by
investors.
289. So far, BSEC countries have been exchang-
ing information in various fields of co-operation.
With the support of Turkey's State Institute of
Statistics in Ankara, participating states have
created the BSEC co-ordination centre for the
exchange of statistical data and economic infor-
mation. This initial information on BSEC mem-
bers is required in order to achieve harmonisation
of foreign rade and to prepare the conditions for
the adoption of free ffade agreements. Co-oper-
ation in infrasffucture building has begun with a
plan to create a " ring " corridor along the Black
Sea coast, as well as a radial network and a pro-
gramme for the modernisation and construction of
new sea ports and the development of port struc-
tures. In telecommunications, there are two pro-
grammes of fibre-optic submarine cable systems,
one connecting Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and
Turkey, and the other connecting Russia, Turkey,
Ukraine and Italy due to be completed in 1995.
2N. After seven years of Uruguay rounds,
regional integration might seem to lose its impor-
tance as a provider of free trade. However, the
establishment of a free ffade area in the BSEC still
seems to be a distant prospect. First, the member-
ship of Greece in the European Union and the fact
that Turkey might enter the European Union cus-
toms union in 1995 limit their ftade r6gimes with
third countries. One possibility would be to adopt
European Union standards in trade, given the fact
that most BSEC members wish eventually to join
the European Union. On the other hand, apart
from Greece, which has been a member since
1981, none of these countries will become a mem-
ber of the European Union in the near future. Uni-
lateral liberalisation of trade and multilateral co-
operation are thus the only options for now. Some
economists argue that unilateral trade liberalisa-
tion may dominate any free fiade area; however,
regional integration may contribute to the welfare
of the region through co-operation in fields such
as education, infrastructure, research and deve-
lopment, and environment. The BSEC could pro-
vide a favourable ground to undertake such pro-jects in the region, a far more important r6le for
now than the provision of free trade.
(ii) Political advantages and problems
291. Although the BSEC has an economic orien-
tation, there is also a strong political aspect: the
safeguarding of peace and stability in the region.
The political aims can be summarised as follows:(i) to take advantage of the new internationaljuncture created by European d6tente; (ii) to
sftengthen political understanding and co-opera-
tion after building the necessary economic infra-
structure; and (iii) to facilitate the active partici-
pation of member countries in the European
integration process through regional co-operation.
The political aspects ofco-operation are also stated
by the members in the Bosporus statement issued
at the close of the Istanbul meeting in 1992. They
noted that their partnership was inspired by the
values of democracy, rule of law and respect for
human rights. They also realistically acknowled-
ged the existence of serious conflicts and the dan-
ger of future new tensions and they emphasised
the need for the peaceful settlement of all disputes
in accordance with the principles set out in the
25r
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OSCE documents to which they all subscribed.
Through intensive co-operation and the develop-
ment of good-neighbourly relations, it is hoped
that it will promote peace and friendship. The
Bulgarian, Georgian, Romanian, Russian and
Turkish sides are also considering close co-oper-
ation at diplomatic level. However, it is doubtful
whether conflicting parties such as Armenia and
Azerbaijan will agree to this. The prerequisite for
close co-operation at a political level is the settle-
ment of existing conflicts between member states.
292. The BSEC covers an area larger than the
territory of the EU and has a total population of
324 million. About half of this number lives in
Russia (Turkey has 56.6 million and Ukraine 52.5
million inhabitants). The BSEC is characterised
by national and religious diversity. There are
several types of conflict in the region:
- 
controversies over sovereignty inside the
FSU;
- 
territorial disputes between member
states of the BSEC;
- 
nationality conflicts within individual
countries as a result of ethnic interming-
ling of titular nations and minorities.
293. There are enmities between some states
which have their origins in the past such as the
conflict between Azerbaljan and Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has traditionally
strained relations with Turkey. There is a Turkish-
Greek conflict over the use of the Aegean Sea and
over Cyprus and the relationship between Bulga-
ria and Greece is srained. All these disputes and
conflicts, not to mention others, could impede co-
operation. Also, perception of the initiative varies
with each member. Some feel that Turkey might
be using the BSEC to expand economically in the
region, others claim that Russia has a historical
interest in the Black Sea area and could use the
initiative to secure its presence there and to keep
its hegemony over former Soviet states. Turkey's
and Russia's interests might clash in the area.
Obstacles are numerous and extremely difficult to
overcome. It might take a very long time for
members to begin to grasp the advantages of this
important initiative.
Plnr Two: Gnrecr
I. Greece and the Ballmns
294. With the armed conflict in former Yugosla-
via continuing despite cease-fire agreements and
peace proposals, Greece considers the present
unstable situation as threatening to its own secur-
ity. Security experts have suggested different
nightmare scenarios, each of which would affect
Greece.
295. One possibility is the outbreak of ethnic
violence in Kosovo, which could spill over to the
Albanian-populated Tetovo region in FYROM.
Serbian intervention in Kosovo could extend to
the FYROM's territory. Even if there would not
be a spill-over of armed operations into the
FYROM, armed intervention in Kosovo would
trigger massive migration of ethnic Albanians in a
southern direction, causing ethnic Greeks in Alba-
nia to flee to Greece.
296. An armed conflict between Albania and
Serbia, as a consequence of oppression of Alba-
nians in Kosovo, would not only result in massive
refugee migration but could also lead to a redefi-
nition of borders and start a very undesirable pro-
cess of further instability in the region.
297. The possible involvement of Ttrrkish troops
in operations to protect or support the Muslim
population in Bosnia or other regions in the Bal-
kans could lead Greece to reconsider its policy of
non-involvement in the Balkan conflict, in parti-
cular, if its border areas would be threatened or
violated.
298. Although escalations of the existing conflict
in the Balkans cannot be ruled out, it seems that
some of the abovementioned scenarios, in particu-
lar the intervention of Turkish troops in order to
protect Muslim populations in the region, are far-
fetched.
299. On the other hand, it should be recognised
that the economic malaise, social tension and
political fragility in the ex-communist states
neighbouring Greece could easily lead to mass
migration southward. The desperate economic
situation has already caused such migration
movements at an earlier stage with up to 400 000
Albanians Urying to integrate into the Greek society
and economy, resulting in serious social and eco-
nomic problems for Greece itself.
300. Except for its relations with the FYROM,
Greece's policy in the Balkans is at present less
outspoken than in the early stages of the war in
former Yugoslavia and, in general, Greece
appears to have chosen a position which is more
or less in line with the aftitude taken by the other
member states of WEU.
(a) Albanin
301. The main causes of tension between Greece
and Albania, in particular since 1991 when the [at-
ter began to open up its frontiers, have been the
large numbers of illegal immigrant workers
moving from Albania to Greece and respect for
the human rights of the Greek and orthodox mino-
rity living in Albania.
302. Since 1991, there have been up to some
400 000 illegal Albanian imrnigrants in Greece
whose earnings represent a substantial contibu-
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tion to the economy of Albania. At regular inter-
vals, Greece has organised the expulsion of large
numbers of them back to Albania. One round of
expulsions took place in the summer of 1993 and
another one in August and September 1994, after
the Greek Minister of Public Order announced a
package of new measures to stem the tide of ille-
gal immigrants from Albania. In justifying this
policy, Greece invoked the protection of its fron-
tiers and those of the European Union, and the
fight against criminality and illegal work. At the
same time, it called upon Albania to discuss the
conditions of a bilateral agreement in order to
control and normalise the movement of Albanian
citizens into Greece.
303. The Greek minority living in the south-
eastern part of Albania, also called " North Epirus ",
is estimated by Albania to be 59 000, but Greece
claims 300 000. Independent estimates assert a
figure of 100 000 to 120 000'. Greece has argued
repeatedly that this Greek minority does not enjoy
an equal status and that, with regard to it, Albania
does not fully respect minority and human rights,
including rights to education and to practise one's
own religion in accordance with the articles of the
CSCE Paris Charter. The Greek minority organi-
sation " Omonia " has alleged that Greeks are
being " terrorised ". This is denied by the Alba-
nian President, Sali Berisha, who stated that Alba-
nians and Greeks in his country are living in " full
harmony ".
304. Border incidents have been reported includ-
ing the exchange of small arms fire and Greece
has reinforced its border guards with 6lite troops
and elecffonic surveillance equipment.
305. Notwithstanding these problems, the Greek
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Karolos Papoulias,
paid a visit to Tirana on 15th November 1993 to
establish a co-operation programme between
Greece and Albania in such fields as economy,
hade, culture, transport and others. Greece is the
second-ranking foreign investor in Albania, after
Italy.
306. The worst incident took place on 10th April
1994 when two Albanian soldiers were killed on
Albanian territory near the Greek-Albanian
border. A meeting between the Albanian and
Greek Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Zurich on
3rd May ended without agreement and on 20th
May, six ethnic Greeks, members of Omonia,
were arrested in Albania and charged with
having links with secret Greek irredentist groups,
fomenting separation and illegal possession of
weapons. Five of them were convicted and impri-
soned for terms of between six and eight years.
57. Eastem Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
States lD4, Europa Pubtcations Ltd., [ondon 1994, page 106.
307. Meanwhile, Greece expelled 70 000 illegal
Albanian immigrants during August and September.
308. In December, President Berisha pardoned
one of the convicts who was released immediately
and ordered that the prison sentences ofthe others
be reduced by between one and two years. Finally,
on 6th February 1995, Albania's appeals court
freed the remaining four Greeks and this further
reduced tension between the two countries.
309. On l3th March 1995, the Greek Foreign
Minister, Karolos Papoulias, met with the politi-
cal authorities in Tirana in order to re-establish
good relations with Albania. Discussions concen-
trated on a better control of the flow of illegal
Albanian immigrants to Greece, a clear deline-
ation of the mountainous Greek-Albanian border
and improved conditions for the Greek minority
living in Albania.
310. Greece and Albania have now taken the
first steps towards negotiations on a statute for
Albanian migrant workers in Greece. As proof of
its positive attitude, Albania recently allowed the
Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Albania to travel
to Greece for medical treatment. Finally, prepara-
tions have started for an official visit by the Greek
President, Costis Stefanopoulos.
(b) FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republit of Macedonia)
3l 1 . Another more serious dispute is that betrveen
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM). Greece has accused the
FYROM of continuing to lay claim to part of
Greece's territory and using names and symbols,
such as the name " Macedonia " and the star of
Vergina, which the Greeks maintain are part of
their national heritage. Consequently, in February
l994,Greece imposed a ffade embargo at the port
of Salonika on goods bound for the FYROM, with
the exception of food, pharmaceutical products
and humanitarian aid.
3I2. The European Commission then brought an
action before the European Court, alleging that
Greece's actions were contrary to the Treaty of
Rome. Greece argued that the treaty entitled
member states to take unilateral measures in cer-
tain circumstances, even though they affected the
functioning of the common market.
31.3. The European Court has now.given a preli-
minary opinion according to which the trade
embargo imposed by Greece did not breach the
Treaty of Rome. The advocate-general argued that
the safeguard clause in the treaty allowed a mem-
ber state to take unilateral action in the event of
war or serious international tension constituting a
threat of war.
3I4. It was also argued that the powers of the
court in such cases were extremely limited and
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that it was only able to decide whether, in light of
all the circumstances, Greece could have had
some basis for considering, from its own subjective
point of view, that the strained relations between
itself and the FYROM could degenerate into
armed conflict.
315. A final court ruling is not expected before
July 1995. Greece has meanwhile recalled that
international bodies have taken earlier decisions
regarding the name, flag and state symbols of the
FYROM, in particular:
1. The decisions of the Council of Minis-
ters of the Community in Brussels on
l6th December 1991 imposing three
conditions for recognition of the
FYROM:
(a) that it should make no territorial
claims on a neighbouring country,
member of the Community;
(b) that it should pursue no hostile pro-
paganda activity against a neigh-
bouring country, member of the
Community;
(c) that it should not use a denomin-
ation implying territorial claims.
2. The decision of the European Council in
Lisbon, 26th-27th June 1992, stipulat-
ing that recognition of the FYROM
would be under a name that did not
include the term Macedonia.
3. Security Council Resolution 817 of 7th
April 1993 authorising the accession of
that republic to the United Nations with
the provisional name of FYROM,
without flag or emblem.
316. Greece argues that these decisions have not
since been revoked or amended and that the Euro-
pean Union member states have established diplo-
matic relations with that country under the name
of FYROM.
317. Since Greece imposed its unilateral trade
embargo on the FYROM in 1994, the industrial
output ofthe country has dropped 9%o.The econo-
mic situation in the FYROM had already deterio-
rated sharply through the United Nations sanc-
tions on Serbia-Montenegro which was its main
trading partner.
318. Trade routes through Albania offer only par-
tial relief due the inadequacy of the Albanian road
network, the shallow ports and their limited steve-
doring and storage capacity especially for oil and
its derivatives. Routing the flow of nade through
Bulgaria is so far the most viable available alterna-
tive although characterised by several drawbacks
such as long supply lines, limited availability of
trucks, higher transportation costs (50Vo) and long
waiting lines at the border crossings in Gjusovo
(trvo to fifteen hours), Zlatarevo (three days), and
the Ruse-Giurgiu bridge on the Danube, between
Romania and Bulgaria (one week).
319. The FYROM's gross domestic product in
1994 was less than half that of 1990. Registered
unemployment is approximately 3OVo, with an-
other 5Vo of the workforce being on forced leave.
32O. The government estimates that the Greek
embargo has cost the country $600 million, which
is approximately half of its yearly export earnings
and equal to the counffy's foreign debt. On the
other hand, it is said that Greece itself has lost
more than $100 million in lost exports and port
dues at Thessaloniki.
321. Additional negative effects derive from the
sanctions imposed against Serbia-Montenegro tt.
The FYROM government estimates that such
losses amount to $1.8 billion for the period May
1992 to May 1993 and $1.3 billion from June
1993 to June 1994. The disastrous economic
effects of the United Nations sanctions against
Serbia-Montenegro and the Greek embargo go
hand in hand with ruinous social consequences.
The government of FYROM argued that a number
of factories had to be closed completely or partially
and that many more are working at a loss. The
unemployment rate is38.3Vo, with 185 000 unem-
ployed and 60 000 on extended vacation. A total
of 129 000 employed have not received any sala-
ry for months.
322. The United Nations-sponsored talks
betrveen representatives of the Greek and FYROM
Governments but they were frozen in June 1994
because of elections in both countries. Prospects
for a compromise have improved with the eclipse
of the Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Move-
ment (VMRO), which boycotted the October
1994 parliamentary elections, but no progress has
since been made, nor was there any headway at a
meeting in Geneva on 7th November 1994
between the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Cyrus Vance and
President Kiro Gligorov. The FYROM's Prime
Minister, Branko Crvenkovski, recently said that
his country was willing to compromise on the
flag, but that the government was adamant on
using the Republic of Macedonia as its name.
323. In a positive development, on the other
hand, it should be noted that the FYROM has met
the targets of the IMF stabilisation plan, its annual
inflation rate having fallen ftom 25OVo in 1993 to
587o in 1994 and the budget deficit being cut from
l0%o to 3.5Vo of the gross domestic product. An
i
58. It is known that the United Nations is ignoring large-
scale sanction violations by FYROM in order to mitigate the
effects of the combined Gieek embargo and United I,lations
sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.
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IMF standby loan of $50 million should become
available in 1995.
324. The FYROM's privatisation programme,
having been delayed for almost three years, was
started recently in response to pressure from the
World Bank and the IMF. The government has
now undertaken to dispose of more than 900 state-
controlled and " socially owned " enterprises,
including tobacco, food processing, hotel and tou-
rism companies and textile manufacturers.
325. The FYROM regrets not having been
included in the European Stability Pact, which
was concluded in Paris on 20th March 1994. As a
consequence of a Greek veto, the FYROM has
also been prevented from becoming a member of
the OSCE and is concerned that such marginalis-
ation from international institutions and agree-
ments could lead to destabilisation. Several Euro-
pean states have repeatedly expressed their
concern at the FYROM's exclusion from the
OSCE and urged the Greek Government to lift its
veto, but these efforts have so far been to no avail.
Greece will maintain this veto as long as the
FYROM remains intransigent on the use of its
present flag and national emblem.
326. A solution to the bilateral dispute between
Greece and the FYROM would enable the Euro-
pean Union to develop its relations with the latter,
for example by concluding a trade and co-operation
agreement and, through that, also enhance
FYROM's security. Meanwhile, some United
Nations soldiers are deployed at the FYROM's bor-
der with Serbia-Montenegro in order to protect any
spill-over of armed operations in other parts of for-
mer Yugoslavia into the territory of the FYROM.
327. President Clinton's national security advi-
sor, Anthony Lake, has said that there was " an
option " to enlarge the 55O-member United States
army observation team in the FYROM to a total
of 2 000 troops, which could be seen as a symbol
of the United States' commitment to contain war-
fare in the region. He made it clear, however, that
the United States would not actually use these
troops to contain the conflict, but would continue
to rely on sanctions and diplomacy. The United
States has not yet established full diplomatic rela-
tions with the FYROM, although many observers
take the view that a decision to do so would
contribute significantly to political stability. So
far, Serbia-Montenegro has refused to recognise
the FYROM because it considers Macedonia to be
part of what remains of former Yugoslavia.
(c) Bulgaria
328. After the fall of the Colonels' r6gime in
1974, the development of a special relationship
with Bulgaria became one of the priorities of the
new Greek Government's foreign policy.
329. Having a long shared history of Ottoman
rule, a period when Greece and Bulgaria were
frequently at odds over territorial claims, the two
countries shared a common concern over a pos-
sible Turkish threat which they also connected
with the presence of an increasingly vocal Muslim
Turkish minority within their borders. Both coun-
tries also considered the existence of a " Republic
of Macedonia ", created by Tito as one of the
constituent republics of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, a destabilising factor in the region
since, in their view, the name " Macedonia "
implied territorial claims against Greece and
Bulgaria.
330. In 1989, after the collapse of the com-
munist r6gime in Bulgaria, the Communist Party
(rebaptised Socialist Pu.ty), which remained in
power, maintained friendly relations with Greece
until the victory of the anti-communist oppo-
sition in the October 1991 elections. The Presi-
dent who was then elected, Jelyu Jelev, and his
Prime Minister, Filip Dimitrov, re-established the
rights of the Turkish minority organised within
the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) '.
Mr. Jelev advocates inter-ethnic peace as a stabi-
lising factor for the new democracy. The new
democratic government, also relying on the pre-
dominantly ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights
and Freedoms, attached great importance to
improving relations with Turkey. It was thought
that such policy would reduce the massive Turkish
armed threat on Bulgaria's southern border and
result in economic assistance from Turkey
for Bulgaria's battered economy. Several agree-
ments were signed and good-neighbourly rela-
tions between Bulgaria and Turkey have been
established 0.
331. It should be noted, however, that when the
Turkish President, Turgut Ozal, visited Sofia in
February 1993, President Jeliou Jelev had recalled
that Bulgaria would oppose the passage of Turkish
soldiers sent to Bosnia. He also insisted on the
Black Sea economic co-operation area not being
transformed into a political forum.
332. The easing of tension on its southern border
with Turkey enabled Bulgaria to pay more atten-
tion to developments on its western border. It
sfressed that the Balkans would be destabilised if
Macedonia was not recognised as independent
and, in January 1992, Bulgaria was one of the flrst
to recognise Macedonia as an independent state
under that name, stating that Bulgaria had no ter-
59. This group is placed between the Socialistparty and the
anti-communist opposition grouped in the Union of Demo-
cratic Forces (UDF).
60. In December 1991, a military co-operation agreement
was signed between Bulgaria and Turkey, followed by a
treaty of friendship, good-neighbourly relations, co-oper-
ation and security in May 1992 and by another military co-
operation agreement in November 1992.
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ritorial claims on it. In February, it added that full
diplomatic relations would be established only if
the republic declared officially that there was no
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and that it had
no territorial claims on Bulgaria.
333. Meanwhile, Bulgaria and Greece conclud-
ed agreements on military co-operation in
November 1991 and January 1992, envisaging
exchanges between the nvo armies, reduction of
the parameters of their military activities and pro-
visions for confidence-building measures of a
more stringent nature than those required by the
Vienna document. Bulgaria also stated at the time
that relations with Greece would improve since
both countries had no alternative.
334.. The considerably-improved relations bet-
ween Bulgaria and Turkey may have slightly
embanassed Greece and contributed to its feeling
of isolation in the Balkans. On the other hand, it is
aware that it shares interests with Bulgaria as
regards stability in the region. The coming to
power of a new government under Prime Minis-
tet Jan Videnov, who did not have to rely on the
support of the Movement for Rights and Free-
doms, was welcomed by Greece.
335. Both Greece and Bulgaria have declared
that they wish to improve the already very good
relations between the two states, but no new ini-
tiatives have been taken in the past two years. It
should be noted, however, that at present Greece
is the first-ranking foreign investor in Bulgaria,
with Germany in second position.
IL Greece's perceptian of Turkey
as a security threat
336. Since its independence in 1830, Greece has
always felt uncomfortable with its new neighbour
and former occupying power, the Ottoman empire,
later transformed into Turkey. Several armed
conflicts opposed the two states, the most savage
of which was the Greek-Turkish war of 1920-
I922,whichended with the Treaty of Lausanne in
1923, including an agreement for the compulsory
exchange of 600 000 muslim Turks and 1.5 mil-
lion orthodox Greeks.
337. The second world war, followed by a com-
munist rebellion and civil war which ended only
in 1949 and the threat posed by the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact, concentrated priorities on
other issues. Both Greece and Turkey became
NATO allies and there were some years of relative
calm in bilateral relations.
338. Soon, however, in the mid 1950s, Cyprus
became the new disintegrating influence and in
L974 the Turkish invasion and subsequent occu-
pation of the northern part of Cyprus reintroduced
Turkey as the most important potential military
threat to Greece. The fact that NATO did not act to
protect the Greek Cypriots against the invading
Turkish armed forces did not increase NATO's
popularity which was already very low because of
its close links with the Colonels' r6gime during
the years 1967-74.
339. Greece points out that in the early 1990s
Turkey started to implement an ambitious and
wide-ranging modernisation and restructuring
prograrnme for its armed forces while its national
military-industrial base was enlarged and is now
able to build fighter and transport aircraft,
armoured fighting vehicles, frigates and electro-
nic equipment. Efforts are being made to develop
a production capacity for tanks, missiles and heli-
copters.
340. Greece is also worried about Turkey's IVth
army, not assigned to NATO, and equipped with
the largest non-ocean-going landing force in the
world (110 ships) which is deployed at Turkey's
western border, facing the Greek Aegean islands.
It does not exclude the possibility of a Turkish
seizure of Greek islands in the eastern part of the
Aegean. Referring to Article 51 of the United
Nations' Charter, Greece has fortifred and milita-
rised a number of its Aegean islands as a measure
of self-defence and to function as a tripwire in
case of a Turkish attack. According to Greece,
large units of Turkey's armed forces are also posi-
tioned in the coastal area facing Cyprus, ready to
move into action if need be. A large proportion of
the Turkish armed forces is also deployed in the
region facing north-eastern Greece, where the
Muslim minority lives.
341. An important new element in the increased
Turkish security threat as perceived by Greece is
Turkey's effort to play an active r6le in the Bal-
kans, based on the presence of Muslim minorities
in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FYROM
and Kosovo and of minorities of Turkish descent
in Bulgaria, the FYROM, Greece and Romania.
Greece takes the view that Turkey's objective is to
create a " green " or islamic belt from the Adriatic
to the Black Sea which would isolate Greece from
Christian Europe. Even if this may be an inflated
view of reality, it has had an important influence
on Greece's Balkan policy and defence posture.
342. At present, only nationalistic extremists in
Turkey would mention the possibility of Turkish
intervention in north-eastern Greece in order to
" liberate " the l2O 0O0-strong Muslim minority
living there, consisting of 49.9Vo Turkish Mus-
lims,33.5Vo Pomaks and 16.57o gypsies. Greece
nonetheless takes into consideration that Turkish
territorial aspirations could emerge and pose a
threat to Greek security, the more so since the
Muslim minority in Bulgaria is mainly concen-
trated in a nearby area across the Greek-Bulgarian
border.
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III. Defence spending and defence policy
(a) Defence spcnding in Greece
343. Since the return of a democratic government
n 1974, there has been a widespread consensus on
the need to upgrade Greece's defence capability
and the corresponding high-level defence expendi-
ture, justified by suspicions as regards Turkey,
which had invaded Cyprus in the summer of 1974.
During trre last years of the cold war period, Greece
ranked first among NATO countries in military
expenditure as related to GDP.
34. A national defence industrial base was
developed in order to satisfy at least part of the
needs of the Greek armed forces and to reduce
dependence on foreign suppliers. Additionally,
lower arms imports limited the drain on currency
reserves while export markets were actively
explored to improve Greece's balance of trade.
345. In the late 1980s, the deteriorating national
economy and ttre depreciation of the Greek drachma
strongly affected the Defence Ministry's purchas-
ing power. At the same time, it appeared that the
development of an all-round modern national
defence indusbry was not succeeding, since it was
able to produce only 20Vo of Greece's armaments.
346. The government decided to restructure the
defence industry, including privatisation and
mergers. Large cuts in defence expenditure were
thought inevitable, but they were postponed as a
result of the war in neighbouring former Yugosla-
via. Simultaneously, Greece received large quan-
tities of modern equipment as a result of CFE
reductions of equipment in other NATO member
states.
347. Greece received 80 M-60 tanks from the
United States and Germany is transferringTl Leo-
pard-l tanks, 200 M-113 armoured personnel car-
riers, 500 BMP-l armoured fighting vehicles,
72 M-It0 self-propelled guns, 150 RM-70 mul-
tiple-rocket launchers and 20 multiple-launch
rocket systems. The Netherlands transferred
60 M-106A1 mortar carriers. Moreover, 17 AH-
lP Cobra attack helicopters together with 24 AH-
64 Apache attack helicopters are to be delivered
in 1995.
348. Greece has adopted a system of compul-
sory military service for all men and voluntary
service for men and women. The breakdown of
military personnel is as follows 5':
Peacetime Wartime
Army
Navy
Airforce
Total
126 000
19 500
23 5N
360 000
43 000
45 000
169 000 ,148 000
349. Greece also receives significant military
assistance from the United States, which is meant
to contribute to a balance of forces between
Greece and Turkey on a 7:10 ratio. Foreign military
assistance, which includes both foreign military
financing and international military education and
training, amounted to $315.3 million in 1993,
$283.6 million in 1994 and $317 million in 1995.
(b) The rdh of thc Greek navy in the Mediterrunean
350. Through its geographic position, Greece
has an important r6le in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean. It is the sfrategic link between Italy and Tur-
key on Europe's southern flank. It conffols the sea
lines of communication in the Aegean and the
movement of naval forces to and from the Black
Sea. Moreover, it provides the Atlantic Alliance
with important military bases in the area.
35 1. The areas of immediate interest for the Hel-
lenic naval forces are the Aegean and lonian Seas
with the corresponding accesses or passages and
the sea area extending south-south-west of Crete
and east-south-east of Rhodes. Greece considers
the Aegean Sea as constituting an inseparable
unique entity with the Greek mainland, the control
of which it considers vital for the survival of Greece
and for the security of Europe as a whole. The sfra-
tegic importance of the island of Crete as a main
maritime base for the southern flank of Europe and
the alliance was proven once again during the Gulf
war while the Ionian Sea is vital for the conffol of
the Adriatic and security in the Balkans.
352. In order to enable the Hellenic navy to
implement its many different tasks, Greece has
initiated a long-term modernisation and develop-
ment progrimrme, ranging from the areas of C3,
through air defence, anti-submarine, anti-surface
and mine warfare to the areas of electronic warfare
and logistic support. The new structure should
provide the Hellenic navy with maximum flexi-
bility and rapid reaction capability. The navy is to
include several types of ships, rather than single-
mission ships, which should, insofar as possible,
be platforms with multi-mission capabilities.
353. Recently, two Katsonis (United States
Guppy-class) submarines and two Themistocles(United States Gearing-class) destroyers have
been retired from service. A fifth Elli (Nether-
lands Kortenaer) frigate has been commissioned,
as have two I Votis-class (German Tiger-class)
fast patrol craft, armed with Exocet SSM, and two
Greek-built Pirpolitis-class coastal pafrol craft.
354. From the United States, it received three Uni-
ted States Knox-class frigates (on lease) and from
Germany it received a further three Thetis-class
anti-submarine warfare corvettes. The navy recent-
ly took delivery of one German-built Meko frigate
and another of this class is under construction.61. Source: Greek Ministry of Defence, March 1995.
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IV. Greece and WEU
355. When the EC member states started to pre-
pare the intergovernmental conference on the
political union in 1990, there was almost general
agreement across the political specffum in Greece
in favour of joining and further developing a
European defence and security system. It was
thought that such a system would protect all mem-
bers against external threats. Greece would as a
consequence be protected by this collective
defence mechanism against any possible threat
from Turkey. In this reasoning, a European defence
system, of which Turkey would be a part, would
offer the perfect protection which NATO, with
Turkey as a member, could not provide.
356. At the Maastricht summit meeting in
December 1991, however, it appeared that nego-
tiations had resulted in conclusions which differed
from Greece's original expectations. The member
states of WEU invited Greece, as a member of the
European Union, to accede to WEU " on condi-
tions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI
of the modified Brussels Treaty ", but at the same
time they invited Turkey and other European
member states of NATO " to become associate
members of WEU in a way which will give them
the possibility of participating fully in the activi-
ties of WELJ ".
357. In the accession negotiations with Greece,
some member states insisted on a modification of
Anicle V of the modified Brussels Treaty in such
a way that it would not apply to external attacks
by one NATO counfiry against another.
358. The Petersberg declaration of 19th June
1992 formulated this exception as follows: " They
(Ministers) also stressed that the security guaran-
tees and defence commitments in the treaties
which bind the member states within Western
European Union and which bind them within the
Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and
will not be invoked by those subscribing to
Part III of the Petersberg declaration in disputes
between member states of either of the two
organisations. "
359. This specific amendment to Article V
which made the vital collective defence vinually
non-applicable to any form of conflict between
Greece and Turkey, combined with the status of
associate membership granted to Turkey, which
almost amounted to full participation of Tirrkey in
the WEU Council's activities, was quite different
from Greece's initial expectations. Although it
felt disappointed by the apparent lack of the other
European Union member states to provide protec-
tion and security guarantees against Turkey, Greece
signed its protocol of accession to WEU on 20th
November 1992.
360. After ratification by all the signatories, the
protocol of accession entered into force on
6th March 1995. Since then, however, it became
known that in its notification of ratification as
registered at the Belgian Ministry for Foreign
Affairs on 10th June 1994, Greece itself has taken
exception to Anicle X of the modified Brussels
Treaty, declaring that for a period of five years it
" excludes from the competence of the Court any
dispute over the Hellenic Republic taking defen-
sive military measures for reasons of national
defence ".
361. Apparently, this exclusion of the competence
of the International Court of Justice in the first
place refers to Greece's dispute with Turkey over
the militarisation of the Aegean islands. Having
understood that its membership of WEU does not
provide any security guarantee against potential
Turkish aggression, it has preferred also to exclude
the possibility of a verdict of the International
Court of Justice, forcing it to demilitarise the
Aegean islands.
362. Article X allows the High confiacting par-
ties to make reservations to the complusory juris-
diction of the Court, but it would seem that this
reservation should have been made at the moment
of signing the Protocol of Accession on 20th
November 1992 and not, as was done, at the time
of notifying ratification on 10th June 1994. Would
the other member states of WEU have signed and
ratified the protocol if they had been informed of
Greece's reservation?
363. The specific amendment to Article V and
the reservation to Article X, in connnection with
Greece's membership and Turkey's associate
membership, have weakened the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and the internal coherence of its mem-
ber states. One may wonder whether this opera-
tion has reinforced security in Europe.
364. Greece has repeatedly made it clear that it
perceives major potential threats at its northern
and eastern borders from the Balkans and Turkey.
With the FYROM and Turkey in particular, it is
involved in long-standing and serious disputes
over a multitude of issues, the solution of which is
by no means in sight. There is no decisive answer
to the question whether, and to what extent, the
other European Union and WEU member states
share its views. The establishment of a European
common security and defence policy as announ-
ced in Article J of the Treaty on European Union,
is certainly hampered by the unresolved disputes
between Greece and its neighbours.
365. If Greece wishes to play a positive r6le in
the Balkans and to make a contribution towards
the European Union's policy in the region, it will
have to make progress in the direction of a nor-
malised relationship with Turkey.
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P.mr Trnrn: Cypnus
I. The political situation
366. The situation in Cyprus, where for many
decades the Greek and Turkish communities have
been opposed in a bitter dispute, is a key issue in
relations between Turkey and Greece. Recent
efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General
to reconcile the positions of both communities on
the island have not led to any breakthrough.
A reconciliation now seems to be more urgent
than ever in view of the fact that the European
Union has fixed a date for the start of negotiations
on the application for membership which was
deposited by the Republic of Cyprus on 3rd July
1990. The rapid decline in the economy and stan-
dard of tiving in the. northern part of the island is
another reason for reconciliation.
367. Without going into too much detail, some
recent events in the history of Cyprus should be
recalled here. 62
368. In February 1959, agreements signed in
Zuich and London between representatives of
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and of
the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus
paved the way for the independence of the Repu-
blic of Cyprus which came into being on l6th
August 1960.
369. According to the 1960 Constitution, the Pre-
sident should be a Greek Cypriot, while the Vice-
President should be a Turkish Cypriot, each elected
by their own community. Each had a veto right on
vital issues such as foreign affairs and defence.
370. In government and in legislative bodies,
Greeks and Turks would share responsibilities on
a70Vo-30Vo basis. According to the 1960 census,
the Greek community accounted for 77Vo and the
Turkish community I8.3Vo of the total Cypriot
population.
371. In 1963, the Greek Cypriot proposals to
change the constitution were rejected by the Tur-
kish Cypriots, while at the same time, Greek
Cypriots officially declared their political objective
to unite Cyprus with Greece (the so-called Enosis).
372. Following violent clashes between the two
communities in 1963 and 1964, the United
Nations Security Council decided in March 1964
to dispatch a United Nations peace-keeping force
62. A report on the situation in Cyprus, submitted by lnrd
Finsberg, Rapporteur, on behalf of the Political Affairs Com-
mittee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Elrrope was discussed in that Assembly on 2nd February
t995.
On llth February 1994,the European Parliament
adopted a report submitted by Mr. Jan Willem Bertens, Rap-
porteur, on the application for membership of the European
Union by Cyprus.
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(LJNFICYP) to Cyprus. The peace-keeping force
is still present in Cyprus but for financial reasons
it has been considerably reduced to the present
number of around 1 200 troops.
373. ln 1967, the Turkish-Cypriot community
established its own provisional administration in
those parts of the island where Tirrkish-Cypriots
were in a majority.
374. On 15th luly 1974, the Cypriot National
Guard committed a successful coup d'6tat against
President Makarios, organised by the Greek mili-
tary junta. The putsch collapsed when a few days
later the Turkish Government intervened milita-
rily. Following the breakdown of the AugustlgT4
negotiations, in which Greece, Turkey, the United
Kingdom and the Greek and Turkish communities
of Cyprus participated, Turkish froops occupied
the northern 37Vo of the island causing the migra-
tion of 200 000 Greek Cypriots to the southern
part and the de facto division into two parts, sepa-
rated by a demarcation line 53. Moreover, demo-
graphic problems have increased with the policy
of colonisation pursued by the so-called Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus in collaboration
with Turkey s.
375. In February 1975, the Ttrrkish Cypriots uni-
laterally and illegally declared their own indepen-
dent state, which was rebaptised the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in Novem-
ber 1983 and recognised only by Tirrkey.
376. Since 1975, the United Nations, through its
Secretary-General has made many efforts to solve
the Cyprus question, including two high-level
agreements reached in Vienna in 1977 and 1979,
which set out the framework for a solution on a
federal basis.
377. ln 1992, a new impulse was given to the
United Nations initiatives to reconcile the posi-
tions of the Greek and Turkish communities. The
results of these activities are discussed in detail in
the abovementioned reports of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the
European Parliament.
378. The United Nations Secretary-General has
proposed a number of confidence-building mea-
sures which, if accepted by both parties, could
help to achieve an overall agreement based on a
" set of ideas " approved by the United Nations
Security Council.
379. An essential part of the confidence-build-
ing measures is the rehabilitation of the Varosha
63. See the report on national refugees and missing persons
in Cyprus, by Messrs. Riesen and Miiller, Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 5716.
64. See the report on the demographic structure of the
Cypriot communities by Mr. Cuc6, Rapporteur, Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 6589.
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area north of the United Nations administered
buffer zone, at present surrounded by territory
conffolled by the Turkish Cypriot administration,
as an area for trade and intercommunity contacts
and the re-opening of Nicosia international airport
to civilian passenger and cargo traffic.
380. One of the guiding principles of the overall
agreement is based on the " set of ideas ", the
establishment by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot communities of a bi-communal and bi-
zonal federation, comprising one territory com-
posed of two politically equal federated states.
This federal republic would have one indivisible
sovereignty.
381. Although progress has been made in pro-
tracted negotiations between the parties concern-
ed, many questions still remain to be settled.
No agreement has been reached on the vital confi-
dence-building measures relating to Varosha and
Nicosia International airport. One of the other
remaining stumbling-blocks is the question of
territorial adjustments. The Turkish part of the
population, representing l8clo of the total popula-
tion, now occupies 37Vo of the island. According
to the United Nations Secretary-General, they
should reduce their portion of land to 28.O2Vo but
the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Mr. Denktash,
considers 29Vo to be the minimum.
382. Since May 1994, negotiations between the
two communities have remained deadlocked.In a
report of 30th May 1994 to the Security Council,
the United Nations Secretary-General stated that
the absence of an agreement was due mainly to a
lack of political will by the Turkish Cypriot side.
383. Informal meetings between President
Clerides and Mr. Denktash in October 1994 were
concluded without any result.
384. In January 1995, Mr. Denktash announced
a 14-point proposal to break the deadlock with the
Greek Cypriots. The proposal included acceptance
of the United Nations proposed confidence-
building measures, eventual demilitarisation of
the island and the exchange of territory, but
Mr. Denktash admitted that it did not signify a
change in attitude or policy.
Mr. Denktash also excluded the possibility of
Greek Cypriots returning to their former homes in
the northern part of the island.
385. On 6th March 1995, when the European
Union concluded a customs union agreement with
Turkey, it was also agreed that negotiations for
accession would start on the basis of proposals by
the Commission six months after the conclusion
of the 1996 conference and taking into account
the results of the latter. Although it was not men-
tioned in any official document, it is hoped that
this promise of future membership could work as
a catalyst to end the stalemate in negotiations
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on an
overall agreement. In its communique of 6th
March 1995, the European Council confirms that
the European Union intends to continue to up-
hold, by all the means at its disposal, the efforts of
the United Nations with a view to a comprehensive
settlement of the Cypriot question.
386. In fact, the first reactions to the agreement
were far from promising and Tirkish political lea-
ders seem to indulge in muscled declarations, pos-
sibly only for domestic consumption. Only hours
after having signed the agreement, the Turkish
Foreign Minister, Murat Karayalcin, stated that
the European Union's decision on Cyprus' mem-
bership was an " unfortunate step " which could
lead to the permanent division of the island. He
said that if accession negotiations were held with
the Greek Cypriot side of the island, Turkey
" would be left with no option other than to take
steps towards achieving a similar integration with
the Turkish Republic and Northern Cyprus " 5'.
387. Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, when visiting
the United States in April 1995, suggested that a
solution to the Cyprus problem would be found
after Turkey becomes a member of the European
Union tr.
388. Both Turkey's government officials and
Mr. Denktash have declared repeatedly that they
consider the request for membership of the Euro-
pean Union by the Republic of Cyprus as an ille-
gal act since, under the terms of the Constitution,
the Republic of Cyprus cannot become part of
another alliance or union without the consent of
both communities. This refers to Article 50(a)
of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus
which reads as follows:
" 1. The President and the Vice-President
of the Republic, separately or con-jointly, shall have the right of final
veto on any law or decision of the
House of Representatives or any part
thereof concerning:
(a) foreign affairs, except the particip-
ation of the Republic in international
organisations and pacts of alliance in
which the Kingdom of Greece and the
Republic of Turkey both participate. "
389. The Republic of Cyprus has dismissed this
argument, noting that a decision to join the Euro-
pean Union would be subject to a referendum, in
which case the right of final veto does not apply.
Moreover, it is argued that the Turkish Cypriots
cannot refer to a clause in a constitution which
they have otherwise unilaterally and fully reject-
ed, and that Turkey itself applied for membership
of the European Union in 1987.
Financial Times, 8th March 1995.
International Herald Tribune, l9th April 1995.
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390. It should be noted that, as a consequence of
its complete dependence on Turkey, the economy
of the northern pan of the island is in a drama-
tically bad shape with an inflation rate of 2l5%o
f.or 1994 and a decrease of 347o in tourism com-
pared to the preceding year with only 70 000 tou-
rists. Moreover, the export of food products,
including citrus fruit, to the European Union has
practically come to a standstill as a consequence
of a ruling of the European Court of Justice. There
have also been increasing intemrptions in the sup-
ply of electric energy from the south, purportedly
of a technical nature. In fact, economic problems
may be a reason for the Turkish Cypriots to change
their attitude.
391. It seems that a majority of the Turkish
Cypriots living in the northern part of the island is
ever more anxious for a settlement which would
lift the trade embargo. Furthermore, it is thought
that future membership of the European Union
could bring considerable regional aid to the ruined
economy of the north.
392. Meanwhile, the economy of the southern
part is in good shape with estimated figures for
1994 of 4.7Vo economic growth, 2.5Vo wemploy-
ment and 4.7Vo inflation. In l994,the Republic of
Cyprus registered 2 million tourists in 1994. The
present per capita income is higher than that of
Portugal and Greece and at the same level as that
of Spain.
393. On 23rd April 1995, the presidential elec-
tions in northern Cyprus resulted in a victory for
Mr. Rauf Denktash with 62,5Vo of the 91 000
votes cast in a second round of voting, with Mr.
Dervis Eroglu taking the remainin g 37 .5Vo. In the
preceding 1990 elections, Mr. Denktash was
elected with 66.7Vo in the first round.
II. The military situatian
394. On numerous occasions, the Security
Council has insisted on a reduction in the number
of foreign troops and a reduction of defence
spending on t}re island. Recently in Resolution
969, adopted on 21st December 1995, it urged:
" All concerned to commit themselves to a
significant reduction in the number of
foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus
and a reduction of defence spending in the
Republic of Cyprus to help restore confi-
donce between the parties and as a frst step
towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot
forces as set out in the Set of Ideas, and
(called) upon the Secretary-General to pro-
mote efforts in this direction. "
Unfortunately, no progress has been made on this
issue and developments have been rather in the
opposite direction.
395. On 17th December 1993, President Cle-
rides made a proposal for demilitarising the island
which included: disbanding the National Guard
and transferring all of its arms and military equip-
ment to the custody of UNFICYP; maintaining
the Cyprus Police at its present sfiength, equipped
with light weapons; defraying the total cost of an
enlarged United Nations peace-keeping force that
would have rights of inspection; use by that
peace-keeping operation of heavy National Guard
equipment in its custody; all money saved from
disbanding the National Guard and from disconti-
nued arms purchases would be deposited in a
United Nations account and, after deducting the
cost of a United Nations peace-keeping operation,
be used for the benefit of both communities after
the solution of the Cyprus problem. President
Clerides added the condition that the Turkish
forces be withdrawn from Cyprus, the Turkish
Cypriot forces disbanded and their weapons and
military equipment placed in the custody of the
United Nations peace-keeping force.
396. Mr. Denktash reacted by calling President
Clerides' proposal impractical and propagandistic
and declared: " Turkish forces, other than those to
be retained under the updated Treaties of Guaran-
tee and of Alliance, will withdraw from Cyprus
within the framework of a lasting solution, which
can only be realised if mutual confidence is esta-
blished between the two peoples on the island ".
It is noted here that the actual military situation
can hardly inspire mutual confidence.
397. In the northern part of the island, Turkey
has deployed a number of troops estimated well
in excess of 30 000, equipped with more than
300 tanks. The armament of these Turkish forces
has recently been upgraded and equipment also
includes armoured personnel carriers, conside-
rable fuepower in different categories of artillery
and helicopters. The active Turkish Cypriot
armed forces count 4 000 infantry troops.
398. The National Guard of the Republic of
Cyprus has 10 000 personnel in active service. The
equipment includes 52 tanks, armoured personnel
carriers and a wide variety of artillery air defence
missiles and guns, and anti-tank weaponry.
Moreover, there are estimated to be in excess of
2 000 Greek personnel composed of the ELDYK
regiment, provided for under the 1960 Treaty of
Alliance and individual personnel assigned sepa-
rately therefrom to Cyprus.
399. Since 1988, successive governments of the
Republic of Cyprus have been implementing a
programme of armaments acquisition to enhance
significantly the equipment operated by the
National Guard, which has resulted in a large
increase in defence spending by the Republic6?.
67. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
operation in Cyprus, Security Council documents 5119941680
(7th June 1994) and Sll994ll407 (l2th December 1994).
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I. Disputes in the Aegean Sea
(a) The Aegean khnds
400. Since the birth of Greece as a state in 1830,
most of the islands in the Aegean sea have gra-
dually come under Greek sovereignty.
401 . Italy occupied the islands of ttre Dodecanese,
then still under Ottoman rule, and Greece took the
northern and cenfral islands in the eastern part of
the Aegean Sea during the Balkan war of l9l2-
13. In February 1914, the six European powers 6
left the Dodecanese to Italy by tacit agrcement
and decided to leave Greece in possession of the
other islands with the exception of Imroz, Tene-
dos and Castellorizo, under the condition that all
the islands left to Greece would be demilitarised.
A final settlement of the legal status of the eastern
Aegean island was reached in the Treaties of Lau-
sanne of 24th July 1923, between Turkey, the
European allies and Greece.
402. The Dodecanese and Castellorizo came
under Greek sovereignty through the Paris Peace
Treaty of 10th February 1947.
403. At present, 2 383 islands in the Aegean sea
are under Greek sovereignty, while some sixty
islands, mostly situated within the three mile
zone of the Anatolian coast, are under Turkish
sovereignty.
(b) The sUtus of the Greek ishnds in the Aegean Sea
404. The governments of Greece and Turkey are
involved in a long-standing dispute over the status
of restrictions imposed upon islands in the
Aegean Sea. A distinction is made between three
different categories of islands, each of which has
a different status.
(i) lzmnos and Samnthrace
405. The statute of these islands was initially
determined by the Convention on the r6gime of
straits, signed in Lausanne on 24th July 1923,
which according to Article 4, had imposed the
demilitarisation of the Greek islands Limnos
and Samothraki and also of the Turkish islands
Gtikgeada (Imroz), Bozcaada (Tenedos) and the
Rabbit islands (Iles-aux-Lapins). Later, in the
Montreux Convention on the r6gime of straits
signed on 20th July 1936, the contracting parties
stipulated that they had resolved to substitute the
present convention for the one signed in Lausanne
on24thJuly 1923.
68. Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the
United Kingdom.
406. Following the conclusion of the Montreux
Convention, both countries gradually started to
remilitarise the abovementioned islands and with
the increasing problems between Greece and Tur-
key over Cyprus the status of the islands became
one of the disputes to which no solution has yet
been found.
407. Tirkey argues that the Montreux Conven-
tion has not completely replaced the Lausanne
Convention and only provides Turkey with the
right to remilitarise the islands and territories
which have been recognised as being part of the
defensive system ofthe Sraits. It also argues that
the remilihrisation of Lemnos and Samothrace by
Greece has not been authorised in the Monfreux
Convention.
408. Greece, on the other hand, argues that the
Monffeux Convention has fully replaced the Lau-
sanne Convention and that any exception as
regards the status of any specific island would
have been mentioned. Moreover, Greece has
pointed out that immediately after the signing of
the Monfreux Convention, Turkey recognised, in
several different offrcial declarations, the right of
Greece to remilitarise its islands in the straits.
4W. In the framework of NATO, Turkey has
used its veto whenever the alliance has proposed
to use Lemnos for operational purposes and to
include it in its military planning.
(ii) Lesbos, Chios, Sdmos and Niluria
410. The military status of these islands is sub-ject to the Lausanne Peace Treaty, signed on24th
July 1923, which states in Article 13, paragraph 3:
" The Greek military forces in the said
islands will be limited to the normal contin-
gent called up for military service, which
can be trained on the spot, as well as to a
force of gendarmerie and police in propor-
tion to the force of gendarmerie and police
existing in the whole of the Greek territory. "
The Treaty also stipulates that the two countries'
military aircraft are forbidden to fly over these
islands and over the Turkish coast and the
construction of arsenals and fortifications is pro-
hibited.
4lL. Since 1974, following the Tirkish invasion
of Cyprus, the situation has changed drastically
and in 1974, 1976 and 1987 there were serious
crises in the Aegean Sea over the mere existence
and limits of the continental shelf of the Greek
islands.
(iii) Dodecanese
412. In Articles 15 and 16 of the Lausanne Peace
Treaty of 24th luly 1923, Turkey gave up its
rights over the islands of the Dodecanese and they
were given to Italy. After the second world war,
li
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Italy handed the Dodecanese over to Greece in
accordance with Article 14 of Section V of the
Peace Treaty signed in Paris on 10th February
1947. This same Peace Treaty put resfiictions on
the militarisation of these islands which were res-
pected by Greece until1974, when Turkey inva-
ded Cyprus. After this event, Greece invoked its
inalienable right of self-defence as codified in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations to
remilitarise the Dodecanese.
(c) The limits of tenitorial waterc
413. In Article 3 of the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea, it is stated that:
" Every state has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding l2 nautical miles, measured
from baselines determined in accordance
with this Convention. "
414. While Greece now considers the twelve-
mile zone as a generally-accepted norn, Turkey
does not want to recognise it and remains hostile
to any unilateral extension of Greek territorial
waters beyond the present six miles. Turkey
insists that the limits of the territorial waters bet-
ween Greece and Ttrrkey should be determined
according to the principle of equity 5e. In the
Mediterranean, only Turkey and Israel do not
recognise an extension of territorial waters
beyond 6 miles.
415. Turkey has gone so far as to say that an
extension of Greek territorial waters beyond 6
miles would be a casus belli and it has put forward
a number of arguments to support its position.
416. The first is that Turkey does not recognise
the twelve- mile zone as a generally-accepted rule
of law. It has noted that even if the twelve-mile
zone were international common law its obser-
vance depends on the agreement of states and that
Turkey has always opposed this common law'0.
417. Finally, Turkey invokes Article 300 of the
1982 convention, regarding abuse of law, arguing
that in closed or semi-closed waters, as those
around its coastline, the twelve- mile zone cannot
be applied. With the abusive application of the
twelve-mile zone in the Aegean Sea, this would
simply become a " Greek lake ".
418. Notwithstanding the legal battle, it should
be noted that the question of territorial waters
between Greece and Turkey is mentioned in the
69. The principle of equity in international law is normally
applied to limit a continental shelf or an exclusive economic
zone.
70. It should be noted, however, that in the protocol of 17th
April 1973 on the limits of territorial waters in the Black Sea,
signed between Tirkey and the USSR, the border of both
countries had been f,rxed at the twelve-mile zone.
Treaty of Lausanne of 24th July 1923. Maps
attached to the British edition of the proceedings
of the Lausanne conference provide the specific
dividing line of the waters between the two coun-
tries, which is the central line between the Anato-
lian coast and the Greek islands opposite. In fact,
ever since then, this has been observed as the
borderline. The borderline between the Anatolian
coast and the Dodecanese was determined in the
agreements of 4th January 1932 and 28th Decem-
ber 1932.
419. As regards the waters at the mouth of the
Evros (Maritsa) river, a protocol was signed on
3rd November 1926 which determined the border
on the cenffal line of the main navigation canal of
the river in a south-western direction for up to
three miles. There is no dispute over this matter.
420. In November 1994, there was growing ten-
sion between Greece and Turkey when the Inter-
national Convention on the Law of the Sea came
into force on 16th November 1994. The Turkish
armed forces held an aeromaritime exercise in the
Aegean Sea, while simultaneously the Greek
armed forces held exercises in the southern part of
the Aegean Sea.
421. Tension was lowered, however, when on
17th November the Greek Government made an
official declaration that the date of the coming
into force of the convention had no specific
importance and that its ratification by Greece
would not have immediate consequences,
although Greece did not renounce the right to
extend its territorial waters.
(d) The continenul shelf
422. At present, the continental shelf is a mari-
time zone of 200 miles bordering on the coast
officially attributed to each coastal state where
this state holds sovereign rights concerning explo-
ration, exploitation, conservation and manage-
ment ofnatural resources. In recent years, this has
become an institution of common international
law which is also being called an exclusive eco-
nomic zone.
423. Since 1961, Greece has awarded explora-
tion permits in the Aegean Sea west of the Greek
islands. ln 1973 and 1974, however, the Turkish
Government awarded exploration permits to the
national Turkish oil company which allowed it to
search for natural resources in areas which Greece
considers to belong to its own jurisdiction.
424. The ensuing dispute over the continental
shelf in the Aegean Sea has not yet been settled.
Greece unilaterally laid the matter before the
International Court of Justice on lOth August
1976,but because of lack of competence due to
the fact that Turkey has refused to attend, the
Court cannot rule on this matter. Greece considers
263
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this as a legal dispute over the limits of the conti-
nental shelf which does not concern the vital stra-
tegic or political interests of both countries. Tur-
key, on the other hand, considers it to be a highly
political dispute which concerns the vital interests
of both countries and the whole of their territorial
and political relations.
(e) Air space and relaled matterc
(i) Air space
425. In the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, it is stipulated that the sovereignty of coastal
states also relates to the air space above its territo-
rial waters. Unlike the rules for ships, however,
there is no inoffensive right of passage for air-
craft.
426. According to the Greek law of 1931 on
civil aviation, the state exerts its full sovereignty
over the air space above its territory, which also
includes its territorial waters. In application of
this law, Greece adopted in 1931 a decree extend-
ing its territorial waters to ten miles for questions
regarding aviation and police.
427. This extension has been contested by Tur-
key since 1974 with the argument that itis not
compatible with the Chicago convention of 7th
December 1994. According to Turkey, both the
territorial waters and air space of Greece cannot
extend beyond six miles from the coastline. Tur-
kish military aircraft quite frequently penetrate
Greek air space without notice.
(ii) Flight information region
428. Since 1952, the air space over the Aegean
Sea is part of the flight information region of
Athens according to an agreement, adopted by the
ICAO Council,.which divided the FIRs of Athens
and Istanbul, mainly on the basis of the maritime
borders of Greece and Turkey. This arrangement
worked well until 1974 when Turkey unilaterally
extended the Istanbul FIR to the West and into the
Athens EIR, following the limits of the continen-
tal shelf as claimed earlier. Later, in 1980, Turkey
lifted the restrictions that it had imposed in 1974.
A dispute still remains over the question of whe-
ther official aircraft, and also as a consequence
military aircraft, have to submit their flight plan.
Turkey claims that only civilian aircraft are obli-
ged to do so.
***
429. A solution to the abovementioned disputes
is not yet in sight. Turkey wants across-the-board
negotiations on all the issues. Greece, on the other
hand, says that the only issue that needs to be dis-
cussed is sea-bed mineral rights, which it wants
settled by international arbitration.
II. The Turkish minority in Western Thrace
430. The situation of the Turkish minority in
Western Thrace is another area of friction
between Greece and Turkey.
431. By the July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, ter-
minating the war between Greece and Turkey,
Turkey undertook to ensure the protection of the
200 OO0-strong onhodox population of Istanbul
and Greece and the 120 000 Muslims in Western
Thrace. The Treaty of Lausanne only recognises
the existence of religious minorities. The origin-
ally 200 OO0-sfiong Greek orthodox population of
Istanbul, Imroz and Tenedos at present only num-
bers some 3 000. According to official figures, of
the 100 000 to 120 000 Muslims living in Western
Thrace, 49.9Vo are of Turkish origin, 33.5Vo
Pomak and 16.57o gypsies. Neither Greece nor
Tirkey were to respect their undertakings. Accord-
ing to the provisions of the treaty, the Muslim
minority in Western Thrace was to enjoy rights
and freedoms in education, management of
foundations and worship. The situation today is
hardly satisfactory. For virtually 70 years, this
minority has been unable to exercise its rights and
freedoms and it has been subject to numerous
pressures.
432. The Turkish population is stagnating despite
a high birth-rate and difficulties caused by the
local administration are encouraging fairly large-
scale emigration to Turkey or Germany. In the
past, several members of this minority have been
deprived of their nationality in the context of
Article 19 of the Nationality Code.
433. Moreover, the Turks of Western Thrace, the
majority of them farmers, are encountering severe
difficulties in obtaining licences to drive agri-
cultural vehicles and permits to build and to buy
or sell land. Nor are m-embers of this minority abl-e
to refer to their Turkish origins since, in accordance
with the Lausanne Treary only their Muslim reli-
gion is recognised.
434. As to freedom of worship, in recent years
Greece seems to have adopted an attitude hinder-
ing the practice of this freedom. In point of fact
Greece recently opposed the visit which the Head
of Religious Affairs of Turkey wished to make to
Western Thrace on24th and 25th July 1994 while
on a tour of the Balkans. The Greek authorities
suggested that such a visit would be detrimental to
public order in Greece during a period when the
two countries were experiencing difficulties, a
reason considered unacceptable by the Turkish
authorities.
435. Greece's attitude has served to confirm the
feeling of the Thracian Turks that they are being
treated as second class citizens. The Turkish
minority has therefore hardened its position and
withdrawn its confidence in the Greek parties.
I
:i
I
{
I
i
1
I
2@
,t
a
DOCUMENT 1465
436. The parliamentary elections in 1989 had,
for the first time, returned an independent Turkish
member, Mr. Ahmed Sadik, who was then impri-
soned for several months by the Greek authorities.
437. It should be observed that the former Greek
government under Prime Minister Constantin
Mitsotakis had started making efforts which led to
an easing of discrimination against and unfair
treatment of the Turkish minority in Western
Thrace. In addition, the Greek Ministry of Agri-
culture, in liaison with the European Community,
has launched a programme of modernisation in
the region and the government is trying to change
ingrained attitudes among local officials in order
to remove obstacles to active Muslim particip-
ation in the economy. Nevertheless, the siruation
still needs further improvement.
III. Turkey and Greece in NATO
438. The very low tide in relations between
Greece and Turkey is now also having an impact
on NATO's activities. NATO has been forced to
freeze all capital projects under its military budget
and to economise on current expenditure because
Greek-Turkish differences are holding up the
North Atlantic Council's approval of both
NAIO's military budget ($797 million) and its
infrastructure budget ($855 million) for 1995.
439. The implementation of a 1992 decision to
activate the 7th NATO Allied Tactical Air Force
and Land Forces headquarters at Larissa in central
Greece and the establishment of a regional head-
quarters for NAIO's new rapid reaction force in
Salonika are being blocked by Turkey which
argues that the responsibilities of the two Larissa
commands must be defined before they are
established.
4/l0. The Turkish Defence Minister, Mehmet
Golham, has been quoted as saying that Turkey
would approve the Salonika command only if
Greece renounced any aspiration to extend its ter-
ritorial waters from six miles to twelve and if the
first commander in Salonika was a Turk, but the
formal link between the Salonika headquarters
and the problem of tenitorial waters has later been
denied by Turkish officials. Both parties now
seem to be prepared to discuss a comprehensive
package deal. 7' In this framework, NATO's
Secretary-General, Willy Claes, visited both
countries on 17th and l8th May 1995.
4/.1. Greece, on the other hand, complains that
the regional NAf,O headquarters at Izmir do not
exist legally and that a new decision of the Defence
Planning Committee is required to establish a
legal status for these headquarters.
Conclusions
442. The region discussed in the present report
is of exceptional importance for the security and
defence of Europe. Developments after the end of
the cold war have demonsftated that the Balkans,
Transcaucasus, the Middle East and even Cenffal
Asia are theatres of a multitude of wars, crisis
situations and potential conflicts which can threaten
the security and stability of Europe. Experience
has also shown that they cannot or will not be
ended, managed or prevented without the active
participation of Greece and Ttrrkey, full member
and associate member of WEU respectively.
443. Moreover, there is a number of long-stand-
ing disputes between Greece and Turkey which
need to be solved sooner rather than later.
444. The agreement concluded with the Repu-
blic of Cyprus to start negotiations on its acces-
sion to the European Union six months after the
conclusion of the Intergovermental conference of
1996, opens the perspective of Cyprus' member-
ship of WEU.
4/,5. In the following paragraphs, the main
conclusions from the report will be summarised.
(a) Turkey
446. For a long time, Western Europe's relations
with Turkey have been rather ambiguous. It did
not want it to be in the European community, but
did not want it either to be out of Europe. Turkey
has been a member of the Council of Europe from
the beginning, but it has always been criticised for
its human rights record and deficiencies in its
democratic system. If Europe does not yet want
Turkey to become a member of the European
Union, neither does it wish to lose it, because in
an Islamic world where radicalism is in the ascen-
dant, it is the only secular state with a democratic
government which is oriented towards the West
and wishing to be an integrated pan of it.
M7. In March 1995, a very important decision
was taken when the European Union and Turkey
agreed to establish a customs union by 1st January
1996. After a transitional period, the customs
union is thought to provide Turkey with a solid
political, social and economic anchor in Western
Europe that could help it to neutralise further
growth of the Islamic movement, which has pro-
mised to pull Turkey out of NATO, resist closer
links with the European Union and forge closer
ties with other Muslim states if it would come to
power. Expected economic growth and stabilis-
ation of the government's position could also pro-
vide the government with an opportunity to make
progress in human rights issues and help it to
implement the Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller's pro-
mise to bring Turkish law in line with Article 1071. Financial Times, l0th April 1995.
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of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which guarantees freedom of expression.
448. Although Turkey is known to be a staunch
supporter of NATO, it is also aware that the
importance of NATO has diminished since the
collapse of communism and the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact. Moreover, if NAIO would be enlar-
ged through the accession ofthe Central European
countries, it might be too busy solving its internal
problems to manage Turkey's security.
449. Turkey is not fully satisfied with its present
status in WEU, but it understands that after the
Maastricht Treaty, a link has been created
between membership of the European Union and
full membership of WEU. Knowing that Euro-
pean membership can only be a long-term objec-
tive, it has accepted associate membership of
WEU as the best possible position, and it partici-
pates actively in the WEU Council's activities.
450. Aware of the many poles of instability
around Turkey, Western Europe has clearly decid-
ed to confirm its close relationship with Turkey,
knowing that it will always have to rely on it to
keep guard over the gateway to Europe.
451. Turkey's efforts to establish good relations
with the newly-independent republics in the
Transcaucasus and Central Asia is often inter-
preted as an over-ambitious quest for influence in
a vast region which has failed to materialise. Here
it is noted that through its cultural and linguistic
kinship, Turkey can play a positive rdle in the oil-
and gas-rich and strategically important Trans-
caucasia and Central Asia, where it can help to
rein in a resurgence of Russian expansionism
while propagating the establishment of secular
and democratically governed states in an islamic
environment.
452. Apparently, Turkey's most difEcult security
problem is the Kurdish problem although the Tur-
kish Government asserts that it has no Kurdish
problem, but only a problem with the terrorist
PKK.
453. For your Rapporteur, the Kurdish problem
is twofold: on the one hand, there is the govern-
ment's legitimate fight against the PKK, which,
through violence and terrorism, is threatening the
security of Turkish citizens and the stability of
Turkish society; on the other hand, there is the
legitimate quest of the Kurdish minority for rights
of cultural self-expression and some form of auto-
nomy, ideas long forgotten by the Turkish
Government which propounds the Kemalist unita-
rian thesis to the effect that the country has no
Kurdish people, only Turkish citizens.
454. As regards the fight against the PKK, it
may be best to quote the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppe, when he said " TUr-
key is a friendly counfiry which is entitled to fight
terrorism. But it must respect the basic rules of
democracy, particularly as far as justice is concer-
ted." "
455. Closely connected with the PKK's activi-
ties in Turkey is the chaotic situation in Iraq,
where the central government is denied to exert its
authority over the northern and southern parts of
the country. The creation of a Kurdish enclave
north of the 36th parallel, protected by the coali-
tion forces with the support of Turkey, where dif-
ferent Kurdish factions are fighting each other
while blatantly violating human rights, has not
improved security and stability in the region.
456. Coalition states responsible for the enclave
cannot wait much longer to decide on its future.
Continuing the present status makes little sense.
The establishment of a separate Kurdish state in
northern Iraq is an even less attractive solution
because it would put into question the existing
borders in the region and provoke further separa-
tion. The only possible solution, strongly sup-
ported by Turkey, seems to be re-establishment of
the pre-Gulf war sitr,ration in the region through
full implementation of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 688 by Iraq and its re-integra-
tion as a normally functioning state in the region.
It is to be hoped that the countries of the region
will one day return to a democratic system allow-
ing the cultural identity of the Kurdish people and
even its right to autonomy to be recognised,
without jeopardising the territorial integdty of the
states of the region.
457. As for the Kurdish minority, if Turkey
considers itself a western-oriented democratic
state based on values generally accepted in Euro-
pe, it has no choice but to find a peaceful solution,
in particular by granting the Kurds living on its
territory democratic rights of cultural self-expres-
sion, including the undiscriminated use of the
Kurdish language. Separatist ambitions, under-
standably, cannot be met, but some form of local,
or regional, autonomy may be inevitable in the
future for maintaining the stability and territorial
integrity ofthe Turkish state. It is necessary there-
fore to recall Recommendation 1266 of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in
which T[rkey is invited " to seek a peaceful solu-
tion to the Kurdish problem on the basis of the
principles embodied in the Statute and the rele-
vant Conventions of the Council of Europe ".
(b) Greece
458. Greece's security concerns are clearly
focused on the Balkans and Turkey. As regards
the Balkans, it appears to have given up a rather
boisterous policy in exchange for more silent and
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effective diplomacy. Relations with most other
Balkan states are mostly balanced and consider-
able progress has been made in improving rela-
tions with Albania.
459. A remaining source of trouble is Greece's
relations with the FYROM, against which it has
maintained a trade embargo in order to force it to
stop using the name " Macedonia " and using the
star of Vergina as its national emblem. The preli-
minary opinion of the European Court of Juitice,
according to which the trade embargo did not
breach the Treaty of Rome, has certainly comfor-
ted Groece's position. It noted, however, that apart
from the question whether it is in accordance with
the Treaty of Rome, the trade embargo could have
negative effects such as inciting a state to persist
in its position, or a further destabilisation of the
internal situation. The FYROM's exclusion from
the OSCE because of a continuing Greek veto is
worrying many other European states since it
excludes the FYROM from the only security
organisation in Europe to which it is eligible.
(c) Disputes between Greece and Tfurkey
460. Although the Cyprus problem has proven
to be a quagmire for more than thirty years now, it
is thought that the solution to this problem is the
key to a much-needed improvement in relations
between Greece and Turkey. The European
Union, under France's presidency, has created
new conditions which can be considered a leap
forward by simultaneously concluding agree-
ments over accession negotiations with Cyprus
and a customs union with Turkey. The implement-
ation of these agreements should be used by both
Greece and Turkey as an opportunity to tretp fina
a solution for the reunification of the northern and
southern part of the island into a federal state,
based on equality of both the Greek and Turkish
communities. Negotiations over such a solution
will only have a chance to succeed if the leading
politicians involved are prepared to forget, for a
moment, the seemingly eternal hair-splitting and,
instead, let themselves be inspired by a much-
wanted vision of common destiny. The example
of the once hereditary enemies, France and G-er-
many, having become the hardcore of Europe's
unification process could be enlightening.
461. It seems to make little sense to review the
other disputes between Greece and Turkey, trying
to propose ingenious solutions. The continuation
of almost all of them is based on deep distrust.
A solution to the Cyprus problem could be a first
step in reversing this attitude into mutual confi-
dence.
(d) Discussion in the commifree
462. The Rapporteur notes that while the preli-
minary draft recommendation as a whole was
adopted unanimously, one Greek member of par-
liament made a reservation concerning paragraph
3 of the operative text, considering it inappropria-
te to refer to a " veto " by Greece of the FYROM's
accession to the OSCE.
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APPENDIX T'3
Defence expenditures as 7o of gross domestic product
Based on carrent prices
1989 1990 t99t 1992 t993 *
Greece 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.4
Turkey 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.1
Based. on constant prtces
1989 1990 t99r 1992 1993 x
Greece 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.4
Turkey 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9
Defence expenditures per capita in US dollarc
1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 l99l t992 1993 *
Greece r07 191 184 235 208 208 194 202 200
Turkey 22 43 49 47 55 62 63 & @
Defence expenditures annual variatian (7o)
Based on constant prices
1989 1990 t99t 1992 1993 *
Greece
- 
5.4 1.0
- 
5.2 4.4 0.1
Turkey 12.0 15.0 2.8 4.9 2.3
(* estimate)
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The Balluns and the Middle East
DOCUMENT 1465 APPENDTX III
EoE /,/E
ffi.:iu s.!
tr6sTtc6
€6o
t-t)//
f.
a
5oo
=
o
E
.cro
I @-sll
^qs{L
W.HG
{ -n (E}
) ;{'/
l--1 [ '\I . J'-'i
YfrIi
l."l{-
,t"' \
I
I
:
o
tr
I
o
f
"ttt
/
-$9
o
IE
kri
I
)
rE
oIt
o
Eo
-
Ld'
\:
i't:
o
tr
o
u.l
o
6o
o
o
i
-J. J
5 tr, 
-f 1 u,
E cD E \. \r./' ift..8 )rl I
t,ooo
F
,o
'.: o
,,:::(9
:1o
b(,
'c
.:o
i:, EL
.l
;GT
,8..'.'\\i ^ri9-\
?n'
E"a
t
ooN
t
o
.E
o
O.a
E g =EtgE lo-9. I6g ol
o..lNl
:l
:I
I
I
I
oJ
APPENDX I11 '
Tigris and Euphrates basin
74. Source: Adelphi Paper 273, Water and instability in the Middle Fast, by Natasha Beschorner, winter 199?J93.
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Amendment 1
I
i
20th June 1995
The Eastern M edilerranean
AMENDMENT 1'
tablcd by Mr. Schloten
ll
N
1. Leave out paraglaph(xx) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
" Aware that the absence of political solution in the " security zone" in northern Iraq has creatgd_ a .
security vacuum in that region which is encouraging external political movements and neigh-
bouring countries to settle their differences; "
Signed: Schloten
l. See lTth sitting, 2lst June 1995 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 2
20th June 1995
2. Leave out paragraph (xii) of the preamble to the draft recomrnendation and insert:
" Concerned that the continuation of the crisis existing between Greece and FYROM does not
contribute positively to the develgpment of stability in the region, while hoping the two countries
will start immediate negotiations in the frameworkbf the United Nations; " -
Si gned : Kastanidis, P avlidis
The Eastern M editerranean
AMENDMENT 2'
tabledby MM. Kastanidis and Pavlidis
l. See lTth sitting, 2lst June 1995 (amendment negatived).
273
Document 1466 12th June 1995
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 565 to 574
RECOMMENDATION 565 '
on a European securiQlt policy'z
The Assembly,
(i) Stressing that the aim of WEU is to achieve the effective sftengthening of European security and
that institutional concerns must in no case weaken efforts to this end;
(ii) Recalling that the modified Brussels Treaty is one of the essential bases for ensuring this security;
(iii) Regretting, therefore, that the Council has failed to take advantage of 
.the opportunity of.the
ioriieth ainive.iary of the treaty, which also coincided with that of the tenth anniversary of thereactiva-
tion of WEU, to diaw the attention of the public at large to progress achieved by WEU since 1984;
(iv) Convinced that the development of a European defence policy by the Council of WEU is conditio-
nui upon the achievement of a European securitypolicy based on a common perception of risks and dan-
gers ind on a joint concept regarding the means of countering them;
(v) Deploring the lack of information from theCouncil regarding its co-operation and contribution in
this respect in the framework of the CFSP and NATO;
(vi) Recalling Recommendations 556, 558 and 559;
(vii) Rejecting paragraph 3 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 559, in which the latter
refuses td proviOi thJAisembly with information on work undertaken in the framework of the CFSP on
questions relating to the modifled Brussels Treaty;
(viii) Yoicing irs protest that the Council transmitted to the Assembly. ttrg_[91Part of the fortieth annual
i"port on its ictiviiies only on 9th November 1994 and deploring that the WEU Secretary-General no lon-
gel sends the Assembly his information letter;
(ix) Aware that it is crucial to settle the substantive issues relating 1o the development of a European
iecurity and defence policy and that the Council seems to be giving priority to studying these questions;
(x) Convinced nevertheless that the Council should not defer discussion of institutional problems in
ihis connection until 1996, leaving the initiative in the interim to other European institutions;
(xi) Recalling the decision of the European Council to create a_stugy group in preparation for the 1996
intergovernmeital conference which is to start work in June 1995 with the participation of two members
of the European Parliament;
(xii) Reaffirming that the supervision of security and defence policy in Europe is a prerogative of the
national parliaments;
(xiii) Insisting therefore that the WEU Assemtly should narticipate fully in thepreparations for WEU's
itanneA reviei of the present provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the common foreig-n, and
iecurity policy, in accoidance with declaration ID8 of the WEU member countries annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty;
(xiv) Fearing that the refusal of certain countries participating in the CFSP to accede to the modified
Brussels Treity might diminish the effectiveness of co-operation between the CFSP and WEU;
(xv) Fearing also that the refusal of the WEU Council to admit all the Eur_ope_an N4TO member coun-
tries to full membership of WEU may complicate the implementation of WEU's r6le as the European
pillar of NATO;
(rui) Wishing WEU to act as a political driving force vis-i-vis the authorities of the Egropgan Union and
the Atlantic Altance and not consider that its main task is to carry out decisions taken by these two orga-
nisations;
Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1994 during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session (9th sitting).
Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1439).
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(ruii) 
.Recalling nevertheless that since the Council has promised the European Union to provide assis-
tance in policing the town of Mostar, it is of the utmost importance for the latt^er to honour itsiommitments
in full;
(xviii) Deploring that-meetings of the WEU Council are divided into four different categories of partici-
pant_countries 
- 
full members, associate members, associate partners, observers 
- 
wtrictr raiies the
problem of multi-speed-co-^operation within WEU and the attehdant risk of its political action being
paralysed by institutional infighting, as was the case over the issue of Rwanda;
(*i*) Wishing WE-U to g11rnTry subsequent accession by its associate partners by basing itself essentially
on the criteria of the modified Brussels Treaty;
(xx) Stressing ttrat ilis WEU'sprimary responsibility to ensure that, in the framework of harmonising
procedures with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance for linking these countries with Eurol
Atlantic strucnlres, security considerations are a means of speeding up this process and not a pretext for
holding it back;
(xxi) 
- 
Recalling that the Assembly.cannot grant associate member and associate partner delegations rights
which exceed the status the Council has granted them;
(oji).Stressing that the enlargement of WEU towards the East is intended to reinforce the security and
stability of Europe as a whole and not to create new divisions;
(ro'iii) Recalli_1g_tl consequence the importance of strengthening the collective security system in the frame-
work of the CSCE and of establishing a stable partrrership withRussia and the other merirbers of ttre CIS;
(xxiv) Wishing tfe_ prgb]gmg raised by the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European
Union to be settled quickly in order to ensure the continuity of WEU's political action;
(rru) Recall^i1g the ippgry*t r6le of-its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in reinforcing
the impact of the work of the Assembly with parliaments, public opinion and the governments of the meml
ber countries,
RrcouurNos rHAT rnp CouNcn
1. In accordance with its declaration ID8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, create a special working
group tasked with studying institutional questions relating to the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmenl
tal conference;
2. Decide that this working group will begin work in early 1995 and that the Assembly will be asso-
ciated with it;
I - Ptqy-F" r6le. of a political driving force vis-h-vis the authorities of the European Union and theAtlantic Alliance with.a view to developing guidelines for linking the Central and Easiern European coun-
tries with Euro-Atlantic structures;
! Open up real prospects of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty for associate partner countries,irrespective of whether or not they belong to other European organisations;
q In so doing, elsure that any future enlargement of WEU does not weaken the scope of Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. Make arrangements without further delay for $anting Slovenia associate partner status;
T Include in its present studies the French Prime Minister's proposal for drafting a white paper onEuropean security in connection with the Noordwijk preliminary concfusions on the formulation of i com-
mon European defen-ce policy and_ensure that the outcome of its examination of the development of a
European defence p-olicy_povides the mlin source of inspiration for the thinking process to be conducted
in the framework of the CFSP and NAIO;
8. Inform the Assembly of the areas and the content of its co-operation with the CFSP and NATO;
9. Contribute actively to a meaningful stability pact in Europe;
10. Work out a joint position with a view to its contribution to the CSCE ministerial conference in
Budapestand.inform $:4Sqg.Uly qf the action taken to follow up its declared intention of 9th May 1994
of strengthening the CSCE " to avoid the emergence of new divisions " and to work for " a reasbnable
division of labour with the CSCE ";
11. Make its views known in a more convincin-g and visible manner in the United Nations and arrange
for WEU members to act in a more co-ordinated fashion in the Security Council of that organisation; -
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12. Follow closely the problems of security in the Mediterranean and inform the Assembly of the action
it has taken on Recommendation 538 as it undertook to do in its reply to that recommendation;
13. Inform the Assembly of the results of studies undertaken by the Council on unresolved questions
relating to the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European Union;
14. Avoid the effectiveness of WEU's action being jeopardised by the development of work conducted
with different forms of participation within the organisation and at different speeds in specific areas;
15. Study the conditions in which the WEU Council might meet as a European- security and defence
council, either as necessary or on the occasion of meetings of the European Council;
16. Organise a regular exchange of senior civil servants between_"-WEu " departments established in
ministrieJ for foreign affairs and defence and in the private offices of the heads of government of member
states;
17. Comply immediately with its obligations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Tleaty QV ,-yU-
mitting its inhual report to the Assembly so that the latter can reply before the report loses its topicality,
accouit being takenbf tne fact that this is not the first time that the report has arrived very late;
18. Continue to inform the Assembly of all activities under the modified Brussels Treaty, even if exer-
cised in other European or transatlantic bodies.
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REPLY OF TTIE COUNCILI
to Recommendation 565
1. The Permanent Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 16 of the
Noordwijk declaration which states that:
" Ministers streps jh.e importance of developing closer relations with the EU. In the light of the
review of Article J.4^ofthe !r-qa!y on EuropeanU{qr that will take place during the int-ergovern-
mental conference of 1996, Ministers decide that WEU should make a timely c-ontributioi to the
work of the conference on the basis of its own review of the provisions of the declaration on the r6le
of WEU and its relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance of December lggl.-
The substance of WEU's contribution to the work of the 1996 intergovernmental conference has
9een on the agendaof the Permanent Council and the Council Working Groip since November t994.TheCouncil considers the present working iurangement adequate. Should the netd arise, it will consider the
_s_e$_ng up of .a dedicated working group or the transfer tb existing working groups of certain aspects ofWEU's contribution.
2. As stated in paragraph 1, the Council reconfirms that reflections within the WEU ministerial organs
9_n the organisation's contribution to the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference staftA inNovember 1994.
. 
Always welcoming the positive.input of the WEU Assembly to the development of the European
lecurity and defence identity.through its reports, recommendationi, written questions and colloquia, ttreCouncil will continue to consider with greaa attention any substantive proposai from the Assembly in this
context.
The Council fully subscribes to the view expressed by the rapporteur that " this report can be
Lgg_arqgd as an initial conffibution to the preparation of the inteigovernm-ental conference on the review ofTitle V of the Maastricht Treaty scheduled to begin in 1996 " and has taken note of the report with great
interest.
3. The Permanent-Coungil is fully convinced of the stabilising effect that could result from a gradual
linking of the Central and Eastern European counffies with the Euro-Atlantic security structurds. ThePermanent Council recalls to the parliamentary Assembly that the European Agreements with the Euro-
p-ean Union, the associate partxer status of WEU and the partnership fof peace programme of NAIO are
all positive.gteps i.n this direction. The Permanent Councifwill playits political iOtJin this respect accor-
djngly., by discussing co-ordinating-and harmonising measures wittr a vi-ew to developing a complementa-
rity with initiatives towards cenffal and Eastern Europe of the EU and NATO.
4. The Permanent Council recalls to the parliamentary Assembly that members of WEU, in their
Maastricht declaration of 10th December 199.L, proposed that states which are members of the European
Union be invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the niodi-
fied Frussell Ttery. The de_v_elopment of WEU's relations with associate partners closely follows their
relations with the European Union.
5. The Permanent Council can reassure the parliamentary Assembly that any future enlargement of
WEU will not be of a nature to weaken the relevance and scope of Article V oi the modified'Brussels
Treaty.
6. The Permanent 9ouncil is currently reviewing its relations with a broad range of countries. Thequestion of grant4g Slovenia the associate partner itatus will be kept under reviei as Slovenia's rela-
tionship with the European Union develops. In the meantime, contacts with Slovenia take place according
to arrangements on an ad hoc basis via the presidency of the WEU Council and the Secretariat.
7 . The Permanent Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 6 of the Noord-
wijk declaration which states that:
" Ministers considered that WEU member countries, associate members, associate partners and
observers should now reflect in common on the new European security conditions, with due regard
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th February 1995.
277
DOCUMENT 1466
for the work already undertaken, in order to arrive at a common analysis_of the problems, including
those related to the-security and stability in the Mediterranean basin, with which they_are fqged 1n!
to reach agreement as to the appropriat-e responses. Ministers asked the Permanent Council to ini-
tiate refledtion in this area, including the proposal put fonuard by France to draft a white paper on
European security. "
The Permanent Council can reassure the parliamentary Assembly, that common positions elaborated
within the WEU, in its quality as defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen
the European pillar of the Ailantic Alliance, will p_rovide a valuable input to the thinking process to be
conducted in the framework of the CFSP and NATO.
8. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's legitimate request for information on the areas and
the content of its co-operation with the EU and NATO. The Council will feat it as a matter- of priorityto
keep the WEU parlianientary Assembly as fully inforrned as possible by.means of the annual-repgrt or.qe
activities of th6 Perrnanent-Council. Furthermore, meetings between the presidency and the Assembly
Presidential Committee before and in the wake of the Minisierial Council will continue in accordance with
existing practice.
g. The Permanent Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that WEU and its member countries
actively participate in the setting up of the stability pact in Eqtop". It is indeed- a priority of the Permanent
Council io ensire WEU's contribution to the enhancement of security and stability throughout Europe.
10. Welcoming the Assembly's ongoing interest for the strengtheni-ng o^f lhe 
-OSCE, the PermanentCouncil draws tf,e parliamentary essemUty's attention to paragaph 30 of the Noordwijk declaration
which states that:
" Ministers stress the importance they attach to the place of the CSCE in the European s_ecgnJy
architecture and its growing r6le, notably in the field of early-warning, conlict-p-revention and crisis-
management. They-undertlke m make the ongoing review conference and the forthcoming summit
in Budapest a suciess in terms of critically evalg4iqg the.implementation of existing standards-and
procedures with a view to better preparing the CSCE fol i$ future tasks.They sup_port propo_s_al.s to
inhance the CSCE's r6le as a rbgional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United
Nations Charter by giving it greater responsibility for goqligt-preverrtion and resolution and crisis-
management, in cirripliance wittr Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, in the CSCE area. "
The Permanent Council is of the opinion that WEU's support for the pact for stability in Errope,
which is to be entrusted to the OSCE, is of a nature " to avoid the emergence of new divisions " and work-
ing towards " a reasonable division of labour with the OSCE ".
11. The Permanent Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly of the provisions on a common foreign
and security policy of the Treaty on European Union, which state that:
Article J.l
(...)
4. The member states shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreserved-
ly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They qlrall refrain from an-y a9tio1 which is conffary to
the inteiests of tlie Linion or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international
relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.
(...)
Anicle J.5
4. (...) Member states which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert
and keep the other member states fully informed. Member states which-ar-e pennanent members of
the Secririty Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions-and
the interesls of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the
United Nations Charter. "
12. The Permanent Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 12 of the preli-
minary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy which states that:
" It [the CFSP working group on security] has made an analysis of European security interests in the
new strategic context and of the risks for European security, which provides a good basis for the
development of a common foreign and security policy. Furthermore, the working group has studied
the implications for European security of the situation in various neighbouring regions (Celtral,aqd
Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Maghreb and the Middle East). These studies should be
complemented with a WEU military analysis, so as to take account of their defence implications for
the further elaboration of a common European defence policy. "
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The WEU Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the European Union's relevant bodies
have elaborated a document entitled: " Implications of the Mediterranean Situation for European Security ".
The Permanent Council endorsed paragraphs 15, 16, 36 and 38 of the analysis of the CFSP Security Wdrk-
ing Group, on which comments by the WEU had been requested, and welcomed further reflectioir on the
r6le defence instruments can play vis-d-vis the economic and diplomatic ones.
13. The Permanent Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the relationships between Euro-
pean U_nion and WEU will be re-examined in 1996. In the meantime,links between bottr-organisations are
being further strengthene!, To this effect, the Permanent Council has been invited to complete its exami-
nation of the question of harmonisation of presidencies in accordance with the ministeiial mandate of
November 1993.
14. The Permanent Council is of the opinion that the development of work conducted with different
forms of participation within the organisation is not of a nature to jeopardise the effectiveness of WEU.
Indeed, this variable geometry in working arrangements takes account of WEU's double finality as defence
component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance.
15. The Permanent Council recalls to the parliamentary Assembly that it will be its responsibility to
evaluate in due time the desirability of holding a WEU meeting at summit level.
16. The Permanent Council takes due note of the parliamentary Assembly's recommendation to " orga-
nise a regular exchange of senior civil servants between ' WEU ' departments established in minisries for
foreign affairs and defence and in the private offices of the heads of government of member states ". The
Permanent Council believes that the eichange of officials of relevant ministries between WEU states is an
idea worth pursuing as a contribution to the definition of a European security and defence identity.
17. The Permanent Council is aware of the necessity of timely submitting its annual report to the
parliamentary Assembly and will do its utmost to achieve that goal in the future.
18. The Permanent Council recalls to the parliamentary Assembly the terms of the reply it gave to
Written Question 326 which remain valid.
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RECOMMENDATION 566'
on a European defence policy'z
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the Council's initiative in starting to formulate a common European defence policy as
announced in the declaration on Western European Union attached to the Maastricht Treaty;(ii) Having taken note of both the Noordwijk declaration and the preliminary conclusions on the for-
mulation of a common European defence policy of 14th November 1994;(iii) Noting that WEU's inability to react quickly to crisis situations as in Bosnia or Rwanda is due not
only to a lack of political will, but also to the fact that joint European interests have not yet been identified
clearly enough and that mechanisms for making and implementing decisions rapidly have not yet been
developed;(iv) Stressing that the operational r61e of WEU urgently needs to be strengthened in order to match the
ambitions set out in the Maastricht Treaty and repeatedly expressed by the Council, while recognising that
the lack of progress in developing WEU's operational r61e is due partly to the lack of political guidance
from a common European defence policy on which it should be based;(v) Stressing that the transformation of NAIO, and especially the implementation of decisions taken at
NAIO's 1994 Brussels summit meeting, is of vital importance for the reinforcement of WEU;(vi) Recognising that WEU's reinforcement must be founded partly in NATO and not replace a failing
NATO;
(vii) Surprised that the reinforcement of the European pillar of NAIO is accompanied by a reduction in
WEU member states' share of defence expenditures in the Atlantic Alliance;
(viii) Recalling that the possibility of making NAIO's collective assets available to WEU cannot relieve
European states of their obligation to make a specific effort in those key defence areas where the alliance
has no collective assets while being dependent on the national assets of the United States, specifically in
the area of satellite intelligence and logistic capacity;
(ix) Recalling that the massive airlift capacity now available in the United States armed forces inven-
tory may considerably diminish in size by the turn of this century, making it necessary for European armed
forces to assume their own responsibility in this field;
(x) Noting that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and
peace-keeping tasks and, however, that defence budgets of countries should consequently provide for a
sufficient level of armed forces to carry out these tasks;
(xi) Insisting that co-operation between European national armed forces must be intensified, also
through the formation of multinational forces, in order to make the most effective use of diminishing
defence budgets and smaller armed forces;
(xii) Noting that the status of associate partner has provided significant opportunities for the countries
concerned to help shape a future European defence policy and to co-operate closely with WEU in possible
future WEU operations of all kinds;
(xiii) Welcoming the first meetings of WEU's Mediterranean Group with government experts from Alge-
ria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, but at the same time stressing that WEU should pay closer
attention to the situation in the southern Mediterranean extending beyond the present diplomatic dialogue;
(xiv) Recognising that the situation in the former republics of the Soviet Union, in particular Russia,
should be continuously followed by WEU, inter alia through regular contacts at both political and mili-
tary level with the objective of fostering mutual confidence and understanding;
(n) Considering that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia would be an incentive for the parties
concerned to escalate the conflict, further endanger the civilian population and cause unacceptable risks
for the United Nations forces on the ground;
Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1994 during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session (9th sitting).
Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document lzl45).
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(rui) Regretting the decision of the United States Government, taken unilaterally and without appropriate
prior consultation with the other states participating in the combined WEUA.{AIO operation Sharp Guard
in the Adriatic, to stop policing the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia;
(ruii) Stressing that the October 1994 crisis in Iraq and the decision of the United States to stop policing
the arms embargo against Bosnia in the framework of operation Sharp Guard have provided compelling
evidence that Europe needs to have its own independent intelligence policy, including a fully-fledged
satellite system,
Rncourumxos rHAT rHe CouNcrr-
1. Stengthen the r6le of the Secretary-General, while at the same time deflning clearly WEU's res-
ponsibilities compared with those of the European Union and NAIO;
2. Reinforce the operational r6le of the Planning Cell, duly enlarging its staff and providing it with the
appropriate equipment and technical resources for data processing and iommunications;
3. Give liaison officers from associate partners a more active r6le in the Planning Cell, in particular by
drafting a list of forces of associate partners available to WEU and by including units from these countries
in force packages for contingency plans;
4. Actively support the creation of a multinational African peace-keeping force which should be able
to act rapidly under a United Nations mandate, by encouraging WEU member states to preposition equip-
ment on the African continent and to take responsibility to ftain African units for such tasks;
5. Help in creating a readily available multinational European humanitarian intervention force to be
included among the forces answerable to WEU;
6. Give further thought as soon as possible to a common security and defence policy, so that a white
paper may be drafted forthwith on European security as proposed by the French Prime Minister specifying
the r6le, tasks, joint command structures and politicaUmilitary interface procedures of WEU for approval
at a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member states in 1996 at the latest;
7. Accelerate the creation of a European armaments agency to manage multinational co-operative pro-
grarnmes, drawing on experience gained from the Franco-German arrnaments agency now being establi-
shed;
8. Continue to pursue actively the establishment of a European satellite system which will be a vital
part of Europe's defence identity;
9. Notwithstanding the United States' unilateral decision to end enforcement of the United Nations
arms embargo against Bosnia, maintain its determination to continue to implement fully the enforcement
of all existing embargoes against the different parts of former Yugoslavia, including the arms embargo
against Bosnia.
28t
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REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 566
1. The Council takes due note of the parliamentary Assembly's recommendation. Being fully satisfied
by the r6le of the Secretary-General, the Council does not see a reason to alter the present arrangement.
The Council considers that the responsibilities of the WEU, the European Union and NATO are clearly
defined in the modified Brussels Treaty, the WEU Maastricht declaration, the Treaty on European Union
and the Washington Treaty. A clear definition of WEU's responsibilities compared to those of the Euro-
pean Union and NATO can be found in communiquds and declarations by these organisations, bearing in
mind the provisions for transparency and complementarity which govern the relationships between them.
The Council considers Title IV and V of the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common
European defence policy to be a clear illustration.
2. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to the terms of the reply it gave to
Recommendation 561 on the WEU Planning Cell which remain entirely valid.
3. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that in order to facilitate their participation in
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crises-management, includ-
ing peace-making, associate partners have been invited to provide details of forces which they consider
suitable for such operations. These units, when designated, will be taken into consideration alongside the
FAWEU list. Furthermore, if the associate partners participate in any of the abovementioned operations,
they will, together with the other participating states in that operation, define the practical modalities for
the conduct of such operation.
4. The Council takes due note of the parliamentary Assembly's recommendation. This issue shall be
included in due time on the Council's agenda, taking into account other reflections on that subject, namely in
the European Union and in the Organisation of African Unity.
5. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 35 of the Noordwijk decla-
ration which states that:
" (...) Recent events have underlined the importance for WEU to be able to play a more significant
r6le in facing humanitarian emergencies caused by international crises or natural catastrophes.
Taking account of the leading r6le of the European Union as a major body for co-ordination of
European humanitarian assistance, Ministers stress that it is one of the r6les of WEU to provide for
a European instrument of reaction in cases where, due to the urgency of a humanitarian crisis or the
need for military protection, military means must be employed. Consequently, WEU has to be able
to count on immediately available capabilities and arrangements which allow a rapid response to
such emergencies. Ministers endorse the report regarding the setting-up of the arrangements and the
provision of the means for a Humanitarian Thsk Force and mandate the Permanent Council speedily
to implement this initiative. "
6. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 6 of the Noordwijk decla-
ration which states that:
" Ministers considered that WEU member countries, associate members, associate partners and
observers should now reflect in common on the new European security conditions, with due regard
for the work already undertaken, in order to arrive at a common analysis of the problems, including
those related to the security and stability in the Mediterranean basin, with which they are faced and
to reach agreement as to the appropriate responses. Ministers asked the Permanent Council to ini-
tiate reflection in this area, including the proposal put forward by France to draft a white paper on
European security. "
7. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to Title VtrI of the Noordwijk declar-
ation which states that:
" (...) Ministers also took note of further work on a European Armaments Agency and approved the
principles for the operation of such an organisation. Ministers agreed that National Armaments
Directors would continue their considerations on this subject, recognising that conditions do not
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currently exist for the creation of an agency conducting the full range of procurement activities on
behalf of member nations. They agreed to consider favourably the Franco-German initiative to
create a new armaments co-operation sfiucture as a subsidiary body under the modified Brussels
Treaty, when infroduced to the WEU Council. " '
8. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 26 of the preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy which states that:
" (...) In the Kirchberg declaration, Ministers reaffirmed their will to set up an independent Euro-
pean satellite system and said that a decision would be taken subject to evaluation of the costs and
meritsof the proposg{ system and of.other WEU alternativgl g$atror$lility. The Space Group is
preparing a proposal for such a decision with a view to a 1995 Ministerial meeting.
9. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 24 of the Noordwijk
declaration which states that:
" (...) Ministers emphasise that the United States measures will not affect the determination of WEU
to continue ensuring compliance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.
Ministers reiterated their intention to continue to implement fully the enforcement of all embatgoes. "
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RECOMMENDATION 567'
on the future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Tonejfln 2
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the fact that the WEU satellite centre has achieved its logistical targets;
(ii). 
-Congratulating thg Spanish authorities responsible for building the centre for having provided it
with the means of operating effectively;
(iii) Recalling that this centre is unique as a result ofinternational co-operation and has been designed
to contribute to peace-keeping and international security;
(iu) 
.Congratulating the Director and the staff of the cenfie on the very substantial sterling work theyhave done there;
(v) 
. 
Judging very favourably the number and nature of the treaty verification and crisis-monitoring tasks
assigned to the centre;
(vi) Regretting, however, that environmental monitoring tasks assigned to the centre are few and far
between;
(vii) Noting that so far certain member states have not tasked the centre at all and wondering about the
reasons for their not doing so;
(viii) Believing that the period for assessing the work of the cenfre is not long enough for the assessment
to be entirely fair and valid;
(.u) 
. 
Considerin-g that there is a risk of the satellite centre's present temporary status being prolonged and
that it might not therefore be able to carry out its work in the optimum Condiiions for achieving its aims;(x) Considering moreover that the Cenffe, although in its infancy, is an important example of measures
to be taken for the progressive creation of a European defence identity;(xi) Taking account moreover of the fact that the centre will be able to have the benefit of Helios satel-
lite images only after summer 1995 at best;
(xii) Reaffirming that the TgrrejQn Satellite Centre must be the cornerstone of a complete European
space-based system covering intelligence, early warning and defence;
(xiii) Believing in any event that the future of the centre should not be indissolubly linked to that of a
European space-based observation system;
(xiv) 
.Insisting on the urge-nt need for the eentre to be as widely supported as possible by public opinionif it wishes to attain its goals of providing Europe with a useful security instrument in thd ri,idest p6ssible
meaning of the term,
Recopnrplos rHAr rrm CotrNcu.
1. Take a decision as soon as possible that will guarantee the continuity of the satellite centre by
making it permanent, so as to avoid a temporary situation being maintained to the detriment of its work;
2. Establish a method for continuously assessing the work done by the centre so as to optimise its
capabilities at all times;
3. 
.. 
Keepthe_Assembly informed of the practical details for implementing the memorandum of unders-
tanding on the Helios satellite signed by WEU and the governments of Frai'ce,Italy and Spain;
4.. 
. - 
Fncourage the member states to avail themselves of the services of the centre, especially those
which have not yet done so;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1994 during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session (9th sitting).
2.. Explanatory Memollndum: see the report tabled by Mr. L6pez Henares on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee (Docum ent 1437 ).
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5. Urge member countries to make use of the services of the cenffe more regularly, in particular by
giving it environmental monitoring tasks (disaster relief, control of water supplies, population movement,
hazardous activities, control of nature of terrain, control of illicit movements);
6. Establish relations with the European Space Agency in order to determine possibilities for co-
operation between the two organisations in space-based observation;
7. Study the possibilities of technical and commercial space co-operation with the CIS countries in
order to allow the technical and human resources of those countries to be used for preventive and peace-
ful purpooes;
8. Inform public opinion in Europe of the tasks and work undertaken by the Torrej6n Satellite Centre
in order to promote a better understanding of such tasks among the citizens of the European countries and
to obtain their support for the aims of the centre.
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REPLY OF TIIE COTJNCIL'
ta Recommendation 567
1. Welcoming the Assembly's ongoing interest for the development of the WEU Satellite Centre, the
Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph26 of the preliminary conclusions on
the formulation of a common European defence policy which states to this effect that:
" The Space Group has also assessed the requirements to ensure the continuity of the operation of
the Satellite Centre until the completion of the evaluation of its capabilities. Based on this assess-
ment, the Centre will be able to continue its activities until the end of 1995 without additional fund-
ing. At the Spring 1995 Ministerial meeting, an evaluation of the Centre's work should be comple-
ted, so as to permit a decision to be taken on the establishment of the Satellite Centre as a penna-
nent body of WEU. "
2. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that since the Satellite Centre is continuously
supplying dossiers in response to tasking, member states and ministerial organs are able to provide a conti-
nuous assessment of the work done by the Satellite Centre so as to optimise its capabilities at all times.
3. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that discussions on implementing the memoran-
dum of understanding on the Helios satellite are actively taking place.
4. The Council is confident that all member states will avail themselves of the services of the Cenre
so as to permit a decision to be taken on the establishment of the Satellite Centre as a permanent body of
WEU.
5. The actual preponderance given to crisis-management and treaty verification over environmental
monitoring is in direct relation to the avowed will of member States to exemplify the Satellite Centre's
contribution to the strengthening of the operational r6le of WEU.
The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that member states make use regularly of the ser-
vices of the Centre. As for environmental monitoring tasks, the Satellite Centre is currently undenaking a
number of environmental tasks.
6. The Council recalls to the parliamentary Assembly that in reply to Recommendation 555 it has
already stated that:
" The WEU Satellite Centre has established a working arangement with ESA and now purchases
images from the successful ERS-I satellite on a commercial basis. "
This working irrrangement remains valid.
7. The Council informs the Assembly that the Space Group is still investigating the possibilities and
modalities for the possible supply of imagery from Russia to the WEU Satellite Centre. No decision on
technical and commercial space co-operation with the CIS countries has been reached yet.
The Council considers that the purchase on a cornmercial basis of CIS satellite imagery by the
Satellite Centre would enhance the envisaged relationship between WEU, Russia and Ukraine
8. The Council can reassure the parliamentary Assembly that speeches and articles by officials of the
WEU Secretariat-General always include, when appropriate, references to the WEU Satellite Centre. The
Director of the Satellite Centre, by means of briefings to visitor groups and participation in colloquia and
seminars, also promotes a better understanding of the tasks and works of the Centre among the citizens of
the European countries with a view to obtaining their support for the aims of the Centre.
Furthermore, the Council is of the opinion that the parliamentary Assembly and its Technological
and Aerospace Committee perform a remarkable job in informing European public opinion on the objec-
tives, functioning and possible futures of European Space co-operation geneially and the WEU Satellite
Qentrg specifically, as was exemplified by the discussion of the repons submitted to the second part of thefortieth ordinary session of the WEU parliamentary Assembly.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 2lst February 1995.
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RECOMMENDATION 568 
'
on the evolutian of the logistbal requirements of the Assembly ta take account of enlnrgement2
The Assembly,
Considering:(i) That present and foreseeable Assembly requirements now necessitate measures to make it possible
to accommodate in the chamber of the Economic and Social Council the parliamentarians of the member
countries, associate member countries, associate partner counries, observer countries and of other coun-
tries invited by the Council to attend Assembly debates, also members of the WEU Council and Secreta-
riat-General and the secretaries of the national delegations and political groups;(ii) That for Greek to be adopted as an official language simultaneous interpretation facilities must be
supplemented by further interpretation facilities once the ratification process has been completed;(iii) That, even after the interpretation facilities for sessions have been transferred to the meeting rooms
in the Wilson wing, the limited number of seats in the official gallery makes it necessary to continue to use
and improve the television area installed in the lobby of the French Economic and Social Council in order
to achieve better television coverage of all Assembly speeches, votes and procedures;(iv) That the meeting rooms cannot accommodate more than 40 participants, they will be too small once
representatives of all participating countries are present and that it would be necessary to resort to the hire
of meeting rooms elsewhere in Paris;(v) That offices need to be allocated to all new parliamentary delegations and that this will be possible
only if the remaining offices on the second floor and all the offices on the third floor can be made available
to the Assembly in the immediate future for use during sessions and committee meetings;(vi) That in the foreseeable future the Assembly will no longer be able to operate properly in its present
location and it will soon become essential to provide the Assembly with new premises;
(vii) Welcoming the progress made on reaching agreement on provisional solutions aimed at alleviating
pressing immediate needs arising from enlargement,
R.ecorwvmxos rHAr rnB CouNcr
1. Take note of this report including in particular Appendix V;
2. Press ahead with the implementation of the measures referred to in Appendix V in particular :
(a) Take the required action to release the remaining office on the second floor in time to accom-
modate the new Greek Delegation;
(b) Authorise the Institute for Security Studies, in close consultation and agreement with the
Assembly, to proceed expeditiously with the proposed refurbishing of Room A, thus enabling
the Assembly to use this room for meetings larger than those that can be accommodated in
Rooms B and C;
(c) Approve the funds required by the Assembly to proceed with the work necessary to accommo-
date parliamentary delegations in the facilities relinquished finally or temporarily and with the
otheiproposals contained in Appendix V and concerning in particular the " electronic office "
intended ipecifically to make more efficient and flexible use of insufficient seating capacity of
the ESC Chamber;
3. Support the Assembly and its President in their efforts to promote a comprehensive plan to meet the
future requirements of the Assembly, in particular :
(a) Reach agreement with the French Government for the transfer of the Institute for Security Stu
dies to alternative premises nearby, thereby releasing the offices on the third floor for the use of
parliamentary delegations, in all categories ;
l. AdoptedbytheAssemblyon30thNovember1994duringthesecondpartofthefortiethordinarysession(l0thsitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Commiftee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration (Document 1438).
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(b) Altenatively, reach agreement now with the French Government for the Assembly to be ins-
talled in new premises suitable for foreseeable future needs;
4. In any case, be prepared to surt consultations with the President of the Assembly and the French
Government on a relocation plan for execution immediately following the 1996 review of all European
institutions, in anticipation of new members in various categories joining in that and subsequent years.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommcndation 56E
1. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that it is well aware of the contents of the report
submitted by the Right Honourable Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur of its Committee on Budge-
tary Affairs and Administration.
Some of the measures referred to in Appendix V have already been implemented.
The office of the Deputy Secretary-General on the second floor of the WEU building in Paris was
converted for use by a parliamentary delegation during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session.
Moreover, several other spaces have been made available to the Assembly, such as the telephone
exchange, the meeting room and the library of the Institute for Security Studies, which were used by dele-
gations of parliamentary observers.
Finally, Room A is now being refurbished.
In the framework of the overall examination of the 1995 WEU budget, additional funds to accom-
modate parliamentary delegations have already been considered. Furtherrnore, the possibility of acquiring
an electronic equipment will be reconsidered and consequently a 1995 WEU Assembly's supplementary
budget will be submitted separately to the Council in due time.
The question of the new premises for the Assembly, suitable for its foreseeable future needs, is not
on the Council's agenda. This issue needs to be raised primarily by the Assembly itself and the host
country bearing in mind the participation of the Economic Council.
1. Communicated to the Assembly on l3th March 1995.
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RECOMMENDATION 569'
on the situatian in Bihac and the need to strengthen WEA 
'z
The Assembly,
(i) Anxious for all the security zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina defined by the Security Council to be
scrupulously respected;
(ii) Noting nevertheless that the fact that Bosnian Serb forces have penetrated the safe area around
Bihac shows the difficulties encountered by UNPROFOR in implementing Security Council resolutions
authorising it inter alia:
- 
to deter attacks against the safe areas,
- 
and to take the necessary retaliatory measures, including recourse to force, against bombing of
the safe areas by either side, armed incursions or any obstacle to free movement by UNPROFOR;
(iii) Fearing an escalation of the conflict and intensification of the fighting that might endanger the
LJNPROFOR troops now deployed and which are insufficiently armed.
(iv) Disturbed that profound differences have emerged between the United States and its European
allies regarding the measures to be taken to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions and to
restore peace in the regions concerned;
(v) Convinced that the lifting of the embargo on Bosnia is not an appropriate means of facilitating the
resolution of the conflict in the region in question;
(vi) Regretting nevertheless that neither the United States nor the countries of Europe have been prepa-
red to send in a buffer force that is large enough and equipped to be able to put an end to hostilities;
(vii) Noting also that the contact group's efforts to achieve a cease-fire that is complied with and a poli-
tical solution to the conflict have so far failed;
(viii) Determined to do everything possible to prevent a further massacre occurring on former Yugoslav
territory;
(ix) Still convinced that, to avoid escalation, efforts to find a political solution to the conflict acceptable
to all parties concerned must not be relaxed;
(x) Recalling nevertheless that, for such a solution not to remain a dead letter, the parties concerned
must be convinced that its implementation will be guaranteed by effective measures of enforcement,
URcnx'rlv RECoMMENDS THAI rrm CouNcu.
1. Immediately hold an urgent joint meeting with the North Atlantic Council with a view to:
(a) appealing to all governments and all competent international organisations to make a new
effon to find a political solution to the conflict, in view of the negotiations in progress on the
basis of the proposals of the contact group, and demonstrate the responsible attitude of the
international community by opposing with great determination and firmness those responsible
for prolonging an unjustifiable and nonsensical war;
(b) considering the timeliness of using all appropriate means to prevent further massacres and to
end the fighting in Bihac;
(c) ensuring that the unilateral decision of the United States Government no longer to participate
in monitoring the embargo on Bosnia cannot affect NATO's commitment nor its operational
capabilities in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. Accelerate the process of strengthening Western European Union by providing it with satellite intel-
ligence means and strategic transport and units of combined forces.
Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1994 during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session (lOth sitting).
Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1450).
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REPLY OF TITE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 569
1. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly ttrat a WEU NATO joint Council was held on
Tuesday 6th December at the WEU Headquarters. This meeting was an occasion on which an exchange of
views on the situation in former Yugoslavia and relevant operations took place.
The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 23 of the Noordwijk decla-
ration, in which:
" Ministers express their full support for the continued efforts by the EU, the United States and the
Russian Federation, including through the contact group, to search for a political solution to the
conflict. In this respect, they express their concern at the continued refusal by the Bosnian Serbs to
accept the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a result of which hostilities continue. The
deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly the attacks on the United
Nations-protected safe areas of Sarajevo and Bihac, as well as on Mostar, should be effectively
addressed. Ministers agree on the need for the United Nations Security Council to consider the
appropriate measures. "
The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 24 of the Noordwijk decla-
ration which states that:
" (...) Ministers take note with regret of the United States measures to modify its participation with
respect to the enforcement of the arms embargo in the combined WEU/NATO operation Sharp
Guard in the Adriatic. In this context, they particularly stress the importance that the United States
in NATO structures will continue to observe fully the mandatory provisions of all relevant United
Nations Security resolutions. "
2. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 26 of the preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy which states that:
" (...) In the Kirchberg declaration, Ministers reaffirmed their will to set up an independent Euro-
pean satellite system and said that a decision would be taken subject to evaluation of the costs and
meritsof the proposed system and ofother WEU alternatives 31d-.a{ord.a!ility. The S.pace Group ispreparing a proposal for such a decision with a view to a 1995 Ministerial meeting. "
1. Communicated to the Assembly on l3th March 1995.
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RECOMMENDATION 570'
on the development of a European space-based observation system 
- 
Part III'?
The Assembly,
(i) Stressing the importance of conffol over space beyond the earth's atmosphere in the global man-
agement of crises;
(ii) Noting that Europe still does not have operational means of observation and detection by satellite
with the military capabilities necessary for strengthening its defence;(iii) Stressing the need for the WEU countries to equip themselves with independent space-based means
of observation and detection in order to be able to take appropriate measures in the event of crises affec-
ting Europe's interests;
(iv) Concerned over the future implications for European security of the proliferation of ballistics tech-
nology in the Mediterranean region;
(v) Recalling Recommendations 410,482,523,533 and 555 in which the Assembly requests that the
Council:
set clear European space policy objectives and priorities;
reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite system;
design the planned system in such a way as to contribute to the security of WEU member coun-
tries and to be useful to other organisations with a European, Atlantic or international vocation;
assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from the proliferation of ballistic and
nuclear technology;
take appropriate decisions to avoid the slowing-down or paralysis of activities entrusted to the
study management team and the industrial consortium commissioned to design WEU's main
observation system;
(vi) Stressing the importance of equipping Europe with early-warning and navigational satellite systems
necessary for the efficient operation of a European anti-missile defence system;
(vii) Aware of the high cost of space-based systems and the need for close co-operation between states,
industry and scientific circles for these projects to succeed;
(viii) Noting with regret the absence of consensus in the Council over the necessary development of the
work of the Satellite Centre and starting the programme for the main observation system;(ix) Deploring that the Council provides so little and such inadequate information on WEU's space policy,
RSCOI\,tr\,IPNOS THAI TIIE COUNCtr-
l. Commence examination of a European space defence policy, taking all aspects of the problem into
account;
2. Tirke the decisions necessary for the development of the Satellite Centre and for starting work on the
main observation system, on the basis of a strategic analysis of what is at stake in the medium and long term;
3. Instruct its Space Group to begin a study of a European space-based defence system, paying particular
attention to the need for communications, early-warning and navigational satellites and their protection;
4. Develop its contacts with the space industries of the member countries and with ESA in order to
obtain information on current programmes and technologies that might be useful for implementing a
European space-based defence system;
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1994 during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session (l tth sitting).
2- Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee(Document 1436).
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
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5. Foster co-operation in early-warning and navigational satellites with the United States and Russia
on a basis of reciprocity and without jeopardising the independence of European systems;
6. Examine the expediency of creating a European space defence agency in WEU with responsibility
in this area;
7. Keep the Assembly better informed of its decisions on WEU's space policy.
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REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 570
1. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the development of a European space defence '1
pQlicy is an integral part of the development of a common European defence policy. Paragraphs 25 and26 ,l
of the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy are a clear illus- i
ffation of this goal.
2. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 26 of the preliminary il
conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy which states that: 'r
1
I
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" (...) In the Kirchberg declaration, Ministers reaffirmed their will to set up an independent Euro- ,i
pean satellite system and said that a decision would be taken subject to evaluation of the costs and il
merits of the proposed system and of other WEU alternatives and affordability. The Space Group is ;
" The Space Group has also assessed the requirements to ensure the continuity of the operation of
the Satellite Centre until the completion of the evaluation of its capabilities. Based on this assess-
ment, the Centre will be able to continue its activities until the end of 1995 without additional fund-
ing. At the spring 1995 Ministerial meeting, an evaluation of the Cenfre's work should be completed,
so as to- penryt a decision to be taken on the establishment of the Satellite Cenfte as a permanent
body of WE(J."
3. The Council takes due note of the parliamentary Assembly's recommendation and will consider
tasking the Space Group accordingly, once the studies currently under way have been finalised.
4. The Council and its Space Group give their highest priority to the preparation of proposals for deci-
sions concerning the possible sening up of an independent European earth observation satellite system and
the establishment of the Satellite Cenfie as a permanent body of WEU.
The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the Technical Working Group of the Space
Group has already recognised the necessity to examine in MOE detail the technical feasibility and iele-
vance of some areas of ESA activity.
5. The Council recognises the merits of " fostering co-operation in early warning and navigational
satellites with the United States and Russia on a basis of reciprocity ". The Council might consider this
possibility when it will assess its overall relations with third countries.
6. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request for further information on the developments
of WEU's space policy. It considers important to keep the WEU parliamentary Assembly as fully inlormed
aspossiblg on future orientations and decisions. Meetings between the presidency and the Assembly Pre-
sidential Committee either before and/or in the wake of the Ministerial Councils will continue to offer a
constructive opportunity in that respect.
preparing a proposal for such a decision with a view to a 1995 Ministerial meeting.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l3th March 1995.
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RECOMMENDATION 571 '
on transatlantic co-operation on European anti-mhsile defence'
The Assembly,
(i) Recognising the need for Europe to determine the risks for its security of the proliferation of ballis-
tic technologies in the countries of the third world and in particular in the Mediterranean and the Middle
East;
(ii) Recalling the need for the discussion already started in WEU to be taken further in order to contri-
bute to identifying these risks and their effects on Europe and for giving this discussion real impetus;
(iii) Taking into consideration the need for European countries to reach a joint position on anti-missile
defence, in order to avoid a dangerous delay in relation to the evolution of the threat;
(iv) Recalling its earlier conclusions on the need to envisage a system of protection which takes account
of European needs and also of work done in this area by the United States;
(v) Considering the many advantages that co-operation in the widest sense and based on equality ber
ween the transatlantic partners could obtain for the two sides in the area of anti-missile defence;
(vi) Considering however that certain prograrnmes launched by the United States, such as THAAD,
have reached a very advanced stage, which precludes co-operation from the outset;
(vii) Recalling moreover that the missile technology control r6gime provides for the signatory countries
to strengthen the principles upheld by that agreement through their respective legislations;
(viii) Takrng into account the differences now separating counffies that used to be members of Cocom in
identifying the countries which constitute a strategic threat to their security;
(ix) Considering that the countries which are at present establishing the bases of the new Cocom must
reach a consensus, particularly with regard to prohibition of certain transactions with given countries or
for a specific purpose;
(x) Considering that the system which is to succeed Cocom must have as its main objective to prevent
the countries constituting a true proliferation risk and a real threat to regional stability from procuring
conventional armaments and associated technology;
(xi) Judging necessary that agreements directed to this end should be concluded as quickly as possible;
(xii) Emphasising the importance for WEU to define a joint policy for the exportation of armaments;
(xiii) Takrng account of the need to take the necessary steps as soon as possible for preparing a conference
on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM),
RgcorrluBNos rHAT rgB CouNcn
1. Give the Assembly precise information about progress made in the study being conducted by the
Special Working Group on European anti-missile defence;
2. Let the Assembly know whether a meeting of experts has been held in order to prepare an analysis
of risks and, if so, what conclusions were drawn from that meeting;
3. Ask member countries to strengthen in their respective legislations the principles upheld by the
MTCR;
4. Encourage the adoption in member countries of a joint position on the definition of the countries
that constitute a strategic threat to their security;
I . Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1994 during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session ( I lth sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Alkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
(Document 1435).
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5. Seek a consensus among member countries on the bases of the rdgime to replace Cocom;
6. Promote among member countries the introduction in the very near future of a joint policy towards
the exportation of armaments to third countries;
7. Speed up examination of the development of a European space-based observation system and the
taking of decisions in that respect;
8. Create a study group on a European early warning system;
9. Discuss the possibilities of co-operation between the United States and Europe on anti-missile
defence; such co-operation should be on a basis of equal partnership in development and production and
might cover the following areas:
(a) programmes on an endo-atmospheric system culrently under study in Europe and the United
States and which might possibly lead to joint implementation of a single prograrnme;
(b) exo-atmospheric systems;
(c) airborne systems, adapted in any event, to European Rafale and Eurofighter combat aircraft;
(d) study of the possibility for Europe to adopt a joint position on the possible procurement of the
American THAAD programme;
10. Reach a joint position on the various possibilities described above in the interests of Europe and our
transatlantic allies;
11. Establish contacts between WEU and the BMDO for discussion on the problems already described.
296
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 571
1. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the study on European anti-missile defence
entitled " A preliminary analysis of the risks of missile technology proliferation on the southern flanks of
Western Europe " which was conducted by the Special Working Group has been temporarily suspended.
The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 25 of the preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy which states that:
" (...) As the defence component of the European Union and as means to strengthen the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU should strengthen its operational capabilities, developing the
military and operational aspects of security such as: (...)
- 
the question of anti-missile defences in Europe;
(...) "
Furthermore, Mr. Mallet, European co-Chairman of NATO's Senior Defence Group on Prolifera-
tion, briefed the Council on work in this area on l8th October 1994. The Council is therefore confident
that work will soon resume.
2. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 6 of the preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy which states that:
" The full development of a common defence policy will require a common assessment and defini-
tion of the requirements and substance of a European defence which would first require a clear defi-
nition of the security challenges facing the European Union and a determination of appropriate res-
ponses. "
The Council will inform the parliamentary Assembly in due course on the chosen method for the
implementation of the provisions of this paragraph as well as on the conclusions it will reach in the exe-
cution of its mandate.
3. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that the missile technology control r6gime
(MTCR) is neither a treaty nor an international agreement but is a voluntary :Irrangement among countries
which share a common interest in limiting missile proliferation. The r6gime consists of common export
guidelines applied to a common list of controlled items. Each member implements its commitments in the
context of its own national export laws. The Council is confident that WEU states have undertaken the
necessary steps fully to comply with the MTCR.
4. The Council recalls its reply to paragraph 2 of the present recommendation since in its view, secu-
rity challenges relate to countries which might constitute a strategic threat.
5. The Permanent Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the European Union has agreed
upon rules for the control of exports of dual-use goods and sffives for a harmonisation of national arma-
ments export policies. The Council considers that the results of these European decisions and endeavours
will be of a nature to fuel the discussions on the new export iurangement after the end of Cocom.
6. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 36 of the preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy which states that:
" (...) Issues to be addressed among others in advancing European armaments co-operation and the
development of a European arm:lments policy include:
(...)
- 
as far as extra-European exports are concerned, within the context of the informal group [com-
posed of governmental experts of WEU/IVEAG and EU member statesl, a study of the possible har-
monisation of national practices, taking into account developments under a common European
foreign and security policy in the area of arms export controls, and a study of ways to translate the
developments of the CFSP into practice in the area of arms export controls. "
1. Communicated to the Assembly on l3th March 1995.
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7. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 26 of the preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy which states that:
" (...) In the Kirchberg declaration, Ministers reaffirmed their will to set up an independent Euro-
pean satellite system and said that a decision would be taken subject to evaluation of the costs and
meritsof the proposed system and of other WEU alternatives fl{fforaflility. The S-pace Group ispreparing a proposal for such a decision with a view to a 1995 Ministerial meeting. "
8. The Council draws the parliamentary Assembly's attention to paragraph 38 of the Noordwijk
declaration, adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers meeting at Noordwijk on l4th November 1994,
which states that:
" (...) The Secretariat and the Planning Cell need to be complemented by capacities in the area of
intelligence and crisis-management in order to fulfil the tasks mandated by the Petersberg declara-
tion: for instance, a situation centre and an intelligence section, which are already under study. The
studies being conducted in this field should be submitted to the Permanent Council so that it can
take the appropriate decisions. "
The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that this study might also address early warning
capabilities (including the space component).
9. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly of the above quoted paragraph 25 of the prelimi-
nary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy.
In this connection the Council sees scope to discuss the possibilities of future co-operation between
the United States and Europe.
10. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that " WEu member states will intensify their
co-ordination on alliance issues which represent an imponant common interest with the aim of innodu-
cing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance which will remain the
essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on
the security and defence commitments of allies under the North Atlantic Treaty ".
11. The Council will consider establishing contacts between WEU and the Ballistic Missile Defence
Organisation (BMDO) once the discussions on the possibilities of co-operation between the United States
and Europe on anti-missile defence have been finalised.
I
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RECOMMENDATION 572 
'
on the readiness and capabilitics of airforces in WEU member stntes 2
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that WEU member states should review the national capability of their airforces to
meet their obligations within the alliance and to provide a proper contribution to the exercise of interna-
tional authority and humanitarian obligations;
(ii) Recalling that, for member states, it is not enough to possess appropriate numbers of military air-
craft since such numbers are of little use if the aircrews are not capable of current operational activity or
if the aircraft themselves are not maintained in serviceable condition;
(iii) Expressing concern about the quality and relevance of flight training and stressing that low-level
flight taining is necessary to sustain the possibility of operational survival;
(iv) Drawing attention to the absence of, or inadequacy of, low-level flight training in a number of mem-
ber states which fails to provide reasonable assurances that the nature and the scale of flight training in
their airforces meets the standards to which they are committed;
(v) Regretting possible shortcomings in logistic support capacity and the reliance upon civilian trans-
port aircraft for military purposes especially where pursuit of peace in the service of humanitarian causes
may require both aircrew and aircraft to be prepared to face a hostile environment, which testifies to the
need, in the long term, to build a European military transport aircraft;
(vi) Considering existing anxieties about the need for adequate air defence, in particular in terms of all-
weather capability, air-to-air refuelling and reconnaissance and early warning in airforces of WEU mem-
ber states;
(vii) Considering that the aircraft in service in several member states are obsolescent thus extending the
considerable range and variety of different types, there being, for instance, some thirteen different types of
strike aircrafu
(viii) Considering that rather more attention should be paid to making provision for adequate air-to-air
refuelling in view of the increased capacity this might provide;
(ix) Noting that the airforce exercise Purple Nova held in November 1994 under WEU auspices is an
interesting development and trusting that further similar exercises will be held in order to assist co-opera-
tion between airforces of member states to enable them to develop further co-operative capacity in res-
ponse to crises and international need,
REcorrawxos rHAT rrm CouNcu-
1. Remind member states that more attention should be paid to the provision of sufficient military air-
craft and aircrews capable ofoperations in support ofinternational need and to ensuring that sufficient per-
sonnel are trained and employed to maintain the numbers of military aircraft which their commitment to
the alliance requires;
2. Urge member states to recognise that whilst their services need to be operated efficiently, the defen-
ce of their realms and their obligation to both the alliance and the international community require the
retention of a sufficient number of uniformed personnel to ensure that support as well as operational requi-
rements can be permanently secured;
3. Pay close attention to the success of the recent airforce exercise Purple Nova with a view to exten-
ding such arrangements on a regular basis.
Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1994 during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session (l lth sitting).
Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 144{;.
l.
2.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendatian 572
1. The Council reassures the Assembly that WEU member states are fully aware of ttre need to balance
the requirements of their commitrnent to the alliance against the requirements for participation in opera-
tions in support of international need.
2. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's recommendation that WEU member states " recognise
that whilst their services need to be operated efficiently, the defence of their realms and their obligation to
both the alliance and the international community require the retention of a sufficient number of uniform-
ed personnel to ensure that support as well as operational requirements can be permanently secured ".
3. The Council welcomes the parliamentary Assembly's interest and appreciation for exercise Purple
Nova.
Admiral Sir Hugo White, CINCFLEET, and members of his staff briefed the Council on Exercise
Purple Nova which had taken place at Northwood, United Kingdom, from 1st-6th November 1994 with
the participation of France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Exercise Purple Nova, a
command post exercise, had placed particular emphasis on command and control issues and had demons-
trated a high degree of multinational integration.
The Council considers that exercises are very valuable for identifying the key issues related to the
operational development of WEU, as Purple Nova and Tramontana have clearly shown recently. They
enhance solidarity among partners as well as the credibility and visibility of WEU. Joint exercises have
been taking place since 1992: Famdet, Ardente (Italy, 1993), Purple Nova (United Kingdom, 1994),
Tramontana (Spain, 1994), to be followed by Misfral in France in 1995.
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l. Communicated to the Assembly on27th March 1995.
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RECOMMENDATION 573 I
on the WEU Institute for Secarity Studies 2
The Assembly,
(i) Noting with satisfaction that the WEU Institute for Security Studies has successfully accomplished
the tasks assigned to it since its creation;
(ii) Stressing the importartce of the activities of the Institute for the emergence of a European awareness
of security and defence questions;
(iii) Welcoming the vital r6le played by the Institute in the development of relations with the Central and
Eastern European countries, associate partners of WEU;
(iv) Noting with interest the initiatives taken by the Institute to make WEU and other European organi-
sations aware of the problems of the Mediterranean and the Maghreb;
(v) Welcoming the fact that the Institute's expertise was called upon in the context of the International
Conference on Peace in former Yugoslavia, thus demonstrating the reputation enjoyed by the Institute
among European research institutes;
(vi) Stressing the Institute's active policy of openness towards European countries seeking membership
of the European Union and WEU;
(vii) Noting that the enlargement of WEU entails an increase in the Institute's responsibilities towards
new members, associate members, associate partners and observers, but that there has been no adjustment
of the Institute's means to meet this new situation;
(viii) Noting that the present structure of the Institute is not such as to be able to meet all expectations ari-
sing from enlargement and from the emergence of a new European security and defence identity;
(ix) Recalling the declaration of the WEU member countries, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, in which
the Council undertook to study "the transformation of the WEU Institute into a European security and
defence academy";
(x) Recalling Recommendation4T4, requesting the Council to "take no measures that may involve
relations between the new institute and the Assembly without securing the latter's prior agreement";
(xi) Regretting that the Assembly may not always be in a position to take advantage of closer and more
direct co-operation with the Institute, to their mutual benefit,
RecoN,IrrEI,{os rHAT THE CouNcIL
1. Consider forthwith the Institute's transformation into a European security and defence academy, in
accordance with the Council's own wishes as expressed in 1991;
2. Encourage member countries to resume holding advanced European defence study sessions, with
the support of the Institute, and to ensure the continuity of such sessions;
3. Provide the Institute with appropriate means for handling the increase in its requirements and acti-
vities stemming from the enlargement of WEU and the development of relations with countries seeking
membership of the European Union and with the Mediterranean countries;
4. Redefine, as necessary, the tasks of the Institute assigned to it at the time of its creation and adapt
them to the new European situation in view of whatever changes may result from the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on lst December 1994 during the second part ofthe fortieth ordinary session (12th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Romiin on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions (Document 1430).
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5. Permit the development of co-operation between the Institute and the Assembly, without the former
having to request the permission of the Council on each occasion in order to respond to a request for infor-
mation or collaboration from the Assembly;
6. Ask the Institute to make declassified versions of its studies available to the Assembly and ensure
that, in its work, it takes account of the Assembly's point of view on topics of common interest;
7. Associate the Assembly with the process of examining the transformation of the Institute into an
academy, and, if necessary, establish procedures for close co-operation between the latter and the Assem-
bly with a view to achieving the openness and transparency necessary for fostering European awareness
of security and defence matters.
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1. The Council welcomes the interest the parliamentary Assembly has always shown in the work of
the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the posllive assessment of its achievements in the report of the
Honourable MP Mr Roman. 
_For its part, the WEU Council of Ministers, in the Noordwijk d^eclaration
adopted on l4th November 1994,reiteruted its cornmitment:
" (...) gradual_lV to develop_the Institute for Security Studies into a European Security and Defence
Academy and request the Permanent Council to take this matter forward as a priority. "
2. The Council informs the parliame-ntary Assembly that in early 1995 it will consider favourably pro-
posals by the Institute for Security Studies on the first steps to be iaken towards the development -of the
Institute into an Academy. The Colncil would consider, ai a part of this, the possible resumption of the
European sessions of advanced defence studies with the active involvement ofthe Institute.
3. The Council will consider the budgetary implications of this possible transformation. The Council,
as a matter of principle, has-theresponsibility of providing its ministerial organs with the appropriate
means to carry out their mandated tasks.
4. The ministerial mandate to take the matter of developing the Institute for Security Studies into a
European Security and_Defence Academy fgrward as a priority raises the question of the compatibility of
such a change with the Institute's existing missions. The Couniil will have to determine how to ensureihat
the transition is not detrimental to those missions.
The Council will consider all options before taking decisions on new roles for the Institute.
5. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that a revision of the present arrangements,
pgarding the development of co-operation between the Institute and the Assembiy, without thE former
having to-request-the Council's permission on each occasion in order to respond to i request for informa-
tion or collaboration from the Assembly, is not envisaged. As ministerial oigan of WEU, the WEU Insti-
tute for Security Studies remains under the direct authority of the Council which is the only body compe-
tent to task WEU subsidiary bodies.
6. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that the Institute's work is meant to be carried out
in an independent manner. The Council therefore believes that the Institute should remain free to decide
how " to take account of $e- Assembly's point of view ". The Institute is well aware of the parliamentaryAssembly's concerns and viewpoints as made public in its reports, recommendations and-written ques-
tions.
The Council will instruct the Institute for Security Studies to make available to the members of the
parliamentary Assembly through its Secretariat the unclassified studies it submits to the Council.
7- Thg pa{i_amentary As-sembly,-through its institutional dialogue with the Council is kept informed of
the ongoing debate on the future of the Institute. Therefore, the Council does not deem it necessary to
envisage further formal procedures for closer co-operation between the Institute and the Assembly.
REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 573
1. Communicated to the Assembly on l3th March 1995.
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RECOMMENDATION 574'
onWEU's relations with Russia'
The Assembly,
(i) Considering the importance of the Russian Federation, the main successor to the Soviet Union as a
world power, for-the management of international relations and in particular for the establishment of an
order of stability, security and peace at world and European level;
(ii) Gratified that Russia is no longer a threat to the security of Western Europe, Put recalling neverthe-
iess that, in terms of conventional and nuclear armaments, it is still the greatest military power in Europe
and still has the largest army and the highest defence budget of all the countries of Europe;
(iii) Recalling that after the withdrawal of the last military units from the states of Central Europe, Rus-
iia'still maintains troops in at least ten member countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States
(crS);
(iv) Considering that the Russian Federation is, on the one hand, at a difficult juncture in the consolida-
iion of its internal-political, economic and social situation and, on the other hand, a! a stage.where it is defi-
ning its r6le in the world with particular regard to its place in a new security architecture in Europe;
(v) Convinced that such a security architecture in Europe is inconceivable without the participation of
ihe Russian Federation in the proceis of concerting approaches in the various international bodies desti-
ned to strengthen confidence, slability and collective security, particularly in the framework of the CSCE,
NACC and the partnership for peace;
(vi) Also convinced that the improvement in the domestic economic situation in Russia is an important
factor for strengthening political stability and security on the Eurasian continent;
(vii) Believing it essential to consolidate democracy and respect for human rights in Russia;
(viii) Calling consequently for the conditions to be created without delay for Russia to be associated with
the work of the appropriate international organisations for economic and financial co-operation;
(ix) Wishing relations between the Russian Federation and European authoritigs a1d counffies par-
iicipating in the process of European integration to be governed by the principle of partnership and
co-operation;
(x) Welcoming, therefore, the conclusion of an agreement of partnership and co-operation between the
European Union and Russia;
(xi) Believing that WEU as defence component of the European Union and European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance must also improve its relations with the Russian Federation;
(xii) Convinced that the new relations with Russia should result in a pennanent system for information,
dialogue and consultation and also co-operation in specific areas of mutual interest;
(xiii) Emphasising the importance of establishing contacts and dialogue between the WEU Assembly and
the two chambers of the Russian parliament;
(xiv) Consequently welcoming the re-establishment of a regular interparliamentary dialogue in the
framework of these new relations;
(xv) Stressing the importance of the controlled dismantlement of nuclear and chemical armaments on
Russian territory and that of the CIS in conformity with the international treaties in force;
(xvi) Concerned at the dangers that might stem from possible shortcomings in the control of Russian
nuclear arms and the clandestine trafflc of Russian nuclear material abroad;
(ryii) Insisting that all activities in crisis-management and the maintenance and re-establishment ojP_eac-e
in crisis areas in the territory of the CIS should be conducted in conformity with the rules fixed by the Uni-
ted Nations and the CSCE and in co-ordination with those bodies;
Adopted by the Assembly on lst December 1994 during the second part of the fortieth ordinary session (l2th sitting).
Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1440).
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(r'iii) Also wishing the appropriate western organisations and their member countries to show greater rea-
diness in providing assistance in maintaining or re-establishing peace in the crisis areas mentioned above;
@ix1 Calling the attention of the Council in particular to the consequences of present developments in the
Caucasus and in the Turkish-speaking republics of the CIS for the future evolution of relations between
Russia and Turkey;
(xr) Wishing WEU to start a specific dialogue with the Russian Federation for harmonising their res-
pective concepts concerning the future development of the CSCE, particularly in the light of iire summit
meeting that organisation is preparing to hold in Budapest;
(xxi) Emphasising that outstanding questions between Russia and Ukraine should be settled to the satis-
faction of both sides, respecting the sovereignty and independence of each one;
(xrii) Wishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to continue to develop in such a way as to
become a factor of security and stability from which all its member countries might benefit;
(xxiii) Wishing all the problems of neighbourliness between Russia and the countries that have become
associate partners of WEU to be resolved with due respect for the principles of international law and to the
satisfaction of all the partners concerned in such a way as to increase security and stability in the regions
in question;
(xxiv) Convinced that co-operation between WEU and Russia in the framework of the implementation of
the Open Skies Treaty should be a prelude to the enlargement of this co-operation to other specific areas;
(xxv) Emphasising the importance of establishing close relations between the appropriate Russian
research institutes in security and defence and the WEU Institute for Security Studies,
RrcouurNps rHAT rne CouNcrr-
1. Offer the Russian Federation permanent co-operation including a regular system for information,
dialogue and political consultation at ministerial level and at that of the chairmanship-in-office, the Secre-
tary-General and senior officials of the ministerial organs of WEU;
2. Determine, in co-ordination with the Russian authorities, the specific areas in which WEU might
offer the Russian Federation practical co-operation that might include questions within the purview of
WEAG and possibly space questions;
3. Offer its good offices to the Russian Federation:
(a) in its struggle against the clandestine proliferation of Russian nuclear material by creating ajoint WEU-Russia monitoring committee;
(b) for implementing the destruction of Russian arsenals of chemical weapons;
4. Offer, in co-ordination with the CSCE and using the framework of the conference on the security
pact, its good offices for facilitating the settlement of all problems of neighbourliness remaining between
the Russian Federation and certain countries that have become associate partners of WEU and which
might jeopardise security in the regions in question;
5. Encourage its Institute for Security Studies to increase its contacts and co-operation with the appro-
priate Russian research institutes in the field of security policy;
6. Establish with Ukraine and Belarus similar relations to those proposed in paragraphs 1 and 2.
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REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 574
1. The WEU Council of Ministers, in the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, instructed the Per-
manent Council to examine appropriate ways to develop dialogue and exchanges of information on issues
of common concern between WEU and Russia and WEU and Ukraine. At their meeting in Noordwijk on
14th November 1994, Ministers underlined the particular importance of establishing appropriate relation-
ships with Russia and Ukraine.
As a consequence, the Permanent Council decided, at its meeting on 7th March 1995, that contacts
with Russia and Ukraine should allow for the development of the existing dialogue with WEU and for
exchanges of information on issues of common interest.
In this decision, the Permanent Council welcomed the Assembly's efforts aimed at further develop-
ing contacts with Russia and Ukraine at parliamentary level.
These objectives will be pursued, in particular, through consultations to be held between the Per-
manent Representative of the Presidency, Secretary-General and the Russian and Ukrainian Ambassadors
respectively. The frequency will take into account, inter alia, the calendar of principal WEU meetings.
Other forms of contacts could include meetings with visiting senior members of the Governments
of Russia and Ukraine; visits by the Secretary-General and presidency to Kiev and Moscow; and contacts
through the presidency embassies in Kiev and Moscow.
2. These contacts will be used to identify specific areas of common concern in which practical co-
operation between WEU and Russia might be developed.
3. The Council also considers that " the struggle against the clandestine proliferation of Russian
nuclear material " as well as the " destruction of Russian arsenals of chemical weapons " are issues of
common concern which could be addressed in the framework of the respective bilateral dialogue.
4. On the basis of the pact on stability in Europe, the Council is of the opinion that the good offices of
the European Union should be offered, in co-ordination with the OSCE and using the framework of the
conference on the stability pact, for facilitating the settlement of all problems of neighbourliness remai-
ning between the Russian Federation and the countries that have become associate partners of WEU. The
Council continues to support fully the process initiated in Paris aimed at the conclusion of a pact on stabi-
lity in Europe.
5. The Council is aware of the fact ttrat the WEU Institute should give greater priority in its future
work to contacts with Russia and Ukraine, including the organisation of joint seminas, while ensuring
that these enhanced contacts are fully compatible with the Institute's overall work programme.
6. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the relations mentioned in paragraphs 1 and
2 of this recommendation already apply to Russia and Ukraine. As far as Belarus is concerned, the Coun-
cil will bear in mind the importance of Belarus in European security in the context of WEU's relations
with third countries.
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Draft Recommendation
on the silualian informer Yugoslavia
The Assembly,
(i) Profoundly shocked by the ease with which the Bosnian Serbs were able to seize United Nations
blue berets, hold them hostage and steal armaments and equipment guarded by United Nations personnel
in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(ii) Dismayed by the apparent powerlessness of the international community to prevent Bosnian Serbs
from continuing to massacre civilians in safe areas, particularly in Tuzla, on 25th May 1995, with a toll of
more than 76 dead and 150 wounded, surrounding and shelling the town of Sarajevo and disrupting the
provision of United Nations humanitarian aid to the civilian population;
(iii) Noting also the powerlessness of the international community to prevent Croatian forces from
resuming hostilities against the Krajina region, in violation of the cease-fre agreed in respect of Croatia
on 29th March 1994, and despite present negotiations to find an acceptable political arrangement concer-
ning the status of Krajina;
(iv) Convinced that the time has come either to take vigorous measures to put an end to action by the
Bosnian Serbs, two of whose political leaders are accused of war crimes before the International Court in
The Hague, who are continuing to humiliate the United Nations and the entire international community, or
to withdraw United Nations forces from the region;
(v) Recalling that the Presidential Committee, on 23rd September 1991, asked the WEU Council " to
invite the United Nations Security Council to set up an effective United Nations force to secure a cease-
fire in Yugoslavia " and stated that " WEU stands ready to play its full part in any such proposal ";
(vi) Recalling that Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) gave a wide mandate to UNPROFOR allow-
ing it to resort to force in order to give effective protection to safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(vii) Recalling therefore paragraphs 2 and 3 of Recommendation 541 inviting the WEU Council to
" ensure the strict application of Resolution 836 ... adopted by the Security Council on 4th June 1993 " and
" in particular help the adjustment and reinforcement of forces of WEU countries that may be required by
the implementation of Resolution 836 " and " consider assigning some of these forces to the support of
units responsible for protecting security areas ";
(viii) Considering in consequence that the decision to create a rapid reaction force for former Yugoslavia
taken in Paris on 3rd June 1995 is an appropriate 
- 
if belated 
- 
measure falling within the framework of
the implementation of Security Council Resolution 836, but regretting that the mission and status of this
force are somewhat ambiguous;
(ix) Deeply regretting, nevertheless, the WEU Council's total absence of initiative, despite the under-
taking on crisis-management given by member governments in their Petersberg declaration;(x) Astounded that, despite operation Deny Flight, the United Nations authorities have recorded, up to
the month of April 1995, over 4 290 violations of the ban on military flights in the air space over Bosnia-
Herzegovina;
(xi) Dismayed, moreover, by the blatant contradiction between the WEU Council's affirmation of " the
successful results accomplished by the WEU police and customs mission on the Danube " and " the conti-
nued positive results achieved in the joint WEU-NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic " and
reports of large quantities of fuel being smuggled into the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) through Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and also
through the territory of neighbouring countries;
(xii) Considering that the trade embargo Greece has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia is placing this country in such a difficult economic situation that, in order to survive, it is forced to
maintain some commercial relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in violation of United
Nations sanctions against the latter;
(.rriil Still convinced that the effectiveness of the embargo banning arms supplies to the whole of the ter-
ritory of former Yugoslavia continues to be one of the essential conditions for achieving a peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict in that region;
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(xiv) Disturbed by the contradictory declarations of United States political leaders regarding the policy
and r6le of the United States in the conflict in the Balkans;
(m) Concerned also that the lack of clarity regarding Russia's r6le in its relations with the Federal Repu-
blic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) raises problems, but welcoming the meeting between the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia and the new European Union negotiator, Mr. Carl Bildt, which will
hopefully clarify the situation and lead to a more coherent approach within the contact group andtheZ-4
gIoup;
(ni) Convinced that a peaceful settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia is possible only if all
international organisations and countries participate in efforts to this end, agreeing on a joint strategy and
refraining from isolated and unco-ordinated initiatives ;
(nii) Recalling that the danger of the Yugoslav conflict spreading and escalating into a wider regional
conflict is still present,
Rrcouwxos rHAr um Cotxcu-
1. Resolutely call upon the Bosnian Serbs to free immediately and unconditionally all the blue berets
they still hold hostage;
2. Appeal to all parties concerned to abandon once and for all the illusion of a military solution and
rather work to achieve a political solution based on fair negotiations through which the rights of all ethnic
and religious communities can be guaranteed;
3. Ask all international organisations, the European Union and all countries involved in the peace
efforts 
- 
and above all the members of the contact group 
- 
to strengthen their cohesion by adopting a joint
strategy and to refrain from isolated and unco-ordinated initiatives;
4. Ask the United Nations to strengthen the presence and action of the blue berets and request all
governments to make the necessary manpower, resources and means available to the United Nations;
5. Srengthen the operability of the rapid reaction force created on the initiative of France and the Uni-
ted Kingdom by giving its command responsibility for on the spot initiatives required in certain situations
that endanger the safety and lives of LJNPROFOR troops or of some of its own members;
6. Transform the rapid reaction force into a European multinational unit placed under the authority of
WEU in accordance with the arrangements decided at Petersberg and invite all WEU member countries to
participate;
7. Take steps in the United Nations to obtain a mandate from the Security Council for WEU to elabo-
rate and implement the tasks of this multinational force within the framework of the guidelines issued by
the Security Council;
8. Urge the Security Council to ensure that the task of the European multinational force is to facilitate
the implementation of the missions of the blue berets in former Yugoslavia and not to prepare for their
withdrawal;
9. Ask the Security Council to provide all the means necessary for supervising more effectively the
domestic and international borders of the successor republics of former Yugoslavia, the better to monitor
the effectiveness of the arms embargo;
10. Ask the United States to reverse its decision to panicipate no longer in the embargo against Bosnia-
Herzegovina;
11. Ask the Government of Russia to use its influence in conformity with the the proposals of the
contact group and with the agrcement of its member countries;
12. In co-ordination with NATO, take the necessary measures to prevent any further violation of the
fl ight exclusion zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina;
13. Take appropriate measures to prevent any violation of the embargo on arms supplies to the territory
of former Yugoslavia and inform the Assembly of all proven cases of sanctions-breffngt
14. Request Greece forthwith to lift the trade embargo it has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia;
15. Provide the Assembly with more accurate and detailed information regarding the effectiveness of
operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard and the monitoring of shipping on the Danube;
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16. Ask the United Nations and the European Union to offer compensation to neighbouring countries
whose economies have been weakened by their participation in the embargo against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia;
17. Ask the Croatian Government not to undertake further military action against the United Nations
safe areas since these areas, which belong to the Republic of Croatia, must be integrated peacefully and
given autonomy, as proposed by the Z-4 group;
18. Ask the Government in Belgrade to bring all possible pressure to bear on Bosnian Serb leaders to
persuade them to accept the proposals of the contact group;
19. Furttrermore ask the Government in Belgrade to recognise the borders of Croatia and, explicitly,
Bosnia's right to exist as a sovereign state within its present borders, given that the constitutional frame-
work and territorial organisation of the Bosnian state are to be established by consensus in negotiations on
the basis of the proposals made by the contact group;
20. Call on the Government in Belgrade to restore autonomous structures to Kosovo and Vojvodina and
review its arrangements for minorities in the Sandjak and elsewhere;
21. Oppose any suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegrolrintil such time as it recognises Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as defined by their international
borders;
22. Actively support the resumption of the political dialogue with a view to:
- 
achieving a lasting cease-fire over the whole of the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- 
reaching a peaceful and political settlement of the conflict as a whole on the basis of the peace
plans drawn up by the contact goup and the Z-4 group;
- 
avoiding the conflict escalating into a wider regional conflict;
- 
convening, at the appropriate time, a peace conference with the participation of the political
leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
23. While recognising the many contributions made by the international community, ask all govern-
ments to step up their efforts in the area of humanitarian aid for civilians and refugees;
24. Ask all governments to support the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal.
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E xp lanato ry M e rno randum
(submitted by Mn Fassino, Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
1. The four-month truce concluded on 31st
December 1994 between the Bosnian Govern-
ment and Bosnian Serbs with the help of former
United States President, Jimmy Carter, held no
hope for an end to hostilities, let alone the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially, the truce succee-
ded in halting the fighting. However, as the date
of its expiry approached, in particular, from 20th
March 1995, fighting was resumed with increased
ferocity in nearly all the regions concerned, first
around Bihac, then near Tuzla and in the Vlasic
mountains.
2. The resumption of Serb attacks against the
town of Sarajevo provoked two air strikes (one on
25th May, the other on 26th May 1995) carried
out by NATO at the request of the United Nations
against Bosnian Serb munitions depots. The Bos-
nian Serbs reacted by shelling the town of Tuzla,
causing many dead and wounded among the civi-
lian population, and by taking some 400 blue
berets hostage in several parts of Bosnia. On 2nd
June 1995, the Serbs liberated 126 of them, but
the same day, an American F-16 was shot down in
Bosnia by a Serb missile and Serbs again took
United Nations roops hostage.
II. The situation afier the creation of a rapid
reactionforce based in Croalia and Bosnia
3. After the United Kingdom Government
decided to send reinforcements to improve the
protection of British forces assigned to UNPRO-
FOR in Bosnia, France convened a conference in
Paris, on 3rd June 1995, of the fifteen defence
ministers of the countries of the European Union
and of the Atlantic Alliance participating in the
peace-keeping effort on the spot. This conference
decided to send to Bosnia a rapid reaction force of
some l0 000 men to provide backing for UNPRO-
FOR, prevent the taking of hostages and facilitate
the free movement of convoys. On 6th June, the
Bosnian Serbs released a further 108 blue berets,
while continuing to hold some 150 United
Nations soldiers hostage. Although, as from 13th
June, Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic several
times announced the liberation of all the remai-
ning blue berets, on 15th June,26 blue berets and
United Nations military observers were still being
held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs.
4. The French and United Kingdom Govern-
ments, in panicular, which have the largest num-
ber of blue berets on the spot, believe the new
force should not be placed under United Nations
command. However, following a compromise, it
was decided that it would act under United
Nations' authority. It will be based in Croatia and
Bosnia 
- 
near Sarajevo 
- 
under the operational
command of the UNPROFOR commander for the
whole of former Yugoslavia, the French General
Bernard Janvier, with authority delegated to the
commander of the blue berets in Bosnia, the Bri-
tish General Rupert Smith. France and the United
Kingdom 
- 
which already have the largest num-
bers of blue berets in former Yugoslavia 
- 
will
provide the majority of the rapid reaction troops,
divided into two brigades, as follows:
(l) A multinational brigade of I 500
French, 1 500 United Kingdom and
some 200 Dutch soldiers (The Hague
talks of 170 Royal Netherlands
marines).
(ii) T:he 5 OO0-sffong United Kingdom 24
air-mobile brigade. France has also a
supplementary force of 4 000 men on
alert.
5. The United Kingdom has just sent artillery,
engineering and communications units and heli-
copters for the rapid reaction force. The Nether-
lands marines will be equipped with 120 mm mor-
tars and a trajectory calculation (mortar detection)
unit'. This force will therefore be wholly Euro-
pean; no participation is envisaged by American
or Russian forces in the framework of this multi-
national unit. However, the Americans have sent
the aircraft-carrier Theodore Roosevelt with a
crack unit of 2 000 marines to the Adriatic and the
aircraft-carrier Foch is also off the Bosnian coast.
6. It is still not known exactly what the status
and tasks of this new rapid reaction force will be.
However, it should be recalled in this connection
that, as far back as 19th September 1991, Chan-
cellor Kohl and President Mitterrand had propo-
sed sending an intervention force to Yugoslavia
under United Nations' auspices. This proposal
was rejected however at the time by the Council
of the European Community because the United
Kingdom was not then in favour of it.
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7. Moreover, the question arises as to whether
this initiative is compatible with the new United
Nations thinking on managing the crisis in the
Balkans. On 31st May 1995, the United Nations
S ecretary-General, Mr. B outros-B outros Ghali, in
his report to the Security Council, presented four
options relating to a new r6le for the United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. These four options are as fol-
lows2:
(i) withdrawal of UNPROFOR, which
would be replaced in Bosnia by a
small political mission if the parties
concerned so wished;
(ir) continuation of UNPROFOR's pre-
sent tasks and methods of achieving
them;
(iii) a change in its mandate, in order to
allow greater use of military force;
(iu) a revised mandate, to cover in future
only the tasks that a peace-keeping
force can carry out realistically in the
prevailing circumstances in Bosnia.
8. The United Nations Secretary-General is
clearly in favour of option (iv), but he stipulates
that whatever the final decision may be, it will
not be effective without real prospects for a nego-
tiated solution, in other words, relaunching and
intensifying the peace process through a new and
meaningful initiative. The United Nations Secre-
tary-General makes no mention of the rapid reac-
tion force that is the wish of Paris and London and
whose creation was decided in Paris on 3rd June
1995. He has never concealed the fact that he is
opposed to any offensive r6le for the blue berets
or any other force connected with the United
Nations' mandate in Bosnia.
9. Several other questions arise, however: the
Bosnians' greatest fear is that a change in the
mandate and redeployment of the blue berets
would simply mean the withdrawal of United
Nations forces from particularly dangerous
regions. This is how, for example, Mr. Akashi's
proposal for the demilitarisation of the Bosnian
enclaves of Sebrenica,Zepa and Gorazde is being
interpreted.
10. Furthermore, the Bosnians fear that the
only task of the rapid reaction force and the addi-
tional United Kingdom troops already in the area
will be to protect their UNPROFOR colleagues
and that protection of the safe areas will finally be
abandoned.
11. Above all, one might wonder what was the
purpose of the conference of defence ministers
convened in Paris on 3rd June 1995 and what
decisions were taken. According to the press',
France invited fourteen ministers and the chiefs-
of-staff of the following countries: Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States. A member of the Russian Embassy in
Paris represented Russia as an observer. United
Nations, NATO and WEU officials were also pre-
sent. If the aim was to bring together representa-
tives of all the countries which have blue berets in
the area, one may wonder why Germany and
Greece were invited. It should further be recalled
that forces from the Baltic countries and Argen-
tine, Bangladeshi, Czech, Egyptian, Indonesian,
Jordanian, Kenyan, Malaysian, Nepalese, New
Zealand, Pakistani, Polish, Russian, Slovakian
and Ukrainian forces are also involved.
12. It is understandable that the seizure ofhos-
tages called for rapid action. It is more than sur-
prising, nevertheless, that Portugal, which occu-
pies the chairmanship-in-office of the WEU
Council, was not invited to the conference.
Moreover, one has to note, in relation to the Bos-
nian crisis, that the WEU governmental authori-
ties have been conspicuous for their total silence
since the ministerial meeting in Lisbon on l5th
May.
13. Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU
Assembly, alone launched an urgent appeal on
29thMay 1995 for all European countries to send
troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina on a scale similar
to the deployments already undenaken by France
and the United Kingdom. " It is now up to the
WEU family of twenty-seven nations to show the
leadership which has been so sadly lacking where
the United Nations is concerned " he said. On lst
June 1995, under the title " WEU must be the hard
core of European security ", the President of the
Assembly of WEU, while welcoming Britain and
France's initiative in creating a rapid reaction
force to help the United Nations, requested the
WEU chairmanship-in-office to " ensure that we
take the lead at Saturday's ministerial gathering in
Paris as well ". He also stressed that it was vital to
consult WEU's associate partners.
14. At political level, there is no indication that
an arrangement between the Serbs and Bosnians
in Bosnia-Herzegovina might be in sight. The r6le
of the Belgrade Government remains ambiguous.
Despite several encouraging signs from Mr. Milo-
sevic, the latter has so far refused to recognise
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and there were
serious doubts about whether the decision taken
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) to break off all relations with the
Bosnian Serbs and close the frontier between
2. Le Monde, 2nd June 1995.
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Yugoslavia and Bosnia is actually being imple-
mented.
15. There remains the problem of the Krajina
region in Croatia. The decision of the United
Nations Security Council contained in Reso-
lution 981, dated 3lst March 1995, to replace
UNPROFOR in Croatia by UNCRO, a United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in
Croatia, for a period ending 30th November 1995,
which would provide supervision of the interna-
tional frontiers between the Republic of Croatia,
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro), did not obtain the backing of the Krajina
authorities.
16. Early in May 1995, the Croats violated the
cease-fire agreement of 29thMarch 1994 by laun-
ching a military offensive in the area of western
Slavonia, pushing back the line of the Krajina
Serb militia in the Pacrac region by some 20 km in
order to clear a stretch of motorway linking eas-
tern and western Croatia, which had been cut by
the formation of a Serb enclave. The Serbs reacted
by shelling the town of Zagreb with Orkan mis-
siles which caused deaths among the civilian
population. A temporary cease-fire was conclu-
ded with the help of Mr. Akashi, the United
Nations representative, but the situation remains
very tense and is a cause for concern in the region,
even after the agreement signed on 15th May bet-
ween Croatia and the United Nations on the new
status of UNCRO forces. Moreover, tension is
evident in Krajina where Prime Minister Mikelic,
one of the moderate leaders, has been removed
from office.
17 - It is still impossible to assess the conse-
quences of the escalation of the Bosnian crisis for
the survival of the federation approved between
Croats and Bosnians in Bosnia or for the adminis-
tration of the town of Mostar by the European
Union.
18. Regarding the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, continued encroachment
to the detriment of Albanians, Bosnians, Hunga-
rians and Croats in the Kosovo region, the Sand-jak and Vojvodina, offers an insight into the
extreme complexity of the situation in this trou-
bled region of Europe.
19. The decision taken by the United States no
longer to participate in monitoring the embargo
on arms intended for Bosnia and the resolution
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
on 3rd November 1994 
- 
at the initiative of the
United States 
- 
asking for the embargo on Bosnia
to be lifted, primarily supported by Islamic coun-
tries while European countries and Russia abstai-
ned, resulted in the conflict in Bosnia helping to
increase the tension that already existed between
Europe and Islam in other regions of the world.
20. The lack of coherence that characterises
western policy was further aggravated by the ini-
tiative taken by the United States to negotiate
directly with the Bosnian Serbs despire United
Nations Security Council Resolution 942, which,
in September l994,recommended that no form of
political negotiations should be conducted with
the Bosnian Serbs as long as the latter refused to
accept the peace plan for Bosnia proposed by the
contact group.
2L Even after the decision to create a rapid
reaction force in Bosnia, the future r6le of the blue
berets in the region remains uncertain and the lack
of coherence in the political strategy followed by
the United Nations, NAIO, the European Union
and WEU and the United States and Russia
illustrates how difficult it is to envisage an equi-
table and lasting solution to the conflict before
it reaches proportions far beyond anything yet
seen.
22. Slovenia remains the only country to emer-
ge from former Yugoslavia which has managed to
stay on the sidelines of the conflict in the Balkans
and to establish suitable conditions for ensuring
its political stability and economic recovery, des-
pite a difficult period of transition and the large
number of refugees the counffy has had to take in.
The imminent signature of a Europe Agreement
between Slovenia and the European Union is an
encouraging sign of the country's drawing closer
to the European Union.
III. The sination on the spot
(a) Bosnia-Henegovina
23. In Resolution9S2, adopted on 31st March
1995, the Security Council of the United Nations
decided to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR in
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for a further
period ending on 30th November 1995. The Secu-
rity Council stressed, in this context, " the respon-
sibility of the parties and others concerned'' in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as regards
T NPROFOR safety and protection and demanded
" all parties and others concerned " to refrain from
any acts of intimidation or violence against
UNPROFOR.
24. At the same time, it urged the Bosnian par-
ties to agree forthwith on a further extension and
on the implementation of the cease-fire agree-
ments beyond 30th April 1995 and to use thatper-
iod to negotiate an overall peaceful settlement on
the basis of the acceptance of the contact group
peace plan as a starting point. It further asked the
Bosnian Serbs to accept this proposal.
25. However, neither this resolution nor Reso-
lution 987 dated 19th April 1995 had any practical
effect. The reality is that, as of l6th June 1995, the
313
DOCI.IMEI!-T 1467
Serbs had still not released all the blue berets they
were holding hostage. While fighting continues
between the Bosnian Serbs and government
forces, tension is rising around Sarajevo since the
Bosnian army began to concentrate a large force
some 40 miles from Sarajevo for a purpose which
is still not clear, although according to several
observers, this force seems to be intended to break
the Serb encirclement of the Bosnian capital.
26. Among the many areas of tension in Bos-
nian territory there is another sensitive area in the
Brcko region where the Croatian Serbs occupy
only a narrow corridor between the Croatian bor-
der and the territory of the Bosnian federation
established by the Muslims and Croats. There are
signs that General Mladic, the leader of the Bos-
nian Serbs, will try to widen this corridor in order
to prevent Serb-occupied territory in Bosnia being
divided into two separate parts. In December
1994,the Bosnian Serbs had already expelled all
the United Nations military observers from the
Brcko region and transferred them to Belgrade to
make it impossible to observe directly what was
happening in that regiona.
27. Moreover, quarrels have apparently broken
out between Croats and Bosnian Muslims over the
organisation of the federation to which they had
agreed in Washington on 18th March 1994 thanks
to the mediation of the Unit€d States and Russia.
(The Bosnian Serbs had rejected this federation,
with the exception of ttre Council of " moderate "
Serbs around Sarajevo, which supports the Bosnian
Government.) Nevertheless, the agreement btween
the nvo parties signed in Bonn on 10th March 1995,
which provides specifically for granting the federal
bodies all the powers embodied in the constitution
of the federation, together with the adoption of a
plan for the return of refugees and displaced per-
sons, is a positive step according to the report sub
mitted by the United Nations Secretary-General to
the Security Council on 22nd March 1995s. All pro-
blems are still far from being settled, however.
28. These difficulties have repercussions in
particular on the administration of the town of
Mostar, for which the European Union has had
responsibility, with the assistance of WEU, since
23rd July 1994, under the direction of Hans
Koschnik, former burgomaster of the town of
Bremen. In order to re-establish a common poli-
ce force in the town for Croats and Muslims,
WEU committed itself to assisting the European
Union administrator by setting up a multinational
police force of approximately 200 officers.
However, to date, it is still not clear whether this
force has actually been brought up to full strength.
Nevertheless, in their Lisbon declaration dated
15th May 1995, the WEU Ministers " welcomed
the agreement between the parties concerned on
the implementation of the flrst phase of the estab-
lishment of a unified police force of Mostar
(UPFM) and regarding the structure of the future
UPFM. They believe that these important steps
should lead to the implementation of the UPFM.
Ministers agreed to continue to encourage the par-
ties, in particular via the presidency, to secure
agreement to the subsequent implementation
phases and the establishment of the UPFM.
Ministers welcomed the forthcoming participa-
tion of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the WEU
police element, in addition to the contributions
provided by the member states. "
29. The re-establishment of an adminisfration
in Mostar is regarded as a test of the viability of ttre
Bosnian-Croat Federation. However, the results
obtained so far by Mr. Koschnik are not particul-
arly encouraging. In January, he accused the
Croats in particular of hindering his task. He noted
in a communiqud that the town remained comple-
tely divided between the Bosnians who confrol the
eastern part, and the Croats who confrol the wes-
tern part. The adminisfiation specifically accuses
the Croats of holding up the formation of mixed
Muslim-Croat-European patrols, which is
delaying the re-establishment of free movement
throughout the town. Moreover, in early April, Mr.
Koschnik stated that he was convinced that the
embargo against Bosnia would primarily harm the
civilian population while doing nothing to prevent
the clandestine importation of armaments into the
Balkans6. Your Rapporteur will return to the ques-
tion of the embargo in a later chapter.
30. As to monitoring the prohibition of military
flights in the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
accordance with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 816 (1993), the United Nations Secre-
tary-General reports regularly to the Security Coun-
cil on information received by LjNPROFOR regar-
ding apparent violations. According to the most
recentreport of which your Rapporteuris aware (9th
April 195)? covering the period 30th March to 2nd
April 1995, it would appear that2l aircraft or heli-
copter flights took place in the airspace over Bosnia-
Herzegovina. According to the report the total num-
ber of flights regarded as apparent violations stands
at present (9th April 1995) at4 290!
31. One may wonder why the WEU Council
does not communicate any information on these
violations and their implications. It does however
emerge from the report of the United Nations
Secretary-General dated 22nd March 1995' that
NAIO, at the request of UNPROFOR, is conti-
nuing to monitor and enforce the flight exclusion
zone. According to this report " the 'no-fly-zone'
6. Frankfurter Allgemeine 7*itung,4th April 1995.
7. United Nations document Sll995l Add.24.
8. United Nations document 5119951222.
4. The Times, l4th December 1994.
5. Document Sl 19951222.
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enforcement has successfully prevented the use by
the warring sides of offensive air power and the
availability of NAIO air power has considerably
shengthened UNPROFOR's bargaining position
in negotiating convoy clearances ". The United
Nations Secretary-General is keen to " emphasise
that, despite regular frequent infringements of the
'no-fly-zone' by helicopters and some occasional
fixed-wing activity " he remains " convinced that
the deterrent effect of NAIO operations has contri-
buted to the effective containment of warring fac-
tions' air activity for combat purposes ". One may
wonder whether such an assessment is still valid,
particularly after the Serbs succeeded, on 2nd
June, in shooting down an American F-16 aircraft
over Bosnian territory.
32. It should also be recalled that, on 4th
August 1994, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) had decided to break off
political and economic relations with the " Repu-
blic Srpska " representing the Bosnian Serbs, to
prohibit the Bosnian Serb leaders from visiting
Federal Yugoslav Republic tenitory and to close
its border with Serb-confrolled Bosnian territory
to all forms of transport except that carrying food-
stuffs, clothing and medicines.
33. Following a report submitted on l1th April
1995 by the co-Chairmen of the Steering Commit-
tee of the International Conference on former Yugo.
slavia b the United Nations Secretary-Generale :
" In light of the foregoing developments
during the past 30 days, based on the mis-
sion's on-site observation, and based on the
advice of the mission ceordinator, IvIr. T. J.
Nieminen, and in the absence of any contra-
ry information from the ar, whether the air-
borne reconnaissance system of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or
national technical means, and aside from the
reported tracking of helicopters crossing the
border, the co-Chairmen conclude that the
Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is
continuing to meet its commiunent to close
the land border betrueen the Federal Repu-
blic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina under the control of the Bos-
nian Serb forces. The co-Chairmen also
conclude that during the past 30 days there
were no commercial ftansshipments across
the border between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. "
34. For that reason the United Nations Security
Council agreed in Resolution 988, dated 21st
April 1995, on a partial suspension of the econo-
mic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro) until 5th July
1995. However serious doubts remain about the
aims of Mr. Milosevic's policy towards the Bos-
nian Serbs and even his determination to break
with Mr. Karadzic. This attitude has, as yet, had
no influence whatsoever on the inhansigence of
the Bosnian Serb leaders' position.
(b) The situation in Croatia
35. Following the precarious truce established
in Croatia since the end of the Croat offensive
against the western sector of Krajina in early May
1995, two problems have to be dealt with: first,
avoiding a resumption of hostilities and, second,
frnding a political solution to the future status of
the " Serb Republic of Krajina " proclaimed on
19th December 1991 by the Serb minority estab-
lished on Croatian territory. It should be remem-
bered that Croatia has never relinquished its claim
to conffol this territory. After the end of the Serbo-
Croat war in autumn iggl, apeace plan signed by
the Croats on 3rd January 1992 provided for the
deployment of blue berets to disarm the rebel
militia and prepare for the return of refugees.
According toZagreb, these provisions were never
implemented and the blue berets served Serb
interests by maintaining the status quo in the terri-
tories occupied by the secessionist Serbs.
36. The new mandate of UNCRO forces in
Croatia, under the terms of United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 981, dated 31st March
1995, and Resolution 990, therefore includes,
inter alia, controlling the movement of military
personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons
across the international borders between Croatia
and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at the
border crossings for which UNCRO is respon-
sible; this mandate further provides that UNCRO
is to facilitate the delivery of international huma-
nitarian assistance to Bosnia through the territory
of Croatia and monitor the demilitarisation of the
Prevlaka peninsula. Its aim is also to facilitate
implementation of the economic agreement
concluded on 2nd December 1994 between the
Croats and the Krajina authorities under the aus-
pices of the co-Chairmen of the International
Conference on former Yugoslavia.
37. To achieve its objectives, the Security
Council approved the implementation plan sub-
mitted by the United Nations Secretary-General
on l8th April 1995'0, which stated that a comple-
ment of some 8 750 troops would be sufficient. It
is therefore envisaged that the United Nations
forces currently in Croatia can be reduced to the
proposed level of 8 750 roops between now and
30th June 1995 and that deployment will be com-
pleted on that date.
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38. The implementation of this new plan has
been seriously called into question both by the
refusal of the Krajina Serbs to accept it and by the
Croatian offensive against the Serbs of western
Slovenia in early May 1995. Security Council
Resolution 994 dated 17th May 1995 therefore
calls upon the parties to complete without delay
the withdrawal of all their troops from the separa-
tion areas agreed in the cease-fire agreement and
refrain from any further violation ofthese areas; it
also calls for the status and mandate of UNCRO
to be respected and the safety and protection of
LINCRO personnel to be assured.
39. Even if the situation prevailing in Croatia
differs from that of Bosnia, principally because
the Krajina Serbs have not taken hostages among
the blue berets, it is impossible yet to predict the
consequences of the creation, agreed in Paris, of a
rapid reaction force on the evolution of events in
Croatia. The differences that divide the Serb
authorities of Krajina are deepening and the
departure of the moderate " head of govern-
ment ", Mr. Mikelic, is reinforcing the emerging
tendency in Krajina to reject the stationing of blue
berets in this territory and initiatives for unifying
Krajina and Bosnian Serb territory.
40. Such a development would have serious
consequences for the chances of plan Z-4 being
accepted, in other words the draft agreement on
Krajina, Slavonia, southern Baranja and western
Sirmium worked out by the ambassadors to Croa-
tia of the United States and the Russian Federa-
tion and certain representatives of the internatio-
nal conference on the former Yugoslavia. This
arrangement provides for very wide autonomy for
the Serb minorities in Croatia and in particular the
right of Krajina Serbs to mint their own coinage
and have their own police force, if the Serbs reco-
gnise Croatia's sovereignty over that region and
over its international borders. If, conversely, a
unified Serbian state spanning Bosnian-Croatian
borders were to be proclaimed, this would not
only be the end of the contact group's peace plan,
which is based on the integrity of Bosnian terri-
tory, but also that of theZ-4 group.
41. Regarding Croatia's internal policy, it
should be noted that the media and independent
information means are encountering difficulties in
relation to Mr. Tudjman's government which is
seeking to control and dominate them.
42. Apart from unresolved problems in other
Serb-occupied regions of Croatia such as Slavo-
nia, Croatia has an additional internal difficulty
linked to the status of Istria, which has, for some
years, been asking for greater autonomy from the
government inZagreb. The region, which has an
Italian minority of some 30 000 out of a total of
250 000 inhabitants, was divided into two parts
following the creation of the independent states of
Slovenia and Croatia after the collapse of Yugo-
slavia. In early February, the Croatian Constitu-
tional Court ruled that Croatian Istria's indepen-
dent status was largely unconstitutional and
repealed several articles, including those relating
to the rights of the Italian minority and the right to
use the Italian language on a par with Croatian.
This decision by the Constitutional Court
confirms the centralising tendency of the Croatian
Government which is leading it to curtail the auto-
nomy of national minorities and local authorities
alike. It is giving rise to acute concern among the
population of Istria and the ethnic Italian
community.
(c) The situation in the former hrgoslav Republic
otMacedonia (FYROM)
43. The relatively small number of Serbs living
on FYROM territory (approximately 2.2Vo of the
population) has certainly helped to keep this coun-
try out of the fighting and to bring about an agree-
ment between Macedonia and former Yugoslavia
in September 1993, establishing the rights of the
Serbian minority. It would appear from a report of
the United Nations Secretary-General dated 22nd
March t995tt that ttre government of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia expressed the
wish that United Nations forces stationed in that
country should be separate from UNPROFOR. The
United Nations Security Council therefore agreed,
in Resolution 983 dated 31st March 1995, that in
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
UNPROFOR would in future be known as the Uni-
ted Nations preventive deployment force (JNPRE-
DEF) and that its mandate would cover a period
ending on 30th November 1995.
M. In the light of Belgrade's equivocal attitude
towards Macedonia (and taking account also of
that country's differences with Greece), the most
widely publicised international effort to prevent
armed conflict in the FYROM has undoubtedly
been the preventive deployment of United
Nations forces. United Nations Security Council
Resolution 795 of 1lth December 1992 had
authorised the deployment of an infantry battalion
and observers to monitor the FYROM's border
with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia. On 18th June 1993, the United Nations
Security Council authorised sending reinforce-
ments of 1 000 American troops. At the end of
March 1995, the true number of American forces
in Macedonia was 540 men, reinforced by a Nor-
dic battalion of 556 troops to which must be
added 53 representatives of the command head-
quarters12. However the United States has still not
opened an embassy in Skopje.
I l. United Nations document 5119951222.
12. Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
29th March 1995, 5119951222.
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45. While this preventive deployment, in
which mainly the United States participates (this
is the only example of American partiCipation in
the territory of former Yugoslavia), has contribu-
ted to stability in this region, it should be recalled
that, during the Political Committee's visit to
Washington in March 1995, an expert from the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) nevertheless pointed to the growing risk of
conflict breaking out in the FYROM following
mounting tension between Macedonians and
Albanians. He did not even rule out the possibi-
lity of Bulgaria's becoming involved in such a
conflict.
46. The United Nations Secretary-General
states in his report dated 22nd March 1995 13 that
the government of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia conducted a nation-wide census
from 25th June to 11rh July 1994, in order to
establish accurate estimates of the ethnic compo-
sition of the population. This exercise is monito-
red, financed and partly organised by the Council
of Europe and the European Union. In November
1994, the government announced the results
which showed that 677o of the population were
ethnic Macedonians, 237o were ethnic Albanians
and the remaining l0Vo were formed of Turks,
Serbs, Vlachs, gypsies and people of non-identi-
fied ethnicity. Ethnic Albanian leaders have dis-
puted the results, proffering a figure of 35Vo for
the ethnic Albanian population.
47. Again according to the report by the United
Nations Secretary-General, " some leaders of the
ethnic Albanian population have stepped up
demands for improvements in their political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural and educational status,
including recognition of Albanian as the repu-
blic's second official language ". Confrontation
occurred on 17th February 1995 during a demons-
tration in favour of establishing an Albanian lan-
guage university at Tetovo.
48. Internal political, social and inter-ethnic
difficulties continue to be exacerbated by the fra-
gile state of the economy of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. According to the above
report of the United Nations Secretary-General,
" the trade embargo imposed by Greece in
February 1994, as well as United Nations sanc-
tions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(Serbia and Montenegro) continue to disrupt
severely the country's principal export/import
routes on its southern and northern borders ".
49. The United Nations Secretary-General
notes that the monitoring carried out by the blue
berets along the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia's borders with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and with
Albania reveals no immediate military threat.
Yet, there has been no decisive move towards
establishing a clear international border between
Macedonia and Yugoslavia. There is only " a mili-
tary administrative boundary " between the two
parties. While LINPROFOR has monitored mili-
tary patrols from both countries crossing the
boundary, it has observed no tension betweeh the
two sides. However the potential for confronta-
tion still exists in the absence of an international
border recognised by both sides.
50. By all accounts, the balance of the situation
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
continues to be unstable and many FYROM poli-
ticians are convinced that Belgrade and Athens
are co-ordinating their policy against Skopje,
since neither Yugoslavia nor Greece is particular-
ly friendly to this small country which neither of
them recognises.
IV The implementation of sancti,ons against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the effictiveness of the embargo
on arrnaments boundfor the tenitory
of former Yugoslavia
51. If information supplied by the WEU Coun-
cil, in particular in the second part of the fortieth
annual report of the Council to the Assembly, is to
be believed, it is a fact that the joint Council of
WEU and NATO noted in relation to operation
Sharp Guard that " the concept of operations
remained completely valid, taking into account
the adjustments made by the operational com-
manders ". We are also informed that the Planning
Cell presents weekly written situation reports to
the Permanent Council with the aim of informing
the Council about current operations such as Deny
Flight, Sharp Guard and the Danube embargo.
The presidency, for its part, has regularly briefed
the Council on developments in the WEU Danube
operation. According to the annual report, the
Council has also closely followed the conduct of
operation Sharp Guard to strengthen the embargo
in the Adriatic.
52. Whereas the Council is giving no concrete
information to the Assembly on the effectiveness
of the embargo, press reports suggest that arms tra-
ders are likely to have a field day tluoughout for-
mer Yugoslavia '', which is somewhat disturbing.
Indeed, is it not to be feared that all the measures
to implement the embargo are proving ineffective
since arms and fuel are crossing the border by
clandestine means that are impossible to control?
53. Referred to primarily are the large arms
deliveries to Bosnia from Iran which are supposed
to have been made in May 1994. However, an
13. United Nations document 5119951222.
3t7
14. Le Figaro, l5th March 1995.
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EU/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Mission exists in
Brussels under the chairmanship of the Italian
Ambassador Antonio Napolitano which reports
regularly on the situation regarding sanctions
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
According to press reports'5:
" The sanctions were first imposed on
Yugoslavia by the United Nations in 1992,
and from the beginning they have been
porous. But controls on the Danube and in
Bulgaria and Romania have reduced,
although not completely elimiated, trade
with Serbia along those routes.
Now, new routes have sprung up, principal-
ly through Macedonia and Albania, accor-
ding to American and European officials
throughout the region.
Nearly 5 000 trucks and 1 200 rail cars
crossed from Macedonia into Serbia during
the f,rrst six weeks of this year carrying che-
micals, spare parts and metals, according to
a 27th.February report of the EU sanctions
commlsslon.
A return flow of 4 535 rucks and | 524 rul
cars moved from Serbia into Macedonia,
according to the report, carrying shoes,
copper wire, furniture and tractors, the stuff
that brings in foreign exchange so that Ser-
bia can pay for the fuel and other strategic
needs being smuggled in.
The United States and the European Union
have virtually given up trying to enforce
the sanctions in Macedonia because the
country is suffering under its own econo-
mic embargo by Greece, arising out of a
feud over the use of the name Macedonia.
In Albania, a leadership stnrggling with a
feeble economy is reluctant to interfere with
the trade that has made the country the
major route for fuel into Serbia, providing
an income for substantial numbers of Alba-
nians as well as revenue forthe government.
The fuel Albanians are smuggling into Ser-
bia is coming from Greek and Italian oil
companies. For nine months last year,
Greek companies shipped nearly 22mlllion
gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel to Alba-
nia, and Italian companies 14 million,
according to the commission.
American officials say that, at most, half of
that was for domestic consumption, with
the rest going on to Serbia, where officials
say it is being used not for consumers, who
are suffering most from the sanctions, but
for Serbia's war machine. "
54. According to American intelligence
reports, Greek companies in particular are send-
ing thousands of barels of fuel to Albania whence
most of these consignments are smuggled into
Yugoslavia. In March, Albania imported 9 000
more barrels a day than it needed for domestic
consumption. In January, the excess came to
3 645 banels a day. Greek companies have repla-
ced Italian ones as the principal source of fuel, the
intelligence reports show. But a Greek official
asserted that Italy, not Greece, was the main cul-
prit'u.
55. According to the American pressrT,
Washinglon has made repeated overtures to Greece
to exercise control over the rade. The response
has generally been that there is nothing illegal
about selling fuel to Albania. Italy has also ans-
wered in similar terms. Another report by the
sanctions commission of the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe indicated
that, after Albania, the most blatant violations of
sanctions could be attributed to Macedonia.
56. Moreover, in their Lisbon declaration of
15th May 1995, the WEU Ministers " welcomed
the successful results accomplished by the WEU
police and customs mission on the Danube, which
contribute to the full implementation of the
relevant United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions ...They also expressed their satisfaction at
the continued positive results achieved in the joint
WEU-NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adria-
tic ". Bearing in mind all the above information,
this declaration seems to have no credibility what-
soever and to be remote from the real world.
57. In this context, it should be noted that on
5th April 1995 the Prime Minister of Bulgaria
said that it was urgently necessary to lift the
embargo against Yugoslavia which, in his view,
constituted an increasingly real threat to the stabi-
lity of third countries'8. According to the former
government of Mr. Luben Berov, Bulgaria suffe-
red direct and indirect losses worth $6.1 billion as
a result of the embargo against Yugoslavia. In
April too, China came out in favour of lifting
sanctions against Yugoslavia. As matters now
stand, the negotiators, endeavouring to offer Bel-
grade a parlial removal of the sanctions against
the country in exchange for Yugoslav recognition
of Croatia and Bosnia as defined by their interna-
tional borders are finding themselves in an increa-
singly weaker position.
58. Other questions arise, however: first, one
cannot help but wonder at the reaction of the
Security Council when informed of sanctions vio-
16. International Herald Tribune, 2nd May 1995.
17. International Herald Tribune, 2ndMay 1995.
18. Agence France Presse,5th April 1995.15. International Herald Tribune, l2th April 1995.
318
I
l
rl
ri
!1
DocUIvGNI1467
lations. Second, the Council of WEU must be
required to give the Assembly specific informa-
tion about the effectiveness of the embargo, or
risk losing all credibility.
V. The rdle of Belgrade
59. With regard to the situation in the Federal
Repubtc of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
developments in the Kosovo, Vojvodina and
Sandjak regions continue to give rise to concern.
In Kosovo province, the population of which is
90Vo Nbanian, there seems to be no hope of an
agreement being reached between the Albanian
community, which is demanding the restoration of
the independence it lost in 1990, and Belgrade,
which not only takes the view that Kosovo is an
integral part of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro) '' but furthermore does not recognise any
form of autonomy for it. Given this situation, the
Geneva talks in the framework of the international
conference on Yugoslavia are making no headway
whatsoever and, in addition, thousands of ethnic
Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo have already left
the country forAlbania. In any event, the problem
remains unsolved and might become a new sour-
ce of conflict in the Balkans.
60. It seems that for Serbs, Kosovo has an
almost mythical significance. This attachment is
historically based, for Kosovo was once the seat
of a medieval Patriarchate and the cenfte of early
Serbian civilisation. Also, it was at Kosovo Polje(the field of Kosovo), near Pristina, that Serbs
fought a much celebrated battle against the Turks
in 1389. Serbs see Kosovo as a central and inalie-
nable part of their civilisation.
61. In 1990, having put an end to the indepen-
dence Tlto had granted Kosovo in 1974, Belgiade
imposed a harsh political and military r6gime on
the population of the region. Prominent ethnic
Albanians lost all the influential political and
adminisrative offices they had formerly held and
a 40 00O-strong security force was set up in the
region. If the number of ethnic Albanian refugees
leaving Kosovo for Albania continues to increase
apace, the situation might dangerously deteriorate.
62. Also in 1990, Vojvodina, like Kosovo, lost
the independent status in Yugoslavia that it had
enjoyed since 1974. Serbs are in the majority in
this region, where they now account for 57% of
the population, followed by lTVo ethnic Hunga-
rians, the remainder being divided between
Romanians, Croats, Slovaks, Ruthenians and
Ukrainians. Not only do the non Serb minorities,
particularly the Hungarian minority, feel them-
selves victims of pressure from Belgrade as a
result of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, they also believe that Belgrade is promoting
the setflement of Serb refugees in Hungarian and
Croat-dominated regions of Vojvodina and even
encouraging ethnic cleansing to Serb advantage,
along with atrocities 
- 
of which proof existi 
-
against the Hungarian and Croaf populations.
Another source of tension is the reluctance of the
non Serb minorities in Vojvodina to enlist in the
ranks of the army of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to
serve the cause of " Greater Serbia ". Roughly
25 000 Hungarians and,37 000 Croats are belie-
ved to have left the area for these reasons. The
growing number of refugees leaving Vojvodina
!9r Hungary, violation of Hungarian air space by
Y-ugoslav aircraft and the shelling of the Hunga-
rian town of Barcs have contributed to increasing
tension between Hungary and the Federal Repu-
blic of Yugoslavia. However the Hungarian
Government has, so far, managed to avoid direct
involvement in the conflict.
63. With regard to the Sandjak, straddling the
border between Serbia and Montenegro and
adjoining Bosnia and Kosovo, this impoverished
region has a majority Muslim population which
identifies with the Muslims of Bosnia-Heruego-
vina. In a referendum on 25th-27th October
1991, held despite police obstruction and disrup-
tion, 98.97o of voters in the Serbian Sandjak
expressed themselves in favour of regional auto-
nomy and subsequent integration with another
republic, namely Bosnia Herzegovina. Shortly
thereafter the Sandjak leaders in Serbia declared
their autonomy. This was an obvious challenge
to Serb interests. As in Kosovo, rumours abound
in the Sandjak to the effect that the Serb authori-
ties in the region are endeavouring to remove
Muslims from posts of influence in politics and
administration and encroaching on Muslim pro-
perty. It appears that there is less tension in the
part of the Sandjak belonging to Montenegro.
However if open conflict were to break out in
Kosovo or cross the border from Bosnia-Herze-
govina, the Sandjak region would quickly
become involved.
64. In a referendum held in March 1992,66Vo
of the electorate of Montenegro voted in favour of
remaining in the Federal Republic of Serbia.
Nevertheless, relations with Belgrade are not
without tension, as it is feared by some in Monte-
negro that nationalist Serbs want federal union
with Montenegro and they are also hoping to
incorporate it into a Greater Serbia. Unlike Bel-
grade, Montenegro has stated that it is willing to
have an OSCE observer mission on its borders
with Bosnia-Herzegovina.
65. The closed and highly cenftalist mentality
of the Belgrade authorities was recently confir-
med by an article by the leader of the Serbian19. Neue Zircher Znitwrg, 27th March 1995.
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socialists, Miharlo Markovic, which appeared in
the newspaper " Borba ", in which he argues that
the rights of nations and national minorities
should be even further curtailed'o. He quotes the
example of countries such as " Bulgaria, Greece,
Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Serbia " which
are able to maintain their territorial integrity only
through repressive measures against the Chechen,
Hungarian, Turk or Albanian separatist move-
ments. As far as the Kosovo Albanians are
concerned, he argues that one must start by ack-
nowledging the fact that Kosovo is part of Serbia.
These alarming views must be challenged and
rejected by the international community.
66. As to the official policy of Belgrade, opi-
nions are divided on the future sftategy of Presi-
dent Milosevic. Some foresee a decisive battle
between Serbs and Croats in the event of a
UNPROFOR withdrawal, others feel that Mr.
Milosevic's first priority is likely to be the lifting
of sanctions imposed on.his country and its return
to the international community of states. There
are signs to suggest that the thinking in Belgrade
is also that it would not be in Mr. Milosevic's
interest to become involved in further war with
Croatia over the Croatian Serbs. According to
this view, Belgrade would not be opposed in prin-
ciple to Krajina being reintegrated into the Croa-
tian state, although this would not necessarily
mean that Belgrade was prepared to recognise
Croatia's pre-war borders. For that to happen,
Serbia is asking Croatia to recognise it as the sole
successor to former Yugoslavia and to settle the
status of the Krajina region.
67. Regarding the position of the internal oppo-
sition parties in Serbia which hold 123 seats out of
250 in the Belgrade Parliament, it must be noted
that these have widely differing views. Among
the latter are extreme nationalist elements whose
r6le is exfremely negative. Other, more moderate
tendencies are trying to encourage Mr. Milose-
vic's government to take a more flexible attitude
towards negotiation. It also appears that the pres-
sure exerted by the government in Belgrade on all
forms of opposition, especially the independent
media, has intensified following the break with
the Bosnian Serbs. Many feel that Milosevic has
undermined the basis of his own legitimacy by no
longer fighting for a solution to the problem of
Serbia as a nation, i.e. the creation of a Greater
Serbia in which all Serbs would be united, but
solely.for the lifting of international sanctions at
any pnce.
68. Indeed, there are many signs indicating that
Mr. Milosevic is preparing to decide whether or
not to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina. Talks bet-
ween the Yugoslav Head of Government and Mr.
Filipovic, the Bosnian Ambassador to Switzer-
land, held in Belgrade in March 1995, seemed to
point in this direction. However, a month later,
Mr. Milosevic stated to contact group representa-
tives that there was no question of recognising
Bosnia-Herzegovina until the latter was transfor-
med into a union of states that included the Serb-
held regions. Mr. Milosevic also asked for sanc-
tions to be lifted as a precondition of any
recognition2'.
69. Since the end of May 1995, there have been
many reports to the effect that Mr. Milosevic may
have accepted recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina
in principle. In particular, the American represen-
tative on the contact group, Mr. Frasure, has nego-
tiated this question several times with Mr. Milo-
sevic. However these rumours have given rise to
sfiong protest from the exffeme right opposition
in Belgrade, which has denounced any form of
recognition as a betrayal of Serb interests.
Conversely, other opposition elements have stated
that they would support Mr. Milosevic if he were
to recognise Bosnia.
70. Nevertheless, it seems that hope largely
now rests on Mr. Milosevic. According to a
contact group proposal, recognition of the integri-
ty of Bosnia-Herzegovina's international borders
might be obtained by a panial lifting of the eco-
nomic sanctions against Belgrade for a period of
200 days. Arms and fuel deliveries alone would
continue to be prohibited. It is hoped by this reco-
gnition to further isolate the Serbs in Pale, but it is
impossible to foresee the consequences of such
recognition.
71. The influence of Mr. Milosevic over Serbs
in Pale and Krajina Serbs seems limited and his
true intentions are still not known. A1l the wes-
tern leaders have put pressure on him to use his
influence on the Pale leadership to obtain an
immediate release of the hostages. At the same
time, they have asked Russia to make representa-
tions to Belgrade in this connection. In such cir-
cumstances, what will be the effect of the creation
of the rapid reaction force which has been decided
in Paris? Can Mr. Milosevic survive politically in
his own country if he abandons his project for a
Greater Serbia once and for all?
72. In this context, one must consider the pos-
sible extent of the r6le of the Orthodox Church
and the influence it exerts over the official policy
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and also
over the Serb authorities in Bosnia and the lGaji-
na and Slavonia regions. According to the politi-
cians your Rapporteur met during his talks in Bel-
grade, the Orthodox Church would appear to be
one of the principal advocates of a Greater Serbia.
The influence exerted by the Orthodox Church
throughout the country is perhaps therefore one of
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the reasons 
- 
or alibis 
- 
for Mr. Milosevic's hesi-
tation. The question is therefore how to avoid the
Onhodox Church becoming a major obstacle to
the peace process.
VI. The possibility of international efforts
pacifying the Balkans
73. International activities to bring an end to
the war, particularly in Bosnia, are concenftated
on two main problems: first, the question of the
UNPROFOR mandate and the division of tasks
between the United Nations and NATO in the
military management of the conflict and, second,
the search for a political solution, properly speak-
ing, acceptable to all concerned. Clearly these two
problems are closely linked.
74. The unease of the blue berets in the conflict
in Bosnia, as in other regions of former Yugosla-
via, has been described, inter alia, in a report by
the United Nations Secretary-General: Supple-
ment to an agenda for peace: position paper, pre-
sented by the Secretary-General on 3rd January
1995 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of
the United Nations22. In this report, the Secretary-
General recalls that in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
" Even though the use of force is authorised
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Uni-
ted Nations remains neutral and impartial
between the warring parties, without a
mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be
identified) or impose a cessation of hostili-
ties. Nor is this peace-keeping as practised
hitherto, because the hostilities continue
and there is often no agreement between
the warring parties on which a peace-keep-
ing mandate can be based. The safe areas
concept in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a
similar case. It too gives the United Nations
a humanitarian mandate under which the
use of force is authorised, but for limited
and local purposes and not to bring the war
to an end. "
75. It is precisely on this last point that major
differences between the United Nations and
NATO have arisen. Although the United Nations
mandate is in fact as limited as the above paragraph
describes, account must nevertheless be taken of
Security Council Resolution 836 of 4th June
1993,in which it was decided first:
" to extend ... the mandate of UNPRO-
FOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas
... to deter attacks against [the latter] to
monitor the cease-fire, to promote the with-
drawal of military or paramilitary units
other than those of the Government of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to
occupy some key points on the ground, in
addition to participating in the delivery of
humanitarian relief to the population as
provided for in Resolution 776 (1992) ot
14th September 1992;"
second:
" ... To make the adjustments or reinforce-
ment of UNPROFOR which might be
required by the implementation of the pre-
sent resolution, and to consider assigning
UNPROFOR elements in support of the
elements entrusted with protection of safe
areas, with the agreement of the govern-
ments contributing forces; "
third, to authorise:
" UNPROFOR, in addition to the mandate
defined in Resolutions 770 (1992) of l3th
August 1992 and 776 (1992), in carrying
out the mandate defined ... above, acting in
self-defence, to take the necessary mea-
sures, including the use of force, in reply to
bombardments against the safe areas by
any of the parties or to armed incursion into
them or in the event of any deliberate obs-
truction in or around those areas to the free-
dom of movement of UNPROFOR or of
protected humanitarian convoys; "
fourth, the Security Council decided:
" that ... member states, acting nationally or
through regional organisations or arrange-
ments, may take, under the authority of the
Security Council and subject to close co-ordi-
nation with the Secretary-General and
UNPROFOR, all necessary measures,
through the use of air power, in and around
the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the
performance of its mandate set out... above. "
76. Finally, the Security Council requested the
member states concerned, in other words, prima-
rily those of the Atlantic Alliance, and the Secre-
tary-General and UNPROFOR to co-ordinate clo-
sely on the measures they were taking over the
arrangements to implement the foregoing para-
graph. However, bearing in mind what has hap-
pened in the " safe area" around Bihac, for
example, implementation of Resolution 836 has
been a complete failure. Implementation of this
resolution also failed when the United Nations
authorities asked NAIO to carry out air strikes on
24th and 26th May 1995 around Sarajevo, since
the blue berets were not in a position to defend
themselves nor to prevent the Serbs from taking
some of them hostage. The decision taken in Paris
on 3rd June 1995 to create a rapid reaction force
might therefore be considered as a measure which
seeks to implement 
- 
somewhat belatedly 
- 
Secu-
rity Council Resolution 836.
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77. Many questions remain regarding the man-
date and status of this force. Under what type of
command is it to be placed? What will be its rela-
tions with the United Nations, NATO or WEU?
Quite apart from the problem of the release of the
hostagei, will this force have the task of ensuring
that the blue berets remain in Bosnia or will it
facilitate their withdrawal?
78. It appears finally to have been understood,
however, that NATO air strikes are useless, indeed
dangerous, without land forces that are sufficient-
ly large and well-armed in the field to repel
actions taken by those against whom the air
strikes were directed and protect the safe areas.
What must be avoided at all costs is that the new
rapid reaction force should be considered from
now on as the unit involved in the war. Conse-
quently, it is important to state clearly that its esta-
blishment is fully covered by Resolution 836 and
it remains for the members of the United Nations
Security Council to reach agreement on a new,
more specific mandate. However, the Security
Council's decision on the implementation of this
mandate has been delayed, the American
Congress having opposed American participation
in financing the rapid reaction force. Finally, on
16th June 1995, the Security Council voted a
resolution authorising the creation of a rapid reac-
tion force of up to 12 500 troops. Russia and
China abstained. The resolution does not specify
the conditions under which this force will be
authorised to use its heavy weapons. Moreover, it
merely indicates that a decision on financing will
be taken later.
79. One might nevertheless wonder whether
this force will be really strong enough to carry out
the tasks it will have to shoulder. Moreover, what
r61e will be played by WEU, the only European
defence organisation involved in this matter? The
United States, whose official line changes vir-
tually from day to day as regards whether or not it
will be prepared to paflicipate in action on the
ground in former Yugoslavia, has eventually
given to understand that it would become invol-
ved only if a possible withdrawal of the blue
berets called for military suppotr. It is now there-
fore for Europeans to demonstrate whether or not
they are able to manage this crisis alone (with of
course the backing of the United Nations). Rus-
sia's attitude to the Paris decision is the major
unknown factor at the present time.
80. However, in attempting to reach agreement
on the best way to protect the safe areas, the pro-
blems encountered are not only those of co-ordi-
nation between the United Nations, NATO and
WEU but also the fundamental problem that
consensus is as much lacking among the powers
represented at the Security Council as in the
Atlantic Alliance, the European Union or WEU,
over who are the aggressors, who are the aggres-
sed, who are the guilty parties and who are the
victims in this war. Preferably, reference is made
to " belligerents ", thus putting all the parties
involved in the hostilities on the same footing.
Preferences and sympathies linking those concer-
ned with either the Serbs, Croats or Bosnian Mus-
lims have invariably prevented common positions
being taken in regard to this conflict and also
when faced with the need to put forward a peace
plan acceptable to all concerned. As Mr. Cutileiro,
Secretary-General of WEU, observed recently in
an address to the Royal Institute for International
Relations, Brussels23:
" Former Yugoslavia does show that in
1991 we had not yet reached a stage where
political agreement among us could have
led to swift and decisive collective action.
But it also shows 
- 
and this is more impor-
tant 
- 
that we had already reached a stage
where a conflict of that magnitude and clo-
seness to our borders was unable to make
us break ranks and come into confrontation
with each other. If we look back to history,
this is a remarkable achievement. "
81. It may be said that we are no further for-
ward in 1995 than in 1991 
- 
and the danger of a
wider confrontation is still present. NATO is the-
refore intensifying its preparation of contingency
plans in support of a possible withdrawal of the
blue berets. Yet a political solution which makes
no provision for supervision by United Nations
forces is unrealistic. Must the fighting be conti-
nued inexorably until the total collapse of all
sides?
82. The pursuit of political efforts to find a
solution to the conflict in Bosnia is still based on
the peace plan proposed on 5th July 1994 by the
contact group of representatives of France, Ger-
many, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United
States: this plan allocated 5lVo of Bosnian terri-
tory to the Croatian-Muslim federation and 49Vo
to the Serbs, while envisaging that the state as a
whole should continue to exist within its recogni-
sed borders. The parliament of the Croatian-Mus-
lim federation accepted this proposal, but the Bos-
nian Serbs rejected it and demanded new
negotiations.
83. At the beginning of January, new initiatives
were taken by the contact group with a view to
offering the Bosnian Serbs the possibility of
amending the lines on the map drawn up on 5th
July 1994 for dividing the territory between the
populations concerned. The Serbs had specifical-
ly laid claim to the Muslim enclaves of Srebreni-
ca and Gorazde together with part of the town of
Sarajevo. While the Bosnian Government rejec-
23. Western European Union 
- 
myth and reality. Address by
Mr. Jos6 Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, Palais d'Eg-
mont, Brussels, Thursday, fth February 1995.
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ted any changes to the peace plan, Mr. Karadzic
reiterated the demand for the partition of the town
of Sarajevo.
84. After a six-month period of diplomatic iso-
lation of the Bosnian Serbs, contact group emissa-
ries resumed negotiations with them to try and
persuade them to accept the peace plan. More-
over, the American Government had informed the
Bosnian Government on 19th January 1995 that
the United States was prepared to resume talks
with the Bosnian Serbs, while emphasising that
this in no way called American support for the
contact group's plan into questionu. (This Ameri-
can initiative ran counter to Resolution 942 pas-
sed in September 1994 whereby the Security
Council prohibited such contacts for as long as the
Bosnian Serbs did not accept the peace plan.)
85. Following talks between the Americans
and the Bosnian Serbs, the latter appear to have
formulated new demands for control over the
whole of the town of Sarajevo and the Tuzla
industrial centre and the division of the country
into two equal parts2s.
86. For as long as the Serbs of Pale hold hos-
tages and continue shelling Sarajevo and for as
long as they are not willing to accept the existing
peace plan as a basis for negotiation, it is scarcely
conceivable that they should again be recognised
as partners in the negotiations that were broken
off on 25th January 1995. Nevertheless, on 5th
June 1995, the Greek Government sent its defence
minister to Pale to obtain the release of the hos-
tages.
87. One might wonder whether the time has
come to take up once again the French proposal
made at the end ofJanuary 1995 for convening a
summit that would bring together Presidents Slo-
bodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, Alija Izetbegovic
of Bosnia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia under
the aegis of the European Union, the United
States and Russia in an attempt to take up the
threads of the dialogue on the whole range of pro-
blems that are still outstanding. On 6th February
1995, the European Union had agreed this propo-
sal, after having specified that such a meeting
might have as the frst agenda item mutual reco-
gnition of these three states. A fuither aim of the
meeting would be to reaffirm acceptance of the
contact group's plan on the division of territory
between the three Bosnian communities; in
exchange, suspension of sanctions against Yugo-
slavia might be offered to Mr. Milosevic and last-
ly, the summit meeting might ratify the most
recent international proposal for a settlement of
the conflict in Croatia between theZagreb autho-
rities and the Krajina Serbs.
24. I* Monde, 24th January 1995.
25.Die Welt, 24th January 1995.
88. The offer of a total suspension (rather than
lifting) of the sanctions imposed on Serbia by the
United Nations in May 1992 (with the exception
of the embargo on arms) was a crucial part of the
French proposal to revive the process of negotia-
tion over the whole range of conflicts in Croatia
and Bosnia, provided that Serbia agrees to reco-
gnise the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia within
their present borders which would amount to for-
mally renouncing the creation of a Greater Serbia.
89. However, for this offer to be valid, it is
necessary to ensure that the embargo really
works. It is also absolutely essential to convince
the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group's
peace plan at a time when they feel strong enough
to keep by force the 70Vo Bosnian tenitory they
control at present. Mr. Milosevic's influence over
the Bosnian Serbs in this connection cannot be
relied upon any more than his political will to
exercise it.
90. Several proposals to modify the contact
group's peace plan have begun to circulate in the
press, either for creating a kind of confederation
of all the former components of Yugoslavia- or
persuading the Bosnian Government to accept the
present front lines as borders and allow the Bos-
nian Serbs to form a confederation with Yugo-
slavia".
91. Any uncertainty over the determination of
the international community to implement the
existing peace plan will strengthen the intransi-
gence of the Bosnian Serbs, but would the inter-
national community be prepared to implement the
peace plan by force? There is no indication what-
soever that the United Nations would be prepared
to give such a mandate to any intervention force.
Given the United States' reluctance to become
militarily involved in the Balkans, the Russian
Government's attitude is becoming ever more
important.
92. Russia is a member of the contact group
but does not always support joint approaches
developed in this framework. Moreover, it signed
a military co-operation agreement with Belgrade,
the content of which is unknown. This pact is due
to enter into force only after the lifting of sanc-
tions against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
and Moscow sfrongly supports the lifting of these
sanctions. The President of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia has already expressed
concern about this pact. It should be noted that
Russia did not vote in favour of Security Council
Resolution 981, but instead abstained.
93. When Western European leaders pressed
the Russian President to use his influence to calm
26. See Flora Lewis, Intemational Herald Tribune, l9th May
1995. Die Znit,3lst March 1995.
27. International Herald Tribune, 20th May 1995.
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the situation around Sarajevo, he agreed to do
everything in his power on condition there was a
halt to NATO air strikes in Bosnia, but in reality
Russia's efforts have been negligible; nor did it
react favourably to the creation of a European
rapid reaction force. In any event, Moscow wishes
to play a key r6le in settling the crisis and its
interests are not always the same as those of
Europeans.
VII. The rdle of WEU
94. WEU's political r6le in the conflict raging
in former Yugoslavia may be described as inexis-
tent; the organisation has in fact handed over all
responsibility in the matter to the authorities of
the European Union. As is clear from the first part
of the fortieth annual report of the Council2s, the
latter has done no more than keep informed of the
situation:
" The Greek Representative, on behalf
of the presidency of the Twelve, has regu-
larly briefed the Permanent Council on the
activities and ddmarches of the European
Community aimed at reaching a peaceful
settlement of the conflict in former Yugo-
slavia. "
95. The Council's activities have focused spe-
cifically on the implementation of the Danube
embargo, operation Sharp Guard and WEU's poli-
ce conffibution to the European Union's adminis-
tration of the town of Mostar. The extent of
WEU's marginalisation in political terms cannot
be better described than by the sentence in the
annual report stating that " WEU's involvement is
contingent upon the negotiations on Mostar bet-
ween the European Union's troika and the parties
on the spot ". WEU has not even proved capable,
to date, of supplying the promised number of pol-
icemen for Mostar, in other words, 200 men!
96. However, the WEU Council of Ministers
used its Noordwijk declaration of 14th November
19942e to present a few political considerations
concerning this conflict. Thus, they agreed " on
the need for the United Nations Security Council
to consider the appropriate measures " (against
attacks on safe areas). They also stated their
conviction " that the full development of the fede-
ration of Bosnia and Herzegovina [was] an essen-
tial factor in a political settlement which should
be based on the principle of balanced treatment of
all the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina ".
97. The ministers welcomed " the important
decision by Belgrade to support the peace plan
[which one?] and close the border with Bosnia in
28. Document 1433, 9th November 1 994.
29. Document 1443, lSth November 1994.
order to make the Bosnian Serbs accept the plan ".
They furthermore asked that the contact group
should better inform " non-contact group mem-
bers who, through the contribution of troops, mili-
tary assets or otherwise, contribute to the interna-
tional effort to restore peace in former Yugo-
slavia ". In conclusion, they thought it necessary
for appropriate measures to be envisaged for pre-
serving peace once it was restored in the Balkans,
without specifying what WEU's r6le should be in
such an eventuality, which is still far from immi-
nent.
98. At operational level, there is no longer any
question of WEU being involved in drawing up
contingency plans and the United Nation's sole
interlocutor in this respect is NATO. The Council
criticised the measures taken by the United States
for withdrawing from participation in the enforce-
ment of the arms embargo in the framework of
operation Sharp Guard, but when, in Written
Question 328, Mr. De Decker asked specihcally
about the political consequences of this decision,
the Council's answer was very evasive. The clear
impression conveyed is that WEU's increasing
marginalisation with regard to former Yugoslavia
is not confined to political matters but extends
also to its r6le in the military management of the
crisis.
99. At the close of their meeting in Lisbon, the
WEU Ministers published a declaration on former
Yugoslavia which made no reference whatsoever
to WEU's r6le. Conversely, the Chief-of-Staff of
the French armed forces, Admiral Lanxade, stated
at the close of the Lisbon meeting that the worse-
ning of the situation in Bosnia and Croatia had
been the subject of a mere exchange of views bet-
ween a few WEU countries. In his view it was not
for WEU today to define policy on former Yugo-
slavia30.
100. Marginalisation of WEU became total
when, on 3rd June 1995, France convened the
conference of the fifteen defence ministers of the
countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the Euro-
pean Union to take a decision on the creation of a
rapid reaction force in Bosnia. Apparently, WEU
involvement in this undenaking is in no way envi-
saged. Under such conditions, how can WEU
become the armed branch of the European Union?
The question is still open, but seems of interest to
no one, with the exception of the Assembly.
VIII. Conclusions
101. As matters now stand, the main issue to be
decided is whether the blue berets should remain
in former Yugoslavia and under what terms. Des-
ll
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30. Agence France Presse, l5th May 1995.
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pite all the difficulties and the many humiliations
the United Nations forces have had to undergo, it
must not be forgotten that they have brought and
will continue to bring humanitarian aid, both very
necessary and irreplaceable, to the civilian popu-
lation in the areas of the fighting.
L02. Even if up to now it has not been possible
to protect the United Nations safe areas in Bosnia
and Croatia, the psychological aspect of the pre-
sence of the blue berets providing a degree of
reassurance to the population should not be under-
estimated. A withdrawal of the blue berets would
probably lead to a massive exodus towards the
countries of Western Europe.
103. It is therefore necessary to make clear that
the purpose ofdeploying a rapid reaction force on
the spot is neither to prepare for the withdrawal of
the blue berets nor to allow the international com-
munity to side with one or other of the bellige-
rents, but better to protect the safe areas in accor-
dance with the present United Nations mandate
and specifically with Security Council Resolution
836. If a new Security Council mandate is neces-
sary for the rapid reaction force, this should pri-
marily serve to place the latter clearly under the
existing United Nations mandate, in other words
within the framework of Resolution 836; the wor-
ding should specifically state this.
104. It would also be desirable for other WEU
member countries to participate in some form or
other in the newly-cieated-rapid reaction force
and for WEU to take responsibility for this force,
ensuring the necessary co-ordination with the
United Nations.
105. Apart from the question as to whether there
can be a partial suspension of the sanctions impo-
sed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the
event of Yugoslavia recognising Bosnia and Croa-
tia, a lifting of the embargo on armaments and fuel
cannot be entertained until all parties have agreed
to a peaceful solution of the conflict. Since it is
apparent that this embargo is constantly circum-
vented by illegal supplies through Albania and
Macedonia, it is essential to take vigorous mea-
sures to strengthen its effective implementation.
106. Once there is a multinational buffer force
truly in position between the belligerents, every
effort must be directed towards achieving a last-
ing cease-fire agreement throughout the territory
of former Yugoslavia as the precondition of a
peaceful and political settlement of the conflict
that can be accepted by all the parties concerned.
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Amendments l and 2
lfth June 1995
The situation informer Yugoslavia
AMENDMENTS I and 2'
tahlcd by Mr. Hardy
l. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after" presence and " insert " to clarify the pur-
pose and capacity to take ".
2. At the end of paragraph 16 of the draft recommendation proper, add " but notes that the member
states which have been heavily involved have also borne substantial cost ".
Signed: Hardy
1. See lTth sitting, 2lst June 1995 (amendment I amended and agreed to; amendment 2 agreed to).
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Amendments 3 to 7
19th June 1995
The situation infonner Yugoslavia
AMENDMENTS 3 to 7'
tablcd by Mr. Fassino
3. At the beginning of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " Transform the
rapid reaction force into a European multinational unit " and insert " Verify with the countries which estab-
lished the rapid reaction force that that force is ".
4. Leave out paragraph l0 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Ask the United States Government not to act on the proposal to participate no longer in the
embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina; "
5. Leave out paragraph 14 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Request the governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to open
negotiations and, in that framework, ask Greece to lift the trade embargo it has imposed on the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; "
6. Leave out paragraph2l of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Make any suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) conditional upon recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its international borders; "
7 . l*ave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Resolutely call upon the Bosnian Serbs to refrain from any action against the blue berets and to
guarantee them freedom of movement and free access to 'safe areas'; ".
Signed: Fassino
l. See lTth sitting, 2lst June 1995 (amendments 3,4 andT agreed to; 5 and 6 withdrawn).
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Amendment E
20th June 1995
The situation informer Yugoslavia
AMENDMENT 8'
tabled by Mr. Benvenuti and Mn Martinez
8. Leave out paragraph 14 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Request the governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to open
negotiations on the basis of United Nations resolutions and ask Greece to lift the trade embargo it
has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; "
Signed: Benvenuti, Martinez
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l. See 17th sitting,2lstJune 1995 (amendment agreedto).
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Amendment 9
2fth June 1995
The situation in former Yugoslavia
AMEI\DMENT 9'
tabled by Mn Antretter
9. Leave out paragraph 17 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Ask the Croatian Government not to undertake further military action against areas controlled by
Serb forces since these areas, which.belgng to the Republic of-Croatia, irust be integrated peace'-
fully and given autonomy, on the basis of tieZ-4 groub proposal;,,
Signed: Antetter
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European armedforces
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee 2
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur
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Prefoce
It is known only too well that the new security environment in Europe after the cold war has led to
an overall revision of defence expenditures in all the member states of NAIO and WEU.
In November l99l,NATO adopted a new strategic concept calling forhighly-mobile, multinational
and flexible forces to replace the former linear defence forces. Only a few months later, in June 1992, the
WEU Ministerial Council issued the Petersberg declaration including a chapter on strengthening WEU's
operational r6le. WEU member states declared that thgy wele pre.pared to-make available military units
from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the autho-
rity of WEU. It was also said that military units would be organised on a multinational and multiservice
baiis and that WEU member states intended to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable
the deployment of such units in accomplishing specific tasks.
Since then, many initiatives have been taken, both in NATO and WEU, to implement the decisions
mentioned above and the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly considered it appropriate to present
a concise inventory of what has been accomplished in the area of bilateral or multilateral forces. Admit-
tedly, some of the iorces mentioned in the present report existed before the 1990s, but they also had to be
adapted to the new strategic environment and find their place in new structures.
One chapter in the present report discusses the stage reached in the implementation of the combinedjoint task forcei concept (Cfff) since its adoption at the January 1994 NATO summit meeting.
Originally, the committee had also intended to examine recent developments in defence budgets
and armed forc6s of the individual WEU member states, but your Rapporteur, much to his regret, has not
been able to accomplish all the necessary preparations for such a survey which proved to be more deman-
ding than foreseen.-It is hoped, however, that it will be possible to make this survey on another occasion.
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Drafi Recommendation
on European armed forces
The Assembly,
(!) 
- 
Noting.the NATO Council's declared tll support for the development of a European security anddefence identity and the sfrengthening of the Europ-ean pillar of the alliince through WEU;
(ii)-. Notingt\at, according.to the NAIO Council's decision, the alliance's organisation andresources
will be adjusted so as to facilitate this process;
(iii) 
.Believing, however, that in more than eighteen_months since the endorsement of the CJTF concept
at NAIO's summit meeting in January l994,no significant progress has been made in the implementation
of this concept, even though it is almost g yeq ago now, on 29th June 1994, thatWEU presenled to NATO
its report on criteria and modalities for the effeciive use of the CJTF;
(r:.) {q4ng_Egt_there is an.ever tgIe qrgent need for WEU to identify clearly those assets and capabi-lities which WEU will need in.possiblefuiure operations and to defineits views on ways and 
-"unr fo.the use of such assets and capabilities which the alliance could make available to WEU;'(v) Recognising and calling upon the Council to demonstrate its own recognition that WEU member
states will have to procure, t$ough.Tyltinational-co-operative prograrnmes, tliose assets and capabilities
which the alliance cannot make available to WEU; -(vi) Emphasising that the European allies cannot afford to delay the establishment of appropriate
operational capabilities and command structures for whatever European contingency operationi^in irt ich
NATO may choose not to act;
(uii) 
.Welcomjng pe decisions taken at the WEU ministerial meeting in Lisbon on l5th May 1995
regarding the development of WEU operational capabilities;
(viii) Tat'rng_note of the.increasing reluctance of the United States to commit ground troops to any
operation on European soil which is not based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic TrEaty;
gx) Recognising that on either side of the Atlantic there might be different perceptions of the threats to
European security and the political and military means to handle them;(x) Welcoming the fact that, with the approval of a document identifying their common interests as well
as potential risks to European security, tlte. 27 WEU nations have tateri' tfre first steps towards joint think-
$8 on the new.European security conditions which should result in the publicatirin of a while paper onEuropean security;
(xi) 
.Welcomingl!_e_rgcell {e1i_s1on by France, Italy and Spain to establish a land force (EUROFOR) and
a maritime force (EUROMARFOR) in both of which fortugA will participate and which will be deciared
forces answerable to WEU;
(.rii). 
-Somewhat surprised that, wheneverEuropean multinational forces are established, NATO insists onits right to use them, while at the same time it seems increasingly reluctant to mount operations in the new
type of post-cold war contingencies which are threatening Euiope's security;
(xiii) Welcoming the decision to establish the WEU Satellite Centre in Tonejdn as a permanent WEU
body;
(xiv) In doubt whether the establishment in the near future of a WEU humanitarian intervention force
would be an adequate solution for the hazardous and often hostile environments in which such a force
would have to operate both on European soil and elsewhere in the world;
(ru). C-onsidering that the United Nations' lack of an appropriate command, control, communications
and intelligence structure calls into question its ability to commanO humanitarian, peace-keeping or peace-
enforcing operations which are taking place in hazardous circumstances;
(ni) Expressing.the_wish that the WEU Permanent Council's examination of peace-keeping and conflict
prevention, c,ombined with the initiative taken by France and the United Kingdbm, will prod-uce early and
tangible results;
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(xvii) Emphasising that recent developments in the Bosnian conflict have clearly d€monstratedthe urgent
need for e-xclusively European rapid rbaction forces for all WEU operations mentioned in the Petersberg
declaration;
(niii) Noting that geostrategic developments and reductions in the means, European.states are allocating
to tfreir defeice are encouraging them to opt increasingly for multinational co-operation but that such co-
operation is haphazard,
RSCOIVIMEI.IOS THAT flTS COUNCTI-
1. Invite WEU member states to stop reducing their defence expenditure;
2. Organise a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member countries in the
first ha[6f 1996 atthe latest to eiamine European security and more particularly the need to co-ordinate
means, policies and multinational co-operation in order to organise effective joint defence;
3. Devote its every effort to urge NATO to implement the CJTF concept by the end of 1995;
4. However this may be, by the end of 1995 at the latest, identify clearly thoseassets a1{ capabilities
which WEU will need in possible future operations and, in addition, as mentioned in the Lisbon declar-
ation, define views on ways and means of using such assets and capabilities which the alliance should
make available to WEU;
5. In parallel, identify those assets and capabilities which WEIJ shoul4 possess in its own right and
which its member states will have to procure urgently through multinational co-operative programmes or
otherwise;
6. Promote forthwith the establishment of permanent exclusively European rapid reaction forces,
including headquarters and political-military command sffuctures, for all WEU operations mentioned in
the Petersberg declaration;
7. Refrain from accepting, or appearing to accept, further obligations or commitments where there is
a lack of capacity or a will to fulfil them.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)
I. The European Corps
l. On 14th October 1991, President Frangois
Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who in
1987 started to create a French-German brigade
which has been operational since October 1991,
informed the President of the European Council,
at that time the Prime Minister of the Netherlands,
Ruud Lubbers, of their intention to create an
army to which other member states of WEU
could contribute. The official decision to create
the European Corps was taken at the French-
German summit meeting at La Rochelle on22nd
May 1992 with the adoption of the " joint
report concerning the creation of the European
Corps ".
2. In July 1992, a provisional staff was crea-
ted in Strasbourg with the task of setting-up the
staff of the European Corps, which became fully
operational on 1st July 1994. General-Lieutenant
Helmut Willmann from Germany, who took office
on 1st October 1993, marking the official creation
of the European Corps, was nominated as the first
General to command the European Corps.
. 
(a) Membrship
3. The European Corps is currently drawn
from five member states: Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Luxembourg and Spain. The Belgian
Council of Ministers decided to request participa-
tion in the Franco-German corps on 22nd Jine
1993 and Belgium's official accession to the
European Corps took place on25th June 1993.
The official Spanish accession was on lst July
1994 and in June 1994 Luxembourg announced
that it would like to join the European Corps.
Although all member states of WEU have betn
invited to join the European Corps, it is thought
that - if only for practical reasons - it should not be
enlarged beyond its present composition. It is now
generally agreed that if more nations are interest-
ed in participating, consideration should be given
to the possible creation of a second European
Corps.
(b) Relations with NATO
4. After the creation of the European Corps,
based on their earlier understanding of December
1992. The French Chief-of-staff, Admiral Jacques
Lanxade, and the German Chief-of-staff, General
Klaus Naumann, signed an agreement with
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
General John M. Shalikashvili, on 21st January
1993, on the use of the European Corps. Belgiurit
signed the SACEUR agreements on 12th October
1993. According to this agreement, the corps may
be used by NATO either as a main defence force
in Central Europe or as a rapid reaction peace-
keeping or peace-making force in the European
theatre, covered by the North Atlantic Trtaty
Organisation. Relations between the European
Corps and NAIO are based on the specific nature
of this new multinational European formation,
which the participants wished to maintain.
Moreover, it should be noted that the European
Corps is adapted to the structures and procedures
of the alliance, thus confirming it as compatible
with NAIO and as France's contribution (in that
context) to the strengthening of the European
pillar in NATO. As a consequence, in the event of
a crisis and under specific circumstances, French
troops could be placed under the operational com-
mand of NATO. However, such engagement of
French troops could take place, after approval by
the French authorities, for specific and preliminary-
defined missions. In such a case, France would be
prepared to participate in the debates of the Mili-
tary Committee together with the other member
states of the European Corps.
(c) Rehtions with WEU
5. The European Corps was also created with
a view to reinforcing the European defence iden-
tity, and the forces of the European Corps have
been designated as forces answerable to WEU(FAWEU) at the WEU Council's meeting held in
Rome on 19th May 1993. The conditions for
WEU's employment of the European Corps were
then agreed on 20th September 1993 in the " joinr
declaration stating the conditions for the use of
the European Corps in the framework of Western
European Union ". The joint declaration states
that the corps could be subordinated, after a deci-
sion of the Council for use, to a command design-
ated by WEU, for which the participating states
will set up a joint committee for internal co-ordi-
nation. The European Corps can be deployed for
all the tasks specified in the Petersberg declara-
tion and its use by WEU would be based on plans
formulated by the operation commander design-
ated by WEU, in co-operation with the WEU
Planning Cell.
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(d) Missions
6. The European Corps itself has first call on
the units allocated to it intended for joint oper-
ations. The joint decision to deploy the European
Corps, remains the responsibility of the particip-
ating governments. The Joint Committee in charge
of carrying out the governments' decisions
defines the method and procedures for the deploy-
ment and transfer of command of the European
Corps for each mission.
7. The missions of the European Corps are the
common defence of the allied territory in applica-
tion of Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington or
Article V of the Brussels Treaty. It can also be
deployed for peace-restoring and peace-keeping
milsions, humanitarian and rescue tasks, and
tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, mis-
sions mentioned in the Petersberg declaration.
Furthermore, the European Corps is to serve as
the central core structure for European armed
forces, to constitute an instrument for the com-
mon foreign and security policy and a means of
reinforcing the European pillar within NATO.
(e) Composition
8. The first unit assigned to the European
Corps was the Franco-German brigade of 5 250
men, operational since 1991, with headquarters in
Miillheim. The other national contributions are:
- 
France: the lst armoured division with
headquarters in Baden-Baden;
- 
Germany: the 10th armoured division
with headquarters in Sigmaringen, com-
posed of the l2th armoured brigade and
the 30th mechanised brigade;
- 
Belgium: the lst mechanised division
with headquarters in Saive, consisting of
the lst, the 7th and the 17th mechanised
brigades;
- 
Spain: the 21st mechanised brigade
based in Cord6ba which will join the
European Corps in 1995. The Spanish
contribution will be completed to a full
mechanised division in 1998.
9. Luxembourg intends to integrate a recon-
naissance company into the Belgian lst mechanised
brigade.
10. The total strength of the European Corps is
presently 50 800 men, spread over the member
states as follows:
Belgium
France
Germany
Spain .........
Franco-German Brigade
9 600
10 300
18 500
4 500
5 250
(f) Training
11. The first exercise of the European Corps
(Pegasus) was held from 7th-17th November
1994 with about 5 000 soldiers from all the parti-
cipating states, practising interoperability of the
corps staff and troops. Pegasus was based on
counter-concentration, requiring quick movement
of large units over long distances. The ultimate
goal of the exercise was deep integration at a high
operational level. The exercise has demonstrated
that the objective of being operational on
1st October 1995 is feasible.
(g) Problems still to be resolved
t2. The creation of the European Corps has
caused a number of problems, all of which have
not yet been solved satisfactorily. The most
worrying is the absence of a juridical and institu-
tional statute for the headquarters. At the moment,
transposed NATO texts are used. The present
situation affects the operational capability of the
European Corps and is leading many observers to
wonder whether political willingness will be
enough. An even greater problem is the require-
ment for unanimity on every decision taken in thejoint committee. Furthefinore, there are difficul-
ties with the heterogeneity of equipment, the lack
of appropriate independent logistics, mobility and
appropriate mission training, military airlift capa-
bility and military transport capacity. In particu-
lar, for logistics, communication systems and air
transport capacity, the European Corps is still too
dependent on the United States.
13. Although it is still in the process of being
established, the European Corps has already ful-
filled one important task of its mission: it has
shown that the resilient and flexible working
arrangements between NATO and WEU are
capable of extension and expansion.
II. EAROFOR. EAROMARFOR
14. Initially, as discussed at the 20th November
1992 ministerial meeting in Rome, the idea had
been to create a trilateral, non-permanent, air-
maritime force eventually to be extended with an
amphibious capability. At the meeting in Luxem-
bourg on 22nd November 1993, ministers " wel-
comed and agreed to study the Italian initiative
envisaging a multinational groundforce aimed at
enhancing the operational significance of the air-
maritime initiative ". This ground force would be
able to act alone or co-operate with the air-mari-
time force. At their meeting in Noordwijk
(14th November 1994),WEU ministers discussed
the progress made by France, Italy and Spain and
asked them to present these forces at their minis-
terial meeting in the spring of 1995.
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15. At a WEU ministerial meeting on 15th May
1995, France, Italy and Spain signed the founding
documents for the creation of an army joint rapid
reaction force (EUROFOR) and a European mari-
time force (EUROMARFOR) to provide extra
security for the Mediterranean at a time of mount-
ing concern over the security situation in the
southern Mediterranean.
16. Also on 15th May, Portugal officially made
its request to participate in the two forces. Spain,
Francg and Italy have now agreed to Portugal's
participation from the beginning of the establish-
ment of these forces. The United Kingdom has
already shown its interest in EUROMARFOR and
its possible association in the future is not ruled out.
(a) Goals and rnissions
y. According to a joint communiqu6 issued by
France, Spain and Italy, the EUROFOR and
EUROMARFOR initiatives are meant ro contri-
bute to the creation of a military capability for
Europe, notably in the field of force projection;
create a multinational base structure for member
states of WEU that wish to participate in its oper-
ations; contribute, while respecting the content of
the Petersberg declaration, to initiatives of inter-
national organisations, to promote and maintain
peace and security.
18. EUROFOR is a large multinational land
force of up to a division in strength. It has a rapid
reaction capability, easy deployment and can act
on its own or together with EUROMARFOR. It
will have no permanently-attached units but
consists of pre-assigned professional elite units,
which are available at short notice.
19. EUROMARFOR is a pre-structured, non-
permanent multinational maritime force, with
aeronaval and amphibious forces, capable of
acting on their own or together with EUROFOR.
The composition and structure of the EURO-
MARFOR will depend on the missions to be per-
formed. A typical composition for certain tasks
could be an aircraft-carrier with four to six escort
units, a landing force, amphibious forces and a
supply ship. EUROMARFOR will have no per-
manent structures nor a permanent headquarters
but will come under rotating command of ihe par-
ticipating states. Warships under WEU will be led
by a French aircraft-carrier. In each of the partici-
pating states, marines will be designated to prepare
a possible operation and will co-ordinaie *ith
their counterparts. Although some of the prob-
lems over how to finance the operations are still to
be solved, the two forces will be established as of
autumn 1995.
20. The missions for EUROFOR and EURO-
MARFOR correspond ro those set out in the
Petersberg declaration: humanitarian and rescue
tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces
in crisis-management, including peace-making. It
is noted, however, that the fulfilment of thtse
tasks must not involve the participation of these
forces in defence missions in the sense of Article
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
(b) Relatians with NATO andWEA
21. For the use of these forces in a trilateral
framework, a common decision of the participat-
ing states is needed. Their use within the frame-
work of WEU has priority, but they could also be
used in the framework of NAIO. In preliminary
WEU discussions, the United Kingdom had in
sisted on the two forces being equally available to
NATO and WEU, although WEU would have frst
priority. The British view was endorsed by Italy,
which also wishes to avoid any weakening of
NATO. As a consequence, NATO would have
first call on the new forces should the territory of
the alliance be threatened or attacked.
22. An agreement is being prepared on the
conditions for the use of these forces in WEU
with a view to WEU's r6le as the defence compo-
nent of the European Union and as a reinforied
pillar of NAIO. It is noted that EUROFOR and
EUROMARFOR will be declared forces answer-
able to WEU (FAWEU). A high-level interminis-
terial committee will assure politico-military co-
ordination, establish the conditions for use and
provide directives for the command of these two
forces. The Permanent Council was charged to
specify the relations between WEU and these
forces. The two forces are intended to comple-
ment the European Corps in its promotion of the
operational r6le of WEU.
23. France has already suggested creating mul-
tinational and multiservice European intervention
forces, under the command of a European general
staff.
(c) Structure
24. EUROFOR will have a permanent com-
mand with a multinational headquarters in Florence
and the capability to perform joint operations. It is
expected to have about 5 000 troops with the pos-
sibility of being expanded to 10 000. It wiil be
highly mobile and capable of long distance oper-
ations. Procedures will be prepared for WEU to
uselhe rapid reaction force. The four participating
nations plan to contribute infantry and light
artillery units. Although no units will be specifi-
cally and permanently attached, they will be
directly available for peace-keeping and humani-
tarian operations. Troops will remain with their
national armed forces and be earmarked for WEU
when needed for missions undertaken by WEU.
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25. The command of EUROMARFOR does
not require the creation of new permanent struc-
tures. Existing command structures will intensify
their co-operation and learn how to co-operate
better. In the case of an operation, a joint com-
mand will be established under the alternating
command of one of the headquarters of the parti-
cipating states. Other member states of WEU can,
if they wish, be admitted to participate in the two
forces, after acceptance by the other participants.
(d) Exercises
26. In preparation of the present initiative,
France, Italy and Spain have held a number of air-
maritime exercises.
27 . The first exercise, Farfadet 92, was held in
the South of France in 1992. This was only a
French-Italian exercise in which Spain partici-
pated as an observer. The aim of the exercise was
the simulation of a rescue mission, including the
removal of residents from conflict zones.
28. The second exercise, Ardente 93, in the last
two weeks of October 1993 in central ltaly, com-
prised 10 000 troops from France, Italy and Spain
with the participation of six other counffies. This
was considered the first ever WEU exercise. The
main objectives of the exercise included the build-
up and transfer of a combined multinational force
in an out-of-area operation, cofllmand and control
in overseas operations, the use of special forces
and electronic warfare for intelligence gathering,
organisation and conduct of search-and-evacua-
tion operations, the study of rules of engagement.
29. The third exercise was Tramontana 94 with
France, Italy and Spain as the main participants,
on 14th-25th November 1994, in the southeast of
Spain. Further participants were Greece, the
Netherlands, Portugal and a battalion of the Euro-
pean Corps. This exercise, comprising 8 000
ffoops, was also concentrated on the simulation of
evacuations in a humanitarian operation.
30. These exercises have already greatly
improved co-operation among the air-maritime
forces of France, Italy and Spain. The abovemen-
tioned exercises demonstrated the lack of ground
forces in such operations.
31. In September 1995, the next exercise, Mis-
tral 95, will again be held in the south of France.
III. The Dutch-British amphibious force .
32. After having been nationally oriented since
the second world war, the Dutch marines corps
decided, in 1968, that it was necessary to have the
ability to deploy amphibious-trained marines for
the benefit of SACLANT. In 1970, the Nether-
lands realised that within the framework of the
Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic it was
necessary to co-operate with the British marines,
with the British also agreeing that co-operation
would be beneficial for the efficiency of both
corps. This resulted in modest exercises of both
corps in l97l and 1972.
33. On 9th May 1973, this co-operation was
formalised by the signing of the memorandum of
understanding (MoU), the officialisation of the
Dutch-British amphibious force (UK/t [UAF), the
prime example of NATO/European maritime co-
operation and often seen as one of the most mili-
tarily effective (flexibility and operational effec-
tiveness) multinational European forces. This
MoU was re-adapted in 1979,1987 and is at the
moment being revised again.
34. The MoU covers, inter alia, the following
aspects: the constituent units of UKA.IL/AF and
their way of concentration during deployment;
command and control; logistic support; common
exercises and raining in times of peace.
(a) Missions
35. The UKATIL landing force is the land com-
ponent of the UK/NI-/AF and is a lightly-equip-
ped unit which is quickly deployable and which
operates independently. The UK/NI-/LF is prima-
rily destined for the execution of amphibious ope-
rations/landings and prolonged land operations. It
is a mobile unit, capable of operations on any type
of terrain and under any climatic conditions and,
because of that, it is perfectly suited for crisis-
management operations anywhere in the world
(for example operation Haven, North kaq, 1991).
36. In the framework of NATO, the UIVNL/LF
can be deployed on the northern and southern
flank of the territory of NATO and on the Atlantic
Islands. With the growing emphasis nowadays on
the problems of Southern Europe, the UK/iL/LF
has also become available to Commander Allied
Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED, when not
needed by SACLANT).
(b) Composition
37. The British contribution to the UKA.IL/LF
is the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines(3 CdoBdeRM, headquarters in Plymouth). The
Dutch contribution is formed by units of the group
operational units of the marine corps. During ope-
rations and exercises the units are placed under
the command of the Commander UK/NL/LF.
38. The 3rd Commando Brigade consists of:
- 
a headquarters and signals squadron
royal marine;
- 
three royal marines commandos;
- 
a royal marines air squadron (Gazelle
helicopters);
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- 
the 29th royal artillery commando regi-
ment;
- 
8451846 naval air squadron (NAS);
- 
the 59 independent commando squadron
royal engineers;
- 
a commando logistics regiment royal
marines;
- 
the 539 assault squadron royal marines.
39. The Dutch units, contributed to the
UKA.[[./NL, are:
- 
the 1st marines battalion;
- 
the lst mortar company;
- 
a part of the engineers platoon;
- 
the anti-aircraft platoon;
- 
a platoon and staff element of the boat
company;
- 
a part of the amphibious reconnaissance
platoon;
- 
a logistic element.
40. The UKAIL/LF has 5 200 men in rimes of
peace (3 600 British,900 Dutch).
41. The combat support units are expected to
support the manoeuvre units and because the
UK/NL/LF is partly deployable by means of heli-
copters there are certain special requirements for
the weapon systems. Support is given by:
- 
the 29th royal artillery commando regi-
ment with the light 105 mm gun. The lst
Dutch mortar company is integrated in
this unit and has the 120 mm mortar;
- 
air defence troops, which belong to the
headquarters and signal squadrbn RM
gguipped with the anti-aircraft weapons,
in which the Dutch anti-aircraft platoon
is integrated and is equipped with the
Stinger;
- 
the 59th independent commando squa-
dron royal engineers, for the engineers
support. The Dutch engineers platoon
can be integr*ed in this unit;
- 
helicopter support (for reconnaissance,
command and control and troops sup-
Port);
- 
the 539th assault squadron RM, takes
care of the transfer of the UML/LF
from ship to landing strand, the bigger
units of which are landing crafts vehicle
and landing crafts utility.
42. Logistic support is provided by the com-
mando logistic regiment RM, which includes a
tran_sport squadron, a combat supply group, a
medical squadron, a workshop squadion and
administrative units. For the transport of supplies,
merchant ships are hired in times of peace, and
commandeered in times of war. The communica-
tion system used in the UK/}.{L/LF is the British
* Clansman " radio-system.
43. The headquarters of the Royal Marines is
located in Portsmouth, together with Comman-
dant-General Royal Marines, the Head of the
Royal Marines. The Command-General RM falls
under CINCFLEET (Commander-in-Chiefl. The
Commander of the Dutch sea forces retains full
command over the units of the marines corps
during the deployment of the UK/NL/LF. The
commander of the commando logistic regiment
RM is the deputy brigade commanderbf the
UK/NL/LF.
44. The units of the Dutch marine corps have
been fully integrated into the UK/NL/LF. Tactical
and lo€istic procedures have been completely
assimilated and the material has been standardi-
sed where possible.
(c) Relations with NATO and\VEU
45. Withil NATO, the UK/IIILILF forms a part
of the rapid reaction forces under SACLANT,
especially meant for combat crisis situations.
46. The UK/NL/AF is available for possible
olt-of-area military tasks under the auspices of
WEU, as specified by the Petersberg declaration.
The UKA{L/AF was declared a force answerable
to WEU (FAWEU) at the Rome summit meeting
on 19th May 1993. The UK/I.{\-IAF, or part of it,
can be deployed after a WEU Council decision to
do so and a common decision of both participat-
ing countries to place the UKA.{L/AF at the dispo-
sal of WEU. The deployment of the UIVITIL/AF is
based on plans formulated by the Planning Cell
qry!_lhe_Operational Commander, designated by
WEU' To thig purpose, the UK/I.[L/AF regularly
provides the Planning Cell with updated informa-
tion. In the framework of NATO apoint of contact
provides regularly updated information to CINC-
FLEET. In the case of an operation, the British
and Dutch units are placed under the operational
command and control of the Operation Comman-
der. After this transfer of authority, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom retain responsibi-
lity for personnel and administrative matters and
for logistic support.
(d) Exercises
47. The UK/I.L/LF participates every year in
the NATO exercise on the northern flank, for
w$gh preparational raining is held every January
to March in Norway. Furthermore the UK/I.{L/LF
takes part in the Combined Amphibious Force
Mediterranean (CAFMED) exeicises, once or
twice a year, in the Mediterranean. Every autumn,
the UK/IrIL/LF takes part in NATO ex-ercises in
Norway or Denmark or in the United Kingdom.
48. In the foreseeable future, the UK/I.{L/LF
will participate in the following exercises: Tiartan
Vgnture (June 1995), Rolling Deep (September
1995), Misftal (September 1995), Dynamic Mix
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(October 1995), Battle Griffin (March 1996),
Destined Glory (May 1996).
(e) New developments
49. On 6th April 1995, the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands signed an exchange of letters
regarding common interests in the area of maritime
defbnce and a reafftrmation and strengthening of
co-operation between the two navies in such areas
as logistics, personnel, training, research and
development, information, hydrography, oceano-
graphy etc. It shows the common will of both
countries to develop closer links in all naval acti-
vities and to contribute to the development of the
European common foreign and security policy.
The exchange of letters does not alter the many
existing MoUs regarding the UK/iL/AF and the
navy to navy agreements concerning submarine
matters, nor does it prevent the signing of further
MoUs, but it seeks to draw them together under a
single policy directive.
50. These closer links, to be developed, include:
- 
closer co-operation between the respective
defence departments and the constitution
of even closer maritime links;
- 
closer co-operation between operational
and planning staffs and those of their
subordinate commanders. Probably this
will be further enhanced by the develop-
ment of a navy to navy letter of intent on
closer co-operation in the Caribbean.
Co-operation in other areas such as sub-
marine forces is envisaged. Another
domain of close co-operation is the regu-
lar participation of Royal Netherlands
Navy surface ships in all aspects of
Royal Navy operational sea training, in
exchange for the provision of essential
submarine support to flag officer sea
training (FOST) under the Portland cre-
dit scheme, with permanent Royal
Netherlands Navy liaison officers
assigned to the FOST staff. The above-
mentioned exchange of letters also men-
tions that further opportunities for co-
operation should be investigated;
- 
exploration of the anangements on logis-
tic co-operation and co-operation in the
domain of equipment are to be encou-
raged, both on a bilateral and NATO
basis. Examples of these arrangements
are: the close links between naval sup-
port command and the Royal Nether-
lands Navy; the ties between the defence
helicopter support authority and the
Royal Netherlands Navy through the
Lynx multinational support committee;
liaison between the director general fleet
support and the Royal Netherlands Navy
liaison officer;
- 
more exchange of personnel and com-
mon training;
- 
extension of research and development
and the pooling of knowledge and expe-
rience, under the Anglo-Netherlands
Joint Naval Committee, created by the
Defence Research MoU, 1991;
- 
enhancement of co-operation by regular
and good quality information exchanges
in all areas of mutual interest (technical
data, doctrine and tactical developments
etc.);
- 
more co-operation between the two res-
pective hydrographic offices.
51. On 6th April 1995, the Secretary of State
for Defence of the United Kingdom, Malcolm
Rifkind, and the Dutch Minister of Defence, Joris
Voorhoeve, also signed a statement of intent on
tri-service defence co-operation. It concerns their
intention to extend existing co-operation in naval
matters to other areas within their organisation,
including land and air forces.
IV The Allied Cotnmand Europe
rapid reaction corps (ARRC)
52. In late May 1991, the NATO Defence Plan-
ning Committee agreed in principle to create an
allied rapid reaction corps (ARRC). This was
endorsed at the NATO summit meeting in Rome
in November l99l as a part of NAIO's adaptation
to the changing strategic security environment
and was worked out in the new strategic concept,
in which highly-mobile, multinational and
flexible forces replace the former linear defence
forces of NAIO.
53. The ARRC headquarters was officially
activated at Bielefeld, Germany, on 2nd October
l992,with the ARRC being officially recognised
by General John M. Shalikashvili, Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The
corps will be able to draw forces from thirteen
nations, NATO member states: Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the Uni-
ted Kingdom and the United States. In peacetime
the ARRC takes its guidance from SACEUR. The
ARRC headquarters is an international headquar-
ters directly subordinate to SACEUR and the
Commander ARRC (COMARRC), who co-ordi-
nates authority over the divisions, reports to
SACEUR and ARRC headquarters. Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has
overall control over the ARRC, a decision to
deploy forces must follow the appropriate proce-
dure before SHAPE can commit the ARRC.
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54. The United Kingdom, as the framework
nation, will always provide the commander of the
ARRC, a three-star general. From October 1992
until December 1994, Lieutenant-General Sir
Jeremy McKenzie commanded the ARRC. He
was replaced in December 1994 by Lieutenant-
General M.J.D. Walker.
(a) Missions
55. Within the NATO new straregic concept,
the ARRC forms the land component of the Allied
Command Europe (ACE) rapid reaction forces.
The air and sea elements of this rapid reaction
force can operate independently or alongside the
ARRC. In support of SACEUR's crisis-manage-
ment options at short notice, the ARRC has five
r6les, in a so-called " ACE-wide-plus-area ":
- 
demonstration of resolve to be prepared
for any aggression;
- 
reinforcement of NATO's main defence
forces and of national forces;
- 
combat r6le in sustained multinational
operations up to corps level in case of a
major conflict;
- 
peace support operations (PSOs) in res-
ponse to regional conflicts or at the
request of the United Nations or the
Organisation for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe (OSCE). Such peace sup-
port operations will include, amongst
others, monitoring tasks, humanitarian
assistance and peace-keeping;
- 
the performance of other related tasks as
monitoring, movement control or disar-
mament verification tasks.
(b) Composition
56. The ARRC has a permanent headquarters,
located in Rheindahlen since May 1994. Troops
and units assigned to it will be allocated for speci-
fic operations as a force package. The ARRC
comprises a headquarters staff, combat support
units, combat service support units and the assign-
ed divisions. The ARRC force structure includes
ten divisions, which fall into the following cate-
gories:
- 
National divisions which consist of for-
mations solely from one nation, the fol-
lowing forces being assigned to the
ARRC:
Germany: the 7th armoured division
with up to three brigades (headquar-
ters in Diisseldorf);
United Kingdom: the lst armoured
division (headquarters in Herford),
with three b'rigades;
- 
Greece: the 2nd mechanised division
(headquarters in Edhessa), with two
mechanised brigades;
- 
Turkey: a Turkish division will be
operational within the ARRC in 1995,
but the assigned Turkish mechanised
brigade and the Turkish armoured bri-
gade are currently already operational;
- 
United States: the 1st armoured divi-
sion (headquarters in Bad Kreuznach),
with two armoured and one mechani-
sed brigade;
- 
Spain: the fully operational Spanish
rapid reaction force (FAR), consisting
of a Para brigade, a light aeromobile
brigade, a legion brigade and support
units.
- 
Framework divisions, which contain
troops from two nations, in which the
nation making the major contribution
provides the framework. Framework
divisions within the ARRC are:
- 
The 3rd UK division (headquarters in
Bulford) consisting of the lst and 19th
mechanised brigades, the 5th airborne
brigade and an Italian brigade, the
Ariette armoured brigade ;
- 
The ltalian mechanised division
(headquarters near Milan) operational
by 1995. It will consist of the Garibaldi
brigade, the Legnano brigade and a
Portuguese airborne brigade.
- 
Multinational divisions in which three or
more nations make an equal contribu-
tion. Multinational divisions within the
ARRC are:
- 
The multinational division (Central)(MND(c))
The MND(C) will be an airmobile
division comprised of airborne bri-
gades from Belgium and Germany and
airmobile brigades from the Nether-
lands (the 11th brigade) and the United
Kingdom (the 24th brigade). The
MND(C) headquarters is located in
Rheindahlen;
- 
The multinational division (South)
(MND(s))
The MND(S)) will include a Greek
infantry brigade, an Italian airborne bri-
gade and a Turkish commando brigade.
(c) Training
57. Ready to tackle a whole mix of missions,
the ARRC had34 exercises planned for 1994, the
most important of which were:
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- 
Mapex,l9th-20th January 1994, to study
the capacity of ARRC headquarters for
possible action of the .ARRC in Bosnia-
Herzegovina;
- 
Arucade Guard, a command exercise
with some 2 000 troops participating
with the objective of validating proce-
dures for deployment to a foreign coun-
try under a United Nations mandated
peace support operation. A similar Arr-
cade Guard exercise will be held from
21st to 28th April 1995. The ftaining of
the combat ffoops takes place at national
and divisional level.
(d) Shonconings otthe ARRC
58. Participants regret the absence ofFrance in
the ARRC, but they are aware that France's non-
participation in NATO's integrated military struc-
ture is an unsurmountable impediment.
59. As for the ARRC itself, it is thought that
the disparate nature of the main elements and the
fact that its troops are widely dispersed in peace-
time will cause problems. The ARRC has no autho-
rity to train the forces assigned; it can only request
the participating states to provide ftoops assigned
to the ARRC with the appropriate training.
60. Furthermote, it is suggested that the domin-
ance of the United Kingdom within the ARRC
(the United Kingdom provides the day-to-day
infrastructure, running costs, 607o of the staff and
the Commander and the Chief-of-Staff of the
ARRC) might one day cause problems. Given its
preponderant position in ARRC, it might not be
attractive for the United Kingdom to participate in
other European armed forces initiatives where it
would play a different and most probably less
important r6le. Other European states have in fact
reluctantly criticised the dominance of the United
Kingdom within the ARRC.
61. Although all nations provide their own
logistical support, the ARRC is heavily dependent
upon the United States for strategic lift 
- 
mostly
aircraft and partially shipping 
- 
and satellite intel-
ligence. The United Kingdom provides the largest
part of long-haul communications with some
contributions from other countries.
62. Initially, the ARRC was planned to be ope-
rational by 1995, but NATO Hoadquarters had
sufficient confidence in the progress to commit
units of the ARRC to peace-keeping duties in
Bosnia-Herzegovina as early as summer 1993.
V. The Dutch-German anny corps
63. On 30th March 1993, the Ministers of
Defence of Germany and the Netherlands, Relus
Ter Beek and Volker Rtihe, acting upon NAIO's
London declaration of July 1990 and Rome decla-
ration of November 1991, signed a common decla-
ration concerning the creation of a multinational
corps. Thejoint declaration announced the creation
of a multinational corps, with initially Dutch and
German participation as a main defence force, in
conformity with the new strategic concept of
NATO. The Dutch-Gennan corps will be open to
other NAIO member states for participation.
64. Although the corps has not yet been made
officially available to WEU, units of the corps
may be deployed in WEU operations. Joint opera-
tions with the European Corps, although it is not a
part of the integrated NATO military structure, are
not excluded because some of the forces in the
European Corps are also earmarked as NATO
main defence force units.
65. The headquarters of the Dutch-German
army corps, which is located in Mtinster (Germany)
and became operational in March 1995, has a
unique, completely integrated corps staff with
partial task specialisation, composed of 400 men
(507o Dutch,50Vo German).The command of the
anny corps will rotate every three years, the first
commander being a Dutchman, Lieutenant-General
Ruurd Reitsema. The official language of the
corps will be English. The Dutch-German army
corps is expected to be operational by the end of
August 1995.
(a) Missions
66. The Dutch-German anny corps is part of
the main defence forces of NATO, integrated in
NAIO's command structures and will come under
direct LANDCENT command. When half of the
Dutch army was dissolved as a consequence of
defence budget cuts, it was decided to merge the
remaining forces with German forces so that the
Dutch army would still be able to co-operate
effectively in military defence operations within
NATO. It was also thought that this move, with its
ineluctable international obligations, would pro-
tect the Dutch army against further budget cuts.
The army corps will function only in situations of
war; in peacetime it will remain under national
command, so that the two countries will be free to
use parts of the corps for crisis-management ope-
rations within NATO or any other international
context.
(b) Composition
67. The Dutch-German army corps will be
composed of the following units:
- 
the lst Dutch division (headquarters in
Apeldoorn) consisting ofl
. the 41st light brigade;
. the llth airmobile brigade;
. the 13th, the 43rd and the 52nd mecha-
nised brigades.
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- 
the 1st German armoured division (head-
quarters in Hanover) which consists of:
. the lst, the l9th and the 32nd mecha-
nised brigades.
. the 7th armoured division (headquar-
ters in Dtisseldorf), which can also be
used in the ARRC.
68. The corps will be 35 000 men strong. The
command and support group will be mixed and
will be established in Eibergen, in the Nether-
lands. Support will be provided by corps troops
with task specialisation: Germany, for example,
will provide most of the intelligence assets and
the Netherlands will provide corps-level commu-
nications. The integration will be accommodated
through equipment standardisation.
69. The only possible serious problem for the
Dutch-German army corps might be the fact that
the divisions are separate and co-operate only in
times of crisis.
VI. lA,NDl UT (H eadquafiers allicd land force s,
S c hle swig - H olstein and I utland)
70. NATO's LANDJUT corps is the oldest
example of a multinational corps within the
NATO organisation. The multinational head-
quarters 
- 
Headquarters Allied Land Forces,
Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT) 
-
located in Rendsburg, Germany, was created in
t962.ln the Oslo agreement of 1951, it was deci-
ded to form a combined and joint defence head-
quarters (Baltic Approaches, BALTAP) with two
corps, LANDruT and LANDZEALAND, to pro-
tect the critical land area controlling the Baltic
approaches and exits.
71. In peacetime LANDJUT is manned only by
Danish and German forces (although the head-
quarters also involves other NATO officers), but
in times of war it can be expanded to include
forces from Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States. The Commander of LANDJUT,
cunently the Danish Lieutenant-General Gustav
Griiner, reports directly to the Commander Allied
Forces Baltic Approaches in Karup, Denmark,
who, in turn, in accordance with the new strategic
concept of November 1991, reports to the Com-
mander-in-Chief Central Europe (CINCENT,
Brunssum). Overall control reverts to the Supre-
me Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).
72. The commander and chief-of-staff rotate in
a three-year cycle between Denmark and Germany,
the other permanent staff positions are distributed
on an equal basis among the nations.
73. There are no formal relations between
LANDJUT and WEU. In the summer of 1994,
however, the Danish Parliament decided that if
WEU made a request to use Danish forces assign-
ed to NATO, it could rely on Denmark's LAND-
JUT units.
(a) Missions
74. The initial mission of the Commander
LANDJUT (COMLANDJUT) was to ensure the
flexible forward defence of the territory control-
ling the Baltic approaches and exits and to deny
an attack into the heart of Schleswig-Holstein and
Jutland and the Baltic Sea area up to Poland. Pos-
session of the strategically important Baltic
approaches is essential for the cohesion of
NATO's defence of Europe.
75. With the end of the Warsaw Pact, the need
for a strong defence towards Poland has diminished
but the collective defence tasks of LANDJUT
remain.
(b) Composition
76. The Danish contribution to the LANDJUT
corps consists of the armoured infantry Jutland
division with headquarters in Frederica, Denmark.
77. Since NATO's increased focus on peace-
keeping and crisis-management as indicated in its
new strategic concept of November 1991, Den-
mark reorganised its forces on lst July 1994 and
created a new force, the Danish reaction brigade,
its objective being to integrate this force into the
ARRC by the end of 1995. The Danish reaction
brigade has become a modern, heavy-armoured
infantry brigade of about 4 500 men. The most
important parts of the reaction brigade are:
- 
one armoured battalion with among
others three tank squadrons, equipped
with Leopard lA5 tanks;
- 
two mechanised infantry battalions;
- 
one self-propelled artillery battalion.
78. This Danish reaction brigade does not co-
operate with LANDJUT in peacetime, but in
times of war can be allocated to the LANDJUT
corps for reinforcement.
79. The German contribution to LANDJUT
consists of the 6th armoured infantry division
with headquarters in Neumiinster (Kiel, Germany),
composed of the 7th mechanised brigade (Ham-
burg, Germany) and the 18th mechanised brigade
(Boosted, Denmark). Also part of the German
contribution is the German defence group 13, a
territorial brigade-size formation located at Eutin,
Germany, with a defence mission in the forward
defence area.
80. Normally, corps combat support and service
troops come from both countries with each coun-
try supporting its own troops, but exceptionally a
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few combined units are to be created. Combined
communication systems already exist.
81. The headquarters has a reduced peacetime
strength of around 100 men, including officers
and non-commissioned officers from Germany,
Denmark, Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States. The latter tfuee countries have cer-
tain contingency forces earmarked for the area.
82. LANDJUT's left flank neighbour is the
Allied Land Forces,Znaland, in peacetime a natio-
nal Danish corps command at Ringsted, operating
together with the Danish fleet, the Danish airforce
and parts of German naval forces. The LANDJUT
corps maintains close liaison with these forces as
well as with its neighbour to the right, the 1st Ger-
man corps south of the river Elbe.
(c) Exercises
83. To enhance interoperability, a constant and
permanent exercise programme is conducted at all
levels from headquarters to the company through-
out the year, on German and Danish soil. Every
four years, a major live exercise is conducted
under the name of Bold Guard, in which, since
1989, American and British naval- and land-
forces can take part. The exercises are held under
the command of the multinational corps head-
quarters.
(d) Critical poin*
84. The introduction of external reinforce-
ments from the United Kingdom or the United
States into the area brings a number of host nation
support problems that only national commands
can solve. Furthermore, there is a problem of
availability of forces. The German forces are rea-
dily available and near their wartime positions but
the Danish forces must be partially mobilised and
moved to wartime positions.
85. Notwithstanding the abovementioned pro-
blems, it is noted that, because of its long expe-
rience, the LANDJUT corps has already over-
come its most urgent problems including
language. Together with the Anglo-Dutch amphi-
bious force and the European Corps, the LAND-
JUT corps can therefore be considered as the only
operational multinational force.
VII. Co-operatian initiatives in Belgium
and the Netherlands
(a) Belgian-Netherlands naval co-operation
86. On 28th June 1994, the Dutch and Belgian
Ministers of Defence, Relus Ter Beek and Leo
Delcroix, signed a declaration of common intent
on the reinforcement of the Dutch-Belgian naval
co-operation in times of peace and war and in
times of crisis and tension. The agreement called
for both navies to co-operate in operations, logis-
tics, instruction and training. Both countries had
severely cut their defence budgets and abolished
conscription. The ensuing fundamental review of
their naval forces and the standing down of the
Belgian navy's maritime command centre at
Ostend, further increased their desire to achieve
more intensive multinational military co-opera-
tion. Some observers consider the initiative as a
possible nucleus for closer co-operation between
the two nations and even in a wider international
context.
87. During the annual meeting of the Ministers
of Defence of Benelux, in Alden-Biezen, Belgium,
on 28th March 1995, the current Ministers of
Defence of the Netherlands and Belgium, Joris
Voorhoeve and Karel Pinxten, formalised the
intent of both countries in an extensive co-opera-
tion agreement. Co-operation is intended to be
effective on 1st January 1996 and will result in the
creation of one of the largest naval forces in
NATO.
88. The objective of the Dutch-Belgian naval
co-operation is to promote efftciency and better
mutual use of existing expertise and means, and to
improve operational readiness. The two navies
will also operate together in peacetime, possibly
outside their territorial waters, which means an
extension of the 1951 Admiral Benelux agree-
ment, which only envisaged co-operation in times
of war.
89. The 1995 co-operation agreement in parti-
cular envisages the following activities:
the creation of an integrated bi-national
operational command staff centre in Den
Helder, the Netherlands, jointly manned
by Belgian and Dutch officers but it is
stipulated that each country retains the
possibility of committing its ships to
purely national missions or making them
available to international organisations.
The centre will be under the command of
a Benelux Admiral (currently Dutch,
Vice-Admiral Luuk Kroon), but it is not
excluded that a Belgian naval officer
may be assigned this command. The staff
will have command of 40 Dutch and
about l0 Belgian surface vessels 
- 
sub-
marines and naval patrol boats have been
excluded. The official languages will be
Dutch and French, with English used for
operations and procedures within
NAIO;
common operation/command of opera-
tional fleets;
adjustment and integration of training
and education;
{
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- 
deepening of existing co-operation
agreements in mat6riel and logistics,
standardisation of equipment and use of
cofllmon infrastructure.
90. A very wide range of opportunities for co-
operation has been outlined, comprising;
- 
joint schemes for ocean surveillance;
- 
greater transparency in procurement
plans and in strategic intelligence, the
pooling of expertise in ship design and
construction and logistic standardisation;
- 
combined operational exercises;
- 
joint action in the enforcement of inter-
national law and order at sea.
91. The objectives of joint planning and joint
exercises are undertaking missions regarding
peace-keeping, search and rescue and humanita-
rian operations.
92. Around the year 2000, the combined
Dutch-Belgian fleet is planned to have under its
command 19 frigates (16 Dutch and 3 Belgian),I landing platform dock (LPD), 4 underway
replenishment and command ships, up to 26 mine
countermeasure vessels (MCMVs) and support
and survey ships. Belgium might contribute one
or more amphibious transport ships (LPDs).
(b) The Belgian-Netherlands dephyable air tasktorce
93. In June 1994, when Belgium and the
Netherlands signed the declaration of common
intent on naval co-operation, both parties also
stressed the importance of closer co-operation
between their air forces. At their meeting in
Alden-Biezen, on 28th March 1995,the Ministers
Pinxten and Voorhoeve also signed a declaration
of intent on the creation of a deployable air task
force (DATF), which is meant to be a joint inter-
vention air wing, to be employed first and fore-
most for peace operations. The division of tasks
and the concepts for the use of this force have yet
to be defined and a definitive agreement, specify-
ing the different elements of co-operation will, in
principle, be signed before lst January 1996. The
idea is to create a force which can be easily adapt-
ed to the situation and the tasks to be fulfilled.
94. Both Belgium and the Netherlands think
that the creation of this deployable air task force
will help them to reduce costs through the use of
common and complementary assets, especially in
the domain of logistics and command and to
improve operational efficiency for common air
operations. They also take the view that it could
be the first step towards the creation of a Europe-
wide partnership of smaller air forces. Depending
on the situation, the Benelux wing could be
deployed in support of United Narions, WEU,
NATO or OSCE sponsored operations.
95. The intent is to maintain the independence
of each of the two participating air forces, particu-
larly in policy and planning. It is also thought that
this form ofco-operation should not be extended
too far, given the experience that in general smaller
air forces are more productive than larger ones.
Force multiplication through collaboration in
complementarity is to be preferred.
VIII. The Franco-British Euro air group
(a) Tasks, objective and importsnce
96. The ministerial announcement of the for-
mation of the Franco-British Euro Air Group(FBEAG), a joint air command, was one outcome
of the 17th Anglo-French summit meeting at
Chartres on 18th November 1994. The framework
agreement, a formal agreement regarding the
creation of the FBEAG, is currently in the final
stages of drafting.
97. The new air group is in fact a planning and
co-ordination cell with no aircraft permanently
allocated to it, which could designate, if need be
and on a case-by-case base, the best adapted com-
bat or transport squadrons of the two countries to
participate in operations and exercises. It will be
responsible for preparing requirements and proce-
dures for combat and transport missions and com-
mon use of assets in combined out-of-area and
non-NATO-Anicle 5 peace-keeping and humani-
tarian operations which are compatible with mis-
sions mentioned in the Petersberg declaration.
98. The FBEAG constitutes an operational cell
for distributing assignments between French and
British fliers and drawing forces from existing
units, in the framework of combined operations
set up on short notice, with the respective forces
remaining under national command. These opera-
tions will be conducted either bilaterally or pbssi-
bly under the auspices of WEU. At Charties, it
was stated that other European Union air forces
could join the group at a later stage.
99. At this stage, the political inrerest of this
initiative is far more important than its military
significance. Apparently, on the one hand, France
has staned to attach more importance to co-opera-
tion in military planning, while, on the other hand,
the United Kingdom is showing more interest in
European initiatives and a greater commitment to
European defence. Moreover, the FBEAG consti-
tutes the first joint military initiative between the
only two European countries capable of signifi-
cantly projecting their military power overseas.
100. It is expected that ties will be developed
with WEU and probably also with NATO, as rhe
United Kingdom has stressed the complementarity
of the FBEAG to NAIO. The FBEAG is planned
to be operational by lst September 1995.
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(b) Structure
101. France and the United Kingdom have
agreed to establish a permanent staff of ten senior
offrcers (five from each nation) at the Royal Air
Force base at High Wycombe. The first director of
the FBEAG will be a French two star general,
combining this task with his duties in the French
national air force. His deputy will be a British one
star air commodore, who will combine this task
with his assignment at Strike Command. These
posts will alternate between the two nations.
102. The permanent staff will have a chief of
staff and a deputy with the rank of colonel or
group captain, again one from each nation and
alternating between the two nations. Serving
under their command there will be four staffoffi-
cers from each nation, specialised in operational
and logistical matters, who will be tasked with
making both air forces complementary and inter-
operational. Overarching control will be in the
hands of a steering group at ministerial or Chief of
Defence staff level. A lower level working group
will deal with the day-to-day activities of the
FBEAG.
103. The staff will be able to draw forces from
any unit of the two countries air forces, including
transport aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, offen-
sive airpower and communications or troops to
establish and guard ground bases. The FBEAG
may also be able to call on naval aircraft.
IX. Amhafion of the Danish reaction brigade
and the lst United Kingdom armoured division
104. After the restructuring of the Danish forces
and the creation of the Danish reaction brigade
which started in October 1993, discussions began
on how to integrate this reaction brigade into
NAIO and especially into the ARRC. In order to
enable it to carry out a broad spectrum of interna-
tional missions, the Danish reaction brigade pur-
sued co-operation with forces of other NATO
member states. It was thought that after Germany,
to which Danish forces were already closely link-
ed in the LANDJUT corps, the United Kingdom,
in view of its geographical proximity, was the
next logical co-operation partner.
105. On 13th December 1994,the Danish Chief
of Staff of the armed forces, General J. Lyng, and
his counterpart from the United Kingdom, Field
Marshall Sir Peter Inge, signed a letter of intent on
the affiliation between the Danish reaction brigade
and the lst UK armoured division. This affiliation
is intended to lead to the establishment of a divi-
sional formation within the framework of the lst
UK armoured division, to be part of NATO's
ARRC as from lst January 1996. In case of acti-r
vation of the ARRC, the Danish brigade will be
practically integrated into the British division,
which will facilitate and simplify command in the
ARRC.
(a) Missions
106. The Danish and British forces are expected
to co-operate in support of the ARRC's missions
which are, as mentioned in paragraph 17 of this
report: demonstration of resolve, reinforcement of
main defence, combat and peace support opera-
tions such as humanitarian assistance and peace-
keeping.
107. There is still doubt about whether the Danish
reaction brigade will be able to implement mis-
sions outside NAIO's ffeaty area in Central and
Eastern Europe.
(b) Composition
108. The 4 SOO-strong Danish reaction brigade
comprises amongst others one armoured batta-
lion, two mechanised infanbry battalions and one
self-propelled artillery battalion. The 1st United
Kingdom armoured division consists of the 4th,
7th and 20th armoured brigades.
109. Since these forces are only af[rliated there
is nojoint headquarters, only an exchange ofliai-
son offrcers. There is no common commander and
both countries support their own troops, without a
pre-established support co-operation system.
Logistical support provision is also separate.
There might be integration in transport and com-
munications, the Danish headquarters company is
linked to British communication systems.
(c) Rehtians with NATO andWEU
110. [n view of the loose structure of the Danish-
British affiliation, there was no need for any for-
mal agreement with NATO in the ARRC frame-
work. hovisions have been made for some form
of command co-operation in case of combined
deployment of the affiliated Danish and British
forces. Only in this case does the Danish com-
mander report to the British commander, other-
wise command is separated. There is no penna-
nent infrastructural co-operation.
111. Unlike the Danish brigade, the lst United
Kingdom armoured division is also available for
WEU missions. It is, however, noted that the
Danish Parliament has decided that Denmark will
not withdraw its forces if WEU " borrows " forces
from NAIO in which Danish forces participate.
The Danish reaction brigade participating in British
exercises in Germany under the control of the
ARRC have already demonstrated a perfect sym-
biosis.
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X. Two Gennan-American corps
Il2. On 25th February 1993, the then American
Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin, and the German
Minister of Defence, Riihe, agreed in Washington
on the creation of two German-American corps,
which were constituted on 22nd Ap/.l1993-in
Giebelstadt in the neighbourhood of Wtirzburg, to
increase the number of multinational miliiary
units in Central Europe. These corps were created
as a central element of NATO's new main defence
force. It is recalled here that NATO's new strate-
gic concept called for smaller, more flexible, and
more mobile forces. Initially, co-operation was
limited to the exchange of headquarters offrcers,
but in May l994itwas decided to give both corps
a multinational structure.
(a) Compositian
113. The two German-American corps are: the
2nd German-US corps (53 000 men) and the 5th
UlGeryan corps (56 000 men), each being a so-
called framework corps with a " lead nation ".
It4. The 2nd German-US corps comprises the
2nd Crerman corps based in Ulm and the lst US
armoured division (18 000 men) based in Bad
Kreuznach. The 2nd German corps which is also
available to the Multinational Diviiion Central and
Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Forces-
Land, consists of two divisions: the lOth tank divi-
sion, located in Sigmaringen (18 000 men) which is
also part of the European Corps and the 1st Moun-
tain division, located in Munich (17 000 men).
115. The 5th US-German corps comprises the
5th US corps based in Frankfurt and the 5th Ger-
man mechanised division (19 000) based in
Mainz. The 5th US corps consists of two divi-
sions, the 3rd mechanised division (18 500 men)
and the lst armoured division (18 500 men) both
based in Bad Kreuznach. The lst US armoured
division is also assigned to the ARRC;the United
States decides at the critical moment which mis-
sion the division will have.
116. The staffs of both corps will, in principle,
retain their national structures but it is understood
that for exercises and operations in the framework
of NATO, the lst US armoured division and the
5th German mechanised division will be subordi-
nated to the 2nd German-US corps and the 5th
US-German co{ps, respectively, with joint staff
for planning and command. The subordinated
divisions are expected to have their own support
and logistics means, intelligence and the deciiion
for deployment is taken under national authority.
(b) Dfficulties in co-operation
ll7. Co-operation within the two German-US
corps may face some problems as a result of dissi-
milarities between the forces of the two countries.
For example, the United States force is a profes-
sional force which is fully available at any given
time, while German forces depend on conscripts
and,receive their general and special tasks during
deployment within alliances. This basic dissimila--
rity affects advanced planning co-ordination
between the two forces.
118. There are several structural differences,
such as the fact that the 5th US corps includes an
armoured brigade and an engineer brigade, units
which are no longer part of the 2nd German corps.
Furthermore, it is noted that the 1st US armourbd
division is better equipped, more readily available
and more easily deployed, because of its helicop-
ter brigade, than the German units which are, in
general, less mobile. Also, the two corps are
dependant on the United States for the constitu-
tion of reserves. These differences in forces could
also frusffate their mobility and flexibility.
(c) Exercises
119. The technical arrangement, signed on 14th
June 1994, improved the willingness for deploy-
ment and both bi-national corps have declared
that they are prepared to subscribe to field stand-
ing operation procedures (FSOP). The degree of
interoperability will be resred for the first iime in
a framework exercise of the 2nd German-US
corps to be held in the Spring of 1995.
XI. The combined joint taskforces (CJTF)
120. At their meeting in Luxembourg, on 22nd
November 1993, WEU Ministers, aware of the
need to allow for specific European military ope-
rations outside the cases ofcollective defence spe-
cified under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,
looked to the NAIO summit meeting to endorie
the principle that WEU should be able ro use not
only European allies' forces and resources, but
also collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance such
as communication systems, command facilities
and headquarters.
l2I. The NAIO summit meeting held in Brus-
sels on 10th and llth January 1994 then respon-
ded to the requests made by WEU Ministers in
I uxembourg. It endorsed the concept of combinedjoint task forces " as a means to facilitate contin-
gency operations, including operations with pani-
cipating nations outside the alliance ". It dirbcted
the North Atlantic Council with the advice of the
NATO military authorities to develop this concept
and establish the necessary capabilities. In the
communiqu6 it was also said that " The Council,
with the advice of the NAIO military authorities,
and in co-ordination with WEU, will work on
implementation in a manner which provides sepa-
rable but not separate capabilities that could-be
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employed by NATO or WEU ". The CJTF
concept was the result of co-operation between
the United States Department of State and the
Pentagon, witnessing United States support for
WEU employment of NATO assets and a further
development of a European security and defence
identity.
122. The CJTF proposal aimed at a flexible and
efficient multinational, tri-service headquarters
capability for non-Article 5 contingency opera-
tions, facilitating the use of NATO collective
assets by WEU, should NATO choose not to act,
preventing useless duplication. It concerns short-
term, quick reaction multinational (combined)
and multiservice (oint) self-contained contingen-
cy elements within NATO, which on the basis of
an ad hoc North Atlantic Council decision could
be detached for certain missions and put under the
command of WEU should NATO choose not to
participate in an operation. The idea is to create a
stand-by capability for out-of-area operations,
including conflict-prevention, peace-keeping,
humanitarian aid and peace-enforcement,
drawing elements from AFCENT, AFSOUTH
and AFNORTHWEST. According to the original
concept, nations outside the alliance could
participate.
123. It is thought that WEU would, in particular,
use CJTF for humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in
crisis-management, including peace-making, as
outlined in the Petersberg declaration of June
1992.
124. Since early t994,the implementation of the
CJTF concept has been discussed at three levels
under the authority of the North Atlantic Council
and in co-operation with the military authorities
of NATO. At the Military and Political Commit-
tee level, the Provisional Policy Co-ordination
Group (PPCG), is treating questions such as the
role of SACEUR, the activation process of CJTF,
etc. At the major NAIO command level, under
the command of SACEUR, the Military Tiansi-
tion Issue Working Group is examining operatio-
nal aspects for CJTF command and control and
harmonisation of the positions of member states,
while the Allied Command Europe (ACE) and
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) are study-
ing the procedures, training and equipment
aspects. Finally, a co-ordination group at SHAPE
is discussing the composition and designation of
potential CJTF forces, though this might also be
possible on an ad hoc basis. WEU has established
a special CJTF political-military working group
and authorised the Planning Cell to take part in
the working group's weekly working meetings
and support its work. The terms of reference
for this group were approved by the Council on
15th March.
(a) Comnund and control
125. The basic idea of the CJTF concept is to
maintain the original objectives of NAIO, while
adapting it to the new security environment. Col-
lective defence of the territory of the alliance, pre-
servation of the transatlantic character and conti-
nuation of the integrated military structure of the
alliance remain NATO's priorities. CJTF will
therefore be separable but never separate from
NATO's sffuctures.
126. The command and control of CJTF should,
in particular, enable it to provide timely responses
out-of-area, ensure smooth co-ordination between
NATO and WEU and accommodate staff from
participating non-NATO members. Such opera-
tions will require the assimilation of intelligence,
logistics and management, reception and
commitment of forces and maintenance of com-
munication at all levels.
I27. The CJTF headquarters will be hosted by
one of the eight NATO major subordinate com-
mands (MSC), AFCENT, AFSOUTH or
AFNORTHWEST in the case of ACE, which
might task subordinate commands to provide
assets and might receive resources from other
MSCs, with the commanders reporting directly to
the MSC. Both ACE and Allied Command Atlan-
tic (ACLANT) will develop capabilities for pos-
sible CJTF operations. NATO keeps insisting that
CJTF lines of command always lead back to the
major NATO command responsible for Article 5
defence in the region, taking the view that any
CJTF operation could escalate a straight- forward
NATO Article 5 operation to defend allied terri-
tory. For WEU-led CJTF, procedures will be esta-
blished to recall forces under NATO in the case of
territorial collective defence.
(b) CITF under WEU
128. There are three possibilities for the employ-
ment of CJTF; purely under NATO, a NAIO-plus
CJTF including forces from non-NATO member
states and a CJTF under WEU.
129. After a unanimous decision of the North
Atlantic Council, a CJTF headquarters and sup-
port could be provided, on an ad hoc basis, to
WEU, which can ask for conffibutions from its
members, observsrs, associate members and asso-
ciate partners, altogether 27 states. It should be
noted here again that the essential shortcoming of
WEU in case of military operations remains the
absence of a political-military structure within
WEU. For the European Corps, however, an ade-
quate political-military structure has been created
and this force could therefore carry out a CJTF
mission, obtaining those elements from NATO
which the European Corps is lacking (logistics,
communication systems, air transport capacity,
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airlift and sealift), acting under the aegis of WEU.
A solution must still be found for the participation
of France in CJTF, given the fact that it does not
participate in NAIO's integrated military structu-
re. Different proposals are now being discussed
but the problem has not yet been solved.
130. In the discussion about CJTF, the question
of which units will participate in a task foice, has
not been discussed because most of the parties
expect that this will be solved without too many
problems. For the Europeans, the CJTF remains
an essential tool for building up the European
security and defence identity (ESDD.
131. After stating the importance of CJTF in the
Kirchberg declaration (9th May 1994), WEU has
worked out a report on the criteria and modalities
for effective use of the CJTF which was presented
to NAIO on29th June 1994.
132. Once the North Atlantic Council has decid-
ed to provide WEU with a CJTF, NATO will
select CJTF headquarters elements (including
support assets) from one of its MSCs and prepare
it for deployment, the control of which will at a
certain moment be given to WEU. The forces will
come from WEU member states maintaining
forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) such as the
European Corps, the United Kingdom-Nether-
lands Amphibious Force and the Multinational
Division Central. Co-ordination between CJTF
and FAWEU, and possibly their integration,
would simplify force generation processes and
aJTangements.
I33. An important issue on this field will be the
r6le of SACEUR and of SACLANT. Given the
fact that SACEUR is a United States General, at
present Lieutenant-General Joulwan, many Euro-
peans are concerned that in a WEU operation,
supported with CJTF, ultimate military decision-
making would be in American hands. France, in
particular, has problems in accepting the day-to-
day planning function of SACEUR, in which it
does not want to participate since this function is
part of NAIO's integrated military structure.
134. Recent declarations by the United States
that the CJTF cannot count on logistic support
from NATO if the CJTF are not placed undef the
military command of NATO, because of its
concern for escalation into Article 5 operations,
have provoked especially French opposition.
None of this changes the fact that the European
political-military structure for a CJTF under
WEU command is inadequate. Joint military
planning capabilities will have to be developed
and WEU's operational headquarters strengthen-
ed. The CJTF concept does not provide for the
automatic availability of assets; WEU will there-
fore have to retain its autonomous planning capa-
bility and should continue to develop a credible
operational r6le. In this regard especially the r6le
of the WEU Planning Cell has to be developed
further so as to serve more as the intended motor
for exclusively European military operations. As
long as WEU lacks its own command staff/mili-
tary command structures, questions about military
control remain premature.
(c) Advantages of CJTF
135. The implementation of the CJTF proposal
may help NATO to adapt its command and force
structure in line with the requirements of the
alliance's strategic concept. First of all, it could
make current NATO procedures and structures
more flexible, simplify communication links and
rationalise mobilisations, also because it will
increasingly rely on experienced, well-trained
units. The possibility of employing " coalitions of
the willing ", with some countries participating
and others not, certainly increases flexibility
in the use of forces, but it is thought that, in deci-
sion-making, the unanimity rule in the North
Atlantic Council will not be abandoned under any
circumstances.
136. Second, CJTF may help to reinforce the
European security and defence identity (ESDI),
avoiding duplication which might cause waste
and damaging competition. It is also a clear
demonstration of the United States' determined
support for the development of the ESDI.
137. A third advantage, not to be neglected, is
the possibility of conducting operations with par-
ticipating nations outside the alliance. Earlier
experience in ad hoc operations such as the Gulf
war and the enforcement of the embargo in the
Adriatic Sea have proved the feasibility of the
CJTF concept. At present, there is an urgent
requirement for smaller, more flexible and deta-
chable headquarters, which can be reinforced with
different NATO assets according to the circum-
stances. As a consequence, there is a need to draft
possible contingency plans, indicating the opera-
tional and material requirements for different cir-
cumstances.
138. Fourth, CJTF may be a tool to engage both
France and Spain in NAIO's military planning
process for certain contingency operations.
(d) Problems concerning the implementation of C.ITF
I39. After sixteen months of intensive discus-
sions in many different working groups, task
forces and committees, it has become quite clear
that implementation of the CJTF idea is even
more complicated than it was thought to be at the
moment of its conception. In the following para-
graphs, some of the problems encountered will be
reviewed.
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140. First of all, negotiators have noted that the
notion of joint or multiservice activities, one of
the foundations of CJTF, is not yet widely accept-
ed in the armed forces activities. The fact thatjoint activities are supposed to include mobilisa-
tion, interoperability of on-hand communications
and intelligence, airlift, sealift, transport and
multiservice preparation and planning, shows the
range and complexity of the concept. Notwith-
standing the extended efforts made so far, the
implementation of CJTF is still at a preliminary
stage. Basic elements such as a financial frame-
work and a command and control system for com-
bined and joint forces and for ground force mis-
sions are still lacking.
l4l. The CJTF concept is still a semi-official
project and until now work has been developing
on this semi-official basis, still awaiting a com-
mand system, control of combined and joint
forces and missions for ground forces. Another
important deficiency in this regard is the lack of a
financial system.
142. Some key allies have diverging views on
the required interface between political and mili-
tary decision-making authorities. In particular, the
level of political control over military operations
to attain a politically decided objective are subject
to discussion.
143. The r6le of SACEUR in CJTF operations is
another vital issue. The European allies would not
like SACEUR, under present arrangements
always a United States General, to have the ulti-
mate military decision-making authority over
CJTF when it operated under WEU. They consi-
der CJTF to be an element to reinforce the Euro-
pean security and defence identity. Ultimate
control by NAIO's SACEUR would in fact subor-
dinate WEU operations with CJTF to United
States control and considerably limit Europe's
opportunities to conduct military operations inde-
pendently.
lM. The United States, however, will never
allow its own assets, or those of the alliance, to be
used in a non-NAIO CJTF framework without the
possibility of exerting control. Nor will the United
States allow any infringement of NAIO's inte-
grated military structure.
I45. Will CJTF cause a radical reorganisation of
NATO's integrated military structure? Some
member states, France in particular, seem to take
the view that the creation of CJTF makes little
sense if it not accompanied by a thorough reor-
ganisation of NAIO's integrated military structure
and a flexible system to provide those assets need-
ed for operations under European command.
Others, in particular Denmark and the United
Kingdom, have made it clear that CJTF should
not lead to any infringement of NATO's integra-
ted military structure and command, which they
regard as a guarantee of United States military
presence in Europe and a prerequisite for the
continuation of the ffansatlantic link.
146. If the allies succeed in establishing CJTF
which are substantial enough to provide Euro-
pean-led operations with the assets which at pre-
sent are missing in the European inventorY, such
as satellite intelligence, logistics and strategic air-
lift, the question will arise as to whether this
might not diminish the incentive for Europeans to
develop and acquire their own independent strate-
gic assets. In other words, CJTF intended to rein-
force the European security and defence identity,
could ultimately result in weakening it.
147. For the security and defence of their terri-
tory, Western Europe's NATO member states have
always relied on the strategic assets of the United
States. The development of a European security
and defence identity is meant to enable Europe to
assume greater responsibility in this field. It was
finally endorsed by the United States because it
was, and still is, thought that an economically
strong Europe should also pay for its own defence
and security.
148. The CJTF idea was conceived to fill the
deficiencies in Europe's operational capabilities
and enable European allies to carry out contin-
gency operations should NATO choose not to act.
This is a useful and rational procedure in the pre-
sent times of transition. It would fail in its puryose
if it led to ultimate United States decision-making
authority over non-Article 5 European contingen-
cy operations. At the same time, it should not
deter European allies from acquiring their own
strategic assets which, in the long term, should
enable them to develop and implement their own
security and defence policy.
XII. Conclusians
149. Taking into account the many initiatives in
recent years to create bilateral or multilateral
forces and to adapt existing forces to new mis-
sions and structures, there is a clear determina-
tion, especially among WEU member states, to
adapt their forces in order to meet the challenges
of a new security environment.
150. It should be noted, however, that the new
patterns of co-operation are not only the result of
decisions taken in the framework of NAIO or
WEU. One other compulsory reason was, and still
is, that reductions in defence budgets and armed
forces in a number of member states have been so
drastic that there has been no alternative to more
intensive co-operation with other nations if the
effectiveness of what was left of their armed
forces was to be maintained.
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151. At the same time, one cannot avoid feeling
that the overall result of the many different initial
tives, some bilateral, others tri- or multilateral,
somehow lacks coherence.
152. 
- 
The.implementation of the CJTF concept
decided eighteen months ago, and considerdd
essential for specific European military contin-
gency operations where NATO chooses not to act,
leaves much to be desired. Negotiations clearly
seem to be at a dead end. The WEU Council
should devote its every effort to urge NATO to
implement the CJTF concept by the end of 1995.
On the other hand, European allies will have to
realise that, whether the CJTF concept is imple-
mented or not, they will not be able [o rely eter-
nally upon others for their security.
153. In the near or more distant future, WEU
should possess in its own right a number of strate-
gic assets, in particular strrategic military trans-
port, a satellite observation system and military
headquarters.
154. 
_Finally, United Nations operations inSomalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herz6govina have
clearly demonstrated that the United Nations
chain of co-mmand, even after recent improve-
ments, is a failure, causing unacceptable riiks for
military units involved in such operations.In the
llturg, European units operating in contingency
situations under the aegis of the UniteO Nitioni
should rely upon WEU headquarters.
l:5. Apparently, there is an urgent need to orga-
nise a summit meeting of heads of state ana-of
government of WEU member states to examine
European security and more particularly the need
to co-ordinate means, policies and multinational
co-operation in order to organise effective joint
defence.
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Document 1468
Amendment 1
European armedforces
AMENDMENT 1'
tabledby Mn Guidi
l. Leave out paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper.
15th June 1995
Signed: Guidi
1. See 16th sitting, 21st June 1995 (amendment negatived).
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Amendment 2
lfth June 1995
European ormedforces
AMENDMENT 2'
tnbled by Mn lipez Henares
2. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
:_S_gqy_q! inclusion, and overall framework, of the various partial or regional initiatives such asEUROFOR, the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force, the ARRC, and othei similar initiatives in a
general European-defence system, in order to provide coherence and a global vision ofthe European
defence identity; "
Signed: lipez Henares
l. See 16th sitting, 2lst June 1995 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 3
19th June 1995
European armedforces
AMENDMENT 3'
tabledby Mr. Hardy
3. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add " except where a member state
is unable to provide its proper contribution to international security ".
Signed: Hardy
1. See l6th sitting, 2lst June 1995 (amendment agreed to).
356
Document 1469
QUESTTON 32E
put to the Council by Mr. De Decker
on 6th Decemher 1994
Can the Council clarify what the conse-
g_ugncgs have been of the decision taken by the
United States, on 11th November 1994,no longer
to participate in measures in the Adriatic for
ryo1i_tg.nng e-nforcement of the embargo agreed by
the United Nations on supplies of arms to Bosnia-
Herzegovina and specifically:
1. What remedial measures have been found
to the American decision no longer to share
information on arms supplies to Bosnia?
2. How can a single command co-ordinate
ships operating under different rules, given that
American units have received instructions no
longer to apply certain of operation Sharp Guard's
rules of engagement?
3. How are areas of control divided between
the United States and its allies?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 16th Janwry 1995
1. The Permanent Council endorses the ana-
lysis of the Military Committee (Adriatic), which
is content with the Operation Commander's over-
all assessment and considers that the Nunn-
Mitchell amendment is unlikely to downgrade the
overall military effectiveness of operation Sharp
Guard.
_ - _ 
ThejointWEUArlATO Council, meeting on
6th December, noted that the concept of opera-
tions remained completely valid, taking - into
account the adjustments made by the Operation
Commander.
2. The Permanent Council can assure the
Honourable Parliamentarian that the areas of
control have been divided in a way such as to ensure
the maximum effectiveness of the operation.
QTTESTION 329
put to the Council by Mn de Puig
on l9th December 1994
In their declaration annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the WEU member states agreed,
inter ali4 that states which were members of the
European Union would be invited to accede to
357
Written questions 328 to 331 and replics of the Council
16th June 1995
QUESTTON 330
put to the Council by Mn Cac6
on 26th April1995
Can the Council confirm that the terms of
the ratification by Greece of the protocol of acces-
sion of the Hellenic Republic to the modified
Brussels lreqty, as deposited with the BelgianMinistry for Foreign Affairs on 10th June 1994
contained the following passage:
On 10th January 1994 the Government of
the Hellenic Republic accepted the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice; the Minister for
WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance
with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or
to become observers if they so wished.
. 
Will this principle also hold good for Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden as soon as these coun-
tries become members of the European Union?
Has the Council already invited these three
countries to join WEU?
Would such invitation be limited to the
option provided for in the Maastricht declaration?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 21st February 1995
The Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Coun-
cil of Ministers, recalling the offers made in the
WEU declaration of Maastricht of lOth December
1991, 
^invited the Republic of Austria, the Repu-blic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, in
the light of their ratification of the Treaty of
Accession to the European Union, to state iheir
intentions with respect to their relations with
WEU.
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden replied to the Chairman-
in-Office of the WEU Council of Ministers by
confirming their desire to become observers.
The first meeting of the WEU Council in
1995 took place on 10th January and was marked
by the attendance of the new members of the
European Union 
- 
Austria, Finland and Sweden.
Austria and Sweden were formallv wel-
comed as observers. Finland, which has yet to
finalise its internal procedures regarding its 6bser-
ver status, attended the Council on an informal
basis.
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Foreign Affairs, Mr. Karolos Papoulias made the
following declaration:
On behalf of the Hellenic government,
I declare that I acknowledge as fully bind-
ing in law and without special convention,
on the condition of reciprocity, vis-d-vis
any other state accepting the same obliga-
tion, the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice over all legal disputes
referred to in Article 36 paragraph 2 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
However, the Hellenic govemment exclu-
des from the competence of the Court any
dispute over the Hellenic Republic taking
defbnsive military measures for reasons of
national defence.
The present declaration shall remain in
force for a period of five years. After the
expiry of this period it shall remain in force
until notification of its abrogation '?
Can the Council state the reasons why this
important text has not been fansmitted to the
Assembly?
Does the Council consider ttrat it is lawfuI,
when ratifying an international agreement, for a
reservation to be made which should normally
have been included in the protocol of accession
itself, since such reservation, unilaterally modify-
ing Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty,
cahnot acquire validity without the signature and
ratification of all the other conffacting parties?
REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 12th lune 1995
The content of the verbal note which
accompanied the deposit of the instrument of rati-
fication by Greece of its accession to WEU cor-
responds to the reservation made by Greece at the
timb of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
The maintenance of this reseryation, as
communicated to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and known to all WEU member
states, is entirely consistent with the wording of
Article X, second paragraph, of the modified
Brussels Treary.
(...) The high contracting parties will, while
the present treaty remains in force, settle all
disputes falling within the scope of Anicle
36, paragraph2, of the statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, by referring them
to the Court, subject only, in the case of
l. Unofficial translation.
358
each of them, to any reservation already
made by that party when accepting this
clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the
extent that that party may maintain the
reservation. (...)
The verbal note by Greece was forwarded
on 10th June 1994 to all the signatories of the pro-
tocol of accession of Greece to WEU.
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QIIESTTON 331
put to the Council by Mr. I*nzer
on 3Uh May 1995
In its issue datedZZnd May 1995, the Ame-
rican weekly " Defense News " devoted an article
to WEU's space activities. The article contains
the following passage:
" WEI-J's access to Helios data was $anted
in April 1993 by the French, Italian and
Spanish defence ministers. These three
governments own Helios I.
An official familiar with the cenffe said the
access would be determined in part by the
price per image. This official said negotia-
tions led to tentative settlement on 200 000
French francs ($39 000).
'If this price becomes final, the cenfre will
be able to purchase no more than eight
Helios images a yeag' the official said.
'This price is ridiculous'. "
What price has the Torrej6n Cenffe been
asked for each image from this satellite by the
governments participating in the Helios I pro-
gramme?
Is the Council able to inform the Assembly
whether an agreement already exists for sup-
plying the cenfre with Helios I images? If such
an agreement does not yet exist, what stage have
the negotiations reached?
Document 1470 19th June 1995
Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1995
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION I
^ -tabledby Mr. Rathbone, Chairmnn and Rapporteurof the Committee on Budgetary Affairc and Adiiinistration2
The Assembly,
(!) Having heard the report by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion;
(!il 
- 
Ngqng the continued absence of the opinion g! $_e Cguqcil on the draft supplementary budger ofthe administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1995 submitted to it, at its re{fest, in thd autuirn of
1994:
(iii) Noting that the Assembly had already expressed its disappointrnent at its autumn session;
(lv) 
. 
Noting that the Council thus appears unsupportive of the Assembly's plans to meet satisfactorily the
requirement of expanded membership including guest members and obJemers;(v) Considering that the Council had, in its_ Kirchberg declaration, invited the Assembly to welcome
new members and to adjust its rules accordingly;(yi) Reiterates its support for the outlined plans to meet the logistics of the Assembly in the foreseeable
future, in particular the requirement to accommodate over 400 members in a chamber conceived to seat
228;
(yii1 Recognises the effoms made by the Presidential Committee to speed up negotiations with the
Council;
(viii) Exprelsgs its disappointment at the Council's delay in giving its opinion on the draft supplement-
ary budget of the Assembly,
Uncex'n-y RECoMMENDs rHAr nrp CouNcn
Consider the draft supplementary budget of the Assembly in order to make available to it adequate
financial means to allow.it to play its r6le in a reactivated WEU, taking into account in particulai tf,"
Kirchberg declaration and its requirements.
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee:_Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alvuez (Alternate: Herrero
Meredlz), Anomeritis, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Biefnot, Branger, Brugger, Curto, Daniel, Daine peggy Fenner,
Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, Mr. G$a Marq-ues, Mrs...Hoffman,_Ml.H9T, Sir-Ralph H6ivell, MM. Kriedner (AlternateT"ito;;ri;,
Lauricella, trers, Magginas, Masson, Michels (Alternate: Siebert), Pinto, Recoder, Roger, Scaglioso, Thiisen, N ...
N.B. Tie names of tltose taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1995
PREVIOUS QUESTION',
movedby Mr. Rathbone
on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairc and Administratian
under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure
The Assembly,
(i) Considering the procedure for approving the Assembly's budgets;
(ii) Considering that the opinion of the Council on the supplementary budget has not yet been commu-
nicated to the Assimbly, despite repeated requests by the Assembly at its previous session;
(iii) Considering that the Assembly is therefore unable to vote in full knowledge of the facts on the sup-
plementary budget for 1995,
DecpBs
That the draft supplementary budget is withdrawn from the agenda of the session.
Signed: Rathbone
l. See lTth sitting, 21st June 1995 (previous question agreed to).
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Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacifu
REQIIEST FOR A DEBATE 
'
under urgent procedure tabled by Mn Guidi and others
. 
Considgri.n8 tlat the decision taken by 
-the lrelch Government to resume nuclear testing concernsthe security of the whole.of Europe,JVlr. Guidi and nine others ask the hesident to arrange foiun u.grni
debate on this matter in the course of the present session.
Signed: Guidi, Benvenuti, Cuc6, Martinez, Brito, Blunck, Hardy, Baarveld-Schlaman, Schluckebie4
Vrettos
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l. See l4th sitting,20thJune 1995 (motion agreedto).
Document 1473 lfth June 1995
Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific
MOTION FOR AN ORDER'
tablod by Mn de Puigfollowing the requestfo1 q debae under
urgent proceduri tahled by tun memhe-rc of the Socialist
- Group of the AssemblY
The Assembly,
Considering that the decision taken by the French Government to resume nuclear testing concerns
the security of the whole of EuroPe,
Dncoes
To instruct the committee concerned to table urgently an operative text on this question.
Signed: de Puig
l. See l4th sitting, 20th June 1995 (motion agreed to).
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Docunent 1474 2lst June 1995
The stale of the Assembly's intcrpretation and microphone system
MOTION FOR AN ORDER'
tablcd by Lord Finsberg and others
wilh a requestfor urgent procedure
The Assembly,
Placing on record its total anger at the repeated failure of the interpretation and microphone system,
Druemos rHAr rIIE Pnrsnevr oF TIIE Asssr\dgly
Urgently-sullTlg the Managing Dirltor of the suppliers, SAII of Paris, in order that he may apo-
logise qr behalf of SAII for the failures and guarantee thit there will be no furiher problems.
- 
Si_gned: Finyberg, B_aarveld-Schlamnn, Martinez, Fenne4 Fassino, Patnich lipez Henares, Fer-
nandes Marques, Ltapis, Horn
l. See 18th sitting, 22nd June 1995 (urgent procedure agreed to and motion referred to the presidential Committee).
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Document 1475 2lst June 1995
Failure of the Assembly's interpretatian system
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
'
tnbledby Mn Haruly and otherc
wilh a requostfor urgent procedure
The Assembly,
Considering the confounded nuisance arising from the farce revealed by the inability to provide it
with properly functioning interpretation facilities,
1. Succssts ro rtm PnEsneNnAL corraMFrss
That these sporadic suspensions caused by equipment failure should lead to a decision not to call
any further sessions until a retiable arrangement can be guaranteed in the hemicycle or alternative pre-
mises are found, and
2. RseuEsrs trrr PnnsDeNT oF THE AssBvtglv
To issue a full report in explanation of the breakdowns of the interpretation facilities on 21st June
t995.
Signed: Hardy, Antretter, Davis, Dunnachie, Guirado, Jeambrun, Johnston, Marshall, Mackie,
Wray
l. See 18th sitting, 22nd June 1995 (urgent procedure agreed to and motion referred to the Presidential Committee).
3&
l
Document 1476 2lst June 1995
Resumption of French nuchar tests in thc paciftc
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
'
tabled by Sir Russell Johnston
on behalf of the Defence Committee
The Assembly,
(i) 
^ 
N9ti1C t: t.lm June 1995 decision of the President of France to resume France's nuclear tests inthe South Pacific in order to ensure the saf_ety, security and reliability of its Oeienent forces and to
complete current work on the development of aiest simuiation;(ii) Aware that this decision concerns a total of eight tests between September 1995 and the end of May
1996 at the latest;
(iii) Aware that France intends.to sign the comprehe_nsive nuclear test ban treaty 
- 
which is now being
negotiated 
- 
without reservation in the autumn oi 1-9gl;
(iu) 
. 
Noting that in May 1995 all signatories unanimously decided to extend indefinitely the non-proli-feration treaty;
(v) 
. 
Recognising_that only very few specialists have at their disposal the scientific and technical means
needed to assess whether these additional nuclear underground teits are indispensable;(vi) Considering that this autonomous decision was taken notwithstanding the existence of a self-imposed
moratorium on nuclear testing which had been observed by France, Russi"a, the United firgOo- uria ifr"United States since 1992;
(vir.) 
. 
Considering that unilateral decisions on issues which can be considered vital for the defence and
security of Europe could impede the development of a commori European security anJd"i"n;; p;li;y;-
(vlii) Regretting that France has not taken the oppornrnity to hold a fundamental discussion with its Euro-pean partners on a common security and defence policy and the r6le of the French nuclear forces in thatframework;
(ix) 
. 
Considgring that it is increasingly less likely that, within the framework of a common European
::c[ty and defence policy,_nuclear fories would be an asset for the defence and iecurity Jtht;;6*iterritory of only one particular country;
(-r) 
. 
Recalling its Recommendation 564 on the r6le and future of nuclear weapons adopted on 16th June1994:
(xi) Considering thl.this decision ndg.ht encourage those states which are not offrcial nuclear weapon
states, but which are either trying to acquire such weapons or have the ability to urse-Uie tt 
"* 
qri"tfii"proceed with their efforts to possess a nuclear capability;
(xii) Profoundly concerned that France's decision to proceed with nuclear tests has political conse-quences that are damaging to the cohesion of the European policy to promote non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons;
(xiii) Accepting. that France wishes to ensure that its deterrent force is fully effective in advance of its
commitment to-sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but nevertheless considering ttrat its Oicision could crea-
te political conditions which endanger the signature of such a treaty in the au"tumn of tbqO,
Asrs rHe FnBNcu GovrRNurNr
1. To review its decision to proceed with nuclear tests as a gesture of good faith and as evidence of its
commitment to the achievemeni of a worldwide nuclear test b; in autunin 1996;
2. To initiate discussions with the British Government with a view to enabling co-operation on their
nuclear forces and consider in what way these forces can be integrated into a comiron eirropian a;"u.ity
and defence policy.
l. See 18th sitting, 22nd June 1995 (text referred to the presidential Committee).
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Amendment L
Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific
AMENDMENT 1'
tobled by Lord Finsberg and Dame Pegg Fenner
22nd June 195
Signed: Finsberg, F enner
1. Leave out para$aph2 of the motion for a resolution proper.
1. See l8th sitting, 22nd June 1995 (vote postponed in the absence of a quorum)'
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